This is a fascinating account of the development of revolutionary tactical concepts (and the equipment and training needed to carry them out) and adaptation in the midst of combat. Does an excellent job of refuting basic claims about German tactical innovation in the First World War such as "just the product of a genius officer [Hutier, Ludendorff, etc.]," "stole it from a French pamphlet," "they needed it more due to inferior numbers," etc., and showing how a combination of factors were required to make this revolution successful.
Perhaps its best service is in refuting the popular perception (as exemplified in Horne's account of an unthinking Prussian NCO infiltrating Fort Douaumont) of German troops as the Kaiser's automatons; the tolerance of dissent and discussion at all levels and command climate required for tactical adaptations to "infiltrate" their way up to the top from lower echelons are more "democratic" than the military cultures in the Western democratic states opposing Germany. Certainly nothing similar occurred in the French or British armies. All in all, the comparison of the German officer corps - steeped in military education and history, but with a less well-rounded education than his generally aristocratic peers in the UK and France (or the inducted college kids of the US Army in both World Wars) makes for a fascinating contribution to the debate on officer selection and education.
Finally, the impact of these "bottom-up" adaptations on the development and procurement of new weapons makes for an interesting comparison with the experiences of Western democracies as well - compare, for instance, German development of trench mortars in response to urgently communicated infantry needs to how the US Army's Ordnance Board overruled or ignored feedback from the front on artillery (World War I; the disastrous 3-inch M1916) or tanks (World War II; the Ordnance Board resistance to re-arming the Sherman or replacing it entirely in 1943).