Black Wind, White Snow: The Rise of Russia’s New Nationalism

by Charles Clover

Charles Clover, award-winning journalist and former Moscow bureau chief for the Financial Times, here analyses the idea of "Eurasianism," a theory of Russian national identity based on ethnicity and geography. Clover traces Eurasianism’s origins in the writings of White Russian exiles in 1920s Europe, through Siberia’s Gulag archipelago in the 1950s, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, and up to its steady infiltration of the governing elite around Vladimir Putin. This eye-opening analysis pieces together the evidence for Eurasianism’s place at the heart of Kremlin thinking today and explores its impact on recent events, the annexation of Crimea, the rise in Russia of anti-Western paranoia and imperialist rhetoric, as well as Putin’s sometimes perplexing political actions and ambitions.

Based on extensive research and dozens of interviews with Putin’s close advisers, this quietly explosive story will be essential reading for anyone concerned with Russia’s past century, and its future.

Genres: Russia, Politics, History, Nonfiction, International Relations, Journalism, European History

384 pages, Hardcover

First published October 27, 2015

About the author

Charles Clover is a journalist and author, with a weekly column about environmental matters in the Sunday Times.
He was Environment Editor of The Daily Telegraph, based in London, from 1988-2008 and conceived the Telegraph Earth website and developed it with a small, talented team of other journalists.
He has been elected national journalist of the year by the British Environment and Media Awards three times, in 1989, 1994 and 1996.
He was co-author with the Prince of Wales of Highgrove: Portrait of an Estate, (1993) a best-selling study of Prince Charles's conversion to organic farming and gardening and a clarion call for sustainable farming.
His book The End of the Line: how over-fishing is changing the world and what we eat (Ebury 2004), has been described as the definitive book on over-fishing.
It won the Guild of Food Writers' Derek Cooper Award for investigative food writing, an Andre Simon award for food writing and the Zoological Society of London's BIOSIS award for communicating zoology. (endoftheline.com)

Reviews

[Katia N · Rating 4 out of 5]

It is quite interesting book trying to trace the ideology of "Russki Mir" currently prevailing in Russian state and initially promoted by a chap called Dugin among the others. It tries to find a connection through the 20th century from Eurasian movement of the emigrants in the 20s and to Lev Gumilev's pseudo-scientific paradigms of the 70-80s and to the modern day with Dugin and co. The author did not convince me all these "theories" are connected, never-mind begotten from each other. But the story is well told. The most interesting, shorter parts were about Trubetskoy, the linguist and the duke and about Gumilev-junior life. Gumilev, the son of Anna Akhmatova, an iconic Russian poetess and Nikolay Gumilev, another poet shot in the 20s. Lev has spent almost all his youth in gulag. He went there twice. He joked that once he went to pay who was his father and the second time - mother. He was released after Stalin death in the 50s. And since then he studied ancient tribes. Crudely He claimed that the Russians are ancestors from the Eastern hordes from the Steppe. And that is where Russia belongs to, not the West. He has become substantially anti-semitic in the second part of his life. He did not talk to Akhmatova for the last 6 years of her life. Counter-intuitively he was very saddened when the Soviet Union collapsed. I am not sure whether it was because a Stockholm syndrome or a nostalgy about the greatness of the Empire. Interesting, very tragic and quite odious character.

But the big part is devoted to the later years, Dugin and other figures in the post-soviet Russia. He was an Nazi in his Soviet youth. Then decided to combine it with the orthodox christianity in some proportions, updated his views on the thinking of the post-war radical right like Julius Evola and some French of Belgium character. I do not remember his name, but cannot be bothered to check again. It has moved from the open aggressive racism to open aggressive nationalism combined with imperialism. Another defining feature of all of this is against so-called 'antlantism". Dugin has branded himself as a scientist and has written a lot. The most famous is Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia: English Translation where he pondered about who is supposed to take it all eventually. It was not taken seriously initially but has become progressively more and more on demand as Russia moved back towards aggressive totalitarism (or whatever you want to call it). According to Dugin Russians are so special:

“we are less pragmatic (the Russians), less calculating than representatives of other peoples, and we have bigger hearts. Maybe this is a reflection of the grandeur of our country and its boundless expanses. Our people have a more generous spirit." Amplified by the mass media, the message was hammered home over and over again: Russia is unique, Russia is different, Russia is superior, Russia is under attack, Russia must defend itself [the comments from the author].”

He was of course not the first who quipped such things. Apart from anything else it was all over some prominent writers since 19th century minimum. Dostoyevsky comes to mind as a first reference, but the list is frustratingly long. When I was reading this part about Dugin and co, my prevailing feeling was of a revulsion. Prevailing thought was that all this "theory is a plethora of science but in essence the mixture of messianic exceptionalism with the right-wing rhetoric borrowed from you guessed the west radical right." This is from this book. So "all I've taken before for the mysterious enigmatic Russian soul, all that messianism is appeared to be an ordinary fascism". Not sure where I've seen this sentence first. It is not mine. But indeed I totally agree with it based upon this book and the current events.

Here is the one from Dugin on the subject:

I cannot be bothered to write more about all of this. Just leave a few excepts from the book here.

Excepts:

According to Dugin:

‘lunar Putin’ – a concept he seems to have concocted in the midst of his social-media rage: There are two identities to Putin – the patriotic, heroic (solar) and the one inclined toward liberalism and compromises of the West (lunar). Therefore it is impossible to rule out that the decision to dismiss me was taken by one half, obviously the lunar … The solar Putin is the saviour of Russia during the Second Chechen Campaign, liberator of Ossetia and Abkhazia, and hero of the Crimea. The lunar … Let everyone himself guess where the lunar is …

course, we are less pragmatic, less calculating than representatives of other peoples, and we have bigger hearts. Maybe this is a reflection of the grandeur of our country and its boundless expanses. Our people have a more generous spirit.8 Amplified by the mass media, the message was hammered home over and over again: Russia is unique, Russia is different, Russia is superior, Russia is under attack, Russia must defend itself.

Liberalism is ‘an updated version and continuation of a Western universalism that has been passed from the Roman Empire, Medieval Christianity, modernity in terms of the Enlightenment, and colonization, up to the present-day’, wrote Dugin in what was probably his most significant book since The Foundations of Geopolitics, entitled The Fourth Political Theory, published in 2009.19 Drawing on his readings of the European New Right, Dugin channelled the philosophy of as many ex-Nazis as he could lay his hands on – the political theories of Carl Schmitt, the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, the geopolitical theories of Karl Haushofer, and the traditionalism of Julius Evola – into a profoundly anti-liberal metaphysical project...


In Dugin’s capable hands, Mackinder was transformed from an obscure Edwardian curiosity who never got tenure at Oxford, into a sort of Cardinal Richelieu of Whitehall, whose whispered counsels to the great men of state provided a sure hand on the tiller of British strategic thinking for half a century, and whose ideas continue to be the strategic imperatives for a new generation of secret mandarins. In addition to Mackinder, there were the opposing geopoliticians profiled by Dugin, mostly German, who argued from the same logic as Mackinder but in defence of continental land power rather than global sea power. These included Friedrich Ratzel, a late nineteenth-century German geographer who coined the term Lebensraum, or ‘living space’, which later was co-opted as an imperative by the Third Reich. The second generation of geopolitical writings earned the theory a lingering association with Nazism. Mackinder’s contemporary Karl Haushofer was a German army general and strategic theorist who was a strong proponent of a three-way alliance between Berlin, Moscow and Tokyo.

Dugin’s main argument in Foundations came straight from Haushofer’s pages: the need to thwart the conspiracy of ‘Atlanticism’ led by the US and NATO and aimed at containing Russia within successive geographic rings of newly independent states. The plan was simple: first put the Soviet Union back together, counselled Dugin, and then use clever alliance diplomacy focused on partnerships with Japan, Iran and Germany to eject the United States and its Atlanticist minions from the continent. The key to creating ‘Eurasia’ is to reject a narrow nationalistic agenda which could alienate potential allies. He quoted New Right theorist Jean-François Thiriart, who said ‘the main mistake of Hitler was that he tried to make Europe German. Instead, he should have tried to make it European.’ Russia, it followed, would not be making a Russian Empire, but a Eurasian one.3 ‘The Eurasian Empire will be constructed on the fundamental principle of the common enemy: the rejection of Atlanticism, the strategic control of the USA, and the refusal to allow liberal values to dominate us’, wrote Dugin.

Foundations was premised on the notion – an easy sell to a conspiracy-mad reading public – that real politics took place behind a veil of intrigue, according to rules that the elites and regimes of the world had internalized for centuries behind their bastions of privilege, but were loath to demonstrate publicly. It came with all the esoteric trappings of an initiation to secret wisdom: runic inscriptions, arcane maps with all manner of arrows and cross-hatching, introductions to unheard-of grey cardinals of world diplomacy. But there were just enough actual facts in support of the fantastic conclusions for the reader (I must admit, I was one) to be instantly intrigued – just as players at a Ouija board are often most impressed when the planchette lands on some fact of which they are already aware.

German-Russian alliance would reorient Europe away from Atlantic influence and towards Eurasia. France would be encouraged to orient towards Germany, which would cement the Eurasian vector of Europe around a ‘Moscow–Berlin–Paris’ axis: The tendency towards European unification around Germany [Dugin never uses the term ‘European Union’] will have positive significance only on one fundamental condition – the creation of a firm geopolitical and strategic Moscow–Berlin axis. By itself Central Europe does not have enough political and military potential to gain independence from the Atlantic United States.

Why empire? The essence of a uniquely messianic nation. Outside empire Russians lose their identity and disappear as a nation.

Author:
Helped by large oil surpluses and the devaluation of the rouble in 1998, Russia’s economy began to boom. The elusive middle class that Western reformers hoped would be a bulwark of democracy and civil society was instead fashioned by an authoritarian, paternalistic system. Rising incomes were supposed to lead to greater acceptance of liberal values. But the opposite was happening. The new middle class thought they owed their better fortune to Putin and to the social compact they believed they had made with him – giving away their freedoms in exchange for rising incomes. Products of the 1990s, they associated democracy with social anarchy and impoverishment.

According to one study [beginning of 00s], ‘A mood which was formerly concentrated in the Soviet Communist subculture and limited to those with poor education, low income, and non-urban groups, has started to penetrate the layers of society which until recently acted as the agents of modernization’.1 Some 79 per cent of Russians, for example, felt the end of the USSR to have been a mistake, compared with 69 per cent in 1992; 56 per cent saw NATO as a ‘bloc of aggression’ rather than a defensive alliance, an 18 percentage point rise since 1997. One of the largest subcategories to subscribe to this view included those with higher education (68 per cent). Increasingly, nationalism was becoming the centre of gravity in Russia’s domestic politics, and the Kremlin struggled to keep pace with this mood. The Kremlin’s efforts to centralize power were mirrored in the centralization of the production of images and symbols. Pavlovsky was the public face of the Kremlin’s efforts at political technology, and during Putin’s first term he and his Kremlin handlers oversaw a shift in politics and the media away from the liberal parties and voices of the Yeltsin era, and towards a preponderance of more conservative and nationalist figures, to which they recruited Dugin and his Eurasianists.

[Geza Tatrallyay · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very insightful analysis of where Russia is today, given historical trends. Clover does a masterful job in explaining the rise of nationalism in Russia, and how it has come to be the centerpiece of current Russian political ideology. It helps explain much of what is happening in the Ukraine and indeed the recent efforts by Putin and his gang to exert influence on the USA. A must read for anyone interested in East/West relations.

[Elaine Aldred · Rating 4 out of 5]

There is no doubt that Russian authors were, and still are, not short of material on which they can draw on extensively for their novels; some of it in epic proportions. The content of Black Wind, White Snow reinforces this opinion.

Although a non-fiction book, it reads like a sweeping epic with secret organisations, spies, flights across war-torn Russian territories to safety, major political figures, gulags and dispossessed Russian nobility. It is a book rich with details, where Charles Clover also finds time to focus in on the human stories of love, hate, arrogance and the inability to fit in. With this in mind Black Wind, White Snow is a wonderful of starting point for a writer in any genre, as well, as being an absorbing read for the curious.

At the centre of the book is the Russian concept of Eurasianism, which is one perception of Russian national identity. It is something that has come and gone, then been recently revived by Validmir Putin, particularly with regards to the annexation of the Crimea.

Eurasianism was a movement Started by the Russians exiled from their homeland in the 1920s, the idea was nurtured again in the 1960s, then again by Putin as a rationale for extending Russia as a nation.

However, his reference to the concept was made in such an oblique way at an annual gathering of Russia’s handpicked elite, that blink and you would have missed it. The idea that Putin uses messages embedded within his speeches (or dog whistles as they are known in US politics because only certain people can hear them), is only the start of a book that is a switchback of changing loyalties and the painful legacies of successive governments with people tossed around like flotsam and jetsam.

This is quite an internal contemplation of the subject with little comment made about the possible effects of the West on Russia. However, for anyone wanting to better understand the shifts in Russian mind-set over the last few years or just wanting a really good book to lose themselves in, Black Wind, White Snow is in many ways better than a novel.

Black Wind, White Snow was courtesy of Yale University Press, via NetGalley

[billyskye · Rating 4 out of 5]

It is hard to escape the idea that Putin’s ‘Eurasia’ has become, in some sense, a geographical border around a separate truth. A century ago, the original Eurasianists gave birth to a new continent, a fictitious one, which over the decades has become more and more real; at the same time, Russia, a real entity, has become more and more fictional.

As Russia’s barbaric war in Ukraine grinds on, it is surprising how little attention has been paid to Charles Clover’s excellent intellectual history of the ‘Eurasianism’ movement. Black Wind, White Snow adds a valuable dimension to analysis of the conflict and its origins, tracing the mutation of this viral ideological strain through three generations of Russian thinkers – ultimately lending Vladimir Putin a language, an organizing principle, and perhaps even a personal belief system (though who is really to say on that front) through which his disastrous campaign of terror might be waged.

The book is divided neatly into three sections – each generation given a protagonist around which its flirtations with Eurasianism are concentrated. First, the progenitor – Prince Nikolai Trubetzkoy – a linguist who fled the Russian Revolution and, from the salons of Europe alongside figures like Roman Jakobson and Pyotr Savitsky, extrapolated tenuously on his study into isoglosses, ultimately concluding that “cultures and civilizations have natural boundaries that delineate the extent of the unconscious architecture of a unique cultural geometry” and that “these natural cultural boundaries buttressed the argument for the common political identity of Eurasia and put into practice the fundamental axiom: the cause of all geopolitical misfortune that had befallen the Russian Empire was the non-recognition of the frontiers of natural systems.” While Trubetzkoy ultimately came to regret his involvement in the movement, it was too late. His pseudoscientific ideas had already begun to metastasize.

Next comes the haunted son of famed Russian poets Nikolai Gumilev and Anna Akhmatova. A historian interested in the peoples of the steppe, Lev Gumilev is introduced and mentored by Savitsky during their time in the gulag. Building off the ideas of the old guard, Gumilev begins to develop his concept of ‘passionarity,’ a quantifiable characteristic embedded to different degrees within ‘ethnoi’ that described their “desire to sacrifice themselves, and the highest level of ‘complementarity’, a sense of attraction of its members for each other.” Weaving a prideful (and self-serving) mythology for his ethnic heritage, he argued that “The tribes, societies and nations which flourished were not the most rational, enlightened or advanced, he theorized, but rather those that contained the highest proportion of passionaries.” Clover provides a detailed portrait of Gumilev’s persecution by the Soviet bureaucracy, his exhaustive attempts at gaining academic respect and recognition, and, ultimately, the bizarre directions in which his theory took (it involves “cosmic radiation from outer space” and “the biogenic migration of atoms of chemical elements in the biosphere” of course). As one of the book’s many insightful sources puts it, “Gumilev smashed up everything. He said two times two equals five. And it was true. Two times two equals four was simply boring.” People were paying attention. Momentum was building.

Finally, we arrive at Aleksandr Dugin, the enigmatic political philosopher often portrayed as something of an éminence grise to the modern Russian state. Coming of age in Yury Mamleev’s subversive Yuzhinsky circle, Dugin gorged himself on occult samizdat and sought to break free of the older generation’s “passive willingness to accept the arbitrary diktat of a malfunctioning system, in exchange for the knick-knacks of a barely comfortable life.” In Eurasianism he found such an escape. Fueled by an ambition to infiltrate the highest levers of power, Dugin attempted to do what his intellectual forebears found impossible – weaponize the ideology, mold it into a more infectious variant able to reach both the public and Russia’s siloviki. In this endeavor, a flair for the theatrical, the conspiratorial was his constant ally because, as Clover notes, “The major advantage of conspiracy theories over reality is that reality is not logical, consistent and organized the way a conspiracy theory is... totalitarian regimes found that conspiracy theories were always the easiest way of explaining ideology to an otherwise uninterested public.” Dugin is a man of many masks, Clover (who has interviewed the svengali extensively) writes, “Irony… was a constant companion to Dugin’s otherwise rather dire-sounding manifestos. Dugin was simultaneously a critic, a theoretician and a practitioner of an art in which the three roles are (or should be) mutually exclusive.” Impossible to pin down. Impossible to control.

Informing Dugin’s biography are colorful portraits of a coterie of political characters who would come to dominate Russia’s post-Soviet landscape – figures like Eduard Limonov, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Boris Yeltsin (“An empty vessel waiting to be filled: a man of white-hot ambition who had his finger on the national pulse and was willing to follow wherever that led.”), ‘political technologist’ supreme Vladislav Surkov, and, of course, Putin. With the organizational capacity of communism degraded beyond repair, those in power sought to co-opt new ideologies that might cement their control of the Russian state and justify their dreams of reestablishing its empire. Clover contends that Eurasianism “was seductive for Russia’s siloviki – the generals, security men, centurion guardians of the state – who had been consigned to irrelevance at the end of the Cold War by pronouncements about the ‘end of history’. They wanted to be told that the fundamental reality of the world had not changed: nations still needed armies, spies, security services, strategic alliances and large defense budgets.” By viewing Russia as a fundamental watershed into which all of Eurasia flows – the core of a single, unimpeachable civilizational unit ordained by history and biology – Putin found a raison d'être for his increasingly fascistic kleptocracy. As Clover puts it, “Eurasia’s appeal stems not from its accuracy or its explanatory power or its rigor (none of which it has), but from the way in which it exorcizes demons, heals psychic wounds and papers over ruptures in Russia’s crude and disjointed history.” All the better that this chimerical theory – mutated by three generations of fringe thinkers who barely seemed to believe in it themselves – is essentially bunk: “Putin has correctly surmised that lies unite rather than divide Russia’s political class. The greater and more obvious the lie, the more his subjects demonstrate their loyalty by accepting it, and the more they participate in the great sacral mystery of Kremlin power by believing it.”

It is interesting to note, as Clover does, that all three of his subjects were oppressed dissidents of the Soviet Union – and yet went on construct a movement animated by worship of its authoritarian empire, ultimately supporting a system quite similar in many ways to the one that had abused them for so long. From a Western perspective, it is alluring to look at the failures of the communist experiment and conclude that the only viable alternative – the only avenue for opposition – would be ‘more West.’ However, Clover argues that for these men communism was viewed as a Western import and its mistakes lay in its constraint of the true ‘Eurasian’ character. In other words, the only way forward was quite the opposite: more East. Still, I had a little trouble squaring the psychoanalysis while reading and wouldn’t have minded further investigation of this trend. That aside, the only flaw of Black Wind, White Snow results from the strength of its introduction, which is in some ways a victim of its own success. It’s such a banger that the rest of the book, which essentially fleshes out the points already encountered in the first section, feels slightly deflated and baggy by comparison. This is admittedly a rather pedantic critique, but I couldn’t help but feel at times like Clover tipped his hand a bit too early.

The triumph of Black Wind, White Snow lies less in its meticulous examination of the Eurasianist model (which, as Clover deftly shows, would be laughed out of any serious academic institution) and more in how it illustrates the eerie manner in which an idea can gather weight and ultimately manifest a physical form – an unserious hypothesis disavowed by a homesick, exiled linguist a century ago compels those in one nation to disregard the sovereignty of another, level their cities, commit unspeakable atrocities against their neighbors, their kin in the present day. The hyperstitional element of this is equal parts fascinating and horrifying, almost Lovecraftian. What power can the truth claim? Nurtured in an alluvium of disinformation, plausible deniability, meta-ironic equivocation, some eldritch thing from beyond the void was pulled into reality and now the fields of Ukraine are drenched in blood.

[Jimmy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Do you want to understand what drives the thinking of Putin’s foreign policy outlook especially in light of the consequences of what’s going on in Ukraine? This book would be an important work you don’t want to miss. The reason I read this book was to better understand what’s going on in Russia that shapes their foreign policy especially with the war that happened in 2022 with Ukraine after I saw it was quoted frequently from a master’s thesis on Alexander Dugin, Putin’s so called Rasputin. The subtitle of the book is “The Rise of Russia’s New Nationalism.” The book traces the origin and development of an idea call Euroasianism and while the subtitle is “Nationalism” Eurasianism is Russia’s political outlook that is a hybrid of Russian supremacy blended with a call for the people of the Steppes and former Soviet republics in Russia’s orbit to be one civilization. Eurasianists would see the heartland of Russia and other Eursasians are in a clash of civilization with Atlantists and coastal and Island base people.
The preface explains a bit of the author’s background in Russia covering decades of current events and even having interviewed key figures in the book such as Alexander Dugin. An introduction follows that talks about Putin and after that the meat of the book consists of 15 chapters grouped in three parts that traces the ideological genealogical history of how Eurasianism developed. Part One begins in 1920 where the Bolsheviks have taken over Russia and the “White Russians’ opposing them are crumbling. In this chaotic scene Prince Nikolay Trubetskoy is evacuated by an American warship on the southern tip of Crimea while on vacation and escapes to Europe. Trubetskoy along with his friend Roman Jakobson would start the Prague School of structural linguistics but their view of Russian history would lay the ground work for Eurasianism. Part two looks at Lev Gumilev who popularized Eurasianism within the Soviet Union. Whereas Trubetskoy and Jakobson were outside Soviet Russia forming their ideology Gumilev lived within the Soviet Union. Part three then looks at how Eurasianism goes from Gumilev to the next generation especially with a focus on Alexander Dugin towards the end of the book.
The overall sense I get with Eurasianism is how it has appeal to some even though its founders have repudiated it, those who told lies about it have retract it and even then the movement remains. The movement is driven by conspiracy, inaccurate history of various people group, and false science such as the idea from Gumilev who thinks cosmic rays makes Russians strong. Plus leaders then and now are caught up with the occultic and occultic symbols. This movement is so whacky.
It is interesting to note the focus of the book in terms of how much pages are devoted to individuals and era. While part two seems to have the least chapters compared to the other parts there is one chapter titled “Gulag” that was the longest chapter in the book and has 118 footnotes. It is incredible how much work the author spent on Gumilev I almost wonder if originally the book was going to be just only on Gumilev’s life and philosophical outlook. I did wish there was more focus and discussion of our contemporary Alexander Dugin himself. Still the book gives us a lot of information about Dugin that I didn’t know before.
Even before I read this book Alexander Dugin is super concerning. I think Dugin became even more concerning after I learned what I learned from the book. It is ironic that right now in 2022 Russia has argued that they are intervening in Ukraine to denatzify Ukraine. But it is strange that the architect for much of Putin’s foreign policy outlook is Dugin, a man who since his youth has a fascination with glorifying the Nazis. Dugin teaches at the Academy of the General Staff of the Russian military, and his best seller Foundations of Geopolitics is required reading at the academy that train Russian generals. So we now have decades of Russia’s core generals buying into Dugin’s geopolitical outlook which unfortunately has led these men to see conspiracies and the West as their enemies on the basis of a lot of false history and literally adopted Nazi ideologies. I think it is fair to say that Eurasianism is influenced by Nazi ideology even more so than the controversy of Critical Race Theory is influenced by Marxism; its just less known by the public. The influence on Dugin’s geopolitical views include Friedrich Ratzel who coined the term Lebensraum (“living space”) something the Nazis used heavily (234). Dugin’s book The Fourth Politicla Theory uses the political theory of Nazi legal theorist Carl Schmitt with land versus sea civilization (239), the geopolitical scholar Karl Haushofer, Nazi advocate of traditionalism Julius Evola and philosopher Martin Heidegger. It seems the criteria for Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine to get rid of Nazis can be turned around as an argument by other countries to say they should invade Russia; note I’m not saying other countries should do that but rather I’m pointing out how Russia does have a log in their eye after all if Russia can invade Ukraine because of the Azov Regiment how much more problematic is a Nazi ideological influence in Russia’s outlook and strategy. This book was written in 2015 and chillingly notes that Dugin even think Russia should annex Ukraine (238) and that Russia should “kill kill kill” Ukrainians. Freighting to me is how Dugins’ outlook doesn’t seem to stop with only Ukraine: Dugin sees the need to have Germany ally with Russia against the “Atlantists” (237).
There’s so much more I want to say but in summary there’s a lot more contents than I can discuss in this review. The book definitely puts Eurasianism in context and also gives us rare information about Dugin that comes from the author’s research and also interview with Dugin. The discussion about past generation’s Eurasianists also feature the author’s research into previously classified Soviet KGB archives. There’s so much treasure trove of information. I recommend this book.

[Can · Rating 5 out of 5]

2019 Eylül civarıydı, kıymetli bir arkadaşım bana bir koli kitap hediye ettiğinde okumaya başladım. Anca bitti. Tabi, bu süre çerçevesinde sadece onu okumadım ama kesinlikle "uzun okuma"lardan

Avrasyacılığı çıkış noktasından itibaren detaylıca anlatıyor. Kendinizi sıkça kitapta geçen isimler hakkında daha fazla şey ararken buluyorsunuz. Rusya'ya ilginiz varsa mutlaka okuyun.

Kullanılan dil görece akıcı.

[Kitty · Rating 4 out of 5]

päris ajakohane lugemine. seda juttu, et Venemaa on tsivilisatsioon ja peaks valitsema kogu Euraasiat ja nii, on viimasel ajal palju kuulda olnud, nii et päris huvitav ja vajalik teada saada, kust see kõik välja võetud on ja kes ja miks ja mis ajast saadik seda usub.

Clover jutustab vene natsionalismi ja Putini praeguse retoorika (lühidalt öeldes: eurasianism) sünni meile kolme mehe elulugude kaudu: 1917. aasta revolutsiooni käigus Venemaalt pagenud vürst ja lingvist Nikolai Trubetskoi, Stalini ajal vangilaagrites vaevelnud Lev Gumiljov ja siis praeguseni elu ja tervise juures olev Aleksandr Dugin. ja okei, Trubetskoist ja Duginist puudusid mul eelnevad teadmised ja arvamused, aga seda, kuidas Anna Ahmatova oma poega vangilaagritest tagasi ootas, Stalinile palvekirju esitas ja reekvieme kirjutas ja mis kõik, seda lugu ma ju ometi teadsin. üldse ei osanud oodata, et esiteks ei saanud Gumiljov oma emaga õieti kunagi läbi (süüd selles tundub jaguvat mõlemale poolele) ja teiseks suutis ta ära näha N Liidu lõpu ja oli selle üle sügavalt õnnetu.

noh, ja siis see, kuidas ta vangis istudes lihtsalt ajaviiteks igasuguseid teooriaid välja mõtles ja neid siis pärast ajaloo pähe avaldas ja inimesed lugesid ja neile see kõik meeldis. (lugesin Sirbist Jaak Alliku muidu üsna kahtlase rõhuasetusega arvustust sellele raamatule ja minu meelest tema võrdlus Lennart Meri ja Valdur Mikitaga oli küll tabav. ikka on ju tore lugeda raamatut, mis näitab su rahvast teistest iidsema, õilsama ja tähtsamana, eks?)

samas jälle Duginist oli ka põnev lugeda, sest ikka päris uskumatu oli, millist vanakooli natsismi (haakristide ja Hitleri piltide ja juudiviha ja kõigega) 80ndate Venemaal harrastati. pool aega mulle muidugi tundus, et Dugin ja ta sõbrad tegid sellist... Kaur Kenderi ja/või Za/Umi tüüpi showd. kindlasti oli neil endal hästi lõbus.

kahjuks see Dugini-osa edenes mul jube aeglaselt, sest oli samal ajal ka Venemaa ajalugu 80ndate lõpust tänaseni ja kuigi seal oli kohti mu olemasolevatesse teadmistesse haakimiseks küll (näiteks polnud mulle viimased 30a meelde tulnud sellise organisatsiooni nagu Pamjat olemasolu, teile on või?), siis seda kõike oli ikkagi päris palju. põhiline moraal oli, et kui me seni olime arvanud, et mõned Vene poliitikud olid aegajalt ikka okeid ka (Jeltsin, Gorbatšov), siis... tegelt ei. Putini pukkisaamise lugu ma ka enne ei teadnud (tl;dr: vene rahvas ütles arvamusküsitlusel, et kui valida oleks tuntud filmitegelaste vahel, siis presidendiks valiksid nad parima meelega Max Stirlitzi. mõeldud, tehtud.)

ja noh, kõik selle läbi lugenuna muidugi ei üllata enam absoluutselt mitte miski, mida see riik või selle juhid või rahvas teevad või ütlevad või arvavad.

mind täiega jäi kummitama see pealkiri ja tundub, et see on võetud Aleksandr Bloki luuletusest, mida Clover raamatus ka tsiteerib, aga eesti keeles ja Johannes Semperi tõlkes seal seda musta tuult päriselt ei ole ikkagi, vaid paistab olevat must õhtu.

[Joel · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent historical work by Charles Clover on the history of Eurasianism, the hodge-podge philosophy peddled by Alexander Dugin. It also functions as a mini biography of Dugin and several other figures in the esoteric circles of Russian politics. In the wake of the Soviet collapse, Dugin latched onto the theory of "sea nations" like the USA locked into struggle with "land nations" like Russia. Sprinkle in fascism, post-modernism, and Orthodoxy and you have the rough outline of Eurasianism.
Unfortunately this theory was adopted by Vladimir Putin and some around him, and is partially responsible for the war now underway in Ukraine. Clover takes us through the history of these ideas and ends shortly after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

[William · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very detailed history of why Russia is so nationalistic. Begins about 1900 and ends not too long ago. Book could have been about three-fourths the size without losing any narrative arc.

[Natalie K · Rating 3 out of 5]

Слава Богу, что я дочитала эту книгу! [Thank God I have finished reading this book!]

So, this book is epically long (I would NOT have read it on my iPhone, had I known how long it would take for me to finish it, because the backlit screen hurts my eyes after a while) and somewhat interesting. It's almost like three books in one.

The first is about the Eurasianists like Trubetskoy who fled the nascent Soviet Union and lived in Eastern Europe during the early aftermath of the Russian Revolution. I did not enjoy this part, despite my normal fascination with White Russians living in exile after the Revolution.

The second is about Lev Gumilev, Anna Akhmatova's son. I admit I misjudged him: I thought he was a pro-Communist fool. He wasn't, and even if he had been, I think those stints in the Gulag would have disabused him of such notions rather quickly. I found this section fascinating—I want to learn more about Gumilev and the Gulag in general.

The third is about Dugin himself, the ostensible subject of this book. It was interesting—better than the first part, but not as good as the second.

This book is a tough read, though. It did feel overly long and like three disparate parts were smashed together. I almost think the author should have written three separate, shorter books, all on this theme of Eurasianism.

[Chet]

This book is written in that grating style of Atlanticist intellectualism, boasting of ostensible objectivity while in fact using every rhetorical trick it can find to portray any and all forces of Russian patriotism as deeply dangerous and delusional. But if you can set aside that annoying arrogance, the text does contain some valuable background information, particularly on Dugin's early life, that I haven't found elsewhere. It confirms for example what I guessed all along, that Dugin's flirtation with Nazi signalling was nothing but the attempts of a young rebel trying to (successfully) piss off his dad. Present day journalists like Ben Norton should be ashamed of themselves when they bring up such a past to excuse pro-Nazi voices who cheered on the recent murder of Dugin's daughter at the hands of terrorists. I.e. "this is just Nazis murdering Nazis, who cares?" The author of Black Wind White Snow would likewise obviously prefer such mystifications prevail in our current discourse. Unfortunately for him and his financial backers the actual stakes of the current Eastern European conflict zones are becoming clearer and clearer to more and more people in the West. What I fear now is what further terrifying actions those financial backers may resort to in reprisal for said clarity. Let's hope Ukraine will find peace with Russia before things get to that point.

[Philip Girvan · Rating 4 out of 5]

A sweeping examination of the concept of Eurasianism that provides historical context and illustrative portrayals of the philosophy's present day gurus, particularly Aleksander Dugin.

Book does a formidable job of demonstrating how disillusionment with the fall of the Soviet Union, often most keenly experienced by those imprisoned and otherwise punished by the regime, led to Eurasianism's gaining currency within the military and eventually with President Putin. Also quite revealing re its influence on nationalist movements in Europe.

Clover has good contacts who are willing to speak to him openly. It's a revealing book and a compelling read.

[Matvey Aksenov · Rating 4 out of 5]

So, a westerner tries to tie the rather pathetic attempt of the Russian government to re-establish USSR to a quasi-nationalistic ideology of Eurasianism through Dugin. Pretty weak, as there's no way you can argue that Eurasianism has a chance of taking hold as a popular ideology: just ask an average ethnic Russian what they think about Buryats or Uzbeks.

Nevertheless, it's very well written and the biographies of Trubetskoy and Gumilev were unexpectedly captivating.

[Alismcg · Rating 4 out of 5]

"As a geopolitician I take the pulse of Russian history – it is my pulse as well, my heart beats with the same rhythm as the heart of my country, my people."

--Dugin
a BIG name

a review to follow

[Murtaza · Rating 5 out of 5]

What ideology is driving modern Russian nationalism? Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine this February, this has transformed from an academic musing to an urgent political question. Though carried out with modern weaponry, Russia’s war feels like a throwback to the brutal interstate conquests that brought Europe to collapse in the 19th and 20th centuries. At at time when the whole world has seemingly come to a post-historical agreement on prioritizing commerce and globalization, Vladimir Putin is sending divisions of tanks and troops across foreign borders, promising new wars to expand the borders of what would be in empire in all but name. After the annexation of Crimea back in 2014, Angela Merkel was already warning that the Russian leader was trapped in “old patterns of thinking.” The extent to which she was right is now jarringly clear.

This is not all coming from nowhere, nor merely as a response to the past missteps of the West. Putin is pursuing a specific idea that would exist even without NATO. The Soviet Union in which he was raised was an empire that had a grand ideological mission that gave its citizens a sense of purpose. Since its collapse, the enfeebled Russian state that replaced it has had nothing comparable to fill the void; until now. “Black Wind, White Snow,” by former Financial Times Moscow bureau chief Charles Clover is an analysis post-Communist Russian nationalism, that zeroes in on a vague, obscure idea that has now come to the center of Russia’s new national identity as promoted by its elites: “Eurasianism.” Published in 2017, the book is an intellectual history of this idea and how it crept from the extreme margins of the Soviet Union to become useful to Russia’s post-Communist elites.

Russia has always been divided between Westernizers (Peter the Great was the paradigmatic example) who saw Russia as a European country, and romantics who held to the idea of Russia as a distinct civilization, a Eurasian one, that had little to do with the West at all. The balance of power between these two ideas has ebbed and flowed over generations. During the Communist Era, when there was a hunger for non-Communist ideas in general, amateur intellectuals like Lev Gumilev imagined a different origin of Russian civilization that would help give meaning to both its past and present. Gumilev laid the foundation for the Eurasian idea, starting his writings about it while a prisoner in the Soviet gulag. He had many eccentric and poorly sourced beliefs about the true origins of Russian history, as well as the unique Russian character and soul. Suffice to say that the impact of intergalactic solar rays on the Russian people do not go unmentioned. More interestingly, Gumilev argued history that the experience of rule by the Mongol Golden Horde was formative in giving Russia its unique character, something that was expressed even in the collectivism of Soviet society. From the Mongols, and other bordering Eurasian peoples, Russian developed deep values of communalism, traditionalism, and “passionarity,” a term that roughly denotes a willingness to take risks and self-sacrifice for a collective. Gumilev invented the word, and it has been cited on more than one occasion by Vladimir Putin himself in speeches to the public. Because Russians are Eurasians, a land-based, conservative people, they are by nature destined to clash with the liberal and cosmopolitan Atlanticists, who have always threatened and hated Russia and by their ineffably nature always will.

Over a century or so, Gumilev’s idea of Eurasianism, which, importantly, contains unique political directives for Russia, has slowly crept from the margins to take on a significant role in modern Russian political discourse. Its most famous exponent today is Aleksandr Dugin, a Russian fascist intellectual who studied under Gumilev and who has published widely on the subject. Dugin is among Russia’s most well-known and influential political exports, and has become something of a traveling activist for the Eurasian idea – building ties with countries like Iran and Serbia that are deemed ethnic or ideological natural allies of a Eurasian Russia. Though he had documented ties with Russia’s security services in the 1990s, the nature of Dugin’s ongoing influence on the Kremlin remains a matter of speculation. Dugin has nonetheless written numerous popular books that have been taught in Russian military academies and have gained an audience on the Western far-right, including “The Foundations of Geopolitics,” and “The Fourth Political Theory.” In addition to scathing attacks on liberalism, these works described Russia as a country with an urgent historical mission to fight liberalism and preserve local cultures that necessitates a clash with the globalizing West. His works have clearly struck a chord with many. This was how Dugin described the response to reading his book by Russian security elites living after the collapse of the Soviet Union:

“It was a kind of psychotherapy for them…Imagine the shock they were feeling: they had always been told the US is our enemy. Suddenly some democrats come to power, and they say, no, the US is our friend. Because there is no ideology. They were all confused. Their job is to aim missiles and they need to be clear…This was once an elite caste, responsible for huge institutes, thousands and thousands of warheads. And suddenly, these democrats come and take away everything from this hugely respected caste. And nobody offers them anything. I come to them and say, ‘America is our enemy, we must aim our missiles at them,’ and they say ‘Yes, that is correct.’ And I explained why.”

Besides an excuse for post-Soviet security elites to maintain their caste power, what does “Eurasianism” actually mean? The answer is not really clear. You could summarize it as the belief that Russia is a civilization that promotes traditional values inspired largely by Orthodox Christianity, that it has its own unique historical experiences, that it is anti-liberal, that it is always under threat by the West, and that it is linked historically to neighboring peoples over whom modern Russia needs to expand its political control. With those rough guidelines, much can be justified. In modern Russia, the fight against global capitalism that gave mission to the Soviet Union has been replaced with a new fight against global liberalism. The ability of Russia to prosecute this war on the same scale as the Soviets did is greatly reduced. As Putin is now showing in Ukraine, however, there is the will to try.

One of the strangest quirks of Eurasianism, an idea that holds that Russians are naturally a unique people embodying the undying spirit of the Mongol Horde, is that no one seems to fully believe in it. It’s most prominent proponents even seem to view it in an instrumental and ironic way. Dugin openly muses in his writings about ideology being a means of manipulating the masses to achieve material ends, with the actual content of the ideology being of limited importance. It’s a view shared by many elites in Russia. This cynical view of ideology makes sense for a generation of men who were raised with the official state hypocrisy of the Soviet Union and are comfortable operating in an environment where everyone merely pretends to believe in what they say. This is a stark contrast with liberal Europe and the United States where sincere belief in the ideology of liberalism as a universal capital-T truth is widespread.

Clover’s book, published in 2017, began to be written well over a decade earlier purely as an academic exercise to understand where Eurasianism came from. But in his own words it was after the 2014 Russian invasion of Crimea that the project started to take on a darker, more urgent character. I have noticed that a new issue of the book is scheduled to be released later this year in light of the even more shocking war now raging across eastern Ukraine, an event that seems to vindicate his thesis about Eurasian expansionism further. What I took away from his intellectual genealogy of Eurasianism was not that it’s a serious idea, but that Russian elites had felt deeply humiliated and disoriented by the collapse of the Soviet Union and needed an ideology that could give them a new sense of mission. They are now in the midst of reclaiming the imperial sphere of influence once claimed by the Soviet Union – a mission justified and rationalized in the writings of men like Gumilev and Dugin – and are doing so by any means necessary and at any cost. Dugin seemed to predict in his books both the 2014 war in Crimea and present one in eastern Ukraine with eerie specificity. His writings predict more Russian conquests still. The idea that Putin’s wars will end if and when Ukraine is conquered seems laughable. They’re only getting started.

The U.S. has mishandled aspects of its relationship with Russia by failing to respect it as an equal. Regardless of how it happened though, the Russian state today is completely radicalized. The prospect of ramped up defense spending by the U.S. does not please me at all. But after coming to a deeper understanding of what is driving Russian expansionism against its neighbors, I feel like it’s probably prudent to give the Ukrainian government as many billions of dollars of advanced arms as necessary to help grind the Russian war machine to a halt and perhaps dissuade it from launching more wars still. Putin and those around him are operating with an entirely different map of the world, an alternate reality of a Russian-centered empire spanning across Asia and Europe, which they are now trying to bring into existence with brute force. While most countries have accepted an End of History focus on globalization and trade, Russians are re-enchanting the world. Fantastical as it is, Eurasianism is a useful tool to help pursue this aim. And like any other fantasy, it can only really be stopped by harsh confrontation with reality. Orwell described this apparently timeless dynamic best, and I’ll let him conclude:

"We are all capable of believing things which we know to be untrue, and then, when we are finally proved wrong, impudently twisting the facts so as to show that we were right. Intellectually, it is possible to carry on this process for an indefinite time: the only check on it is that sooner or later a false belief bumps up against solid reality, usually on a battlefield."

[Dmitry · Rating 1 out of 5]

(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)

Браслеты на браслеты
Браслеты на браслеты
Аж на запястьях уж мест нету
Пакуют в ПАЗ, будто в брикеты
Браслеты на браслеты
Да браслеты на браслеты
И ты от бати их унаследуй
Наручники эти нам как скрепы

Я выскажу довольно удивительную версию, но мне кажется, эта книга была написана по просьбе Кремля. Во-первых, книга была переведена и издана в России в 2017 году. Это странно, потому что острые политические книги о России перестали издаваться почти сразу, как Путин стал президентом России. Я могу ошибаться, ибо интерес к книгам у меня появился много позже 2000 года, но в тот момент, когда я стал активно интересоваться российской политикой, я смог найти очень небольшое количество переведённых на русский язык книг зарубежных авторов о путинской России. Если бы я самостоятельно не изучил английский, я бы так и думал, что о Путине никто на Западе не пишет. В реальности, конечно, на Западе вышло огромное количество книг о Путине. Россияне даже не подозревают, как много книг было выпущено о той России, что построил Путин. Это я к тому, что в России на русском языке публикуются только дозволенные Кремлём книги. Является ли эта книга дозволенной? Я прочитал чуть больше половины, поэтому не могу сказать, что там в самом конце, но по тому, что я прочитал можно сделать вывод, что автор не является критиком Путина и путинской России. Его книга воспринимается, как попытка объяснить иностранцам, что имперский пути России, которым якобы движется страна, был «не вчера придуман», т.е. что он «естественен» для России и что он был заложен российской аристократией. Конечно, это глупость полная и та идеология которую пытается выдавить автор из всего того что он нашёл в истории России XX века ничего кроме смеха у меня не вызывает. Ну, это как если взять Алекса Джонса (Alex Jones) и сказать что он является ярким примером крупного идеологического мейнстрима в США. Алекс Джонс является либо сумасшедшим, либо, что вернее, человеком, делающим деньги на всём том бреде, что он несёт.

Я всё думал, неужели автор ничего не скажет о товарище Дугине? И вот, где-то в середине, автор посвящает целую главу Дугину. Дугину! Т.е. Дугин у автора является националистом? Это, честное слово, смешно! Может тогда Алекс Джонс является консервативным американским идеологом? Или всё-таки фриком? Вот то же самое можно сказать и про Дугина. Дугин что-то пытался создать в 90-х, однако ни при Ельцине, ни при Путине он не смог создать ни парию, ни организацию, ни даже группу сторонников. Почему, когда речь заходит о русских националистах, непременно нужно указывать в качестве главных идеологов русского национализма именно фриков, фашистов и просто городских сумасшедших? Даже в 90-х годах национализм не был популярен в РФ. То, сколько голосов получило ЛДПР на выборах, стало результатом не силы ЛДПР и их идей, а ненависти к Ельцину со стороны народа, а так же страх перед КПРФ. Поэтому многие голосовали за ЛДПР. Но даже в том случаи ЛДПР никогда не имело большинство мест в государственной Думе. Так зачем из русского национализма, который даже в 90-х годах не имел сильных лидеров и идеологов, делать чучело? Ответ очень простой: для того чтобы было чем пугать Западное общество. Вам не нравится Путин? Так посмотрите, кто может прийти в Кремль вместо него. Неужели вы хотите, чтобы Дугин стал президентом? Примерно так переводится книга на понятный язык.

Конечно, книга посвящена не только Дугину, но идеи евразийства. Что это за идеология? Трудно сказать, так как мало кто смог чётко сформировать основную идеологическую базу этого движения. В России мало того что Китай воспринимается (всегда воспринимался) в качестве угрозы, но и Евразия как таковая всегда рассматривалась как чуждая для России территория. Чуждость чувствуется в каждом проявлении, начиная от внешнего вида людей и заканчивая религией. В России всегда люди предпочитали общаться, торговать и путешествовать по Европе, а не по Евразии. Так что насчёт евразийства? Да его нет. Точнее, это маргинальная идея, которую используют, чтобы оправдать отсутствие демократии. Вот не хочет власть давать людям свободные СМИ, честные выборы, права человека, вот поэтому и заявляет, что у нас, типа как, евразийская национальная идея, а в ней нет места ни демократии, ни правам человека. Я хочу сказать, что цель всей этой идеи или идеологии евразийства только одна – оправдать диктаторскую природу российского режима. При этом богатые люди в России, предпочитают детей отправлять учиться не в Дели и Алмату, а в Лондон и Берлин. Если хотите узнать, какую идеологию исповедует России, просто посмотрите на тот стиль жизни, который придерживается российская элита, российский высший класс.

Но я сказал, что с моей точки зрения книга стала результатом заказа со стороны Кремля, а также упомянул, что обычно в России издаются только одобренные Кремлём книги. И это всё? Нет, это не всё. Более того, это наименее важный момент. Я думаю, книга была необходима путинскому режиму как противовес тому, что делал Алексей Навальный. А что он делал? А вот он как раз делал то, о чём я написал только что. Он показывал всему миру, что путинские олигархи и чиновники, есть не что иное, как сплошное ворьё, которое отправляет своих детей на Запад, отдыхают со своими жёнами и любовницами на Западе и покупают недвижимость так же на Западе. Другим словами, вся путинская идеология есть идеология воровства и гедонизма. Именно поэтому эта книга идеально ложится в канву путинского нарратива об «особом пути России», «строительстве пятой/либеральной империи» и так далее. Вся суть путинской власти в том, чтобы придумывать идеологические фантомы, которыми якобы руководствуется Путин в своей международной политике. Но это фантомы или как сказал маркиз де Кюстин, фасад. Вот то, что пишет автор этой книги, есть не реальность, а фасад. Никакого русского национализма или евразийства Путин не строит и не придерживается. Как сказал Алексей Навальный: он - вор. И это самое точное определение, как Путина, так и его политики.

Автор начинает своё исследование евразийства с работ и биографии белых иммигрантов, работ Льва Гумилёва и Дугина. Вот только какое они имеют отношение к нынешнему русскому национализму? В российской политике, начиная с 90-х годов, были популярны лишь левые идеи, которые ассоциировались с КПРФ (но которые ими не ограничивались) и центриские идеи, которые ассоциировались с Яблоком (социал-демократы?), СПС, и правительственными партиями. ЛДПР аккумулировало националистическую риторику, но при этом не была идеологическим институтом (think tank) этой идеологии, в том смысле, что не занималась совершенствованием и адаптацией националистических идей, так же как в ЛДПР не было видных идеологов и мыслителей русского национализма. Короче, автор пишет о том, что является маргинальным в России. Наделять Путина или кого-то в нынешнем Кремле в качестве сторонников евразийства, значит просто не понимать, как устроена России и что вообще из себя представляет современная путинская Россия. Поэтому и читать эту книгу, особого смысла нет.

Что касается российской аудитории, то это очень типично для россиян, искать чёрную кошку в тёмной комнате, в которой этой кошки и нет. Это напоминает позицию многих россиян что, мол, и на Западе есть коррупция, и выборы там такие же фейковые как в России и демократия такая же, как России и институты там работают также как в России. Я хочу сказать, что россияне поверили в очень опасную идею – правды не существует и все врут. Именно поэтому они так относятся к тому, что происходит сегодня в Украине. Они считают что «не всё так однозначно», со всеми вытекающими из этого последствиями. Трудно сказать, что они думают по поводу погибших мирных граждан Украины, но не удивлюсь, если они считают, что все эти картинки с разрушенными городами являются, по их мнению, фейком. «Всей правды нам не узнать», «не всё так однозначно», «а что насчёт США?» и так далее. Поэтому не удивительно, что они смогли найти евразийство в своём подъезде, ибо «не всё так однозначно».

P.S. Что касается меня, то как не удивительно, я разделяю некоторые положения умеренных националистов (хотя себя не причисляю к националистам). К примеру, я согласен с их позицией касаемо культурного тупика совместного сожительства одних народов с другими. В целом, умеренный национализм разделяется многими людьми в восточной Европе (Польша, Венгрия, Украина, Беларусь, Россия, Сербия и т.д.). Так что национализм национализму рознь. И не нужно смешивать национализм и фашизм, о чём многие люди почему-то забывают.

I'll give a rather surprising version, but I think this book was written at the request of the Kremlin. First, the book was translated and published in Russia in 2017. This is strange because edgy political books about Russia stopped being published almost as soon as Putin became president of Russia. I may be wrong because my interest in books started much later than 2000, but at the time when I became actively interested in Russian politics, I could find very few books translated into Russian by foreign authors about Putin's Russia. If I hadn't studied English on my own, I would have thought that no one in the West was writing about Putin. In reality, of course, there are a huge number of books about Putin in the West. Russians don't even realize how many books have been published about the Russia that Putin built. That's what I mean: only books allowed by the Kremlin are published in Russian. Is this book authorized? I read a little more than half of it, so I can't say what's at the very end, but from what I read, I can conclude that the author is not a critic of Putin and Putin's Russia. His book is perceived as an attempt to explain to foreigners that Russia's imperial path, by which the country is supposedly moving, was "not invented yesterday", i.e., that it is "natural" for Russia and that it was laid down by the Russian aristocracy. Of course, this is nonsense, and the ideology that the author is trying to squeeze out of all that he found in the history of Russia in the XX century does not cause anything but laughter in me. Well, it's like taking Alex Jones and saying that he is a prime example of a major ideological mainstream in the United States. Alex Jones is either a lunatic or, more accurately, a man who makes money off of all the nonsense he spouts.

I kept thinking about whether or not the author would say anything about comrade Dugin. And then, somewhere in the middle, the author dedicates an entire chapter to Dugin. Dugin! So the author's Dugin is a nationalist? That is, frankly, ridiculous! Maybe Alex Jones is a conservative American ideologue? Or is he a freak? You could say the same thing about Dugin. Dugin tried to create something in the 90s, but neither under Yeltsin nor under Putin was he able to create a party, an organization, or even a group of supporters. Why, when it comes to Russian nationalists, do we have to point to freaks, fascists, and just plain urban lunatics as the main ideologues of Russian nationalism? Even in the 90's, nationalism was not popular in the Russian Federation. The number of votes the LDPR received in the elections was not the result of the strength of the LDPR and their ideas but of people's hatred of Yeltsin and fear of the CPRF. That's why many people voted for the LDPR. But even in that case, LDPR never had a majority of seats in the State Duma. So why make a scarecrow out of Russian nationalism, which, even in the 90s, did not have strong leaders and ideologues? The answer is very simple: to have something to scare Western society with. "You don't like Putin? Well, look who could come to the Kremlin to replace him. Do you really want Dugin to become president?" This is roughly how the book is translated into an understandable language.

Of course, the book is not only about Dugin but the idea of Eurasianism. What kind of ideology is this? It is difficult to say, as few people have been able to form the main ideological base of this movement. In Russia, not only is China perceived (always has been) as a threat, but Eurasia as such has always been seen as a territory alien to Russia. Alienation is felt in every manifestation, from people's appearance to religion. People in Russia have always preferred to socialize, trade, and travel in Europe rather than Eurasia. So what about Eurasianism? It doesn't exist. More precisely, it is a marginal idea that is used to justify the lack of democracy. The government doesn't want to give people free media, fair elections, and human rights, so it declares that we have, as it were, a Eurasian national idea, which is why the country has no room for democracy or human rights in it. I want to say that the purpose of this whole idea or ideology of Eurasianism is only one - to justify the dictatorial nature of the Russian regime. At the same time, rich people in Russia prefer to send their children to study not in Delhi and Almaty, but in London and Berlin. If you want to know what ideology Russia professes, just look at the lifestyle of the Russian elite, the Russian upper class.

But I said that from my point of view, the book was the result of an order from the Kremlin, and I also mentioned that, usually, only books approved by the Kremlin are published in Russia. Is that all? No, that's not all. Moreover, that is the least important point. I think the book was necessary for Putin's regime as a counterbalance to what Alexei Navalny was doing. What was he doing? Well, he was doing exactly what I just wrote about. He was showing the world that Putin's oligarchs and officials are nothing but thieves who send their children to the West, vacation with their wives and mistresses in the West, and buy real estate in the West. In other words, Putin's entire ideology is an ideology of thievery and hedonism. That is why this book fits perfectly into Putin's narrative of "Russia's special path," "building a fifth/liberal empire," and so on. The whole point of Putin's power is to invent ideological phantoms that supposedly guide Putin's international policy. But these are phantoms or, as the Marquis de Custine said, a facade. What the author of this book writes is not reality but a facade. Putin is not building or adhering to any Russian nationalism or Eurasianism. As Alexei Navalny said, he is a thief. And this is the most accurate definition of both Putin and his policies.

The author begins his study of Eurasianism with the works and biographies of white immigrants, the works of Lev Gumilev and Dugin. But what do they have to do with current Russian nationalism? In Russian politics since the 1990s, only leftist ideas, which were associated with the CPRF (but not limited to them), and centrist ideas, which were associated with Yabloko (social democrats?), SPS, and government parties, have been popular. The LDPR accumulated nationalist rhetoric, but it was not an ideological institution (think tank) of this ideology, in the sense that it was not engaged in improving and adapting nationalist ideas, just as the LDPR did not have prominent ideologists and thinkers of Russian nationalism. In short, the author is writing about what is marginalized in Russia. To label Putin or anyone in the current Kremlin as a proponent of Eurasianism is to simply not understand how Russia is organized and what modern Putin's Russia is in general. That's why there's not much point in reading this book.

As for the Russian audience, it is typical for Russians to look for a black cat in a black room where there is no cat. This is reminiscent of the position of many Russians who say there is corruption in the West, elections there are as fake as in Russia, democracy is the same as in Russia, and institutions there work the same way as in Russia. I want to say that Russians have believed in a very dangerous idea that there is no truth and everyone lies. That is why they have such an attitude to what is happening in Ukraine today. They believe that "everything is not so clear-cut," with all the consequences that this implies. It's hard to say what they think about the dead civilians of Ukraine, but I wouldn't be surprised if they think that all those pictures of destroyed cities are, in their opinion, fake. "We can't know the whole truth," "Not everything is so clear-cut," "What about the US?" and so on. So it is not surprising that they could find Eurasianism in their driveway, for "not everything is so unambiguous."

P.S. As for me, surprisingly enough, I share some of the positions of moderate nationalists (although I do not consider myself a nationalist). For example, I agree with their position on the cultural impasse of cohabitation of some people with others. In general, moderate nationalism is shared by many people in Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Serbia, etc.). And there is no need to mix nationalism and fascism, which many people forget for some reason.

[Jeremy · Rating 4 out of 5]

A compelling and well-reasoned overview of the philosophical underpinnings driving Putinism. My biggest takeaway is that those of us on the American side should really take time to actually understand what these things mean instead of immediately jumping into conspiratorial Russophobia or, god forbid, an even further acceleration of reheated Cold War jingoism

[Myles · Rating 4 out of 5]

A few days ago, in an appeal broadcast across Russia and translated for the world, President Vladimir Putin justified his recent call up of an additional 300,000 Russian soldiers to join the patriotic fight to dismantle the independent state of Ukraine.

His immediate goal was to shore up support for his unilateral annexation of Eastern Ukraine provinces.

Putin claimed that the West hates Russians and took trillions of dollars out of the country at the close of the 20th century. Experts tell us that Boris Yeltsin, his cronies, and Putin after them stole roughly the equivalent of one-half of all the wealth possessed by Russians following the demise of the Soviet Union. An estimated US $800 billion.

Rewriting the history of Russia did not begin with Vladimir Putin, nor did Russian nationalism.

I recommend as a healthy playbook to Putin’s appeal to Russian patriots Charles Clover’s “Black Wind, White Snow: The Rise of Russia’s New Nationalism” published in 2016, after the Russian incursion into Crimea but before its invasion of mainland Ukraine.

Putin’s appeal to patriotism is confusing to the lay reader probably because it has many different roots in the Russian psyche.

Clover identifies four strains of the “new” Russian nationalism: an ethnic chauvinism or Pan-Slavism; Eurasianism, or a strategic block of nations willing and able to undo the hegemony of “the West;” Sovietism; and the Orthodox religious confessional.

Several of these strains appear in Putin’s speech and authoritarianism is a consistent theme in Russian nationalism and, indeed, in Putin’s speech.

A few weeks ago Russia was rocked by the apparent assasination of Darya Dugina by car bombing. Dugina was the daughter of Aleksandr Dugin, a longtime voice of Russian nationalism and confidante to Putin’s upper circle.

Clover follows the evolution of Dugin’s thought and influence, although he falls short in ascribing Putin present state of mind directly to Dugin’s most famous and controversial work “Foundations of Geopolitics.”

This is the Eurasionist school of Russian nationalism based on earlier suspect works of linguistics and philosophy, and political science.

What I find equally telling about the current brand of Russian chauvinism is the reliance on the Soviet experiment, when Russia reached the apotheosis of its world power.

In the early Soviet Union the communists attempted to co-opt the many nations encompassed by the Soviet Union. It was a time when over 200 languages were spoken in those lands and even Stalin couldn’t control them all without a little hanky-panky on the margins.(Probably more than a little.)

The assembly of the Soviet Union was the most blatant of many attempts to pacify the regions. Nationalism in that Russia was always a double-edged sword. The threat of violence breaking out was a consistent worry of the period.

Putin’s regime is based as much on clan politics as it has ever been in Russia. It features the settling of scores (witnesses the epidemic of oligarchs “falling” out of windows), and Murder Inc. tactics for opponents such as the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko and the murder numerous journalists including Anna Politkovskaya.

According to Clover, Putin’s authority rests on his ability to problem-solve and adjudicate in elite disputes. In his Russia general collusion is a spectacle of awesome despotic power.

And there are few rules between the cliques and clans.

One of my favourite quotes in the book about the diffuse nature of power in Moscow is that “the Kremlin has many towers.”

I also found noteworthy in the outsize power of political spindoctors in the Kremlin. They are constantly polling the public. They are their own worst enemy. There’s a lot of “whatever the truth may be” thrown around at higher levels of the Kremlin. That can’t be good for any government needing to deal with the same problems yours and my government face every day.

And I’m sure some of those Kremlin spindoctors had a hand in this week’s speech. They want Russians to feel the guilt and debt owing to heroes long gone by, whether ethnic Russian, Soviet, or Orthodox.

Fail your country now and you fail it for all time.

[Egor Prosvirnin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Неплохое исследование по истории евразийства

Но какое-то незавершенное, в частности, ощутимо проседает ключевая часть про переход этих всех изумительных историй из адовой маргиналии в мейнстрим.

[Matti Paasio · Rating 5 out of 5]

If you want a good man to give you a summary of Putin and his "ideology," Charles Clover is your boy. He convinced me to read Umberto Eco's FOUCAULT'S PENDULUM, and finish it, and that is saying something. Everyone and their dog should read this book. Hands down, it is the best of its kind.

[Alex Kondrashin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Captivating account of Russian ideological struggles and eternal search of national identity.

[Joel · Rating 4 out of 5]

I’ll be the first to admit I’m baffled by the decisions of Russian decision-makers. Take the most recent dustup between Vlad and his personal chef Evgeny Prigozhin, who it seems was assassinated this week for his wild “march on Moscow” in June. Prigozhin had everything an Austin Powers super-villain would want: a billionaire, a personal army, a friendship with the dictator, notoriety. So, why march on Moscow? I mean humiliate Vlad on the world stage, how did he think that was going to go? It was so bizarre that I assumed it was a “false flag” – that Vlad asked him to raise hell to try and weed out opposition in the armed forces. I was wrong. Which brings me back to the Russians: if you march on Moscow, why stop half way? And if you do, take your billions and flee to Miami and turn state’s evidence. But keep on as if nothing had happened? You’re gonna die in a fiery plane crash.

I was equally baffled by Vlad’s Ukraine war. I assumed as he amassed troops that he would force the issue, try and get Ukraine to miscalculate. Maybe hold some fake referenda in the Donbas. But a land invasion in Europe in 2023? Yet here we are.

When I get caught flat-footed, my knee-jerk reaction is to read more. In this process, I came across a Financial Times Article on Lev Gumilev and Putin called “Passion, Putin and Power“. This led me to a book by the same author called “Black Wind, White Snow” (by the same author, Charles Clover).

This in turn led me to Aleksandr Dugin; to Lev Gumilev; and others. “Black Wind” is about the advance in Russia’s philosophical thought of a geopolitical idea called “Eurasianism”. It would be akin to America’s idea of Manifest Destiny. Russian leaders – Tsars and dictators and premiers – are not comfortable with Russia being a “Slavic stronghold”. Theirs are always imperial plans. Communism was just that. The economic model was fairly irrelevant to Russian geo-politicians. It was the destiny of Russia to rule Eurasia and challenge the west. USSR did that.

Putin inherited Russia at its smallest state since maybe Catherine or even Ivan the Terrible. A Slavic homeland, which didn’t really fit in with his vision. Eurasianism was a discovery or description or perhaps an articulation of the intercourse of invasion and commerce across the great Eurasian steppes that make the Russians different from the Europeans. It was an explanation that resonated with a nation in deep crisis after the disaster following the fall of communism; and gave meaning to their suffering (read here about ‘passionarity’, Gumilev’s singular idea).

“Black Wind” is a story of how that particular philosophy was articulated, about 100 years ago, and its slow way to the mainstream in modern Russia. As it has to be, its a story about men and women; and their writings and how those writings seeded the future, through today. And brought war back to Europe.

It’s a fascinating read, well worth the effort. The only advice I’d have for the author – he finished the book with a rant about how Eurasianism is nonsense, which sort of undid the previous 300 pages telling the story of how it came to be. Whether you like an idea or not (and Clover is clearly a lefty – like most journalists – and wants to make sure his contempt for anything that even smells like ‘fascism’ is clear), ideas will take root only if they resonate. And in Russia, very clearly they have a well developed idea of what their role in the world and specifically in Eurasia should be.

What Clover gets right – Russia is best represented by her novelists; and Clover highlights not only the great ones (Tolstoy etc.) but also the unknown writers and how they inched Russia towards war during Russia’s “Weimar Republic” moments (THAT is a great analogy). All told, good book, worth the read.

[Marks54 · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a good book about some strange people and some stranger ideas. It is the intellectual history of "Eurasianism" that has developed as an expansive mutation of Russian nationalism and came into vogue to support the consolidation of power and foreign policy of Vladimir Putin, especially since he assumed a third term. The basic argument (such as it may be) is a geopolitical argument for an enhanced Russia as the central power on the Eurasian land mass. This idea is tied to the work of Halford Mackinder in political geography and the book features a famous illustration by Mackinder as used in Alexander Dugin's 1997 work on geopolitics. The book profiles the work of a number of minor Russian scholars most of whom suffered under the Soviet regime, including Nickolay Trubetskoy, Lev Gumilev, and Alexander Dugan. It then suggests how these ideas help motivate Russian political and military actions in Ukraine, the Crimea, and the Caucaus region.

Why is this interesting?

To start with, the recent actions of Putin have put Russia back into the limelight as it has not been since Communism went out of business. A new generation has grown up since then and it is worth while to learn more about Russia since 2000. The book is a nice history that way and what is important to me was not the ideas of Eurasianism but more how these ideas have been used to support the reestablishment of Russian autocracy.

This book is useful in clarifying the audience for half-baked political ideas. I had always assumed that political ideas were targeted towards the masses. Clover's book shows that this is not the case. The point is for the ideas to unify Putin's cronies so that everyone supporting the Putin regime can use these ideas to make sure that everyone in the ruling elite is "on the same page". This strange nationalist ideology is a management tool to enhance cohesion among rulers and administrators. It does not make any difference that the ideas are bad ones - anyone who followed 2016 US presidential elections knows that whether ideas were true or reasonable had little to do with whether they were useful to the political class. Clover's book also clarifies that Putin is no simple autocrat or closet communist but has crafted a blend of ideology, simplified Russian history, and dreams of global Russian expansion. This is not to say that Putin is not a power hungry autocrat but rather that he has made use of a wide range of resources in gaining and enhancing his power. The book is also valuable as one of many potential sources about the investigations of the Trump administration and its dealings with Russia.

It is not surprising that these odd geopolitical ideas can still influence people. Mackinder' work, even if discredited now, was very influential in its day. This is true for the US where Mackinder's influence can be seen in association with the work of Alfred Thayer Mahan.

[John Goodell · Rating 4 out of 5]

First off, Clover's book is about as close to an un-biased portrait of Putin's Russia as I have encountered. Whether discussing the Crimean situation or the U.S. military base in Kyrgyzstan, Clover presents all perspectives and cites sources from both sides. Granted, towards the end he begins to side more with the Western view that Putin's rise and Russia's actions should be condemned, but he largely stays true to the historical texts and people who influenced the Eurasianist ideology.

Any Westerner who wants to better understand the long, often fraught relationship between the U.S. and Russia, especially as it stands today, must pick up this book. It's a very accessible read, regardless of your background in Russian history and politics, and reads more like a novel than anything else given the enigmatic characters involved in this truly incredible history.

Clover masterfully traces Eurasianism from its early roots in pre-Soviet times, to its slow dissemination by professors and underground groups alike throughout the later Soviet period, and then finally its infiltration into the ranks of the Kremlin under Yeltsin and Putin. Considering the suppression of orthodox Christian values during the Soviet era and a weakening sense of what it meant to be Russian, it is no surprise that Putin's nationalist sentiment has begun to take wind in recent years. He timed it well with a rise in commodities prices during the 2000s, a period which saw the livelihoods of Russians increase substantially. Of course, we can only speculate where Eurasianism will go from here, especially amidst the strengthening ties between Russia and China, and the financial rating agency the two countries have developed as a rival to the Western agencies responsible for deciding the quality of assets everywhere.

"Eurasianism is a forgery that has superseded the original - not because it is a good forgery, but because it is so audaciously false that it undermines the true"-Clover

[Анатолій Бабинський · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is not an academic study but somewhat investigative journalism. A rather excellent and concise description of how the "neo-Eurasian" idea flowed from one environment to another until, with Dugin's presentation, it entered the rhetoric of the Russian regime. As for the shortcomings, the author seems to have "unlocked" this whole masquerade behind which Russian imperialism is simply hiding but still accepts what his interlocutors tell him at face value. As for Ukraine, he does not know or understand it at all (perhaps this book would be different now, but not 100%). His picture is in the window of the correspondent bureau in Moscow. Where everything around, including Ukraine, is a periphery without its subjectivity (for example, the Revolution of Dignity is described in it as a clash between "the West" and Russia, where Ukrainians are simply victims of the game of "the powerful of this world." And there are a lot of such Russian propaganda stamps ). The reading is interesting, but to a large extent, it is "reading from the surface."

Це не академічне дослідження, а скоріше журналістське розслідування. Досить добрий і стислий опис того як "неоєвразійська" ідея (і ідея пасіонарності Гумільова) перетікала з одного середовища в інше поки з подачі Дугіна вона не увійшла в риторику російського режиму. Щодо недоліків, то автор ніби й "розкусив" весь цей маскарад за яким просто ховається російський імперіалізм, але все одно місцями приймає з чисту монету те, що йому говорять його співрозмовники. Щодо України, то її він цілком не знає і не розуміє (можливо тепер би ця книга була іншою, але не 100%). Його картинка - це вікно "корпункту" в Москві. Де все, що навколо, включно з Україною, це периферія без власної суб'єктності (до прикладу, Революція Гідності в нього описана як зіткнення Заходу і Росії де українці просто жертви гри "сильних світу цього". І таких російський пропагандистських штампів там є чимало). Чтиво цікаве, але великою мірою є "зчитуванням з поверхні".

[Mubeen Irfan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Russia is an intriguing country. Possibly because of her Soviet past, closed society and culture of secrecy propagated by the country's establishment. However, when she opened her gates in 1990s all hell broke loose and the country ended up making certain Billionaires who were later reined in by the deep state. This book however is upon Russian nationalism or a concept known as Eurasianism.

Frankly, I had never read about this term before starting this book but it has become a very popular political movement in Russia. The sudden rise of nationalism in many of the European countries, after this concept was banished post second world war 2, has been a cause of concern for world en masse. This book details the birth and adaptation of Russia's own nationalism and how it is playing a big influence on Putin's actions in Europe. Cases in example are Crimea & Ostessia. It is a detailed account on the Russian philosphers who birthed this concept of Eurasianism and how their sphere of influence kept growing which in turn led to Kremlin owning their ideas.

First half of the book, which is on the evolution of these ideas, is really boring. It picks up pace later when the author details different actual events which happened in USSR & Russia and possible theories and motives behind them. I especially liked the account of 1991's coup (or was it?) against Gorbachov. Read it if you are a geo-politics fan but it might take a hundred and fifty pages or so to get any interesting.

[Daniel · Rating 4 out of 5]

A worthwhile and clearly well-researched account of the rise of nationalist views in Russia today. Despite the ambitious undertaking, the transition between the author's associations of previous and current players, beginning in 20th century Russia, and their impact with Kremlin thinking today was well written. I did find certain sections of the book to be repetitive and did not mind. Understandably, the legitimacy and/or motivations of certain events are questionable given large amounts of undocumented history. Regardless, the author did a good job of tracing the origins of Eurasianism, "a theory of Russian national identity based on ethnicity and geography," from earlier writings and events during Soviet-Russia up until recent times. Above all, this book is entertaining and does encourage further reading.

[Scott Martin · Rating 3 out of 5]

(3.5 stars) This work attempts to look at the history and evolution about Russia current national philosophy and governing style. The Novayrussia and Eurasian school of thought go back over a century, as several key scholars and intellectuals sought to define what is was and is to be Russian. This is not as readable or light as comparative reading between Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky, but it has a purpose.

There is a lot thrown into this book, and many a Western reader will learn far more than the my expected about Russian nationalist thought. Still, the writing can get a bit dry and academic, and it can sometimes require more thought to get through than other works. This should really be for the serous Russian scholar.

It would be interesting to see if the author sees things the same way since the invasion of Ukraine, etc (the cutoff for this book was 2014).

[Austin Barselau · Rating 4 out of 5]

An intriguing exposition of the ideological genesis of Russia’s New Right, from the minds of fringe bohemian scribblers to the Kremlin operatives who have turned to it as a means of statecraft. Clover traces the lineage of this “new nationalism” over the course of the 20th century, and shows not only how it earned newfound currency in the tumultuous, soul-searching years after the fall of the Soviet Union, but also how such wanton mythic yearnings were weaponized under Putin. While some of the author’s conclusions are leaping and overdrawn, they nonetheless reveal how the dark and dangerous underworld of conspiratorial, power-crazed, and delusional peddlers of Russia’s illusive imperial hegemony has gone mainstream as a political movement in Russian politics.

[Matthew Griffiths · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was an interesting account of a political philosophy which in recent years has gained increasing purchase. The book does a lot to explain the intellectual background and development of the Euraisianist and modern Russian Nationalist thought starting from the time of the Revolution right through to the collapse of the Soviet Union and into current events. The setting of the scene that the book starts with is a little long winded and would definitely put off all but the dedicated reader but the discussion towards the latter end of the book looking at how much of this political thought has been applied since Putin's rise is worth sticking around for.