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Napoleon 1813: Decision at Bautzen
On June 22, 1812, 430,000 soldiers commanded by Emperor Napoleon I invaded Russia. Few doubted that this enormous force would topple the Russian empire. Among the dissenters were a determined group of Russians and Prussians whose hatred of the upstart 'Corsican' emperor knew few bounds. The fate of Europe trembled in the balance during the summer days of 1812. In an amazing reversal of fortune, Russia defeated the vaunted Grande Armée and sent the invading legions back where they had come from. The combination of terrible French logistical planning, weather, and an adamant foe destroyed the Grande Armée. Conditions became so bad that Napoleon abandoned his army to return to France.
Upon his arrival in Paris, the battle-fatigued emperor set about creating a new army. He exhibited his prodigious talents to build, seemingly from thin air, a force that outnumbered his foe. He drew upon France's enormous patriotism to fill the ranks with young men willing to give their all to emulate the soldiers who had served before them. Even his allied states contributed thousands of fresh recruits. It was no fault of their own that they failed. Rather, their leaders were unequal to the task at hand. Meanwhile, their opponents, most importantly the Prussians, fought with splendid zeal to restore their tainted heritage.
Napoleon 1813 describes and explains Napoleon's efforts to recover from the catastrophe of 1812. It dismisses many conventional myths regarding the spring campaign of 1813. Was Ney to blame for the campaign's failure? What role did Napoleon's lack of cavalry play? Did one of history's 'Great Captains' have a realistic chance to preserve his reign? On the allied side, the role of Prussia is described, including the critical contribution of the much-scorned Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm III. Blücher and the Prussian General Staff emerge with relentless determination to fight the French. Their distrust of the Russians and their own blunders threaten to unravel the Russo-Prussian alliance. At the heart of the allied effort is Tsar Alexander. His messianic vision to bring down the French emperor works at odds with his decision to usurp command of the allied armies from the military professionals. Throughout the story of the tumultuous spring days, Napoleon 1813 gives voice to the soldiers who participated in a campaign that proved Napoleon's last, best chance to preserve his dynasty.
Upon his arrival in Paris, the battle-fatigued emperor set about creating a new army. He exhibited his prodigious talents to build, seemingly from thin air, a force that outnumbered his foe. He drew upon France's enormous patriotism to fill the ranks with young men willing to give their all to emulate the soldiers who had served before them. Even his allied states contributed thousands of fresh recruits. It was no fault of their own that they failed. Rather, their leaders were unequal to the task at hand. Meanwhile, their opponents, most importantly the Prussians, fought with splendid zeal to restore their tainted heritage.
Napoleon 1813 describes and explains Napoleon's efforts to recover from the catastrophe of 1812. It dismisses many conventional myths regarding the spring campaign of 1813. Was Ney to blame for the campaign's failure? What role did Napoleon's lack of cavalry play? Did one of history's 'Great Captains' have a realistic chance to preserve his reign? On the allied side, the role of Prussia is described, including the critical contribution of the much-scorned Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm III. Blücher and the Prussian General Staff emerge with relentless determination to fight the French. Their distrust of the Russians and their own blunders threaten to unravel the Russo-Prussian alliance. At the heart of the allied effort is Tsar Alexander. His messianic vision to bring down the French emperor works at odds with his decision to usurp command of the allied armies from the military professionals. Throughout the story of the tumultuous spring days, Napoleon 1813 gives voice to the soldiers who participated in a campaign that proved Napoleon's last, best chance to preserve his dynasty.
- GenresMilitary History
464 pages, Hardcover
First published March 1, 2015
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
November 27, 2022
James R. Arnold is perhaps one of the greatest American voices covering various military aspects of the Napoleonic Wars. Written as a stand alone (he only wrote about the first phase of the 1813 campaigns, before going on to write about 1806 and the destruction of Prussia), this volume delves into the spring campaign in Saxony that set the stage for the eventual Battle of Nations at Leipzig later in the autumn.
Arnold does a good job of highlighting that, as devastated as La Grande Armée was by the Russian Campaign, so too was the Russian Army.
Overall, Russian losses were not dissimilar to those of the French (and when we say 'French' in this context, we're referencing over a dozen Kingdoms, Duchies, and States), and they too needed to rebuild their shattered legions from the frozen Armageddon of prior months. This is one of the strengths of Arnold's works, is that he showcases the Russian Imperial Army system not just on the field, but also how they recruited, or conscripted, their logistical systems, and their organization.
While Arnold focuses primarily on the military events, he does spend sometime inspecting the political and strategic interplay between the Russians and the Prussians, though he doesn't go deep enough to highlight the tensions between the two over repartitioning Poland, which was a legitimate area of tension between the two, once Prussia switches sides and actively joins the Coalition. And while he does look into the view from Vienna, it's cursory, and doesn't do a good enough job of showcasing why they felt inclined towards war even with the outcome of the Spring campaign.
Arnold does, however, do a better job, politically, with the French. Napoleon's lightning efforts to rebuild his shattered army, and to hold together his alliances is well touched upon, albeit briefly. Once the marching begins, however, is when Arnold really shines as a historian.
Nowhere else have I encountered such a wonderfully detailed narrative, and analysis, of the Spring 1813 campaign which culminated in the two French victories at Lützen and Bautzen. Arnold's analysis, I believe, is spot on, in that these were victories which were far more difficult to win than in the past, as the Russians and Prussians, both, had improved their own military doctrine vastly.
Still, however, French command and control was superior, as were their small unit tactics, and their artillery simply dominated the field. What ensured that these two victories weren't as decisive as they could have been, or should have been, was the lack of French cavalry. These battles were won by the French artillery.
And artillery simply can't effectively pursue a beaten foe.
Arnold makes the point that I wholeheartedly agree with: Napoleon no longer had a rapier, he had a cudgel, and he won by smashing his opponents over their heads with superior firepower. In a sense, this meant that the French, too, were evolving into a more modern force, as their emphasis on heavy firepower, as well as maneuver, would carry through for all Western militaries through the industrial age into the Great War.
While I would have loved to have seen Arnold continue the saga of the 1813 German Campaigns, apparently he has retired from the field. In a blog post of his on his site, and in the forward to his excellent book on the 1806 Prussian Campaign, he said that is leaving the field to younger historians.
While, personally, I am sorry to see Arnold hang up his sword, his works are very worthwhile, and this one is no exception.
Very highly recommended.
Arnold does a good job of highlighting that, as devastated as La Grande Armée was by the Russian Campaign, so too was the Russian Army.
Overall, Russian losses were not dissimilar to those of the French (and when we say 'French' in this context, we're referencing over a dozen Kingdoms, Duchies, and States), and they too needed to rebuild their shattered legions from the frozen Armageddon of prior months. This is one of the strengths of Arnold's works, is that he showcases the Russian Imperial Army system not just on the field, but also how they recruited, or conscripted, their logistical systems, and their organization.
While Arnold focuses primarily on the military events, he does spend sometime inspecting the political and strategic interplay between the Russians and the Prussians, though he doesn't go deep enough to highlight the tensions between the two over repartitioning Poland, which was a legitimate area of tension between the two, once Prussia switches sides and actively joins the Coalition. And while he does look into the view from Vienna, it's cursory, and doesn't do a good enough job of showcasing why they felt inclined towards war even with the outcome of the Spring campaign.
Arnold does, however, do a better job, politically, with the French. Napoleon's lightning efforts to rebuild his shattered army, and to hold together his alliances is well touched upon, albeit briefly. Once the marching begins, however, is when Arnold really shines as a historian.
Nowhere else have I encountered such a wonderfully detailed narrative, and analysis, of the Spring 1813 campaign which culminated in the two French victories at Lützen and Bautzen. Arnold's analysis, I believe, is spot on, in that these were victories which were far more difficult to win than in the past, as the Russians and Prussians, both, had improved their own military doctrine vastly.
Still, however, French command and control was superior, as were their small unit tactics, and their artillery simply dominated the field. What ensured that these two victories weren't as decisive as they could have been, or should have been, was the lack of French cavalry. These battles were won by the French artillery.
And artillery simply can't effectively pursue a beaten foe.
Arnold makes the point that I wholeheartedly agree with: Napoleon no longer had a rapier, he had a cudgel, and he won by smashing his opponents over their heads with superior firepower. In a sense, this meant that the French, too, were evolving into a more modern force, as their emphasis on heavy firepower, as well as maneuver, would carry through for all Western militaries through the industrial age into the Great War.
While I would have loved to have seen Arnold continue the saga of the 1813 German Campaigns, apparently he has retired from the field. In a blog post of his on his site, and in the forward to his excellent book on the 1806 Prussian Campaign, he said that is leaving the field to younger historians.
While, personally, I am sorry to see Arnold hang up his sword, his works are very worthwhile, and this one is no exception.
Very highly recommended.
July 4, 2021
Great book on the first half of the 1813 campaign. So far the author has not released the volume that covers the fall campaign after the armistice.
The author goes into details into troop movement, and why the commanders did what they did. It is also a good narrative and not dry like a lot of other military history work.
Maps are adequate, though a little amateur looking.
Will definitely seem out the other book in the series.
The author goes into details into troop movement, and why the commanders did what they did. It is also a good narrative and not dry like a lot of other military history work.
Maps are adequate, though a little amateur looking.
Will definitely seem out the other book in the series.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews