Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military

by Stephen Peter Rosen

How and when do military innovations take place? Do they proceed differently during times of peace and times of war? In Winning the Next War , Stephen Peter Rosen argues that armies and navies are not forever doomed to "fight the last war." Rather, they are able to respond to shifts in the international strategic situation. He also discusses the changing relationship between the civilian innovator and the military bureaucrat. In peacetime, Rosen finds, innovation has been the product of analysis and the politics of military promotion, in a process that has slowly but successfully built military capabilities critical to American military success. In wartime, by contrast, innovation has been constrained by the fog of war and the urgency of combat needs. Rosen draws his principal evidence from U.S. military policy between 1905 and 1960, though he also discusses the British army's experience with the battle tank during World War I.

Genres: Military Fiction, History, War, Nonfiction, Technology

288 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1991

About the author

Stephen Peter Rosen is a Harvard College Professor and Beton Michael Kaneb Professor of National Security and Military Affairs in the Government Department in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University.

Reviews

[Mad Hab · Rating 5 out of 5]

The book is just amazing, even after more than 30 years of publishing, still relevant and informative.

[Trav · Rating 4 out of 5]

Rosen writes a counter to Posen's argument made in The Sources of Military Doctrine. Examining organizational innovation in peace and war, as well as how technological innovation occurs, Rosen makes a compelling case that the military is not the recalcitrant, ultra-conservative, anti-innovationist organisation depicted by Posen.

In times of peace it is through the military's appreciation of the international system in which it must operate that innovation begins, and it is fostered through the personnel policies that support the organizational learning needed to ensure the growth of these innovations. The examples of Moffet's development of carrier aviation, the embrace of Ellis's concept of amphibious operations by the USMC are presented clearly and provided excellent evident in support of Rosen's thesis on peacetime innovation.

Wartime innovation is more difficult to generalise. As, generally, time available for the organizational changes possible in peacetime, innovation while fighting is generally more difficult. Rosen argues that innovation during this period is more the result of changes in the strategic measures of effectiveness against which the success of military operations are assessed. However, the case of US submarine operations in the Pacific provide excellent support for the effectiveness of personnel-focused organisational policies, as the decentralised nature of submarine command, and the lower ranks of commanders enabled the injection of new blood untainted by the overcautious training instilled in the prewar generation of commanders. This led to significant increases in merchant tonnage sunk.

Finally, Rosen discounts the argument that scientists, as the SMEs in technology, should direct the process of innovation (Rosen's uses the scientists own definition of innovation as the decision on which technology to pursue) Using the pathway to the development of guided missile and nuclear weapons technology as cases in support of successful military-driven innovation, Rosen uses the words and prediction made by the scientists themselves to highlight their inability to effectively manage the uncertainty inherent in future planning. Rather, military technological innovation, Rosen argues, is a matter of uncertainty management that balances concern over potential enemies, and the costs and benefits of new technology. (p.249)

In summary: A well constructed and argued book. Rosen clearly states his thesis and draws out the facts of the 21 military innovation he examines to support it. A must read for anyone that reads The Sources of Military Doctrine.

[Nate Huston · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was an enjoyable read. While I'm not sure I fully agree with all of the author's contentions, he has some thought-provoking ideas and he presents them very clearly. As with Posen, I'm afraid he tended to focus a bit too much on those case studies that "proved" his thesis, but in the context of looking for useful ideas, Rosen's book is very valuable.

Most valuable, I found was Rosen's contention that intraservice rivalry is a significant pressure for innovation in the military. While I'm not prepared to go so far as to say it's the only force, he makes a very compelling case for the bureaucratic friction between different branches and its ability to spur innovation. Incidentally, he points to the competition for resources between branches as a major factor, which is the same argument Cote makes, except at the inter-, instead of intra-, service level. Additionally, Rosen makes a very compelling case for the importance of "breeding" a new cadre or generation of officers through the promotion system in order to institutionalize an innovation (or, in some cases, innovation writ large).

His discussion of wartime innovation is intriguing, and I agree with his supposition that the fog and confusion of wartime often works against innovation (people want to stick with what works when the chips are down). However, I think that applies more to institutionalized innovation than innovation in general. For the same reason people marginalize innovation (their lives are on the line), they may in fact embrace it if "the old way" isn't working. He alludes to this fact, discussing the need for new measures of effectiveness, but is skeptical of the ability of such new measures to a) be converted into tasks and b) be institutionalized in time of war. He believes the timeline necessary is, in general, too big a hurdle to overcome. While I am in agreement as to the level of challenge, I'm not sure I am as skeptical that it cannot be overcome.

The primary problem I have with the structure of this book is the separation of technology as a separate study in innovation. While he makes an effort to show that technological innovation can be separated, leaving organizational and doctrinal innovation, I think he falls short. The one case it seemed to apply to was the targeting of merchant shipping by the US Navy in the Second World War. Outside of that, however, every other "organizational" innovation substantially involved a technology. So much so that the extent to which he separate's its impact weakens his argument. Some have a problem with his further separation of peace from wartime innovation, but I think he makes a compelling case for the fact that the environments and forces are different enough in each to merit separate consideration.

[Nicko · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent examination of innovation in peacetime, wartime, and technology. Although the technological innovation chapter is rather lacking, the other two do a good job at tentative theory building. Moreover, Rosen's work is extremely well-researched. Exemplary for anyone engaging in qualitative methods.

[Terry · Rating 4 out of 5]

Overall this was a very interesting book, looking at how various militaries handled innovation throughout the last century. While written while the Soviet Union still existed, many of it's lessons are timeless.

[John · Rating 3 out of 5]

A common accusation levied against the military is that it is often stuck fighting the last war. The military is narrow-minded, backward-focused, and afraid of innovation, and is doomed to face avoidable losses at the start of the next conflict. In Winning the Next War, Stephen Rosen takes an alternative position. He posits that militaries can and do innovate, and that those militaries that are willing to undergo the challenging path of innovation are often rewarded. Innovation occurs in peacetime, wartime, and in technological advances. Each of these phases carry different challenges. In peacetime the military must project how future wars will be fought. In wartime the challenges of stress, poor intelligence, and short time-spans make innovation difficult. In technological innovation, the challenge lies in managing costs, cooperation, and uncertainty in estimating what platforms will be the needed in the future. This essay will focus on peacetime and technological innovation, as these sectors focus on the difficulty in projecting future warfare. The principal critique of this essay is that Rosen’s case selection creates issues of generalizability in application and further testing of his theories.
In Rosen’s view, peacetime innovation is only possible through a widespread, internal change within the military. In the military the key to power is to have the authority to promote officers to higher ranks. Because of this, the alternative theory of civilian intervention or “mavericks” exerting control is untenable. They will not have the respect nor the staying power that “home-grown” officers will possess. Thus, the challenge comes in getting innovative thinkers into positions of authority without upsetting the apple-cart of peer respect.
Rosen tests this explanation against the cases of aircraft carrier development in the U.S. Navy during the Interwar period, in the advances made in amphibious warfare in the U.S. Marine Corps in the same period, and in the development of an integrated helicopter-infantry force in the U.S. Army prior to the Vietnam War.
In the Navy the challenge was integrating the carrier aviators into the promotion pipeline so that as they were promoted they would not be limited to aviation commands, but could be eligible to command their own ships, squadrons, and eventually their own fleets. This was crucial to ensure that in future conflicts carriers would be utilized properly by men who knew their capabilities, and not misused by men only trained in surface warfare. In the Marines, a similar path was taken to remove older officers from the ranks and promote new forward-thinking officers that would seek to develop amphibious tactics. The integration of marine units into the fleet also ensured the attitude that they were connected to the fleet and thus able to engage with the fleet in warfare, and would not be constantly pulled away for small wars. In the Army those in favor of airmobile warfare created avenues to recruit army helicopter aviators into developing and creating new units and tactics. To aid this, forward thinking non-aviators were also recruited to create legitimacy and to help push the army brass to look ahead.
In short, peacetime innovators must be willing to see a generational shift in the thinking of the officer corps for peacetime innovation to be effective. In each of these cases, before any new organizational changes could be made, the need for understanding future warfare was important. Whether it was considering how a war could be fought in the far-flung Pacific or applying maneuver warfare to helicopter-borne infantry, an intellectual foundation had to be laid first. Only then could organizational improvements occur.
Technological innovation revolves around understanding what the enemy is developing and managing the uncertainty of what future developments will be necessary. To test the former Rosen uses the American development of its ground forces prior to World War II, British innovation in electronic warfare, and American research into strategic weapons shortly after World War II. To test the latter, the best case he examines is the American development of guided missiles following World War II. In the former cases, Rosen admits that it is difficult to draw conclusions about the role of intelligence. The Americans failed spectacularly to understand German capabilities prior to World War II. The British were successful in developing ways to minimize losses to bombers due to electronic interference of German radar, but the intelligence in support of the development was limited. In the third case, the Americans were unable to ascertain what capabilities the Soviets possessed, making it difficult to develop new weapons. In the latter case, the plan for developing guided missiles is stated as a success by Rosen. The Americans took the path of doing all the scientific research into a variety of missiles types, but stopped short of procuring any of these until they knew what capabilities they required. By doing so they were able to keep the time frame from development to production of weapons they did choose to a minimum and were able to maintain flexibility.
In varying level of detail Rosen addresses twenty-one innovations in his study, and they are all interesting in their own right. The cases that Rosen tests his theories against in detail are well laid out in their historical contexts, and he does a good job of applying his theories to the cases he selects. Rosen’s central thrust that innovation is difficult regardless of when it happens is clearly conveyed. While not covered in this essay, Rosen’s premise that wartime innovation is different than simply learning from mistakes and re-applying known operating procedures was enlightening.
While it benefited Rosen to choose the cases he did for his theories, that is a point of criticism as well. Rosen’s case selection is almost too perfect. He offers a theory about internally-based peacetime innovation, and uses three important cases that explain exactly what he had in mind. I don’t suggest that Rosen was nefarious in this selection, nor do I suggest that he chose cases then worked backward to create a theory, but I do believe there are grounds for stating he was selective in his case study.
This potential case selection bias damages, however so slightly, his theories for peacetime and technological innovation. In peacetime, Rosen discounts the work of “mavericks” in achieving organizational change in regards to a security concern. He uses the example of Billy Mitchell being unable to drastically change post-First World War purchasing habits in favor of airpower. While Mitchell was initially unsuccessful, the rise of naval and land-based aviation in the years prior to and during World War II show that the intellectual spark that Mitchell created was not lost on the most important decision makers. This raises the question of whether or not a “maverick” is needed to get the ball rolling. Furthermore, in peacetime Rosen states that only those that are internally placed to create new policies will be offered the respect needed to accomplished the necessary innovation, but the real legwork in implementing these innovations will be performed by subsequent generations. In this Rosen assumes that later generations of leaders will be as enlightened as earlier innovators. While stating that militaries are highly political institutions, Rosen glosses over the challenge that leaders, even younger and more highly motivated ones, will have in divorcing their interests from aiding in institutional change. To use Rosen’s Navy example, it would’ve been quite easy for a young officer with a background in surface vessels to hinder naval aviation innovation. This fortunately did not occur, but the possibility of it occurring reveals that Rosen may assume too much.
Rosen’s suggestions for technological innovation seem, frankly, ludicrous. He admits that it is challenging to gather intelligence into enemy developments prior to a conflict, but his suggestion for how to get around this problem appears to be unfathomably expensive. To undergo the research and development in a variety of options then pick and choose as the need arises requires a research arm of the military establishment that is hard to imagine working in any period except the case he offers in the early Cold War when the central security threat was generally recognized and understood. Rosen also discounts civilian interjection, but ignores the importance that bore in the Manhattan Project. He also ignores the spectacular achievement of the Poles in cryptanalysis in the pre-World War II period, which laid the groundwork for the British Ultra program.
In the present day, the challenge of counterinsurgency operations in the midst of conventional warfare requires a dichotomous plan for developing warfighting strategies that even hope of offering victory. Technological innovation is still important, and the move towards simultaneously keeping large capital investments like aircraft carriers while investing in smaller, cheaper, and more numerous weapon systems offerings a new opportunity to test Rosen’s theory of technological innovation. More than twenty-five years after publishing this book, I hope that Dr. Rosen will continue to keep thinking about future warfare, and offer new theories for this evolving period of warfare.