The importance of the "Ostromian" revolution in political science and economics, spearheaded by Vincent Ostrom & Elinor Ostrom, is still underappreciated. And while Elinor received her Nobel Prize, Vincent's work tends to get underappreciated and undervalued in some circles. And yet Vincent's reappraisal of the Madisonian and Tocquevillian principles of federated self-governance stands as the firm foundation upon which much subsequent work on "polycentric" governance is erected.
Reading this book, it is easy to appreciate the stridency and welcome impact of his critique of "Weberian" and "Wilsonian" public administration based on centralized, hierarchical model of decision-making. The idea of the model of the polycentric "compound republic" as a Kuhnian paradigm shift in the study of public administration is tempting and persuasive, since it opens up the space for new experimental and bottom-up methods of governance. It is also clear that the full appreciation of those ideas is sometimes hindered by the author's unsatisfactory writing style and inconclusive substantive arguments. His writing style, while mostly acceptable, can be cumbersome, repetitive, and lacking in structured argumentation. And with regard to substance, it seems to me that Ostrom does not sufficiently ground his analytical framework, which is full of strong normative claims and conceptual bifurcations, either theoretically or empirically. He relies predominantly on abstract theoretical arguments based on 18th century classic republican authors and the advances in neoclassical political economy in his own time. These are not a bad place to start, of course. But the applicability of abstract conceptions to specific issues (about, say, the administration of police forces, healthcare provision, or transportation in metropolitan areas) requires, it seems to me, more empirical evidence. (Incidentally, some of that evidence has been collated by V. Ostrom and his co-authors themselves, but this empirical case for polycentricity is not allowed to fully shine in this book.) In addition, some of the content of the book is outdated, given the time and context in which it was written. So, I would urge readers to primarily look elsewhere - say, into Elinor Ostrom's later works, or the contemporary works of Vlad Tarko or Peter Boettke - for a more up-to-date analysis of the potential value of decentralized governance.
Overall, the book is an important collection of papers, and it contains good historical context for the emergence of the Ostromian research program. It also introduces some key concepts and models, and some daring insights, that have wide application in political science and political economy. At the same time, the book has some structural and substantive weaknesses, in addition to the excusable fact that it is a product of its time, that make it somewhat passable. Nonetheless, I would urge readers to read at least Chapter 4: "A Theory of Democratic Administration."