What do you think?
Rate this book
The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500-1800
Well before the Industrial Revolution, Europe developed the superior military potential and expertise that enabled her to dominate the world for the next two centuries. In this attractively illustrated and updated edition, Geoffrey Parker discusses the major changes in the military practice of the West during this time period--establishment of bigger armies, creation of superior warships, the role of firearms--and argues that these major changes amounted to a "military revolution" that gave Westerners a decided advantage over people of other continents. A new chapter addresses the controversies engendered by the previous edition.
266 pages, Paperback
First published December 1, 1988
16 people are currently reading
923 people want to read
About the author
Geoffrey Parker
98 books171 followersGeoffrey Parker is Andreas Dorpalen Professor of European History and an Associate of the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University. He has published widely on the social, political and military history of early modern Europe, and in 2012 the Royal Dutch Academy recognized these achievements by awarding him its biennial Heineken Foundation Prize for History, open to scholars in any field, and any period, from any country.
Parker has written or co-written thirty-nine books, including The Military Revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge University Press, 1988), winner of the 'best book prize' from both the American Military Institute and the Society for the History of Technology; The Grand Strategy of Philip II (Yale University Press, 1998), which won the Samuel Eliot Morison Prize from the Society of Military History; and Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century (Yale University Press, 2013), which won the Society of Military History’s Distinguished Book Prize and also one of the three medals awarded in 2014 by the British Academy for ‘a landmark academic achievement… which has transformed understanding of a particular subject’.
Before moving to Ohio State in 1997, Parker taught at Cambridge and St Andrews universities in Britain, at the University of British Columbia in Canada, and at Illinois and Yale Universities in the United States, teaching courses on the Reformation, European history and military history at both undergraduate and graduate levels. He has directed or co-directed over thirty Doctoral Dissertations to completion, as well as several undergraduate theses. In 2006 he won an OSU Alumni Distinguished Teaching Award.
He lives in Columbus, Ohio, and has four children. In 1987 he was diagnosed as having Multiple Sclerosis. His latest book is Imprudent King: A New Life of Philip II (Yale University Press, 2014).
Parker has written or co-written thirty-nine books, including The Military Revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge University Press, 1988), winner of the 'best book prize' from both the American Military Institute and the Society for the History of Technology; The Grand Strategy of Philip II (Yale University Press, 1998), which won the Samuel Eliot Morison Prize from the Society of Military History; and Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century (Yale University Press, 2013), which won the Society of Military History’s Distinguished Book Prize and also one of the three medals awarded in 2014 by the British Academy for ‘a landmark academic achievement… which has transformed understanding of a particular subject’.
Before moving to Ohio State in 1997, Parker taught at Cambridge and St Andrews universities in Britain, at the University of British Columbia in Canada, and at Illinois and Yale Universities in the United States, teaching courses on the Reformation, European history and military history at both undergraduate and graduate levels. He has directed or co-directed over thirty Doctoral Dissertations to completion, as well as several undergraduate theses. In 2006 he won an OSU Alumni Distinguished Teaching Award.
He lives in Columbus, Ohio, and has four children. In 1987 he was diagnosed as having Multiple Sclerosis. His latest book is Imprudent King: A New Life of Philip II (Yale University Press, 2014).
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 25 of 25 reviews
January 8, 2022
13/07/2020 (****)
Saggio giustamente celebre, di lettura agevole, che esplica - con ottime argomentazioni - la tesi secondo cui a partire dal XVI secolo si innescò, nell'Europa occidentale, una rivoluzione in ambito militare come non si era mai vista nella storia dell'umanità, e che portò in breve a una svolta storica sotto ogni aspetto,
La rivoluzione militare ruotò prevalentemente intorno a tre fattori:
1) naturalmente, l'innesco di tutti i cambiamenti successivi fu l'invenzione dell'artiglieria. Quest'arma portò al mutamento dei rapporti di equilibrio che nel Medioevo si erano venuti a creare fra attacco e difesa: la guerra si era ormai ridotta a una lunga sequela di assedi a castelli cinti da mura altissime (spesso presi, se presi, per fame) e il cui obiettivo era la presa sistematica di questi borghi o fortificazioni al fine di evitare di lasciarsi sacche di resistenza alle spalle, in grado facilmente di tagliare le già precarissime linee di rifornimento degli eserciti di allora.
Lo stallo si supera a inizio Cinquecento con le Guerre d'Italia, quando i francesi scendono nella penisola con una artiglieria moderna, efficiente, moderatamente trasportabile e sufficientemente potente per mandare in briciole le alte e sottili mura delle città italiane, che cadono una dietro l'altra con velocità impressionante. E non è un caso che proprio in Italia nasce il secondo fondamentale aspetto della rivoluzione militare...
2) ossia la trace italienne o, per dirla alla nostrana, la fortificazione alla moderna. Ideata forse dall'Alberti, forse da Francesco di Giorgio, sviluppata in maniera decisiva sicuramente dai Sangallo, è l'evoluzione logica dei sistemi difensivi di fronte all'artiglieria. Le mura si abbassano e si ingrossano (molte, molte volte) e vengono disposte con un andamento il più possibile spezzettato per esporre meno parti rettilinee possibili al tiro diretto: si costruiscono bastioni sporgenti, a forma triangolare, e ulteriori strutture di difesa e supporto a questo. Le piante (e le sezioni) diventano sempre più complesse, poiché nel tempo l'artiglieria diventa sempre più efficace e potente. Tuttavia, la trace italienne, sviluppata e esportata in tutta Europa da legioni di tecnici italiani, riporta in stallo il confronto fra attaccanti e difensori, e gli assedi tornano a diventare già nel tardo Cinquecento e soprattutto nel Seicento interminabili. Da qui, e dalla facilità con cui anche il contadino più scemo può essere addestrato a utilizzare uno schioppo, si arriva a...
3) per sostenere e rifornire assedi giganteschi (che richiedono sia un esercito che attacca le mura avversarie - svariati km di mura - sia un esercito messo nell'altra direzione a difendersi da eventuali colonne d'aiuto) gli stati europei innescarono una escalation che in breve tempo portò a un colossale aumento di dimensione degli eserciti, che videro ridursi al lumicino la componente montata (indiscussa protagonista della guerra medievale) e aumentare enormemente la fanteria, sempre più armata di archibugio/moschetto, molto più economica, facilmente addestrabile e rimpiazzabile.
Le necessità finanziarie degli stati esplosero a loro volta sia per mantenere gli enormi eserciti del punto 3) che per costruire le costosissime fortificazioni alla moderna di cui al punto 2). Per avere i soldi con cui finanziare le loro avventure belliche, i sovrani creano la burocrazia moderna (o forse è la burocrazia moderna a aver creato le costosissime guerre dei re), che diventa sempre più efficiente nel reperire la pecunia - ovviamente tosando gli stessi che finiscono macellati in guerra.
Artiglieria sempre più efficace, che finisce per essere installata su nave sempre più potenti, fortezze inespugnabili, grandi eserciti armati di moschetti: ecco servita la base per il dominio mondiale dell'Occidente. Che in realtà resterà in nuce almeno fino all'Ottocento: fino ad allora il dominio occidentale è aggrappato prevalentemente a qualche fascia costiera in Africa e in India, mentre il dominio nelle Americhe è più netto (grazie anche allo sterminio già prepetuato al pronti via); nell'Estremo Oriente invece gli europei contano poco o nulla.
Sarà la Rivoluzione industriale a sancire il dominio totale e assoluto, e non serve nemmeno spiegare come mai.
Bel libro, forse un pò troppo anglocentrico. Rimane da spiegare come mai la Cina, che pure conobbe l'artiglieria, le grandi fortezze e gli sterminati eserciti dotati di armi da fuoco ben prima degli europei, finì nell'Ottocento come il famoso vaso di coccio.
Saggio giustamente celebre, di lettura agevole, che esplica - con ottime argomentazioni - la tesi secondo cui a partire dal XVI secolo si innescò, nell'Europa occidentale, una rivoluzione in ambito militare come non si era mai vista nella storia dell'umanità, e che portò in breve a una svolta storica sotto ogni aspetto,
La rivoluzione militare ruotò prevalentemente intorno a tre fattori:
1) naturalmente, l'innesco di tutti i cambiamenti successivi fu l'invenzione dell'artiglieria. Quest'arma portò al mutamento dei rapporti di equilibrio che nel Medioevo si erano venuti a creare fra attacco e difesa: la guerra si era ormai ridotta a una lunga sequela di assedi a castelli cinti da mura altissime (spesso presi, se presi, per fame) e il cui obiettivo era la presa sistematica di questi borghi o fortificazioni al fine di evitare di lasciarsi sacche di resistenza alle spalle, in grado facilmente di tagliare le già precarissime linee di rifornimento degli eserciti di allora.
Lo stallo si supera a inizio Cinquecento con le Guerre d'Italia, quando i francesi scendono nella penisola con una artiglieria moderna, efficiente, moderatamente trasportabile e sufficientemente potente per mandare in briciole le alte e sottili mura delle città italiane, che cadono una dietro l'altra con velocità impressionante. E non è un caso che proprio in Italia nasce il secondo fondamentale aspetto della rivoluzione militare...
2) ossia la trace italienne o, per dirla alla nostrana, la fortificazione alla moderna. Ideata forse dall'Alberti, forse da Francesco di Giorgio, sviluppata in maniera decisiva sicuramente dai Sangallo, è l'evoluzione logica dei sistemi difensivi di fronte all'artiglieria. Le mura si abbassano e si ingrossano (molte, molte volte) e vengono disposte con un andamento il più possibile spezzettato per esporre meno parti rettilinee possibili al tiro diretto: si costruiscono bastioni sporgenti, a forma triangolare, e ulteriori strutture di difesa e supporto a questo. Le piante (e le sezioni) diventano sempre più complesse, poiché nel tempo l'artiglieria diventa sempre più efficace e potente. Tuttavia, la trace italienne, sviluppata e esportata in tutta Europa da legioni di tecnici italiani, riporta in stallo il confronto fra attaccanti e difensori, e gli assedi tornano a diventare già nel tardo Cinquecento e soprattutto nel Seicento interminabili. Da qui, e dalla facilità con cui anche il contadino più scemo può essere addestrato a utilizzare uno schioppo, si arriva a...
3) per sostenere e rifornire assedi giganteschi (che richiedono sia un esercito che attacca le mura avversarie - svariati km di mura - sia un esercito messo nell'altra direzione a difendersi da eventuali colonne d'aiuto) gli stati europei innescarono una escalation che in breve tempo portò a un colossale aumento di dimensione degli eserciti, che videro ridursi al lumicino la componente montata (indiscussa protagonista della guerra medievale) e aumentare enormemente la fanteria, sempre più armata di archibugio/moschetto, molto più economica, facilmente addestrabile e rimpiazzabile.
Le necessità finanziarie degli stati esplosero a loro volta sia per mantenere gli enormi eserciti del punto 3) che per costruire le costosissime fortificazioni alla moderna di cui al punto 2). Per avere i soldi con cui finanziare le loro avventure belliche, i sovrani creano la burocrazia moderna (o forse è la burocrazia moderna a aver creato le costosissime guerre dei re), che diventa sempre più efficiente nel reperire la pecunia - ovviamente tosando gli stessi che finiscono macellati in guerra.
Artiglieria sempre più efficace, che finisce per essere installata su nave sempre più potenti, fortezze inespugnabili, grandi eserciti armati di moschetti: ecco servita la base per il dominio mondiale dell'Occidente. Che in realtà resterà in nuce almeno fino all'Ottocento: fino ad allora il dominio occidentale è aggrappato prevalentemente a qualche fascia costiera in Africa e in India, mentre il dominio nelle Americhe è più netto (grazie anche allo sterminio già prepetuato al pronti via); nell'Estremo Oriente invece gli europei contano poco o nulla.
Sarà la Rivoluzione industriale a sancire il dominio totale e assoluto, e non serve nemmeno spiegare come mai.
Bel libro, forse un pò troppo anglocentrico. Rimane da spiegare come mai la Cina, che pure conobbe l'artiglieria, le grandi fortezze e gli sterminati eserciti dotati di armi da fuoco ben prima degli europei, finì nell'Ottocento come il famoso vaso di coccio.
May 17, 2021
Like most “grand narrative” histories this one is compelling even when it’s not convincing. If you are looking for a solid overview of early modern military history, look no further.
The overview approach is also this book’s weakness, however, and this is a typical problem with volumes that span hundreds of years. Parker presents a wide range of historical details, but you aren’t always sure how they fit into the larger whole, or how some of the lesser arguments would stand up to scrutiny and comparison.
I also think the notion of a “military revolution” comes apart when you broadly consider the “effectiveness” of European armies against each other during this era. If the purpose of war is to win decisive victories then what is truly remarkable about early modern Europe is that large conflicts didn’t really produce major results. You would think that armies backed by the resources of a Charles V would be able to destroy the Valois dynasty and Protestantism on the continent, but apparently not. The short lived successes of Holland and Sweden in the imperial game never truly eclipsed Spain or Portugal. In fact, I can’t think of any major European power that was conquered in this era aside from Hungary, which was invaded by the non-western Ottomans. In 17th century Asia, the Manchurians conquered the Ming dynasty and the Tokugawa clan unified Japan, while the European stalemate in the 30 years war dragged on. Why were these Asian armies able to achieve decisive outcomes while European armies were not? Shouldn’t a revolution produce revolutionary consequences?
In the Western Hemisphere during this era, Europeans were able to conquer large areas, but this also deserves to be qualified, which is something Parker doesn’t really do. The Spanish laid claim to vast territories they didn’t actually control, and the French and the English and the Americans would later do the same. In other words, Europeans may have claimed 35% of the world by 1800, but this can be treated as dubious at best given the number of powerful Indian groups like the Comanche who lived in some of these areas.
One of Parker’s main goals is to use the military revolution to explain European expansion in the 19th century. In my view the causes of that expansion are probably more immediate than long term.
The overview approach is also this book’s weakness, however, and this is a typical problem with volumes that span hundreds of years. Parker presents a wide range of historical details, but you aren’t always sure how they fit into the larger whole, or how some of the lesser arguments would stand up to scrutiny and comparison.
I also think the notion of a “military revolution” comes apart when you broadly consider the “effectiveness” of European armies against each other during this era. If the purpose of war is to win decisive victories then what is truly remarkable about early modern Europe is that large conflicts didn’t really produce major results. You would think that armies backed by the resources of a Charles V would be able to destroy the Valois dynasty and Protestantism on the continent, but apparently not. The short lived successes of Holland and Sweden in the imperial game never truly eclipsed Spain or Portugal. In fact, I can’t think of any major European power that was conquered in this era aside from Hungary, which was invaded by the non-western Ottomans. In 17th century Asia, the Manchurians conquered the Ming dynasty and the Tokugawa clan unified Japan, while the European stalemate in the 30 years war dragged on. Why were these Asian armies able to achieve decisive outcomes while European armies were not? Shouldn’t a revolution produce revolutionary consequences?
In the Western Hemisphere during this era, Europeans were able to conquer large areas, but this also deserves to be qualified, which is something Parker doesn’t really do. The Spanish laid claim to vast territories they didn’t actually control, and the French and the English and the Americans would later do the same. In other words, Europeans may have claimed 35% of the world by 1800, but this can be treated as dubious at best given the number of powerful Indian groups like the Comanche who lived in some of these areas.
One of Parker’s main goals is to use the military revolution to explain European expansion in the 19th century. In my view the causes of that expansion are probably more immediate than long term.
August 25, 2022
Like a lot of people, I've always been intrigued by how and why Europe suddenly rose to dominate the world. This author's answer to this question is that, beginning in the early Renaissance, Europeans developed a few, key military innovations that kickstarted an (ongoing) technological revolution. According to the author, the process went something like this:
1. Improved cannon technology made castles obsolete.
2. In response, Italian engineers created a better type of fortress, the trace italienne.
3. These improved fortifications changed the nature of continental warfare because larger and larger armies were required to subdue them.
4. At the same time, these larger armies began using musketry volleys to great effect, while on sea broadside attacks using improved cannon ushered in a new era of naval warfare.
5. The high level of organization that these massive armies and navies required encouraged the growth of centralized bureaucracy, leading to the modern European nation-states.
Overall, I felt that the author had a tendency to lose the forest for the trees. Over and over again he seemed to get distracted by his own examples to the extent that his thesis seemed a little forgotten. Whole chapters - particularly chapter 2 - seemed to be mainly historical fact after historical fact, with little reference to his central argument.
In addition, he doesn't really discuss why these technologies developed in Europe in the first place, so the central question above remains largely unanswered. Probably realizing this, near the end of the book he (somewhat hastily) suggests the following two reasons:
1. Early modern Europeans thought of warfare as a means to conquer land, whereas other contemporaneous cultures thought of warfare as a way to conquer their enemies and make them slaves. Thus, Europeans had no compunction about killing their enemies in battle, while people in the rest of the world hesitated to do so, since they would be killing potential slaves.
2. The intense military competition between the embryonic European states created a technological arms race (but didn't people compete militarily in other parts of the world?).
This book provokes more questions than it answers. Still, it’s worth reading for the interesting historical facts it recounts as well as for its copious notes.
1. Improved cannon technology made castles obsolete.
2. In response, Italian engineers created a better type of fortress, the trace italienne.
3. These improved fortifications changed the nature of continental warfare because larger and larger armies were required to subdue them.
4. At the same time, these larger armies began using musketry volleys to great effect, while on sea broadside attacks using improved cannon ushered in a new era of naval warfare.
5. The high level of organization that these massive armies and navies required encouraged the growth of centralized bureaucracy, leading to the modern European nation-states.
Overall, I felt that the author had a tendency to lose the forest for the trees. Over and over again he seemed to get distracted by his own examples to the extent that his thesis seemed a little forgotten. Whole chapters - particularly chapter 2 - seemed to be mainly historical fact after historical fact, with little reference to his central argument.
In addition, he doesn't really discuss why these technologies developed in Europe in the first place, so the central question above remains largely unanswered. Probably realizing this, near the end of the book he (somewhat hastily) suggests the following two reasons:
1. Early modern Europeans thought of warfare as a means to conquer land, whereas other contemporaneous cultures thought of warfare as a way to conquer their enemies and make them slaves. Thus, Europeans had no compunction about killing their enemies in battle, while people in the rest of the world hesitated to do so, since they would be killing potential slaves.
2. The intense military competition between the embryonic European states created a technological arms race (but didn't people compete militarily in other parts of the world?).
This book provokes more questions than it answers. Still, it’s worth reading for the interesting historical facts it recounts as well as for its copious notes.
February 26, 2025
E' Parker, quindi una garanzia. Ma l'ho trovato a volo d'uccello su tanti argomenti, compreso l'apporto alla battaglia di tutto ciò che non è protestante-centrico.
August 23, 2023
Buon libro tutto sommato, un po' sorpassato per certi aspetti data l'età ma abbastanza buono come introduzione a quel fenomeno che è la rivoluzione militare. Un peccato per la rivoluzione in ambito marittimo che è un po' trascurata e semplificata, considerata invece quanto è fondamentale
March 4, 2015
In 1984, historian Geoffrey Parker delivered the Lee Knowles Lectures at Trinity College, Cambridge that expanded on historian Michael Roberts’ original argument that gunpowder stimulated a “military revolution” in Europe between 1560 and 1660. Now entering its second edition, The Military Revolution boasts a new afterword that defends the two original theses that a ‘military revolution’ emphatically occurred during the sixteenth-century, and that its technical components—the capital ship, infantry firepower, and the artillery fortress—bestowed decisive military advantage upon Europeans and made possible the ‘Rise of the West.’
Paker proceeds chronologically and thematically, beginning with an overview of the three components of the military revolution: the introduction of artillery, the development of the artillery fortress (trace italienne), and the mobilization of larger field armies. Parker suggests that Europeans adopted artillery to overcome the stalemate between offense and defense that, for centuries, favored the latter. Parker envisions qualitative and quantitative improvements in field artillery subsequently provoking another stalemate with the transformation in fortification construction: replacing vertical fortifications with shorter, thicker ramparts that withstood cannon shot and maximized counter-battery fire. Simultaneously, a revolution in field warfare occurred as armies replaced frontal assaults and hand-to-hand combat with projectile-based tactics (artillery, hand guns, bows). New weapons catalyzed the tactical innovation of new formations to maximize firepower, while also supplanting the mounted knight and pike formation. These first two components—the revolution in fortifications and the composition and tactics of armies—precipitated the final component, larger field armies. Yet larger armies did not achieve decisive victory for states. Ironically, the increasing size of armies and the proliferation of artillery fortresses precluded a “decisive campaign” within Europe for several centuries, and many states resorted to der kliene kriege that used small sapper units to capture strategic objectives.
From the sixteenth century onward, the military revolution provoked two parallel developments: the first in how European states financed and supplied massive armies and the second in European naval warfare. First, Parker opines that expensive armies compelled states to reorganize their economic and bureaucratic capacity to achieve three goals: mobilize manpower, prevent desertion, and supply the army. States mobilized manpower by mustering volunteers and conscripts. States particularly sought veterans who brought considerable combat experience to an otherwise untested army. Volunteers were forthcoming, but limited. Hence, states also utilized the indelningsverk, or parish allocation system of manpower quotas. While mobilizing a heterogeneous army was one problem, states also had to keep men in the field, and thus incentivized soldiers with promises of storm-pay, shared ransom, and pillage. A “system of military devolution” emerged on the tactical level as states increasingly deferred logistics to both independent contractors and to soldiers who systematically exploited the land by extorting fire-money (protection rent) and strained the “contributions system” to acquire clothing, lodging, and victuals. If private coffers ran dry, the state offered guarantees of demand for horses, firearms, or clothing that pulled innovation from the market.
Finally, Parker sees European states breaking the continental military stalemate through naval power. Parker advances two claims about naval development. First, he argues that European interstate competition on land facilitated the evolution of naval fleets from galleys to the capital warship. Second, Parker contends that Europe’s sophisticated navy, coupled with firearms, secured for them 35% of the earth before the industrial revolution. Europeans enjoyed decisive military advantages in Africa and the Americas because the indigenous populations lacked comparable tactics and firepower. Pre-1800 imperial expansion stemmed both from decisive tactical and technological advantages and the failure of European opponents to innovate corresponding technology and tactics—rival empires, like the Ottomans, lacked the military order, discipline, and technique to match European rates of fire. However, Parker concludes that until the Industrial Revolution, Europeans would lack the appropriate combination of naval and land force to completely open trade in East Asia.
Parker may be criticized for his insistence on military superiority as the determining factor in European global expansion. It’s unclear how Parker weighs military superiority relative to other possible factors promoting European expansion. Did the Aztec Empire collapse because it lacked “defensible bases” against Spanish artillery? Certainly, European diseases and Aztec political instability, and Spanish gunpowder, impelled the Aztec collapse. Parker’s focus on military force pulls non-Europeans into the narrative mostly during their miserable encounters with a superior European military. While his thesis accommodates culture, it does not thoroughly analyze how factors other than military superiority aided the ‘Rise of the West.’ Nevertheless, Parker offers a compelling explanation of European ascendancy between 1500 and 1800.
Paker proceeds chronologically and thematically, beginning with an overview of the three components of the military revolution: the introduction of artillery, the development of the artillery fortress (trace italienne), and the mobilization of larger field armies. Parker suggests that Europeans adopted artillery to overcome the stalemate between offense and defense that, for centuries, favored the latter. Parker envisions qualitative and quantitative improvements in field artillery subsequently provoking another stalemate with the transformation in fortification construction: replacing vertical fortifications with shorter, thicker ramparts that withstood cannon shot and maximized counter-battery fire. Simultaneously, a revolution in field warfare occurred as armies replaced frontal assaults and hand-to-hand combat with projectile-based tactics (artillery, hand guns, bows). New weapons catalyzed the tactical innovation of new formations to maximize firepower, while also supplanting the mounted knight and pike formation. These first two components—the revolution in fortifications and the composition and tactics of armies—precipitated the final component, larger field armies. Yet larger armies did not achieve decisive victory for states. Ironically, the increasing size of armies and the proliferation of artillery fortresses precluded a “decisive campaign” within Europe for several centuries, and many states resorted to der kliene kriege that used small sapper units to capture strategic objectives.
From the sixteenth century onward, the military revolution provoked two parallel developments: the first in how European states financed and supplied massive armies and the second in European naval warfare. First, Parker opines that expensive armies compelled states to reorganize their economic and bureaucratic capacity to achieve three goals: mobilize manpower, prevent desertion, and supply the army. States mobilized manpower by mustering volunteers and conscripts. States particularly sought veterans who brought considerable combat experience to an otherwise untested army. Volunteers were forthcoming, but limited. Hence, states also utilized the indelningsverk, or parish allocation system of manpower quotas. While mobilizing a heterogeneous army was one problem, states also had to keep men in the field, and thus incentivized soldiers with promises of storm-pay, shared ransom, and pillage. A “system of military devolution” emerged on the tactical level as states increasingly deferred logistics to both independent contractors and to soldiers who systematically exploited the land by extorting fire-money (protection rent) and strained the “contributions system” to acquire clothing, lodging, and victuals. If private coffers ran dry, the state offered guarantees of demand for horses, firearms, or clothing that pulled innovation from the market.
Finally, Parker sees European states breaking the continental military stalemate through naval power. Parker advances two claims about naval development. First, he argues that European interstate competition on land facilitated the evolution of naval fleets from galleys to the capital warship. Second, Parker contends that Europe’s sophisticated navy, coupled with firearms, secured for them 35% of the earth before the industrial revolution. Europeans enjoyed decisive military advantages in Africa and the Americas because the indigenous populations lacked comparable tactics and firepower. Pre-1800 imperial expansion stemmed both from decisive tactical and technological advantages and the failure of European opponents to innovate corresponding technology and tactics—rival empires, like the Ottomans, lacked the military order, discipline, and technique to match European rates of fire. However, Parker concludes that until the Industrial Revolution, Europeans would lack the appropriate combination of naval and land force to completely open trade in East Asia.
Parker may be criticized for his insistence on military superiority as the determining factor in European global expansion. It’s unclear how Parker weighs military superiority relative to other possible factors promoting European expansion. Did the Aztec Empire collapse because it lacked “defensible bases” against Spanish artillery? Certainly, European diseases and Aztec political instability, and Spanish gunpowder, impelled the Aztec collapse. Parker’s focus on military force pulls non-Europeans into the narrative mostly during their miserable encounters with a superior European military. While his thesis accommodates culture, it does not thoroughly analyze how factors other than military superiority aided the ‘Rise of the West.’ Nevertheless, Parker offers a compelling explanation of European ascendancy between 1500 and 1800.
September 30, 2020
" . . . just how did the West, initially so small and so deficient in most natural resources, become able to compensate for what it lacked through superior military and naval power?"
June 9, 2020
Eccellente saggio (con una bibliografia vastissima e ricchissima) per ciò che concerne i mezzi della rivoluzione militare tra il XVII ed il XVIII secolo. Per ciò che concerne una tematica a mio avviso altresì importante, ovvero l'evoluzione culturale del concetto di guerra (sia in occidente e non), oltre un paio di accenni il libro non cerca di coprire questo argomento, personalmente tanto importante quanto le altre. Rimani ad ogni modo un libro eccellente sotto ogni punto di vista.
February 25, 2013
To put it simply, Geoffrey Parker takes a cultural and technological approach when interpreting military history from 1500-1800.
Cultural when he distinguishes reasons why the rise of the West was due to a few cultural superiority aspects. One case is that the Muslim way of war was traditional and did not allow for tactical revolutions that the West was capable of.
Technological when he states that the development of fortresses heavily changed the way war was conducted.
Overall, for the brevity of the read, I believe that its worth your time if you are interested in military revolutions that impacted the way war was conducted in the past. Furthermore, I believe this book lays out interesting concepts that could be used in military research and interpretations.
However, I wouldn't recommend this to readers who are not interested in medieval history. But if you don't mind that fact, Military Revolution by Geoffrey Parker is a solid read.
Cultural when he distinguishes reasons why the rise of the West was due to a few cultural superiority aspects. One case is that the Muslim way of war was traditional and did not allow for tactical revolutions that the West was capable of.
Technological when he states that the development of fortresses heavily changed the way war was conducted.
Overall, for the brevity of the read, I believe that its worth your time if you are interested in military revolutions that impacted the way war was conducted in the past. Furthermore, I believe this book lays out interesting concepts that could be used in military research and interpretations.
However, I wouldn't recommend this to readers who are not interested in medieval history. But if you don't mind that fact, Military Revolution by Geoffrey Parker is a solid read.
November 3, 2017
One explanation of Europe's dramatic rise from backwater to world-wide influence in a few short centuries
An important work reevaluating the change technology and resulting tactics played in the military - and therefore political and economic - history of the world as Europe rose from a relative backwater to project power and influence around the globe.
An important work reevaluating the change technology and resulting tactics played in the military - and therefore political and economic - history of the world as Europe rose from a relative backwater to project power and influence around the globe.
July 8, 2025
Brilliant written. The writer explained in detail why European armies, although they did not invented gunpowder, but they kept on improving technology. In other parts of the world, such as China and Japan, they also had gunpowder, but there was for a long period of time China and Japan both had a separate ruler. While in Europe, there was so much competition between small states. This competition increased their technology prowess when it come to warfare, combined with discipline and greed enabled a small group of European states (England, France and Spain) to dominate large part of the world. Portugal, The Netherlands and Belgium I left out, because they did not conquer as much as the big states. In short not just technology and discipline was important, but also access to the Atlantic ocean. It could be argued that is not really a military revolution, because revolution happens quick and instantly and the 3 major European powers dominating so much of the rest of the world, took about 300 years.
Read
June 25, 2021Makes for a nice pairing with Charles Tilly's Coercion and Capital, as a good illustration of how warfare strained the logistical and technological capabilities of early modern European states. Fun tidbits:
- In the 1500-1600s, an army of 30,000 needed as much food as all but the largest cities, requiring hundreds of traveling ovens to bake bread. Oliver Cromwell got around the problem by having his soldiers carry a week's worth of biscuit in their packs, and having cheese carried by packhorses. According to a contemporary observer, "Scotland and Ireland were conquered by timely provisions of Cheshire cheese and biscuit."
- This recollection from the soldier Thomas Raymond, on camping circa 1633: "One night I had nothing to keepe me from the cold wett ground but a little bundle of wett dryed flax, which by chance I litt on. And soe with my bootes full of water, and wrapt upp in my wett cloake, I lay as rounde as a hedgehogg, and at peep of day looked like a drowned ratt."
- In the 1500-1600s, an army of 30,000 needed as much food as all but the largest cities, requiring hundreds of traveling ovens to bake bread. Oliver Cromwell got around the problem by having his soldiers carry a week's worth of biscuit in their packs, and having cheese carried by packhorses. According to a contemporary observer, "Scotland and Ireland were conquered by timely provisions of Cheshire cheese and biscuit."
- This recollection from the soldier Thomas Raymond, on camping circa 1633: "One night I had nothing to keepe me from the cold wett ground but a little bundle of wett dryed flax, which by chance I litt on. And soe with my bootes full of water, and wrapt upp in my wett cloake, I lay as rounde as a hedgehogg, and at peep of day looked like a drowned ratt."
May 27, 2024
I bought this book at Uni for a tutorial that never happened and remember it as being an interesting read back then. Re-reading it so many years later, it is just as fascinating. It's quite short, has some full page illustrations, a large font and quite a lot of the pages are taken up with end notes. When you combine this with a not so interesting historiography at the beginning, it's a far shorter read than you'd expect.
There's a lot to take in, but it's great to see Parker explore the non-European world so thoroughly.
There's a lot to take in, but it's great to see Parker explore the non-European world so thoroughly.
October 31, 2024
This is a book explaining a fundamental theory in war studies: the military revolution. But we should probably talk about military revolutionS, or theoretical constructs and case studies used to explain the “modernisation” of warfare and identify watershed transformations in how wars originated and were fought.
Although it’s an inevitable read and seen as authoritative, I wouldn’t blame escalation on technological advance. Wars are conducted differently because the political goals are different. Escalation happens when more is at stake; it wasn’t the better use of infantry that made the Thirty Years War so lasting and bloody, it was the belief that disaster would fall upon Europe if the divinely chosen power (the Habsburg and the Holy Roman Empire) were to crumble. No one created more effective weapons to destroy the enemy —because war isn’t just some sporadic episode of extreme violence— they created more effective weapons because the importance of what was at stake required it. The goal in war is, almost exclusively, never to create the biggest bloodshed known to man.
Although it’s an inevitable read and seen as authoritative, I wouldn’t blame escalation on technological advance. Wars are conducted differently because the political goals are different. Escalation happens when more is at stake; it wasn’t the better use of infantry that made the Thirty Years War so lasting and bloody, it was the belief that disaster would fall upon Europe if the divinely chosen power (the Habsburg and the Holy Roman Empire) were to crumble. No one created more effective weapons to destroy the enemy —because war isn’t just some sporadic episode of extreme violence— they created more effective weapons because the importance of what was at stake required it. The goal in war is, almost exclusively, never to create the biggest bloodshed known to man.
March 17, 2024
An informative look at the prerequisites for military superiority that made colonialism possible. If I take one truth with me from this book it is how the correct method and strategy for using a technology can multiply its advantages.
May 1, 2021
Not organized very well, tough to read
July 8, 2025
So much text on one page makes it hard to read.
I didn't finish the book as it was for a class but I will pick it back up since it's in my ownership and on a interesting topic
I didn't finish the book as it was for a class but I will pick it back up since it's in my ownership and on a interesting topic
July 13, 2012
A very broad history, that provides a useful overview of the impact that guns had on tactics and the balance of power in Europe (and around the world) after 1500. I especially appreciate the extensive use of photographs and pictures to demonstrate his points, and his attempts to broaden his history beyond a simple look at Europe. At times the book is overly simplistic in its explanations, but that is to be expected in such a short, broad overview.
August 3, 2011
3.5/5 stars This reads far too much like the text book that it was for me. I prefer the writers who can disguise their text book stuff behind a thin veil of awesome. Very informative book, just very dry.
February 3, 2009
Colorful account of the rise of Western military strength. Its conclusions have been contested, but the breadth of scholarship is impressive.
February 16, 2013
Absolutely fascinating work. Essentially a primer on how warfare came to be the way it was for the periods of time that I tend to read the most about.
October 31, 2015
Interesting read. He does fall into the trap of assuming that medieval armies were almost entirely cavalry because that's what received the most attention in writing, though.
August 29, 2012
complete and exhaustive description of western history of war, weapon & strategy
February 15, 2014
Brilliant stuff, but as an overview it's a bit shallow. Great for students.
April 9, 2017
I did not enjoy this book. That being said, it's well-written and informative. I just don't read military history for fun, only when coerced for educational purposes. So if you like military history, this is definitely going to be to good for you.
Displaying 1 - 25 of 25 reviews