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万历十五年
万历十五年，亦即公元1587年，在西欧历史上为西班牙舰队全部出动征英的前一年；而在中国，在这平平淡淡的一年中，发生了若干为历史学家所易于忽视的事件。这些事件，表面看来虽似末端小节，但实质上却是以前发生大事的症结，也是将在以后掀起波澜的机缘。在历史学家黄仁宇的眼中，其间的关系因果，恰为历史的重点，而我们的大历史之旅，也自此开始……
本书是黄仁宇名作《万历十五年》的最新中文版本，统一校订全书文字，增收黄仁宇《1619年的辽东战役》等数篇文章，精选黑白和彩色历史图片以及黄仁宇相片、手迹等40多幅，图文相得益彰，采用布面精装形式，是截至目前内容最完善、最丰富的版本。随经典版特别附赠《经典的历程》，揭秘本书中文版传奇故事。
本书是黄仁宇名作《万历十五年》的最新中文版本，统一校订全书文字，增收黄仁宇《1619年的辽东战役》等数篇文章，精选黑白和彩色历史图片以及黄仁宇相片、手迹等40多幅，图文相得益彰，采用布面精装形式，是截至目前内容最完善、最丰富的版本。随经典版特别附赠《经典的历程》，揭秘本书中文版传奇故事。
387 pages, Hardcover
First published September 10, 1982
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October 26, 2020
In 1987, I went to China and visited, among other places, the tomb of the Wanli Emperor near Beijing. It was the only royal tomb open to the public in the Ming Tombs complex at that time. Our Chinese guide led us down a ramp into a subterranean, vaulted chamber clad in white marble. Inside there were thrones carved with dragons and phoenixes, also of the same white marble, and huge blue-and-white porcelain urns. The chamber led into other chambers, just as massive and cold. One contained numerous lacquered boxes of all sizes containing grave-good treasures. The main chamber held the enormous coffins of the emperor himself and two of his consorts. Our guide stopped in front of the royal coffin and told us that the man whose remains it held was ‘the most venal emperor in Chinese history’ and also that his ‘feudal excesses had bled the Chinese people dry’. No doubt he was parroting the official party line at that time, but he made me curious about the Wanli Emperor.
The interesting thing is that he began his almost five-decade reign (one of the longest in Chinese history) as a conscientious young sovereign. Raised by top Mandarins according to strict Confucian principles, the intelligent and sensitive young man was prepared to devote his life to being a model ruler, guided by grand-secretary Chang Chu Cheng. However, Huang tells us, he gradually grew disillusioned with the hypocritical and impersonal nature of the administration that he was the titular head of. By about halfway through his reign, he stopped attending court functions, letting important posts stay vacant and otherwise engaged in a passive-aggressive war against his own ministers.
China’s vast bureaucracy was infinitely more ancient than the emperor and the dynasty that he represented. It was unique in that it was more or less a meritocracy, and that it governed by moral principle. The latter, according to Huang, is the very factor that ultimately led to its collapse. On the one hand, Confucian principles expected the mandarins to serve the people selflessly, to live simply on subsistence wages. On the other hand, the wages were so ridiculously low that most officials had to supplement their incomes by taking advantage of their position. The opportunity for graft and corruption was virtually endless. Huang argues that the most successful officials were not the most honest ones --- who most often than not created more problems because of their overzealousness --- but the ones who could balance the two opposing directions. Shackled to Confucian moral tenets, the judicial system remained ineffective and arbitrary. The army was not organized according to proper military practices and was helpless against Japanese pirates and nomadic marauders. All of these factors eventually led to the collapse of the Ming dynasty in the 17th century. Wanli was not the cause of it but he was a part of a dysfunctional system that was tottering towards its demise.
I wonder if other historians are as lenient to the Wanli Emperor.
The interesting thing is that he began his almost five-decade reign (one of the longest in Chinese history) as a conscientious young sovereign. Raised by top Mandarins according to strict Confucian principles, the intelligent and sensitive young man was prepared to devote his life to being a model ruler, guided by grand-secretary Chang Chu Cheng. However, Huang tells us, he gradually grew disillusioned with the hypocritical and impersonal nature of the administration that he was the titular head of. By about halfway through his reign, he stopped attending court functions, letting important posts stay vacant and otherwise engaged in a passive-aggressive war against his own ministers.
China’s vast bureaucracy was infinitely more ancient than the emperor and the dynasty that he represented. It was unique in that it was more or less a meritocracy, and that it governed by moral principle. The latter, according to Huang, is the very factor that ultimately led to its collapse. On the one hand, Confucian principles expected the mandarins to serve the people selflessly, to live simply on subsistence wages. On the other hand, the wages were so ridiculously low that most officials had to supplement their incomes by taking advantage of their position. The opportunity for graft and corruption was virtually endless. Huang argues that the most successful officials were not the most honest ones --- who most often than not created more problems because of their overzealousness --- but the ones who could balance the two opposing directions. Shackled to Confucian moral tenets, the judicial system remained ineffective and arbitrary. The army was not organized according to proper military practices and was helpless against Japanese pirates and nomadic marauders. All of these factors eventually led to the collapse of the Ming dynasty in the 17th century. Wanli was not the cause of it but he was a part of a dysfunctional system that was tottering towards its demise.
I wonder if other historians are as lenient to the Wanli Emperor.
October 31, 2023
4.5 stars
A fascinating study of the Ming dynasty in the 16th century, focusing on individuals at the highest levels of government—something you routinely see in European histories but which I had not previously read about China. Huang makes extensive use of government records from the time, which given the 1981 publication date and the information available online about his career in the Nationalist Army and subsequent immigration to the U.S., I assume he researched in government archives brought to Taiwan. The records were clearly extensive, including transcripts of entire conversations between the emperor and high-level officials. The book was published by an academic press, and in a sense it’s an academic work—his prose is very concise, meaning a bit on the dense side at times—but it’s free of jargon and tells the story of the era and several prominent men with sufficient interest to appeal to a general audience, provided you accept it won’t be a breezy read.
Despite the title, the book is not really about the year 1587; it uses that as a jumping-off point to tell a broader story about the reign of the Wan-li emperor, and the late Ming period more generally. Several chapters focus on the emperor and his grand-secretaries (responsible for much of the business of the government, though they rarely saw him in person), as well as officials from the bureaucracy and the military. These different perspectives allow the book to explore various issues faced at the time, including those leading to the fall of the dynasty, from the functioning of the court and bureaucracy to business and monetary policy to military tactics to philosophy.
Some tidbits that struck me:
- So many fictional tropes about kings that have proven quite untrue in my reading about later European monarchs were in full force for the late Ming: the emperor raised in isolation from other children, rarely allowed to leave the palace, having regular formal audiences (usually at dawn) with the whole court in attendance, marrying their own subjects (often those of low rank, though their families could get promoted as a result), and being controlled by their advisers. The palace was even full of women taken as a levy as young girls from local towns, to serve the emperor and compete for his attention (most never became his mistresses however, and many later set up housekeeping with palace eunuchs). Of course this was not a novel, however, and all this rigidity resulted from the bureaucratic, ceremonial and ethical context to everything.
- Speaking of barely being allowed out of the palace, the bureaucracy felt very strongly about emperors not accompanying their armies to war. A previous emperor who did so faced massive resistance, from being prevented from passing through the Great Wall by one of his own officials (he had to return to the palace and transfer the official before he could get through), to large-scale peaceful protests by the bureaucracy.
- The bureaucracy itself functioned mostly as a massive HR department, meant to set a moral example. It lacked the technical expertise to really be in charge of anything and so the best it could do was choose the right people for a job. This of course held back development, combined with the fact that it was deeply steeped in the classics as a model. Criminal justice was all about the instincts and reasoning of the officials responsible for it.
- Bureaucrats could submit memorials to the throne whenever they thought something was wrong, and the gutsiest thing they could do was submit papers on the moral failings of the emperor. Some were arrested or publicly beaten (sometimes to death) for this, but it was a way to make one’s name for righteousness. A truly righteous bureaucrat would also be an ascetic, living on the poverty wage of his office rather than accepting bribes, but virtually no one actually did this and one who famously did found himself ineffective, although lauded.
- The army was a distinctly second-class pursuit, and was more capable of putting down peasant rebellions than engaging in proper warfare. A successful general, Ch’i Chi-kuang (given its publication date the book uses the Wade-Giles system of romanization, which sounds pedantic, but if you’re used to seeing Chinese names in pinyin you will notice the difference) made his infantry successful through tactics that made sense to peasant soldiers—including two soldiers in each formation wielding bamboo trees as blocking tactics. Keep in mind we are well into the age of gunpowder here and the same army also used cannon mounted on battle wagons.
- There was no business law, further restricting development, and monetary policy was a mess: at one point the government issued paper money but refused to accept it for taxes, causing its rapid devaluation. Instead currency was silver: not coins, but chunks of silver, which would need to be weighed at every transaction. Because the government didn’t issue these, it also couldn’t control the amount of money in circulation, meaning the rich could hoard it and the poor literally not have access to currency. Predatory mortgages wound up being their only access to credit.
At any rate, I ultimately found this book engaging, readable and formidably smart, although I did struggle with the subjects I usually struggle with (economics, philosophy). Certainly worth a read if you have any interest in the era, or in Chinese history generally.
A fascinating study of the Ming dynasty in the 16th century, focusing on individuals at the highest levels of government—something you routinely see in European histories but which I had not previously read about China. Huang makes extensive use of government records from the time, which given the 1981 publication date and the information available online about his career in the Nationalist Army and subsequent immigration to the U.S., I assume he researched in government archives brought to Taiwan. The records were clearly extensive, including transcripts of entire conversations between the emperor and high-level officials. The book was published by an academic press, and in a sense it’s an academic work—his prose is very concise, meaning a bit on the dense side at times—but it’s free of jargon and tells the story of the era and several prominent men with sufficient interest to appeal to a general audience, provided you accept it won’t be a breezy read.
Despite the title, the book is not really about the year 1587; it uses that as a jumping-off point to tell a broader story about the reign of the Wan-li emperor, and the late Ming period more generally. Several chapters focus on the emperor and his grand-secretaries (responsible for much of the business of the government, though they rarely saw him in person), as well as officials from the bureaucracy and the military. These different perspectives allow the book to explore various issues faced at the time, including those leading to the fall of the dynasty, from the functioning of the court and bureaucracy to business and monetary policy to military tactics to philosophy.
Some tidbits that struck me:
- So many fictional tropes about kings that have proven quite untrue in my reading about later European monarchs were in full force for the late Ming: the emperor raised in isolation from other children, rarely allowed to leave the palace, having regular formal audiences (usually at dawn) with the whole court in attendance, marrying their own subjects (often those of low rank, though their families could get promoted as a result), and being controlled by their advisers. The palace was even full of women taken as a levy as young girls from local towns, to serve the emperor and compete for his attention (most never became his mistresses however, and many later set up housekeeping with palace eunuchs). Of course this was not a novel, however, and all this rigidity resulted from the bureaucratic, ceremonial and ethical context to everything.
- Speaking of barely being allowed out of the palace, the bureaucracy felt very strongly about emperors not accompanying their armies to war. A previous emperor who did so faced massive resistance, from being prevented from passing through the Great Wall by one of his own officials (he had to return to the palace and transfer the official before he could get through), to large-scale peaceful protests by the bureaucracy.
- The bureaucracy itself functioned mostly as a massive HR department, meant to set a moral example. It lacked the technical expertise to really be in charge of anything and so the best it could do was choose the right people for a job. This of course held back development, combined with the fact that it was deeply steeped in the classics as a model. Criminal justice was all about the instincts and reasoning of the officials responsible for it.
- Bureaucrats could submit memorials to the throne whenever they thought something was wrong, and the gutsiest thing they could do was submit papers on the moral failings of the emperor. Some were arrested or publicly beaten (sometimes to death) for this, but it was a way to make one’s name for righteousness. A truly righteous bureaucrat would also be an ascetic, living on the poverty wage of his office rather than accepting bribes, but virtually no one actually did this and one who famously did found himself ineffective, although lauded.
- The army was a distinctly second-class pursuit, and was more capable of putting down peasant rebellions than engaging in proper warfare. A successful general, Ch’i Chi-kuang (given its publication date the book uses the Wade-Giles system of romanization, which sounds pedantic, but if you’re used to seeing Chinese names in pinyin you will notice the difference) made his infantry successful through tactics that made sense to peasant soldiers—including two soldiers in each formation wielding bamboo trees as blocking tactics. Keep in mind we are well into the age of gunpowder here and the same army also used cannon mounted on battle wagons.
- There was no business law, further restricting development, and monetary policy was a mess: at one point the government issued paper money but refused to accept it for taxes, causing its rapid devaluation. Instead currency was silver: not coins, but chunks of silver, which would need to be weighed at every transaction. Because the government didn’t issue these, it also couldn’t control the amount of money in circulation, meaning the rich could hoard it and the poor literally not have access to currency. Predatory mortgages wound up being their only access to credit.
At any rate, I ultimately found this book engaging, readable and formidably smart, although I did struggle with the subjects I usually struggle with (economics, philosophy). Certainly worth a read if you have any interest in the era, or in Chinese history generally.
October 28, 2020
In the autumn of 2020 a Ming dynasty scroll, Ten Views of Lingbi Rock by Wu Bin (1573-1620), sold at auction for a record-breaking $77million. The painting could serve as a metonym for a dynasty famous for its cultural refinement and yet tragic for those unfortunate enough to live through the collapse of a world as they knew it.
Historian Ray Huang examines that collapse through the lives of five historic figures: the Wan-li emperor (reigned from 1572-1620); his childhood tutor and first grand secretary, Chang Chu-cheng (1525-1582); the model scholar-bureaucrat, Han Jui (1514-1587), the pragmatic general Ch'i chi-kuang (1528-1588), and the unorthodox philosopher Li Chih (1527-1602).
Huang does not shy away from big questions like the mechanism of the dynastic cycle. No doubt it was driven by economic factors like land reform, taxation, agrarian catastrophe, weather, and bureaucratic insularity. However, the theme that interests him here is psychological. Cultural assumptions were so ingrained that any attempts at change were futile. Cultural norms were the basis of government legitimacy. Stray from that rigid script even accidentally and irreparable chaos could only result.
The Wan-li emperor, contrary to conventional narratives, was less an autocrat and more a prisoner of his culture. At age nine he underwent the Ceremony of Hats that finalized his status as heir apparent. A few months later he actually ascended the throne. For the next 15 years every minute of his life was governed by mind-numbing ceremonial protocols, prescribed costume changes, and tedious schooling in the Confucian classics and historical records supervised by Tutor Chang. At age 14 he married (the bride was 13). It was yet another ceremonial gesture. By 1587 he was bored and disillusioned. The Confucian values of austerity, devotion to public service and humility were contradicted by reality. He resisted this dehumanizing existence by avoiding public ceremonies, pleading illlness, and relying increasingly on the company of his favorite concubine Lady Cheng. His desire to favor her child for the succession precipitated a troubled ripple in a bureaucracy already destabilized by internal rivalries and insecurity.
Huang pays close attention to the fragile dynastic foundation for legitimacy. While insuring continuity, it foreclosed the option of adaptation. “Ideology worked well in the early years, especially after the dynastic founder, the Hung-wu emperor, systematically destroyed the empire's large landowners and wealthy households and imposed a stringently puritanical standard of living on the rest of the educated elite, insisting that they were civil servants of the general population in the literal sense of the word servant. In an atmosphere of rustic simplicity, the gap between an individual's inner urge for self-gain and his professed moral standards could be minimized, or at least prevented from appearing to be a cause of concern to the administration.” (p.88) By 1572 conditions were infinitely more complex. The country was more populous. The bureaucracy had ballooned from 8,000 positions to around 20,000. Yet, the government's ethos was shackled to the abstract principles of the Four Books and Chu His's compendia and commentaries on Confucianism. Huang asserts that reliance on moral principles precluded a need for rational codification of uniform laws and their consistent application. The example of the scrupulously virtuous and uncorrupted official Hai Jui, no matter how illustrative of a code written 2000 years earlier, was hardly welcomed by the pyramid of scholar-bureaucrats adept at rationalizing their self-interest with the yin yang explanatory model Tutor Chang's successor Shen Shih hsing employed with such finesse.
General Ch'i Chi-kuang was an effective military man – perhaps too effective. His success happened in spite of rather than because of the decentralized government structure. Whether repelling pirates on the southern coast or Mongols in the northern frontier, personnel, supplies, and payrolls had to be cobbled together from a patchwork of local officials, and overlapping jurisdictions. For all his intelligence and organizational acumen, his only legacy was an expanded great wall in order to forestall invasion. Huang laments: “...gone with Ch'i Chi-kuang was our empire's last opportunity to give its armed forces the minimal modernization needed to survive a new era.” (p.188)
Li Chih's downfall came from his intellectual honesty. In 1580 he retired from the civil service. In 1588 he began preparations as a Buddhist novitiate, although he never took the vows. These years of isolation from the social apparatus and subordination to a hierarchic order permitted a close examination of individualism and a novel critique of Chu Hsi's writings. He examined the role of individual intuition in ascertaining reality and from that vantage point questioned the existence of objective reality. With introspection raised as a challenge to social norms, he was going off script. His unorthodoxy was branded as heresy, never mind the flood of other new ideas filtering in to the court through Western contact. Li Chih was imprisoned and committed suicide in 1602. Huang speculates that had he died in 1587 he would have died a much happier man.
The year 1587 both satisfied our longing for a story arc – a “beginning of the end” narrative – and denies us that simplistic notion with a historian's deeper insight: Huang pens an elegant and wistful conclusion to his book. “The year 1587 may seem to be insignificant; nevertheless, it is evident that by that time the limit for the Ming dynasty had already been reached. It no longer mattered whether the ruler was conscientious or irresponsible, whether his chief counselor was enterprising or conformist, whether the generals were resourceful or incompetent, whether the civil officials were honest or corrupt, or whether the leading thinkers were radical or conservative – in the end they all failed to reach fulfillment. Thus our story has a sad conclusion. The annals of the Year of the Pig must go down in history as a chronicle of failure.” (p.221)
NOTES:
Huang uses the Wade-Giles system of transliteration. Conversion tables between Wade-Giles and Pinyin can be found on the internet.
This is an extremely dense book. Although it is well-written, a background in Chinese history is helpful. Without a chronological table, I often had difficulty following the events. However its original perspective made this an interesting read and supplements Jonathan Spence's biography Return to Dragon Mountain; Memories of a Late Ming Man.
Reviews:
by David Lattimore: https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/21/bo...
by Jonathan Spence: https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1981...
Historian Ray Huang examines that collapse through the lives of five historic figures: the Wan-li emperor (reigned from 1572-1620); his childhood tutor and first grand secretary, Chang Chu-cheng (1525-1582); the model scholar-bureaucrat, Han Jui (1514-1587), the pragmatic general Ch'i chi-kuang (1528-1588), and the unorthodox philosopher Li Chih (1527-1602).
Huang does not shy away from big questions like the mechanism of the dynastic cycle. No doubt it was driven by economic factors like land reform, taxation, agrarian catastrophe, weather, and bureaucratic insularity. However, the theme that interests him here is psychological. Cultural assumptions were so ingrained that any attempts at change were futile. Cultural norms were the basis of government legitimacy. Stray from that rigid script even accidentally and irreparable chaos could only result.
The Wan-li emperor, contrary to conventional narratives, was less an autocrat and more a prisoner of his culture. At age nine he underwent the Ceremony of Hats that finalized his status as heir apparent. A few months later he actually ascended the throne. For the next 15 years every minute of his life was governed by mind-numbing ceremonial protocols, prescribed costume changes, and tedious schooling in the Confucian classics and historical records supervised by Tutor Chang. At age 14 he married (the bride was 13). It was yet another ceremonial gesture. By 1587 he was bored and disillusioned. The Confucian values of austerity, devotion to public service and humility were contradicted by reality. He resisted this dehumanizing existence by avoiding public ceremonies, pleading illlness, and relying increasingly on the company of his favorite concubine Lady Cheng. His desire to favor her child for the succession precipitated a troubled ripple in a bureaucracy already destabilized by internal rivalries and insecurity.
Huang pays close attention to the fragile dynastic foundation for legitimacy. While insuring continuity, it foreclosed the option of adaptation. “Ideology worked well in the early years, especially after the dynastic founder, the Hung-wu emperor, systematically destroyed the empire's large landowners and wealthy households and imposed a stringently puritanical standard of living on the rest of the educated elite, insisting that they were civil servants of the general population in the literal sense of the word servant. In an atmosphere of rustic simplicity, the gap between an individual's inner urge for self-gain and his professed moral standards could be minimized, or at least prevented from appearing to be a cause of concern to the administration.” (p.88) By 1572 conditions were infinitely more complex. The country was more populous. The bureaucracy had ballooned from 8,000 positions to around 20,000. Yet, the government's ethos was shackled to the abstract principles of the Four Books and Chu His's compendia and commentaries on Confucianism. Huang asserts that reliance on moral principles precluded a need for rational codification of uniform laws and their consistent application. The example of the scrupulously virtuous and uncorrupted official Hai Jui, no matter how illustrative of a code written 2000 years earlier, was hardly welcomed by the pyramid of scholar-bureaucrats adept at rationalizing their self-interest with the yin yang explanatory model Tutor Chang's successor Shen Shih hsing employed with such finesse.
General Ch'i Chi-kuang was an effective military man – perhaps too effective. His success happened in spite of rather than because of the decentralized government structure. Whether repelling pirates on the southern coast or Mongols in the northern frontier, personnel, supplies, and payrolls had to be cobbled together from a patchwork of local officials, and overlapping jurisdictions. For all his intelligence and organizational acumen, his only legacy was an expanded great wall in order to forestall invasion. Huang laments: “...gone with Ch'i Chi-kuang was our empire's last opportunity to give its armed forces the minimal modernization needed to survive a new era.” (p.188)
Li Chih's downfall came from his intellectual honesty. In 1580 he retired from the civil service. In 1588 he began preparations as a Buddhist novitiate, although he never took the vows. These years of isolation from the social apparatus and subordination to a hierarchic order permitted a close examination of individualism and a novel critique of Chu Hsi's writings. He examined the role of individual intuition in ascertaining reality and from that vantage point questioned the existence of objective reality. With introspection raised as a challenge to social norms, he was going off script. His unorthodoxy was branded as heresy, never mind the flood of other new ideas filtering in to the court through Western contact. Li Chih was imprisoned and committed suicide in 1602. Huang speculates that had he died in 1587 he would have died a much happier man.
The year 1587 both satisfied our longing for a story arc – a “beginning of the end” narrative – and denies us that simplistic notion with a historian's deeper insight: Huang pens an elegant and wistful conclusion to his book. “The year 1587 may seem to be insignificant; nevertheless, it is evident that by that time the limit for the Ming dynasty had already been reached. It no longer mattered whether the ruler was conscientious or irresponsible, whether his chief counselor was enterprising or conformist, whether the generals were resourceful or incompetent, whether the civil officials were honest or corrupt, or whether the leading thinkers were radical or conservative – in the end they all failed to reach fulfillment. Thus our story has a sad conclusion. The annals of the Year of the Pig must go down in history as a chronicle of failure.” (p.221)
NOTES:
Huang uses the Wade-Giles system of transliteration. Conversion tables between Wade-Giles and Pinyin can be found on the internet.
This is an extremely dense book. Although it is well-written, a background in Chinese history is helpful. Without a chronological table, I often had difficulty following the events. However its original perspective made this an interesting read and supplements Jonathan Spence's biography Return to Dragon Mountain; Memories of a Late Ming Man.
Reviews:
by David Lattimore: https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/21/bo...
by Jonathan Spence: https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1981...
May 21, 2018
看过了明朝那些事儿了以后再看万历十五年，心里感受真是复杂极了。从洪武皇帝开朝读起，多少次心潮澎湃，那时候万国来朝的盛况可想而知。以德治国这件事，千百年来曾经使国家凝聚，仁这个很难清楚定义的儒学关键词甚至如今依然是中国人cultural identity里的重要印记。可是明末时，所谓道德已然变成枷锁，制度不可调和的僵化之下，文臣武将也不过戴着镣铐跳舞。明朝那些事儿里处处漫溢着作者对明王朝衰败的扼腕叹息，而万历十五年却用大历史观展示了明朝注定终将灭亡，真是让人难过极了。
以古观今，我们的法律尚未健全，我们的道德却日渐崩坏。还叫人怎么乐观面对呢？
以古观今，我们的法律尚未健全，我们的道德却日渐崩坏。还叫人怎么乐观面对呢？
July 11, 2022
20220711 簡體版2nd read
重讀N+2遍萬曆十五年
發現高中看了十幾遍看到快會背
到現在還是忘得七零八落，嗚嗚
結果說要看的女友還在世間已無張居正...
--
20200422 簡體版1st read
中華版萬曆正文跟學生時代幾乎會背的食貨版內容幾乎完全一樣
只有海瑞買肉少了一個豬字
會買簡體版純粹只是想重看又覺得翻紙本麻煩
但食貨版沒電子書，只好買中華版了
電子書少了作者手跡，不過不是頂重要~
正文沒啥好說的，總之就算到了二十一世紀
儒家文化圈仍然常常上演"萬曆十五年"
最像的地方大概在軍中吧
連我只是個在成功嶺一個月的爽研替
也覺得到處都是"表面即是實質"的荒謬劇
當前鬧得正兇的磐石公主號
也是各種脫離"數目字管理"啊~
最大的驚喜還是在作者跋"我的大歷史觀"
比食貨版多了很多"附匪"言論
然後當然沒有陶希聖的跋
再看番外(?)收的出版延革
"看来作者现代汉语的修养不行”，有些地方“辞不达意”"
這中文版還真的是找捉刀人大幅魔改內容的
而且看了中華版才知道
身為KMT前軍官
黃老第一個想到要出中文版的地方
居然不是"自由中國"
但隨後還是能被黨國元老看中出食貨版
比起充滿波折的英文版
我覺得在開放前夕能夠兩岸都出中文版更是神奇啊
雖然在中國影響很大
台灣也是再版不斷
但歐美漢學界中
黃仁宇似乎不是那麼有名，史觀也不受待見
在中國賣翻應該還是"數目字管理"
深深打動百多年來渴望富強的中國人吧
只是我從高中就聽過一個都市傳說
說大學入歷史系面試只要說出因為此書而嚮往歷史系就NG了
若然則台灣學界也不怎麼喜歡黃的史觀吧
但這樣未免門戶之見太深
至少我國中讀了之後為此多讀了很多書
(雖然要等到大學以後了XD)
翻明史找海瑞買兩斤豬肉的原文
讀回族史論集看"海瑞是否回族"
(見20090814，20100325日記)
找紀效新書對照戚家刀的招式
如果這些都發生在考大學之前
這樣的啟發還不夠嗎?
重讀N+2遍萬曆十五年
發現高中看了十幾遍看到快會背
到現在還是忘得七零八落，嗚嗚
結果說要看的女友還在世間已無張居正...
--
20200422 簡體版1st read
中華版萬曆正文跟學生時代幾乎會背的食貨版內容幾乎完全一樣
只有海瑞買肉少了一個豬字
會買簡體版純粹只是想重看又覺得翻紙本麻煩
但食貨版沒電子書，只好買中華版了
電子書少了作者手跡，不過不是頂重要~
正文沒啥好說的，總之就算到了二十一世紀
儒家文化圈仍然常常上演"萬曆十五年"
最像的地方大概在軍中吧
連我只是個在成功嶺一個月的爽研替
也覺得到處都是"表面即是實質"的荒謬劇
當前鬧得正兇的磐石公主號
也是各種脫離"數目字管理"啊~
最大的驚喜還是在作者跋"我的大歷史觀"
比食貨版多了很多"附匪"言論
然後當然沒有陶希聖的跋
再看番外(?)收的出版延革
"看来作者现代汉语的修养不行”，有些地方“辞不达意”"
這中文版還真的是找捉刀人大幅魔改內容的
而且看了中華版才知道
身為KMT前軍官
黃老第一個想到要出中文版的地方
居然不是"自由中國"
但隨後還是能被黨國元老看中出食貨版
比起充滿波折的英文版
我覺得在開放前夕能夠兩岸都出中文版更是神奇啊
雖然在中國影響很大
台灣也是再版不斷
但歐美漢學界中
黃仁宇似乎不是那麼有名，史觀也不受待見
在中國賣翻應該還是"數目字管理"
深深打動百多年來渴望富強的中國人吧
只是我從高中就聽過一個都市傳說
說大學入歷史系面試只要說出因為此書而嚮往歷史系就NG了
若然則台灣學界也不怎麼喜歡黃的史觀吧
但這樣未免門戶之見太深
至少我國中讀了之後為此多讀了很多書
(雖然要等到大學以後了XD)
翻明史找海瑞買兩斤豬肉的原文
讀回族史論集看"海瑞是否回族"
(見20090814，20100325日記)
找紀效新書對照戚家刀的招式
如果這些都發生在考大學之前
這樣的啟發還不夠嗎?
September 3, 2016
It's my first time writing Book Review on Internet, and first time writing in English. Well, it worth for me doing so, but forgive my poor English level, as well as many logical mistakes in this comment.
After I closing the book eventually, all of contents gather with a sentence emerging in my heart "the Ming dynasty fell for poor practical laws with little maneuverability, relying on ethics and morality excessively."
Chinese tradition culture usually confuse foreigners as well as Morden Chinese especially people living in western culture because of deep gap in many aspects such as values, economical policy, method of development and so on. But we can generalize some essential or integral factors that are dominated in generating differences. The book offer us a angle to analyze the invisible reasons resulting in the consequence behind visible events in history in Ming dynasty. The author cited many ancient books to prove his opinions in the book.
It can be first step for people who want to research the dynasty of Ming or people who are interested in history of Ming. Furthermore, the book can also help dispel some misunderstanding or confusion for Chinese traditions history.
After I closing the book eventually, all of contents gather with a sentence emerging in my heart "the Ming dynasty fell for poor practical laws with little maneuverability, relying on ethics and morality excessively."
Chinese tradition culture usually confuse foreigners as well as Morden Chinese especially people living in western culture because of deep gap in many aspects such as values, economical policy, method of development and so on. But we can generalize some essential or integral factors that are dominated in generating differences. The book offer us a angle to analyze the invisible reasons resulting in the consequence behind visible events in history in Ming dynasty. The author cited many ancient books to prove his opinions in the book.
It can be first step for people who want to research the dynasty of Ming or people who are interested in history of Ming. Furthermore, the book can also help dispel some misunderstanding or confusion for Chinese traditions history.
December 3, 2013
"Part of Wan-li's failure was that he was too intelligent and sensitive to occupy the dragon seat. The more he gained an insight into its apparatus the more skeptical he became. He began to realize that he was less the Ruler of All Men than a prisoner of the Forbidden City." Pg. 93
This sums up the tragedy of this book. Huang offers profiles of not only the Wan-li emperor, but several office-holders as well. In each case, he assesses their failures, not necessarily as causes of the fall of the Ming Dynasty, but certainly indicative of it. He criticizes the traditionalism of the literary bureaucracy, particularly in that it was incapable of addressing any real problems facing the empire, too concerned were they with maintaining the facade of moral leadership. He paints this faceless mass he calls the "officials" as an entity forever spewing petty memoranda and petitions for breaches of decorum.
It must be said that his prose is dreadful. The writing, especially regarding the officials, plods along as if you too are captive right alongside Wan-li. I think it would have done with a touch of the vermilion brush. But that aside, there are some very interesting characters, especially Ch'i Chi-Kuang, the energetic general who helped stave off the pirate invasions that no one else seemed capable of confronting. Also Hai Jui, who was a moralist whipping boy for the rest of the literati because of his "eccentricity", here defined as refusing to take money on the side and lobbying for reforms protecting peasants. That officials so often said one thing and did another was the frustration of all the profiled figures. The emperor was a miserable man of wasted ability, the general was disdained as part of a military culture that officials would do everything to keep down, even as Mongols, pirates, and bandits held sway over the provinces, and Hai, who reminded me of Cato the Younger, was a truly devout Confucian -- a little TOO devout. There are other figures, though these three stood out by far the most, all of which are touched by the ghost of Chang Chu-Cheng, the morally ambiguous first grand secretary.
Don't read this expecting any glimmers of hope. It felt as Huang himself was very personally invested in the failings of the last great dynasty (he doesn't seem to count the Qing), and as I read it I couldn't help but feel that same bitterness and anger about a system held up only by its own dull inertia.
This sums up the tragedy of this book. Huang offers profiles of not only the Wan-li emperor, but several office-holders as well. In each case, he assesses their failures, not necessarily as causes of the fall of the Ming Dynasty, but certainly indicative of it. He criticizes the traditionalism of the literary bureaucracy, particularly in that it was incapable of addressing any real problems facing the empire, too concerned were they with maintaining the facade of moral leadership. He paints this faceless mass he calls the "officials" as an entity forever spewing petty memoranda and petitions for breaches of decorum.
It must be said that his prose is dreadful. The writing, especially regarding the officials, plods along as if you too are captive right alongside Wan-li. I think it would have done with a touch of the vermilion brush. But that aside, there are some very interesting characters, especially Ch'i Chi-Kuang, the energetic general who helped stave off the pirate invasions that no one else seemed capable of confronting. Also Hai Jui, who was a moralist whipping boy for the rest of the literati because of his "eccentricity", here defined as refusing to take money on the side and lobbying for reforms protecting peasants. That officials so often said one thing and did another was the frustration of all the profiled figures. The emperor was a miserable man of wasted ability, the general was disdained as part of a military culture that officials would do everything to keep down, even as Mongols, pirates, and bandits held sway over the provinces, and Hai, who reminded me of Cato the Younger, was a truly devout Confucian -- a little TOO devout. There are other figures, though these three stood out by far the most, all of which are touched by the ghost of Chang Chu-Cheng, the morally ambiguous first grand secretary.
Don't read this expecting any glimmers of hope. It felt as Huang himself was very personally invested in the failings of the last great dynasty (he doesn't seem to count the Qing), and as I read it I couldn't help but feel that same bitterness and anger about a system held up only by its own dull inertia.
August 31, 2020
The first time I read this book was almost 3 years ago. Then I have been picking some chapters to read. There is never any such thing as absolute truth, let alone the history of the ming dynasty. Therefore, insightful historical books are all deconstructions of history from the author's own perspective. Actually, if you want to know more about ming dynasty history, you have to put in the effort.
August 7, 2024
- 久聞此書大名，終於拜讀，果真是好書喲。微觀歷史，以小見大，而且精彩好讀，任何喜歡讀歷史的人都不應錯過。
- 此書對我來說更重要的是，它提醒我們了解歷史的意義。就個體而言，讀歷史與其說是從過往汲取教訓，不如說它教曉我們學會觀看世界的角度，而這個角度是恆常都在學習與調度的。
- 另外特別想說，這本書也讓我重新認識了李贄。中六時讀過李贄的《童心說》，當時的我無法理解，不管是他還是他對儒家／士大夫思想的看法。多年以後的現在，自己是離中國文學更遙遠了，但這位出現在《萬曆十五年》的歷史人物，如今對他是多了一分理解——處在一個注定無有作為的時代，追求宛如異端的自由，對事對人對己都抱以批判性思考，命還不短。這樣的人，怎能不注定不成為悲劇？
- 此書對我來說更重要的是，它提醒我們了解歷史的意義。就個體而言，讀歷史與其說是從過往汲取教訓，不如說它教曉我們學會觀看世界的角度，而這個角度是恆常都在學習與調度的。
- 另外特別想說，這本書也讓我重新認識了李贄。中六時讀過李贄的《童心說》，當時的我無法理解，不管是他還是他對儒家／士大夫思想的看法。多年以後的現在，自己是離中國文學更遙遠了，但這位出現在《萬曆十五年》的歷史人物，如今對他是多了一分理解——處在一個注定無有作為的時代，追求宛如異端的自由，對事對人對己都抱以批判性思考，命還不短。這樣的人，怎能不注定不成為悲劇？
March 30, 2015
This is a tour de force of concentrated historical writing, and among the most original in any field of history that I can think of. Equivalents of the same vintage (1980s) and comparable method (micro history) that come to mind are Carlo Ginzburg's The Cheese and the Worms, or Robert Darnton's The Great Cat Massacre. Without being monumental in size, 1587 nonetheless achieves a sort of monumental significance, aiming for nothing short of an explanation of the decline of one of China's most splendid dynasties in little more than 200 pages. Instead of an abstract, bloodless survey, or a monograph of overwhelming detail, 1587 makes its argument within the framework of six biographical sketches, all intersecting around the pivotal year 1587. That it does this in elegant prose that effortlessly merges individual human experience with abstract historical forces, is all the more impressive. Huang sets up the lives of six late Ming notables, from the Wan-Li Emperor himself to the emperor's generals, grand secretaries, and renegade literati, in such a way that the frustrations experienced by each in attempting to fulfill their official responsibilities help to illustrate the limitations of the entire Ming social order. And these frustrations, which Huang attributes to the nature of the imperial bureaucracy itself and its inability to adapt to ever more complex social circumstances, point not only to the fall of the Ming, which is Huang's explicit concern, but to the eventual eclipse of China by the western powers. A beautiful, sophisticated book that looks at the way the best human talent can be stymied by the arrangement of inherited institutions, it is also not without relevance to anyone interested in how a society can chose to adapt, or be frustrated in adapting, to radically new challenges.
May 22, 2009
I have to preface this book by saying it's not a joke. That's the real title and it's a real look at the social history of China's Ming Dynasty.
I read this in college and it still sticks with me. It's like reading the diary of someone who is not important but is very detail oriented. If you get past some of the tedious aspects of this book, you can capture very interesting tidbits of the daily life of the Chinese 422 years ago.
I read this in college and it still sticks with me. It's like reading the diary of someone who is not important but is very detail oriented. If you get past some of the tedious aspects of this book, you can capture very interesting tidbits of the daily life of the Chinese 422 years ago.
September 5, 2022
I don’t remember clearly how many times I have re-read this book. But every time I finished the reading, the pleasure, knowledgeable, and thinking-provoking are all the same. Anyone who wants to get the insights about China history and its government, should read this book.
August 25, 2024
終於看完了. 看得有點心累的一本書.
所有的根源在於, 極權體制很仰賴頂端帝王的能力吧. 帝王能力不足以控制近臣&平衡勢力, 往下就是文官系統的失能, 一層一層的崩潰下去...但源頭無法解決, 因為帝王就是帝王! 嗯...真是無解......尤其是在中國這種幅員廣大, 民風各異的拼湊型國家更是鞭長莫及.
幅員廣大的國家到底該怎麼治理呢? 像美國那種各洲自治會比較好嗎...又或是走大英帝國的憲政呢? 雖然說我不懂養個橡皮圖章有甚麼好處, 但英國人是很自豪就是了......但感覺至少當頂端的人默默的崩潰的時候, 該要有方法來解套啊~~
所有的根源在於, 極權體制很仰賴頂端帝王的能力吧. 帝王能力不足以控制近臣&平衡勢力, 往下就是文官系統的失能, 一層一層的崩潰下去...但源頭無法解決, 因為帝王就是帝王! 嗯...真是無解......尤其是在中國這種幅員廣大, 民風各異的拼湊型國家更是鞭長莫及.
幅員廣大的國家到底該怎麼治理呢? 像美國那種各洲自治會比較好嗎...又或是走大英帝國的憲政呢? 雖然說我不懂養個橡皮圖章有甚麼好處, 但英國人是很自豪就是了......但感覺至少當頂端的人默默的崩潰的時候, 該要有方法來解套啊~~
December 11, 2017
Amusingly, the original English version of this book is criticised by some reviewers here for having a very dull prose style - one even ventured that it 'could have done with a touch of the vermillion'. That is not something that needs to be said of Professor Huang's Chinese edition! Wading through the chengyu laden paragraphs and often extremely long sentences I felt that I could do with a machete, or just a greater ability to appreciate as opposed to merely survive dense, written, quasi-poetic, allusive Chinese prose.
Taking a key figure from the Chinese elite of the late sixteenth century as the focus of each chapter, the first being the unfortunate Wanli Emperor himself (then walking us through administrators, politicians, a military hero, and ending up with a dissolute philosopher who died a prisoner of conscience), Professor Huang paints a vivid, if somewhat repetitive, picture (can a picture be repetitive?) of Ming intellectual and administrative life.
The reader marvels at the complexity of this pre-modern bureaucracy, the power of the officials, especially when acting in concert, over the Son of Heaven, the enfeebled military apparatus, the ubiquity of the formality of the written word, and the survival of the Ming government and society in the face of its monumental incompetence and unfitness for the task. (As Huang has it this might be summed up as a most unfortunate combination of tax demands pegged to out of date data and woefully inadequate to finance the public works required, corruption and graft literally as a way of life for officials, and inflexible thinking and paradigms as a virtue.) The paradox is quite something: awe-inspiring yet ridiculous. Rather like the tragic figure of Wanli, who dedicated himself to decades of inactivity and stubborn refusal to engage with his responsibilities after the failure of his twentysomething enthusiastic personal schemes for reform (they didn't get off the ground because of resistance from the system) and the deaths or forced retirement of several friends (guardian, regent, tutor, lover) at the instigation of other bureaucrats and eunuch factions. A pique that is awe-inspiring and ridiculous and faintly noble: the very epitome of standing on ceremony... ;-)
Taking a key figure from the Chinese elite of the late sixteenth century as the focus of each chapter, the first being the unfortunate Wanli Emperor himself (then walking us through administrators, politicians, a military hero, and ending up with a dissolute philosopher who died a prisoner of conscience), Professor Huang paints a vivid, if somewhat repetitive, picture (can a picture be repetitive?) of Ming intellectual and administrative life.
The reader marvels at the complexity of this pre-modern bureaucracy, the power of the officials, especially when acting in concert, over the Son of Heaven, the enfeebled military apparatus, the ubiquity of the formality of the written word, and the survival of the Ming government and society in the face of its monumental incompetence and unfitness for the task. (As Huang has it this might be summed up as a most unfortunate combination of tax demands pegged to out of date data and woefully inadequate to finance the public works required, corruption and graft literally as a way of life for officials, and inflexible thinking and paradigms as a virtue.) The paradox is quite something: awe-inspiring yet ridiculous. Rather like the tragic figure of Wanli, who dedicated himself to decades of inactivity and stubborn refusal to engage with his responsibilities after the failure of his twentysomething enthusiastic personal schemes for reform (they didn't get off the ground because of resistance from the system) and the deaths or forced retirement of several friends (guardian, regent, tutor, lover) at the instigation of other bureaucrats and eunuch factions. A pique that is awe-inspiring and ridiculous and faintly noble: the very epitome of standing on ceremony... ;-)
August 19, 2020
Another review here called this history "novelistic" and I admit that's how I read it. I knew nothing about Chinese history; from my perspective as an outsider, Huang explained just enough to help me glimpse the meaning of events (or, one possible meaning) without bogging me down in abstractions, internecine academic battles, or weedy detail. Like "Hamlet," it's about people in the wrong genre or the wrong role. Like "The Wire," this is a story about the complex life of systems, the ways institutions express meaning while constraining action. (And people always find some way to subvert the meanings institutions attempt to embody--subversions which themselves often prolong the life of an overelaborate institution.) I don't know how it reads to those who know more, but as an introduction to a world of discipline and decadence, I can't imagine how it could be better.
August 1, 2019
Simply an essential book if you want to understand how the Chinese empire was governed and what it felt like; presents a picture of Confucian governance in the Ming dynasty that gives a very vivid feeling for how it all worked. And it reads like a novel, with a real once-live emperor as the main character and an ensemble of interesting bureaucrats as supporting cast.
November 7, 2016
When this history was first published no one in academia knew what to do with it -- at once totally deadpan and novelistic. A hidden gem.
November 25, 2019
虚室生白，吉祥止止。
December 31, 2025
I read the Chinese version, translated by the author himself. This book is a fascinating study of the ossification of Chinese society in the 16th century, which set the scene for the centur(ies) of humiliation that came later.
Two things stood out to me.
First, I had no idea that Ming-era military was so inefficient. No wonder a Japanese paramilitary group numbering, say, 50 people (倭寇) could land in Fujian and occupy swathes of territory all the way to Zhejiang. The Chinese armies, based locally, (卫所）had to rely on supplies - including food and weapons - from different nearby towns, not from a central authority. This is the polar opposite of how I had understood ancient Chinese societies to be organised. I didn't know that despite having centralised power the central government had so little actual, technical expertise in managing the country.
Second, I knew that Chinese society was not ruled by law but people, but the book presented a compelling account of how that led to an inefficient, backward, and insular society (that was ripe for conquering!). The author's view was that the most advanced societies of the day (Venice, the Netherlands, England...) developed via commerce, and more specifically, via laws that were developed and adapted for commercial intercourse.
Overall a really good and informative read. The author himself started out as an academic specialising in the finances of the Ming dynasty so may have brought a lot of the ideas he developed then into the book. In particular he was very keen on whether a country could be "mathematically managed" (数字管理). I'm no historian and his definitely a valid - and interesting - perspective.
Two things stood out to me.
First, I had no idea that Ming-era military was so inefficient. No wonder a Japanese paramilitary group numbering, say, 50 people (倭寇) could land in Fujian and occupy swathes of territory all the way to Zhejiang. The Chinese armies, based locally, (卫所）had to rely on supplies - including food and weapons - from different nearby towns, not from a central authority. This is the polar opposite of how I had understood ancient Chinese societies to be organised. I didn't know that despite having centralised power the central government had so little actual, technical expertise in managing the country.
Second, I knew that Chinese society was not ruled by law but people, but the book presented a compelling account of how that led to an inefficient, backward, and insular society (that was ripe for conquering!). The author's view was that the most advanced societies of the day (Venice, the Netherlands, England...) developed via commerce, and more specifically, via laws that were developed and adapted for commercial intercourse.
Overall a really good and informative read. The author himself started out as an academic specialising in the finances of the Ming dynasty so may have brought a lot of the ideas he developed then into the book. In particular he was very keen on whether a country could be "mathematically managed" (数字管理). I'm no historian and his definitely a valid - and interesting - perspective.
March 9, 2024
全书围绕着六个人展开叙述，万历、张居正、申时行、海瑞、戚继光和李贽。这些人或生而为九五至尊、手握寰宇，或曾位极人臣、权倾天下，或名噪一时、万人敬仰，又或入文出武、战功赫赫。但是每个人也都是无奈的。
万历九岁登基，他也曾精神焕发、励精图治，想成为一代明君，开启中兴盛世。然而他虽贵为天子，却也是人。这天下人却只把他当成一个活着的祖宗、一个无上权威的容器。在他登位第十年，还没等他从最敬爱的老师的逝世的悲痛中走出去，他却惊愕地发现自己只是个不停旋转在老师手上的陀螺、一个虚幻谎言世界中的木偶。他手握天下权柄，却在强大的文官集团的压力下不得自由。他最爱的女人被当作是妖女乱世，他最爱的儿子当不了太子。他也有过抗争，但他人生中某种巨大的遗憾可能正源于他足够聪慧却不够坚强。最终他自禁深宫三十年，死后也不能和那个心爱的女人并肩长眠，窒息于命运的残酷。
张居正或许曾经是最有机会改变明朝命运的人。他实行考成法，推行一条鞭法，促成万历中兴。然而天不假年，他五十七岁即撒手人寰，所有改革几乎皆尽化为泡影。他也是复杂的，是阴阳共存的。他有功在社稷的阳面，也有贪滥僭奢的阴面。最终灰飞烟灭，功过只能留与后人评说。
申时行是位温和的首辅，他希望成为皇帝与文官集团间的润滑剂，让这个庞大帝国的统治平稳地延续下去。然而人力终有尽时，他不幸陷于国本之争的泥沼中，夹于皇帝和文官集团之前不得动弹，难以喘息。最终一纸公之于众的密呈成了最后一个稻草，他的首辅生涯再无法延续，只能在苏州的家中看着帝臣两极逐渐崩离。好在他或许在山水之中达成了与自己的和解，洞悉了命运的无奈，也再不会为此遗憾。
如果说人都有阴阳，可能海瑞的阳比起他的阴太过显眼。他似乎是在那个被道德统治下的社会中的道德模范，得到了百姓的敬仰，满朝文官甚至是皇上的“尊重”。然而他力图遵循太祖旧制的努力注定是徒劳。他似乎也没有足以匹配自己高尚道德的认知与能力。他崇高的精神道德标准没办法帮助他成为一个特别有用的人。他成为了一个道德上的图腾，被高高供起，却不得施展自己的抱负。终于在万历十五年的岁暮，他或许在上天的安排下得到了解脱。
戚继光在这个极度重文轻武的时代走到了武官能走到的最高处。他南却倭寇，北镇蓟州，刊著兵书。他足够灵活，但是他也没有办法摆脱这个时代的局限性，没能有选择的自由。在缺乏统一后勤支持的情况下，他的军队没有办法获得精良的武器补给，没有办法征集到足够的精兵良将。他在蓟州精心研究的战术终究因为没能获准作大规模的主动出击而未曾有用武之地。最终，因为他在文官势力中的支持者谭纶和张居正的相继离世，他也只能在生命中的最后几年坠入寂寞和凄凉。
李贽是一个渴望自由的人。在最官运亨通的时候，他剃度出家，著书立说。他希望百千年后自己的文字能在经筵上被诵读，成为取士的标准。然而在当时的社会背景下，他也没办法摆脱自幼诵读的儒学的制肘。他或许能看到问题，但也没办法创造出完整自洽的学说来解决问题，只得困于苦闷。最终他在自刎后的两天受尽折磨，终于脱离苦海。
全书以对六位人物一生的探寻，表达对当时社会制度的批评与反思。在一个大一统的农业社会，我们的帝国是如何陷于自身古老而松散的社会组织，从而失去了拥抱现代化技术和制度的可能性。万历十五年是西班牙舰队全部出动征英的前一年，而我们的帝国的命运却已经逐渐滑向深渊。书中的六个人大多已经是很杰出的人物，是最顶尖的知识分子或者是最运筹帷幄的将军。可见在历史的趋势面前，一个人是多么的渺小；在没有足够外力的情况下，改变是多么的困难。
最后，以书的结尾中的一段话作为结尾：
1587年，是为万历十五年，岁次丁亥，表面上似乎是四海升平，无事可记，实际上我们的大名帝国却已经走到了他发展的尽头。在这个时候，皇帝的励精图治或者宴安耽乐，首辅的独裁或者调和，高级将领的富于创造或者习于苟安，文官的廉洁奉工或者贪污舞弊，思想家的极端进步或者绝对保守，最后的结果，都是无分善恶，统统不能在事业上取得有意义的发展，有的身败，有的名裂，有的则身败而兼名裂。
万历九岁登基，他也曾精神焕发、励精图治，想成为一代明君，开启中兴盛世。然而他虽贵为天子，却也是人。这天下人却只把他当成一个活着的祖宗、一个无上权威的容器。在他登位第十年，还没等他从最敬爱的老师的逝世的悲痛中走出去，他却惊愕地发现自己只是个不停旋转在老师手上的陀螺、一个虚幻谎言世界中的木偶。他手握天下权柄，却在强大的文官集团的压力下不得自由。他最爱的女人被当作是妖女乱世，他最爱的儿子当不了太子。他也有过抗争，但他人生中某种巨大的遗憾可能正源于他足够聪慧却不够坚强。最终他自禁深宫三十年，死后也不能和那个心爱的女人并肩长眠，窒息于命运的残酷。
张居正或许曾经是最有机会改变明朝命运的人。他实行考成法，推行一条鞭法，促成万历中兴。然而天不假年，他五十七岁即撒手人寰，所有改革几乎皆尽化为泡影。他也是复杂的，是阴阳共存的。他有功在社稷的阳面，也有贪滥僭奢的阴面。最终灰飞烟灭，功过只能留与后人评说。
申时行是位温和的首辅，他希望成为皇帝与文官集团间的润滑剂，让这个庞大帝国的统治平稳地延续下去。然而人力终有尽时，他不幸陷于国本之争的泥沼中，夹于皇帝和文官集团之前不得动弹，难以喘息。最终一纸公之于众的密呈成了最后一个稻草，他的首辅生涯再无法延续，只能在苏州的家中看着帝臣两极逐渐崩离。好在他或许在山水之中达成了与自己的和解，洞悉了命运的无奈，也再不会为此遗憾。
如果说人都有阴阳，可能海瑞的阳比起他的阴太过显眼。他似乎是在那个被道德统治下的社会中的道德模范，得到了百姓的敬仰，满朝文官甚至是皇上的“尊重”。然而他力图遵循太祖旧制的努力注定是徒劳。他似乎也没有足以匹配自己高尚道德的认知与能力。他崇高的精神道德标准没办法帮助他成为一个特别有用的人。他成为了一个道德上的图腾，被高高供起，却不得施展自己的抱负。终于在万历十五年的岁暮，他或许在上天的安排下得到了解脱。
戚继光在这个极度重文轻武的时代走到了武官能走到的最高处。他南却倭寇，北镇蓟州，刊著兵书。他足够灵活，但是他也没有办法摆脱这个时代的局限性，没能有选择的自由。在缺乏统一后勤支持的情况下，他的军队没有办法获得精良的武器补给，没有办法征集到足够的精兵良将。他在蓟州精心研究的战术终究因为没能获准作大规模的主动出击而未曾有用武之地。最终，因为他在文官势力中的支持者谭纶和张居正的相继离世，他也只能在生命中的最后几年坠入寂寞和凄凉。
李贽是一个渴望自由的人。在最官运亨通的时候，他剃度出家，著书立说。他希望百千年后自己的文字能在经筵上被诵读，成为取士的标准。然而在当时的社会背景下，他也没办法摆脱自幼诵读的儒学的制肘。他或许能看到问题，但也没办法创造出完整自洽的学说来解决问题，只得困于苦闷。最终他在自刎后的两天受尽折磨，终于脱离苦海。
全书以对六位人物一生的探寻，表达对当时社会制度的批评与反思。在一个大一统的农业社会，我们的帝国是如何陷于自身古老而松散的社会组织，从而失去了拥抱现代化技术和制度的可能性。万历十五年是西班牙舰队全部出动征英的前一年，而我们的帝国的命运却已经逐渐滑向深渊。书中的六个人大多已经是很杰出的人物，是最顶尖的知识分子或者是最运筹帷幄的将军。可见在历史的趋势面前，一个人是多么的渺小；在没有足够外力的情况下，改变是多么的困难。
最后，以书的结尾中的一段话作为结尾：
1587年，是为万历十五年，岁次丁亥，表面上似乎是四海升平，无事可记，实际上我们的大名帝国却已经走到了他发展的尽头。在这个时候，皇帝的励精图治或者宴安耽乐，首辅的独裁或者调和，高级将领的富于创造或者习于苟安，文官的廉洁奉工或者贪污舞弊，思想家的极端进步或者绝对保守，最后的结果，都是无分善恶，统统不能在事业上取得有意义的发展，有的身败，有的名裂，有的则身败而兼名裂。
March 10, 2023
Peter Hessler recommended 1587, A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline at the end of his book River Town: Two Years on the Yangtze. I enjoyed River Town so much I thought 1587 would also be interesting.
The structure of the book 1587 is good enough; Ray Huang selects one year during the Ming Dynasty and tells us its history by describing the lives of several significant players at the time: the young emperor, a general, a bureaucrat, a philosopher etc. The problem is Ray Huang is not much of a writer and as a result the book just plods along.
The structure of the book 1587 is good enough; Ray Huang selects one year during the Ming Dynasty and tells us its history by describing the lives of several significant players at the time: the young emperor, a general, a bureaucrat, a philosopher etc. The problem is Ray Huang is not much of a writer and as a result the book just plods along.
May 7, 2012
There's some interesting information here, and the overall theme of the power of the Chinese bureaucracy is well explored. But I found the organization at times confusing, and the writing style often turgid. I read this after seeing it recommended by Peter Hessler in the afterward to Rivertown. I've discovered a number of good books thanks to Hessler, but I was not captivated by this one.
February 18, 2022
这本书表面上写万历皇帝执政第15年，也就是公元1587年的事情，其实通过了这个基石向前往后梳理了一个王朝的掌权脉络。张居正和申时行这两章披露了这个王朝的集权统治者是怎么运筹帷幄怎么审时度势的。这两章我非常喜欢，我觉得写明了统治者的考量、掣肘和这个朝代的“道德”对统治的把控和障碍。但这两章之后的五章，只不过是按照这两章进行拓展延伸，详细描述了这个朝代进行到万历年间，弊端已经积重难返。思想上的互相矛盾，执政上的种种掣肘，以及武力方面的缺陷，令它气数将尽。所以后面几张我读得越来越疲惫，因为在我看来就是车轱辘话来回说， 简而言之就是两个字：不行。所以我不明白为啥要写那么多章，其实后面那些可以言简意赅一带而过……
October 2, 2008
One of the most insightful pieces on Ming Dynasty.
March 19, 2022
By focusing on its state in one unexceptional year, and on a few key personalities, this book presents the senescence of the Ming Dynasty. The emperor was surrounded by a vast homogeneous and sclerotic literary bureaucracy that would silently resist any bold new initiative. Eventually he gave up. The bureaucracy operated by appeal to Confucian ideas of good and evil, and by exhortations to virtue, with little in the way of codified law, especially in the commercial area. "The body of tenets that Confucius and Mencius had intended some two thousand years earlier to inspire and lead, became an instrument for repressive conformity" (p. 210).
Society did not respect industry or trade. For a rising family, the only ways to advance were farming and officeholding. The latter required great sacrifices from one generation to allow the next the leisure to study for the civil service exams. (Working in academia, I believe I have observed this tendency still operating in some families of Chinese heritage.)
Amazingly, even the imperial army was inefficient, poorly organized, and weak, even if potentially huge.
Society did not respect industry or trade. For a rising family, the only ways to advance were farming and officeholding. The latter required great sacrifices from one generation to allow the next the leisure to study for the civil service exams. (Working in academia, I believe I have observed this tendency still operating in some families of Chinese heritage.)
Amazingly, even the imperial army was inefficient, poorly organized, and weak, even if potentially huge.
October 16, 2023
A book about the end of empire. The key insight is that a system in decline can lack the mechanisms necessary to fix itself, even though many involved are aware of the decline and have potential solutions. In the case of Ming China, this was the corruption and inefficacy of the scholar-gentry class of bureaucrats. Its members, by and large, fought over advancement and wealth, while competence and ability to affect change was not rewarded or even frowned upon. Any attempts to fix the system were prevented by the weight of inertia and official disapproval, often for logical-sounding reasons- a general who reforms the army could topple the emperor, an official who wants to reform the legal system is going against something that's worked for thousands of years. And the country sleepwalked to its end.
May 16, 2020
048-1587, a Year of No Significance-Ray Huang-History-1981
Barack
—— “The world has been in peace for a long time. Some things that happened this year may seem to be small, but in fact, it is the crux of the big events that occurred before, and it is also the opportunity that will make waves in the future.”
The first edition of "A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline" was published in 1981 as a history book. It analyzes some important events during the Wanli years that led the Ming Empire to decline, as well as some of the core historical figures of this period.
Ray Huang, was born in Changsha, Hunan in 1918, and died in 2000. He studied at the Department of Electrical Engineering, School of Science, Nankai University, the US Army Staff University, and the University of Michigan. Representative works: "1587, a Year of No Significance", "Chinese History", "Memoirs of Ray Huang", etc.
Zhu Yijun, born in 1563, died in 1620. He ascended the throne in 1572 and reigned for 48 years. He is called as the Emperor Shenzong.
The fifteen years of the Wanli period is the year 1587 of the Gregorian calendar. A lot of seemingly insignificant things happened this year. The emperor Wanli, who had misrepresented the dynasty for several years, was going to hold a luncheon ceremony.
It has been 4 years since Shen Shixing was the first assistant, and he managed the stability of the personnel. In this Beijing inspection, only 33 of the officials from Jinshi were demoted or removed.
At this time, the dispute over the reserve continued to deteriorate. Hai Rui died. Qi Jiguang died. The following year, Li Zhi shaved his hair to be a monk. From the prime minister to the military commander, all have their helplessness and persistence.
Wanli has remained lazy for decades, without going to the office for decades, and don’t fill in the lacking officials. The stalemate with the civil servants of the entire empire for ten years for the fight of the reserve.
He became an emperor when he was 9 years old, and he relied on Zhang Juzheng. However, in the anti-Zhang craze after Zhang Juzheng 's death, he discovered that the first assistant he had relied on from an early age had an unknown side, and the young emperor couldn't have a deep shock in his heart. He began to deeply doubt these civil servants who are full of "benevolence, morality, and morality", but also have different words and deeds.
Wanli also tried hard to cure, but the imperial conspiracy was criticized by the literary minister, and he was strongly prevented from leaving the capital. Even the matter of establishing the heir seemed to be constrained, and he could not help being discouraged, trying to seek "ruthlessness".
It has been more than 200 years since Hongwu laid the foundation of the Ming Dynasty. The civil servant group has reached its peak. The emperor ’s every move has a reference. If the emperor exceeds the limit, he will inevitably be strongly opposed by the civil servant group.
Wan Li felt deeply that he was only a symbol of this empire, and what his subordinates hoped he would do was to do a good job of red tape to strengthen the emperor's symbolic meaning of heaven and maintain rule.
Hongwu started the foundation, abolished the position of the prime minister, and replaced the position of chief assistant. Zhang Juzheng was determined to innovate and violated the interests of the civil servant group. After his death, he was reprimanded, and his efforts for more than ten years were lost. Shen Shixing cautiously sought a solution in "Yang" and "Yin", but he was still inevitably recognized as an old man and forced to resign.
Since the Ming Dynasty, the superstructure of the entire empire has been deeply ingrained in the ethics of Confucianism reinterpreted by the Neo-Confucian School represented by Zhu Xi. The civil service group with a population of 20,000 is a firm defender of this kind of thinking.
Whether it is Wanli or the first assistant, anyone who shakes the fundamental interests of this civil servant group will encounter strong resistance. To oppose them is to oppose intellectuals across the country.
Civilian forces in the Ming Dynasty were rare in all dynasties. This feature was laid at the forefront of the foundation of the Ming Dynasty. Given the immense strength of the Tang Dynasty's feudal towns, the Ming dynasty's practice puts more emphasis on literary power. When the strength of the Civil Service Group reached its peak, it was when the strength of the Military Service Group fell to a low point.
This background makes Qi Jiguang, the military general ‘s life has a close relationship with Zhang Juzheng, the first assistant. When Zhang Ju was alive, he gave Qi Jiguang a green light, which made him achieve many measures. And it is precise because he has a lot of support from Zhang Juzheng, and in the movement to liquidate Zhang Juzheng, he is not spared.
At the time of the Ming Dynasty, the military officer ’s task was to lead the soldiers to fight. The decision-making and deployment were all determined by the civilians. Qi Jiajun 's name moved the world, and the deeds of eliminating pirates were talked about by people, but only Qi Jiguang 's private army.
According to records, a pirate of 50 to 70 people landed in the hinterland after landing, killing more goods everywhere, as if entering a land of no one, actually crossed Hangzhou Beixinguan, entered Chunxian County of Anhui via Chun'an, approached Wuhu, and drove around Nanjing. They moved in the big circle, then moved towards the Mausoleum to Yixing and returned to Wujin.
Although they were annihilated in the future, as many as 4,000 were allegedly killed by them. Nanjing is the capital of the dynasty, with 120,000 troops stationed there. The Ming dynasty dealt with the Japanese pirates, in essence, they were professional Japanese soldiers against Chinese lay sergeants.
This disparity in the strength of our enemies and foes cannot help but remind us of the history of the Eight-Power Allied Forces with only a few thousand in the land of China.
Gao Gong disrespected Wanli and the two empress dowagers and was deprived of his official position. Humanity, even with high weight, cannot be arrogant.
After Wanli ascended the throne, he not only had heavy learning tasks every day but also listened to government affairs reports. This kind of study and work intensity may not be smaller than the current students.
Zhang Juzheng 's ending is not very good. The high weight is a remembrance of hatred, which is inevitable both at home and abroad. So, you should always be vigilant. If you show yourself, it is easy to leave a handle. The so-called high-key work and low-key life still make sense. Even when your power reaches its peak, you should try to be as low-key as possible, and do not pay attention to vanity.
If the quality of the tribute is evaluated by objective rules, it is difficult for the eunuch in charge of inspection to do anything about it. And if the quality of the tribute is decided by the eunuch, then the articles that can be done are huge.
The traditional Chinese readers have formed their core values based on Confucianism. And the idea that Confucianism attaches importance to principles more or less makes us less flexible.
But the problem is that most people are emotional animals. Although Zhang Juzheng 's approach was correct, the emperor or queen did compromise with him. But resentment will still arise. Over time, this emotion will be released once there is a chance.
Even if Zhang Juzheng wants to uphold justice, subjectively. But everyone around him either feared his authority or hoped to benefit from him. He will surely try to figure out his intentions. In the long run, even if he doesn't want to act with likes and dislikes, there will be other people who have done these things that he can't get on stage without his knowledge.
So, this situation has formed a phenomenon. The emperor ’s secretary, whether he is a bachelor or eunuch because he is closest to the core of power, even those civilian officials or military generals with higher nominal positions can play a role. There must be these people's congresses.
When we read history books, we often notice them only when the eunuch disturbs politics. But often because of these typical negative images, it has greatly affected our impression of this group of eunuchs. Even a shameless character like the eunuch, if he does not have talent, he may be difficult to get promoted.
As an emperor, when he was a child, he not only had to bear huge learning pressure but also had to bear huge mental pressure. Once he became an adult, as the imperial power gradually returned to his hands, plus the villains around him who wanted to be promoted by pleasing the emperor, he could easily indulge in enjoyment.
Ordinary people will encounter this problem when educating their children. The children are with their parents before the age of 18, and parents can easily discipline them to keep them away from sensual dogs and horses. But once they leave their side after the age of 18, their parents can't control what kind of people they associate with, and they can't be sure whether they will indulge in wine-rich wealth.
A person's merits and demerits, even after his death, cannot get a relatively fair ruling immediately. It may take several decades, even hundreds of years, to be judged by non-stakeholders.
Today we read history books, it seems that every minister ’s loyalty and good and evil are obvious. But if we think about the emperor, his source of information can only come from his subjects. This is like a large game of werewolf killing. How could the emperor open up God's perspective to ensure the right and wrong? Even a historian to be an emperor may not be able to do better.
Isn't this our daily life? We believe that the behavior of people who have a good relationship with ourselves is correct. We think that the behavior of people who have committed evil with us is wrong. It is really difficult for a person to be fair and objective. And even if it is fair and objective, it must also consider other people's feelings. If you don't show mercy, you will make others resentful. This resentment may be lurking for a long time. Once when they are at a disadvantage, they will counterattack crazy.
The emperor ’s most important task was to maintain the stability of the empire, not to pursue technological innovation. Their educational philosophy is not the same as today's educational philosophy. But in general. If the emperor was educated as a man of high morality, then even if he had no special talents, he could at least keep the ancestor's inheritance.
I have been thinking about, as a pioneer of the foundation industry, how to make the family of my immediate children continue to prosper? I believe that ancient and modern Chinese and foreign families have inherited more than a century. What is their secret? How do they ensure that the helm of the family's giant ship is not a fool? Although the requirements for the defender are not necessarily as high as those for the founder, this is not a task that anyone can accomplish casually.
This is a traditional Chinese management wisdom. The primary purpose of people in high positions is to select people of high morality, while the primary purpose of people in low positions is to do a good job specifically.
This concept of ruling the country is completely different from the Western economy-oriented in the same period. Even if the pirates are burned to death, they can get the title granted by the Queen of England. And such behavior must be unimaginable in China. Because he is far from our mainstream values and moral code.
It is China that provides such a clear and relatively fair way of class mobility as the Imperial Examination, and the vast majority of the poor people can see the light of their descendants changing their destiny. Coupled with our traditional culture's praise of morality and contempt for the pursuit of wealth, this makes us lack the motivation to create wealth. Therefore, it is also conceivable that neither the geographical discovery nor the industrial revolution took place in China.
Our system is so self-consistent. To the extent that if there were no strong ships and cannons to open our doors and let us see the world, perhaps a feudal society like ours could continue for 1000 or even 2000, and the only change might be the surnames of dynasties and emperors. There will probably not be major changes in the basic political system.
Chinese readers have a common understanding of Confucianism. It has become the spiritual bond that sustains our country. It's probably like religion being the link between most Western countries.
We can make such a vision. If there is a lack of unified spiritual sustenance among the citizens of a country, whether it is a doctrine or a religion, or a deified emperor when this spiritual sustenance disappears, then the connection between the citizen's is nothing left, and the country fell apart.
"The first assistant Shen Shixing called people's orally recognized ideals" Yang "and people's lusts as" yin ". Reconciling Yin and Yang is a complicated task. So, he publicly stated that what he expected is the fear of the unfilial, and the sage has some conversion. "
For leaders of a large group, whether the group is a country, a company, or just a family, the most important thing is not to deny or even try to wipe out the secret desires of people, but to make sure that everyone is afraid of express regulations and are cautious.
At the same time, when people want to devote themselves to the grand goal of this group, they can also receive positive incentives and timely rewards. If the leader can do this, then the group is stable and harmonious internally. Externally, it is full of combat power.
15/11/07
20/05/16
Barack
—— “The world has been in peace for a long time. Some things that happened this year may seem to be small, but in fact, it is the crux of the big events that occurred before, and it is also the opportunity that will make waves in the future.”
The first edition of "A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline" was published in 1981 as a history book. It analyzes some important events during the Wanli years that led the Ming Empire to decline, as well as some of the core historical figures of this period.
Ray Huang, was born in Changsha, Hunan in 1918, and died in 2000. He studied at the Department of Electrical Engineering, School of Science, Nankai University, the US Army Staff University, and the University of Michigan. Representative works: "1587, a Year of No Significance", "Chinese History", "Memoirs of Ray Huang", etc.
Zhu Yijun, born in 1563, died in 1620. He ascended the throne in 1572 and reigned for 48 years. He is called as the Emperor Shenzong.
The fifteen years of the Wanli period is the year 1587 of the Gregorian calendar. A lot of seemingly insignificant things happened this year. The emperor Wanli, who had misrepresented the dynasty for several years, was going to hold a luncheon ceremony.
It has been 4 years since Shen Shixing was the first assistant, and he managed the stability of the personnel. In this Beijing inspection, only 33 of the officials from Jinshi were demoted or removed.
At this time, the dispute over the reserve continued to deteriorate. Hai Rui died. Qi Jiguang died. The following year, Li Zhi shaved his hair to be a monk. From the prime minister to the military commander, all have their helplessness and persistence.
Wanli has remained lazy for decades, without going to the office for decades, and don’t fill in the lacking officials. The stalemate with the civil servants of the entire empire for ten years for the fight of the reserve.
He became an emperor when he was 9 years old, and he relied on Zhang Juzheng. However, in the anti-Zhang craze after Zhang Juzheng 's death, he discovered that the first assistant he had relied on from an early age had an unknown side, and the young emperor couldn't have a deep shock in his heart. He began to deeply doubt these civil servants who are full of "benevolence, morality, and morality", but also have different words and deeds.
Wanli also tried hard to cure, but the imperial conspiracy was criticized by the literary minister, and he was strongly prevented from leaving the capital. Even the matter of establishing the heir seemed to be constrained, and he could not help being discouraged, trying to seek "ruthlessness".
It has been more than 200 years since Hongwu laid the foundation of the Ming Dynasty. The civil servant group has reached its peak. The emperor ’s every move has a reference. If the emperor exceeds the limit, he will inevitably be strongly opposed by the civil servant group.
Wan Li felt deeply that he was only a symbol of this empire, and what his subordinates hoped he would do was to do a good job of red tape to strengthen the emperor's symbolic meaning of heaven and maintain rule.
Hongwu started the foundation, abolished the position of the prime minister, and replaced the position of chief assistant. Zhang Juzheng was determined to innovate and violated the interests of the civil servant group. After his death, he was reprimanded, and his efforts for more than ten years were lost. Shen Shixing cautiously sought a solution in "Yang" and "Yin", but he was still inevitably recognized as an old man and forced to resign.
Since the Ming Dynasty, the superstructure of the entire empire has been deeply ingrained in the ethics of Confucianism reinterpreted by the Neo-Confucian School represented by Zhu Xi. The civil service group with a population of 20,000 is a firm defender of this kind of thinking.
Whether it is Wanli or the first assistant, anyone who shakes the fundamental interests of this civil servant group will encounter strong resistance. To oppose them is to oppose intellectuals across the country.
Civilian forces in the Ming Dynasty were rare in all dynasties. This feature was laid at the forefront of the foundation of the Ming Dynasty. Given the immense strength of the Tang Dynasty's feudal towns, the Ming dynasty's practice puts more emphasis on literary power. When the strength of the Civil Service Group reached its peak, it was when the strength of the Military Service Group fell to a low point.
This background makes Qi Jiguang, the military general ‘s life has a close relationship with Zhang Juzheng, the first assistant. When Zhang Ju was alive, he gave Qi Jiguang a green light, which made him achieve many measures. And it is precise because he has a lot of support from Zhang Juzheng, and in the movement to liquidate Zhang Juzheng, he is not spared.
At the time of the Ming Dynasty, the military officer ’s task was to lead the soldiers to fight. The decision-making and deployment were all determined by the civilians. Qi Jiajun 's name moved the world, and the deeds of eliminating pirates were talked about by people, but only Qi Jiguang 's private army.
According to records, a pirate of 50 to 70 people landed in the hinterland after landing, killing more goods everywhere, as if entering a land of no one, actually crossed Hangzhou Beixinguan, entered Chunxian County of Anhui via Chun'an, approached Wuhu, and drove around Nanjing. They moved in the big circle, then moved towards the Mausoleum to Yixing and returned to Wujin.
Although they were annihilated in the future, as many as 4,000 were allegedly killed by them. Nanjing is the capital of the dynasty, with 120,000 troops stationed there. The Ming dynasty dealt with the Japanese pirates, in essence, they were professional Japanese soldiers against Chinese lay sergeants.
This disparity in the strength of our enemies and foes cannot help but remind us of the history of the Eight-Power Allied Forces with only a few thousand in the land of China.
Gao Gong disrespected Wanli and the two empress dowagers and was deprived of his official position. Humanity, even with high weight, cannot be arrogant.
After Wanli ascended the throne, he not only had heavy learning tasks every day but also listened to government affairs reports. This kind of study and work intensity may not be smaller than the current students.
Zhang Juzheng 's ending is not very good. The high weight is a remembrance of hatred, which is inevitable both at home and abroad. So, you should always be vigilant. If you show yourself, it is easy to leave a handle. The so-called high-key work and low-key life still make sense. Even when your power reaches its peak, you should try to be as low-key as possible, and do not pay attention to vanity.
If the quality of the tribute is evaluated by objective rules, it is difficult for the eunuch in charge of inspection to do anything about it. And if the quality of the tribute is decided by the eunuch, then the articles that can be done are huge.
The traditional Chinese readers have formed their core values based on Confucianism. And the idea that Confucianism attaches importance to principles more or less makes us less flexible.
But the problem is that most people are emotional animals. Although Zhang Juzheng 's approach was correct, the emperor or queen did compromise with him. But resentment will still arise. Over time, this emotion will be released once there is a chance.
Even if Zhang Juzheng wants to uphold justice, subjectively. But everyone around him either feared his authority or hoped to benefit from him. He will surely try to figure out his intentions. In the long run, even if he doesn't want to act with likes and dislikes, there will be other people who have done these things that he can't get on stage without his knowledge.
So, this situation has formed a phenomenon. The emperor ’s secretary, whether he is a bachelor or eunuch because he is closest to the core of power, even those civilian officials or military generals with higher nominal positions can play a role. There must be these people's congresses.
When we read history books, we often notice them only when the eunuch disturbs politics. But often because of these typical negative images, it has greatly affected our impression of this group of eunuchs. Even a shameless character like the eunuch, if he does not have talent, he may be difficult to get promoted.
As an emperor, when he was a child, he not only had to bear huge learning pressure but also had to bear huge mental pressure. Once he became an adult, as the imperial power gradually returned to his hands, plus the villains around him who wanted to be promoted by pleasing the emperor, he could easily indulge in enjoyment.
Ordinary people will encounter this problem when educating their children. The children are with their parents before the age of 18, and parents can easily discipline them to keep them away from sensual dogs and horses. But once they leave their side after the age of 18, their parents can't control what kind of people they associate with, and they can't be sure whether they will indulge in wine-rich wealth.
A person's merits and demerits, even after his death, cannot get a relatively fair ruling immediately. It may take several decades, even hundreds of years, to be judged by non-stakeholders.
Today we read history books, it seems that every minister ’s loyalty and good and evil are obvious. But if we think about the emperor, his source of information can only come from his subjects. This is like a large game of werewolf killing. How could the emperor open up God's perspective to ensure the right and wrong? Even a historian to be an emperor may not be able to do better.
Isn't this our daily life? We believe that the behavior of people who have a good relationship with ourselves is correct. We think that the behavior of people who have committed evil with us is wrong. It is really difficult for a person to be fair and objective. And even if it is fair and objective, it must also consider other people's feelings. If you don't show mercy, you will make others resentful. This resentment may be lurking for a long time. Once when they are at a disadvantage, they will counterattack crazy.
The emperor ’s most important task was to maintain the stability of the empire, not to pursue technological innovation. Their educational philosophy is not the same as today's educational philosophy. But in general. If the emperor was educated as a man of high morality, then even if he had no special talents, he could at least keep the ancestor's inheritance.
I have been thinking about, as a pioneer of the foundation industry, how to make the family of my immediate children continue to prosper? I believe that ancient and modern Chinese and foreign families have inherited more than a century. What is their secret? How do they ensure that the helm of the family's giant ship is not a fool? Although the requirements for the defender are not necessarily as high as those for the founder, this is not a task that anyone can accomplish casually.
This is a traditional Chinese management wisdom. The primary purpose of people in high positions is to select people of high morality, while the primary purpose of people in low positions is to do a good job specifically.
This concept of ruling the country is completely different from the Western economy-oriented in the same period. Even if the pirates are burned to death, they can get the title granted by the Queen of England. And such behavior must be unimaginable in China. Because he is far from our mainstream values and moral code.
It is China that provides such a clear and relatively fair way of class mobility as the Imperial Examination, and the vast majority of the poor people can see the light of their descendants changing their destiny. Coupled with our traditional culture's praise of morality and contempt for the pursuit of wealth, this makes us lack the motivation to create wealth. Therefore, it is also conceivable that neither the geographical discovery nor the industrial revolution took place in China.
Our system is so self-consistent. To the extent that if there were no strong ships and cannons to open our doors and let us see the world, perhaps a feudal society like ours could continue for 1000 or even 2000, and the only change might be the surnames of dynasties and emperors. There will probably not be major changes in the basic political system.
Chinese readers have a common understanding of Confucianism. It has become the spiritual bond that sustains our country. It's probably like religion being the link between most Western countries.
We can make such a vision. If there is a lack of unified spiritual sustenance among the citizens of a country, whether it is a doctrine or a religion, or a deified emperor when this spiritual sustenance disappears, then the connection between the citizen's is nothing left, and the country fell apart.
"The first assistant Shen Shixing called people's orally recognized ideals" Yang "and people's lusts as" yin ". Reconciling Yin and Yang is a complicated task. So, he publicly stated that what he expected is the fear of the unfilial, and the sage has some conversion. "
For leaders of a large group, whether the group is a country, a company, or just a family, the most important thing is not to deny or even try to wipe out the secret desires of people, but to make sure that everyone is afraid of express regulations and are cautious.
At the same time, when people want to devote themselves to the grand goal of this group, they can also receive positive incentives and timely rewards. If the leader can do this, then the group is stable and harmonious internally. Externally, it is full of combat power.
15/11/07
20/05/16
September 2, 2017
This book somehow reminds me sections of Gibbon's The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire as both Huang and Gibbon seems to attribute the downfall of their respective empire to the malfunction of the moral system, though in subtly different ways. In this review, I shouldn't be dealing with anything unrelated, so I will stick with Huang's analysis.
The entire volume is basically six stories of six people, whose seemingly diverse life patterns all point to the same dead end. An aspiring reformer, a conventional minister, a young and energetic Emperor, a high-minded official, a capable general, and an insightful philosopher -- six strings of narratives converging into one result: failure. The book sought to understand why, despite tremendous efforts, all these people end their lives in failure.
The reasons were obviously not individual but systematic, the bureaucratic system of Ming Dynasty that was built on a shaky and unrealistic moral base was near a total collapse. Morality itself wasn't the problem, the problem was the overplaying of it. A central argument of the entire book was that the lack of the rule of law and overindulgence of the rule of man in Ming China essentially caused all the subsequent systematic failures.
One must admit that it takes a great amount of courage for someone to condemn morality for all the failures in a system -- people often condemn the degradation of morality (for example, Gibbon on the fall of Rome) but seldom morality itself. But with a calm mind, one has to agree with Huang, for all six people described previously were victims of a malfunctioning moral system. The ambitious reformer met great resistance not of methodological but ethical kind and was defamed after death; the conformist minister tried to cool everyone down, only to cool himself out; the energetic Emperor was restricted by ethical codes each and every minute and eventually chose to close his mind and hide deep in the palace; the high-minded official was despised by colleagues, alienated by superiors, and eventually died in depression; the capable general, with all his great plans, had to be dismissed and marginalized until death; the perceptive thinker was accused of heresy and committed suicide in prison. But should we really put all the blames on the excess of morality? Moreover, is the rigid moral system a cause or a result of the already declining Chinese empire? I feel this is a typical chicken and egg problem, which means answers can be found in both directions.
Last but not least, I want to briefly talk about Huang's methodology as expressed in the book. Huang tended to look at Chinese history (but not limited to) from a spatiotemporally comprhensive perspective, meaning that his analyses were never simple inferences deduced from one person, one event, or one historical period. He focused on the rationality and necessity of history -- that is, everything happened due to a reasonable causal process which involved complex elements from social, economic, cultural, and religious backgrounds of that particular period. This methodology seems a bit historical-determinist to me, but I do feel it is reasonable on multiple grounds because I personally use this method all the time. In a nutshell, Huang's way of looking at history was quite a groundbreaking innovation in a time when most historians were still preoccupied with their old methods.
Overall I would highly recommend this book to anyone who is interested in that particular period of history, as well as anyone who's curious about the reasons behind China's downfall as an economic and cultural superpower while Europe rose to greatness in the meantime. The book is a relaxing read and does not require too much extra knowledge in Chinese history.
The entire volume is basically six stories of six people, whose seemingly diverse life patterns all point to the same dead end. An aspiring reformer, a conventional minister, a young and energetic Emperor, a high-minded official, a capable general, and an insightful philosopher -- six strings of narratives converging into one result: failure. The book sought to understand why, despite tremendous efforts, all these people end their lives in failure.
The reasons were obviously not individual but systematic, the bureaucratic system of Ming Dynasty that was built on a shaky and unrealistic moral base was near a total collapse. Morality itself wasn't the problem, the problem was the overplaying of it. A central argument of the entire book was that the lack of the rule of law and overindulgence of the rule of man in Ming China essentially caused all the subsequent systematic failures.
One must admit that it takes a great amount of courage for someone to condemn morality for all the failures in a system -- people often condemn the degradation of morality (for example, Gibbon on the fall of Rome) but seldom morality itself. But with a calm mind, one has to agree with Huang, for all six people described previously were victims of a malfunctioning moral system. The ambitious reformer met great resistance not of methodological but ethical kind and was defamed after death; the conformist minister tried to cool everyone down, only to cool himself out; the energetic Emperor was restricted by ethical codes each and every minute and eventually chose to close his mind and hide deep in the palace; the high-minded official was despised by colleagues, alienated by superiors, and eventually died in depression; the capable general, with all his great plans, had to be dismissed and marginalized until death; the perceptive thinker was accused of heresy and committed suicide in prison. But should we really put all the blames on the excess of morality? Moreover, is the rigid moral system a cause or a result of the already declining Chinese empire? I feel this is a typical chicken and egg problem, which means answers can be found in both directions.
Last but not least, I want to briefly talk about Huang's methodology as expressed in the book. Huang tended to look at Chinese history (but not limited to) from a spatiotemporally comprhensive perspective, meaning that his analyses were never simple inferences deduced from one person, one event, or one historical period. He focused on the rationality and necessity of history -- that is, everything happened due to a reasonable causal process which involved complex elements from social, economic, cultural, and religious backgrounds of that particular period. This methodology seems a bit historical-determinist to me, but I do feel it is reasonable on multiple grounds because I personally use this method all the time. In a nutshell, Huang's way of looking at history was quite a groundbreaking innovation in a time when most historians were still preoccupied with their old methods.
Overall I would highly recommend this book to anyone who is interested in that particular period of history, as well as anyone who's curious about the reasons behind China's downfall as an economic and cultural superpower while Europe rose to greatness in the meantime. The book is a relaxing read and does not require too much extra knowledge in Chinese history.
December 31, 2016
Huang Renyu's text 1587: A Year of No Significance has many points of interest and is clearly well-researched; unfortunately, it is hampered significantly by its overwrought prose, and occasionally by its character-based (rather than linear) structure. It took me more than five chapters to realise the main thesis of the book - that the Ming Dynasty's failure is broadly attributable to its lack of an independent legal system and a Legalist philosophy which would allow it to develop and modernise. The tone of the book is slightly spruced up by his biographies of several important and intriguing figures in the Wanli Emperor's reign: grand secretaries Zhang Juzheng and Shen Shixing, official Hai Rui, general Qi Jiguang and philosopher Li Zhi - who in themselves generate enough interest to move the book forward.
Dr. Huang is capable of painting with a vivid brush when he feels like it. The inner life of the Wanli Emperor is well-illumined, as we see him grow from a studious, serious and upright young man into a frustrated, cynical and by turns jaded and vindictive emperor. After Zhang Juzheng's death, he justly feeling betrayed by his harsh and effective (but also corrupt and arguably treasonous) grand secretary, who amassed great wealth and material comfort for himself whilst denying it to him and his own family within the Forbidden City. He was hardly any more grateful to the bureaucracy generally, being frustrated by them at every turn from effectively caring for his beloved imperial consort Zheng and making her son Zhu Changxun his rightful heir.
Unfortunately, Huang is given to some remarkably dry, prolix, meandering and seemingly-pointless expositions which, when reading them for the first time, simply seem like fatalistic gripes about bureaucratic inefficiency in the Ming government. At times, he seems unable to delve into the deeper causes or historical reasons for the Ming malaise, though he makes some attempts to do so in his treatment of Wanli's predecessor Zhengde. When at last he does delve into some of the more meaty ideas in the final chapters, though, one certainly gets the sense that he would rather have seen in the later Ming a more dynamic, charismatic and dictatorial emperor who could lay down the sort of firm and Legalistic rule which had been suggested in the lives and figures of Zhang Juzheng and Qi Jiguang. One gets the strong sense that Huang would rather have seen a military freed from civil oversight and under the Emperor's direct control, and a parallel censorial or adjudicating mechanism which could control the bureaucracy and keep it in check. His frustrations with traditional Confucian moralism become devastatingly clear in the final chapter, in which he laments the fate of Li Zhi within a bureaucracy which could not tolerate moral deviance even for the sake of legal expediency or the exigencies of (one presumes) an enlightened despotism.
As a history text, this book is incredibly useful and informative, and shines quite a bit of light on a period of late Imperial Chinese history with which I hadn't previously been that familiar. It is significantly less impressive as a work of prose. And of course as a student of political philosophy I have some significant differences of opinion with Huang's legalistic political commitments.
Dr. Huang is capable of painting with a vivid brush when he feels like it. The inner life of the Wanli Emperor is well-illumined, as we see him grow from a studious, serious and upright young man into a frustrated, cynical and by turns jaded and vindictive emperor. After Zhang Juzheng's death, he justly feeling betrayed by his harsh and effective (but also corrupt and arguably treasonous) grand secretary, who amassed great wealth and material comfort for himself whilst denying it to him and his own family within the Forbidden City. He was hardly any more grateful to the bureaucracy generally, being frustrated by them at every turn from effectively caring for his beloved imperial consort Zheng and making her son Zhu Changxun his rightful heir.
Unfortunately, Huang is given to some remarkably dry, prolix, meandering and seemingly-pointless expositions which, when reading them for the first time, simply seem like fatalistic gripes about bureaucratic inefficiency in the Ming government. At times, he seems unable to delve into the deeper causes or historical reasons for the Ming malaise, though he makes some attempts to do so in his treatment of Wanli's predecessor Zhengde. When at last he does delve into some of the more meaty ideas in the final chapters, though, one certainly gets the sense that he would rather have seen in the later Ming a more dynamic, charismatic and dictatorial emperor who could lay down the sort of firm and Legalistic rule which had been suggested in the lives and figures of Zhang Juzheng and Qi Jiguang. One gets the strong sense that Huang would rather have seen a military freed from civil oversight and under the Emperor's direct control, and a parallel censorial or adjudicating mechanism which could control the bureaucracy and keep it in check. His frustrations with traditional Confucian moralism become devastatingly clear in the final chapter, in which he laments the fate of Li Zhi within a bureaucracy which could not tolerate moral deviance even for the sake of legal expediency or the exigencies of (one presumes) an enlightened despotism.
As a history text, this book is incredibly useful and informative, and shines quite a bit of light on a period of late Imperial Chinese history with which I hadn't previously been that familiar. It is significantly less impressive as a work of prose. And of course as a student of political philosophy I have some significant differences of opinion with Huang's legalistic political commitments.
March 15, 2020
As a book on history this book is one of a kind, and provides a very enjoyable and insightful read into ancient Chinese societies. Two characteristics make this book special:
1. It is thoughtfully-structured in terms of selecting representative figures to construct a whole picture of bureaucracy in Ming dynasty. Each chapter focuses on one figure, and collectively they cover the perspectives of the emperor, two leading civil officials on top of bureaucratic system, a lower-ranked official who had impeccable character by the system's standard but was rejected by the system, a capable general, and an intellectual. Their fates, struggles, and frustrations vividly illustrate why Ming in 1587, though seemingly in its hay-days, was on its way to collapse.
2. Despite solid roots in historical facts, the book took a very humane approach by looking at the historical figures thru their eyes and walking their lives in their shoes. So instead of judging the Wanli Emperor for not performing his duty for 30 years (aka. a typical tone of history critics), the author sympathizes with him and deeply understood how he became cynical.
From the knowledge perspective, I appreciate the author's insight into the Yang and Yin of ancient Chinese bureaucrats (professed moral standards and urges to pursue self-gain inevitable by both human nature and social conditions), which is still somewhat true today. The author also pointed out the technical difficulties of managing a huge empire from the center. For example, it took several years for an accurate measure of land and population to travel from local counties to the capital, which may already changed drastically by then, so the government wouldn't even know how much tax to assess to each place. Never thought of that before, so every eye-opening.
1. It is thoughtfully-structured in terms of selecting representative figures to construct a whole picture of bureaucracy in Ming dynasty. Each chapter focuses on one figure, and collectively they cover the perspectives of the emperor, two leading civil officials on top of bureaucratic system, a lower-ranked official who had impeccable character by the system's standard but was rejected by the system, a capable general, and an intellectual. Their fates, struggles, and frustrations vividly illustrate why Ming in 1587, though seemingly in its hay-days, was on its way to collapse.
2. Despite solid roots in historical facts, the book took a very humane approach by looking at the historical figures thru their eyes and walking their lives in their shoes. So instead of judging the Wanli Emperor for not performing his duty for 30 years (aka. a typical tone of history critics), the author sympathizes with him and deeply understood how he became cynical.
From the knowledge perspective, I appreciate the author's insight into the Yang and Yin of ancient Chinese bureaucrats (professed moral standards and urges to pursue self-gain inevitable by both human nature and social conditions), which is still somewhat true today. The author also pointed out the technical difficulties of managing a huge empire from the center. For example, it took several years for an accurate measure of land and population to travel from local counties to the capital, which may already changed drastically by then, so the government wouldn't even know how much tax to assess to each place. Never thought of that before, so every eye-opening.
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