I was prepared to be embarrassed by this book. I run a YouTube channel, and on the strength of some rapturous comments from my audience, I listened to maybe 4 or 5 podcast interviews with the author Peter Zeihan. Because people kept asking me about him, earlier this year I published a video where I critiqued what I understood to be his positions. When a bargain priced version of the book jumped out at me at the Strand last week, I was nervous. Would Zeihan's written work make me feel like a chump? Would I have to retract my polite but scathing video?
I'm happy to report that, if anything, my video was way too lenient. This is not a worthless book. Zeihan is an engaging writer, and I got a lot of valuable information from this read. As one example, I think every US declinist should be required to read his passages on the US's almost infinite advantages. Zeihan is a geographer, and his descriptions and maps on that topic are uniformly illuminating. But he shares the weakness of his profession, going back to Halford Mackinder. As a class, these folks are absolutely right that geography is vitally important. But it's not everything, and, as with Mackinder, it's the extrapolations that Zeihan puts on top of his solid geographic knowledge that get him in to trouble.
In my video, I advanced three critiques about Zeihan from his podcasts. 1) He's too close to the oil & gas industry and therefore refuses to recognize the decarbonization juggernaut that's about to eviscerate petroleum producers. 2) His world history knowledge prior to WW2 seems nonexistent and 3) His complete contempt for most political actors, and the assumption that they are guaranteed to be helpless without big daddy America. All three of these faults were very much on display in this book.
On the first front, this book seems to not even acknowledge that renewable energy exists. It's unfair to hold Zeihan accountable for this, however, as the book was published in 2014. For decades renewable energy has been the revolution that never happened. Back in 2014, I too was convinced it was doomed to be a joke forever. That's no longer true.
Zeihan's contempt for a lot of the world's peoples comes through in every chapter. I wouldn't call it racism, just a sort of glib snarkiness, that makes him a very engaging speaker and writer, but I think leads him to underestimate a lot of countries. Africa seems doomed to fail and barely worth mentioning in his eyes, which doesn't match my current sense of all of that continent's 54 countries. His view on China in particular, one of his most famous positions, also seems rooted in a deep sense of contempt.
I don't think Zeihan's descriptions of Chinese history as unending chaos make much sense. Sure, there are periods of great disarray, but many of the "Brief moments" of Chinese unification outlasted all of US history, especially when you consider that we had a civil war just a little over 150 years ago. Zeihan's description of the way that US influence in East Asia has made unprecedented Chinese consolidation possible was very on point, but he seems to leave out industrialization entirely. Yes, China was always limited by its river systems... but now it has trains and highways. Everywhere.
The most glaring issue in this book is its treatment of history. Many commenters argued that I was being unfair to Zeihan, in complaining about the historical ignorance he demonstrated on podcasts. His writing, they assured me, was much better. It is not. Some of these chapters are gobsmackingly ignorant. His description of the pre-American world system is frankly nonsense. There absolutely were nasty mercantilist fights between European empires. But those were largely over by the 1750s, if not the late 1600s, and the British won those fights prettily handily. So handily that after some early failures, even Napoleon had to give up on the world outside Europe. Victorian British statesmen would be appalled by Zeihan's suggestion in this book that the US invented the very idea of "free trade". The world absolutely had a hegemon before the United States, one whose world leadership and failings we should be doing more to learn from. Zeihan seems unaware that the British Empire's world leadership, from 1815 through 1914( or at least the 1880s), even existed.
And Zeihan plays fast and loose with 20th century history as well. I've often been intimidated by Bretton Woods, the gold-based system of fixed exchange rates that governed the world from the 1944 until Nixon ditched the gold standard in 1971. I know it's massive, but I can't quite grasp the significance. Zeihan gets around this entirely by pretending that Bretton Woods is merely the still existing (if shaky) free trade regime set up by the 1947 General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade (GATT) which later evolved into the WTO. Put politely, this is ahistorical nonsense. GATT was an outgrowth of the Bretton Woods System, that survived it, but blithely referring to GATT/WTO as Bretton Woods for half the book is a staggering distortion of history and economics. My understanding from every other work of history I have ever read is that the Bretton Woods system ended in the 1970s. This Bretton Woods thing strikes me as a grave distortion, one so sweeping that I don't just think less of the author, I think less of the publisher and everybody involved in the process who let it get to print.
Prior to reading this book, I had assumed that Zeihan might be more reliable than me when it came to finance and economics. That assumption was wrong. There is a lot in this book about demographics. The fact that most countries in the world are aging rapidly is tremendously important. There are some good suggestions in this book about what the impacts are likely to be. In many cases, I think things may be as dire as Zeihan suggests. But I think Zeihan goes further than pointing out that demographics are important, into a sort of demographics millenarianism.
For Zeihan, Baby boomer retirements don't just mean a shift in investment funds and priorities, they mean an automatic investment apocalypse in every country, taking place in specific years that are perfectly knowable due to each country's demographic structure. This... is not how money works. Yes, if wealth was divided equally among all US baby boomers, who were switching from growth stocks to US treasuries in lockstep on their retirement days, then maybe (probably not) something like what Zeihan describes may be possible. But that's not how wealth works.
Wealth is not evenly distributed. I don't have the figures in front of me, but it's safe to assume that a comfortable majority of the money owned by baby boomers is owned by the top 1-5% of investors who will never want to put large amounts of their money into boring investments. Most wealth is owned by the wealthy. The largest portion of baby boomer wealth, which will become (unless estate tax laws change dramatically) inherited wealth for later generations, is always going to be chasing growth. Again, I don't want to suggest that demographics are not important, or that the baby boomer retail investor's switch to safety might not be important. These are worthwhile dynamics to think about. But they don't guarantee the serial apocalypses (apocalypsi?) that Zeihan predicts.
Honestly I feel kind of bad about this two star review. But the history sections, and the Bretton Woods thing specifically, require it. Zeihan's faulty assumptions about how the world worked before the United States are at the heart of his grand pronouncements about how it might work without our direct involvement. I think Zeihan is a very positive influence generally. His point that the United States is in vastly better shape than the catastrophists of Washington, DC want us to believe is valid, and he makes it with style and verve. But I think he sometimes lets that style and verve take him to places that serve his audience very poorly.