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The Nature of Mind
Since the dawn of history philosophers have speculated about the nature of mind. What kind of thing is the mind? How do mental processes fit with the rest of the natural order? Is the mind something different and separate from the body? What is distinctive of the various kinds of mental phenomena such as thinking, feeling, sensing, and consciousness? Addressing these and related problems, this anthology provides a framework for understanding mental functioning. The readings are grouped into five major General Problems about Mind, Self and Other, Mind and Body, The Nature of Mind, and Psychological Explanation. Each section begins with an introduction that discusses the issues and problems that arise in the various selections and shows how each author approaches them. In addition, a general introduction gives a concise overview of the subject and provides a historical context for the readings. Representative works of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers
such as Descartes, Locke, and Reid provide a solid foundation for the copious selections from contemporary philosophers that follow, among them articles by Fodor, Dennett, Nagel, Putnam, Davidson, Searle, Ryle, Strawson, Burge, Chisholm, Rorty, and Sellars. With sixty-two selections in all, The Nature of Mind is an invaluable resource for anyone interested in this central philosophical topic.
such as Descartes, Locke, and Reid provide a solid foundation for the copious selections from contemporary philosophers that follow, among them articles by Fodor, Dennett, Nagel, Putnam, Davidson, Searle, Ryle, Strawson, Burge, Chisholm, Rorty, and Sellars. With sixty-two selections in all, The Nature of Mind is an invaluable resource for anyone interested in this central philosophical topic.
656 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1991
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August 22, 2024
A COLLECTION OF (MOSTLY) CONTEMPORARY WRITINGS RELATING TO THE MIND
Editor David Rosenthal wrote in the Introduction to this 1991 collection, "Despite our seemingly immediate grasp of mental states, it is often hard to put into words what we know about mind. We seem to understand the mind readily enough from our own experience. What causes problems is articulating what we know objectively, that is, in terms that are independent and of our own case. This raises a problem about how the study of mind should proceed. Are mental processes subject to scientific study, as other natural phenomena are? Or is the study of mind limited to our everyday, commonsense descriptions of mental states? If there can be a science of mind, what is its status relative to the other sciences? The readings collected here reflect these concerns." (Pg. 3-4)
A wide variety of papers and excerpts are included (including from Descartes, Locke, and Thomas Reid), but the vast majority of the collection is given over to contemporary philosophers, such as Ryle, Anscombe, Strawson, Rorty, Putnam, Smart, Block, Quine, Chisholm, Dennett, Sellars, Nagel, Stich, Searle, etc.
D.M. Armstrong argues, "But, in fact, the apprehension of something must be distinct from the thing apprehended. For if not, we are faced with a flagrant circularity. Having a pain logically involves apprehension of---what? The pain itself! This is as bad as saying that to be a cat logically involves being the offspring of cats. It seems, therefore, that there must always be a distinction between BEING in a certain mental state and BEING AWARE that we are in that state. Hence there can be no indubitable introspective knowledge." (Pg. 129)
J.J.C. Smart explains the Identity Theory (or "topic-neutral") theory of mind: "Let me first try to state more accurately the thesis that sensations are brain-processes... in so far as 'after-image' or 'ache' is a report of a process, it is a report of a process that HAPPENS TO BE a brain process... the thesis does not claim that sensation statements can be TRANSLATED into statements about brain processes. Nor does it claim that the logic of a sensation statement is the same as that of a brain-process statement. All it claims is that in so far as a sensation statement is a report of something, that something is in fact a brain process. Sensations are nothing over and above brain processes." (Pg. 170) He adds, "if the brain process theory and dualism are equally consistent with the facts, then the principles of parsimony and simplicity seem to me to decide overwhelmingly in favor of the brain-process theory." (Pg. 175)
D. M. Armstrong says, "My view is that the identification of mental states with physical states of the brain is a perfectly intelligible one... The analysis proposed may be called the Causal analysis of the mental concepts. According to this view, the concept of a mental state essentially involves, and is exhausted by, the concept of a state that is apt to be the cause of certain effects or apt to be the effect of certain causes." (Pg. 183)
In a paper on left/right hemisphere differences, Thomas Nagel says, "I do not wish to claim that the line between conscious and unconscious mental activity is a sharp one. It is even possible that the distinction is partly relative, in the sense that a given item of mental activity may be assignable to consciousness of not, depending on what other mental activities of the same person are going on at the same time." (Pg. 436)
J.A. Fodor asserts, "Searle gives no clue as to why he thinks the biochemistry is important for intentionality and, prima facie, the idea that what counts is how the organism is connected to the world seems far more plausible. After all, it's easy enough to imagine ... how the fact that my thought is causally connected to a tree might bear on its being a thought about a tree. But it's hard to imagine how the fact that ... my thought is made out of hydrocarbons could matter, except on the unlikely hypothesis that only hydrocarbons can be causally connected to trees in the way that brains are." (Pg. 521)
This is an excellent collection, for anyone studying the philosophy of mind---particularly the contemporary debates.
Editor David Rosenthal wrote in the Introduction to this 1991 collection, "Despite our seemingly immediate grasp of mental states, it is often hard to put into words what we know about mind. We seem to understand the mind readily enough from our own experience. What causes problems is articulating what we know objectively, that is, in terms that are independent and of our own case. This raises a problem about how the study of mind should proceed. Are mental processes subject to scientific study, as other natural phenomena are? Or is the study of mind limited to our everyday, commonsense descriptions of mental states? If there can be a science of mind, what is its status relative to the other sciences? The readings collected here reflect these concerns." (Pg. 3-4)
A wide variety of papers and excerpts are included (including from Descartes, Locke, and Thomas Reid), but the vast majority of the collection is given over to contemporary philosophers, such as Ryle, Anscombe, Strawson, Rorty, Putnam, Smart, Block, Quine, Chisholm, Dennett, Sellars, Nagel, Stich, Searle, etc.
D.M. Armstrong argues, "But, in fact, the apprehension of something must be distinct from the thing apprehended. For if not, we are faced with a flagrant circularity. Having a pain logically involves apprehension of---what? The pain itself! This is as bad as saying that to be a cat logically involves being the offspring of cats. It seems, therefore, that there must always be a distinction between BEING in a certain mental state and BEING AWARE that we are in that state. Hence there can be no indubitable introspective knowledge." (Pg. 129)
J.J.C. Smart explains the Identity Theory (or "topic-neutral") theory of mind: "Let me first try to state more accurately the thesis that sensations are brain-processes... in so far as 'after-image' or 'ache' is a report of a process, it is a report of a process that HAPPENS TO BE a brain process... the thesis does not claim that sensation statements can be TRANSLATED into statements about brain processes. Nor does it claim that the logic of a sensation statement is the same as that of a brain-process statement. All it claims is that in so far as a sensation statement is a report of something, that something is in fact a brain process. Sensations are nothing over and above brain processes." (Pg. 170) He adds, "if the brain process theory and dualism are equally consistent with the facts, then the principles of parsimony and simplicity seem to me to decide overwhelmingly in favor of the brain-process theory." (Pg. 175)
D. M. Armstrong says, "My view is that the identification of mental states with physical states of the brain is a perfectly intelligible one... The analysis proposed may be called the Causal analysis of the mental concepts. According to this view, the concept of a mental state essentially involves, and is exhausted by, the concept of a state that is apt to be the cause of certain effects or apt to be the effect of certain causes." (Pg. 183)
In a paper on left/right hemisphere differences, Thomas Nagel says, "I do not wish to claim that the line between conscious and unconscious mental activity is a sharp one. It is even possible that the distinction is partly relative, in the sense that a given item of mental activity may be assignable to consciousness of not, depending on what other mental activities of the same person are going on at the same time." (Pg. 436)
J.A. Fodor asserts, "Searle gives no clue as to why he thinks the biochemistry is important for intentionality and, prima facie, the idea that what counts is how the organism is connected to the world seems far more plausible. After all, it's easy enough to imagine ... how the fact that my thought is causally connected to a tree might bear on its being a thought about a tree. But it's hard to imagine how the fact that ... my thought is made out of hydrocarbons could matter, except on the unlikely hypothesis that only hydrocarbons can be causally connected to trees in the way that brains are." (Pg. 521)
This is an excellent collection, for anyone studying the philosophy of mind---particularly the contemporary debates.
to-keep-reference
October 30, 2019En este libro está publicado el texto de Smart que Searle considera una exposición clásica de la teoría de la identidad (los estados mentales son en realidad idénticos a los estados cerebrales).
La Mente Pág.77
La Mente Pág.77
June 17, 2007
It is lacking in that it is missing a discussion that actually approaches recognizing consciousness as a necessary and real feature of the mind.
February 12, 2008
This anthology rocks!
shelved
July 2, 2011...another upcoming philosophical read for me, all about exploring the mental construct, an interest of mine...
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews