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Το τέλος του ευρώ: Το αβέβαιο μέλλον της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης
Ο διακεκριμένος οικονομικός συντάκτης Johan Van Overtveldt εξετάζει τη μοίρα του ευρώ χρησιμοποιώντας τα πιο πρόσφατα στοιχεία. Δείχνει ότι η ένωση της Γερμανίας, της Γαλλίας, της Ιταλίας και άλλων ευρωπαϊκών χωρών με ενιαίο νόμισμα και νομισματική πολιτική –αλλά χωρίς μια γνήσια πολιτική ένωση– δεν μπορούσε παρά να οδηγήσει σε σημαντικές ανισορροπίες ανάμεσα στα κράτη μέλη και να απειλήσει τη σταθερότητα της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Όμως κανείς από τους πολιτικούς ηγέτες δεν προσπάθησε να αντιμετωπίσει αυτούς τους κινδύνους με συγκεκριμένες ενέργειες και μεταρρυθμίσεις.
Το αποτέλεσμα ήταν ότι η πολιτική ελίτ μετέτρεψε μια εξαιρετική ιδέα –τη δημιουργία ενός ενιαίου νομίσματος– σε ένα τεράστιο ρίσκο. Η λογική τους στηριζόταν στην υπόρρητη παραδοχή ότι οι πολιτικοί της Ευρώπης θα είναι πάντα σε θέση να βρίσκουν κάποια αυτοσχέδια λύση σε οποιαδήποτε κρίση θα μπορούσε να προκύψει. Όμως τα πράγματα άλλαξαν δραματικά με την οικονομική κρίση του 2007-2008.
Με δεδομένα τα χαρακτηριστικά της νομισματικής ένωσης, μια σοβαρή κρίση ήταν αναπόφευκτη αφού οι διάφορες συνθήκες και πολιτικές συμφωνίες που οδήγησαν στη δημιουργία του ευρώ εμπεριείχαν μη βιώσιμες ανισορροπίες. Οι πολιτικοί της Ευρώπης δεν ενήργησαν ποτέ για να αντιμετωπίσουν αυτή την πραγματικότητα, πράγμα που τους καθιστά τους κύριους ενόχους για την παρατεταμένη και επώδυνη επιθανάτια αγωνία του ευρώ. Αν και τα ελλείμματα σε χώρες όπως οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και το Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο ήταν πολύ μεγαλύτερα από το συνολικό έλλειμμα της ζώνης του ευρώ, οι επενδυτές αναγνώρισαν ότι το τεράστιο πρόβλημα το οποίο αντιμετώπιζε η Ευρώπη ήταν η συστημική λειτουργία της ίδιας της ευρωζώνης. Ο Van Overtveldt τελειώνει με μια ανάλυση όσων επιφυλάσσει το μέλλον για τη νομισματική ένωση, αλλά και όλη τη βαθιά διασπασμένη ευρωπαϊκή ήπειρο. Είτε η ΟΝΕ θα μεταμορφωθεί θεμελιακά είτε θα διαλυθεί, και η πιθανότερη έκβαση είναι η δεύτερη.
Το αποτέλεσμα ήταν ότι η πολιτική ελίτ μετέτρεψε μια εξαιρετική ιδέα –τη δημιουργία ενός ενιαίου νομίσματος– σε ένα τεράστιο ρίσκο. Η λογική τους στηριζόταν στην υπόρρητη παραδοχή ότι οι πολιτικοί της Ευρώπης θα είναι πάντα σε θέση να βρίσκουν κάποια αυτοσχέδια λύση σε οποιαδήποτε κρίση θα μπορούσε να προκύψει. Όμως τα πράγματα άλλαξαν δραματικά με την οικονομική κρίση του 2007-2008.
Με δεδομένα τα χαρακτηριστικά της νομισματικής ένωσης, μια σοβαρή κρίση ήταν αναπόφευκτη αφού οι διάφορες συνθήκες και πολιτικές συμφωνίες που οδήγησαν στη δημιουργία του ευρώ εμπεριείχαν μη βιώσιμες ανισορροπίες. Οι πολιτικοί της Ευρώπης δεν ενήργησαν ποτέ για να αντιμετωπίσουν αυτή την πραγματικότητα, πράγμα που τους καθιστά τους κύριους ενόχους για την παρατεταμένη και επώδυνη επιθανάτια αγωνία του ευρώ. Αν και τα ελλείμματα σε χώρες όπως οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και το Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο ήταν πολύ μεγαλύτερα από το συνολικό έλλειμμα της ζώνης του ευρώ, οι επενδυτές αναγνώρισαν ότι το τεράστιο πρόβλημα το οποίο αντιμετώπιζε η Ευρώπη ήταν η συστημική λειτουργία της ίδιας της ευρωζώνης. Ο Van Overtveldt τελειώνει με μια ανάλυση όσων επιφυλάσσει το μέλλον για τη νομισματική ένωση, αλλά και όλη τη βαθιά διασπασμένη ευρωπαϊκή ήπειρο. Είτε η ΟΝΕ θα μεταμορφωθεί θεμελιακά είτε θα διαλυθεί, και η πιθανότερη έκβαση είναι η δεύτερη.
312 pages, Paperback
First published October 1, 2011
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
September 6, 2016
Informative book about that details the history of the EU from its nascence after WWII in keeping neighboring countries talking to each other in an open forum so as to avert another war (primarily France-Germany) and eventually lead towards greater economic and cultural cooperation. In many respects, the EU has been wildly successful, as there have not been any further skirmishes between member nations and economically has been able to serve as a strong counterbalance to the US:
'On the occassion of his eightieth birthday in May 2010, Helmut Kohl told a German audience, "Today I'm convinced more than ever that European unification is a question of war and peace for Europe and for us, and the euro is part of our guarantee of peace."'
Though well-publicized challenges are all around that the EU must weather through today as it did in its infancy. Just as the US constitution was a bundle of compromises, so was the original EU formation (France giving up many of its cultural legacies, Germany giving up its central bank authority) - though we have seen many violations over the years that have led us to where we are today.
Ultimately, the EU started unraveling on account of the lack of truly political unity that made broadband policy coordination impossible:
'The Germans still stood squarely behind the opinion voiced by Bundesbank president Karl Blessing in the early 1960's that monetary union required a "common trade policy, a common finance and budget policy, a common economic policy, a common social and wage policy - a common policy all around" - in short, the kind of policy coordination that is hard to imagine without a full-scale political union.'
Further support for the benefit of political, cultural, and monetary unification:
'The United States, after all, can be considered "the world's most successful single currency union." "American," wrote Paul Krugman, "has a currency union that works, and we know why it works: because it coincides with a nation - a nation with a big government, a common language, and a shared culture. Europe has none of these things."' - although many within our country today would gladly throw this all away were it to help benefit their own individual financial situation (yes I'm talking about you Tea Partiers)
As well as violations to the rules/regulations:
'Nearly every country aiming for acceptance into the EMU applied statistical manipulation and creative accounting. These tricks included: keeping expenses out of the books; selling government assets and booking them as recurrent receipts; blatant exaggeration of expected income from the fight against fiscal and social fraud; announcing savings in expenditures that would never be executed and tax increases that would never become truly effective; ingenious manipulation of data on nominal GDP so as to make deficits and debt levels look smaller as a percent of GDP. Although Italy, Greece, Spain, and Belgium topped the list of suspects, even the German government tried to bend the rules by taking advantage of the Bundesbank's stock of gold.'
The benefits of a monetary union are undeniable:
'For example, the absence of currency conversion costs contributes to economic efficiency. Greater price transparency across countries helps the competitive process and lowers prices, keeping inflation in check and interest rates low [...] The single currency bans competitive devaluations, reducing trade tensions and protectionist inclinations in the common market for goods and services. Wild fluctuations in currency exchange rates had contributed to the devastating economic and political disruptions of the 1920s and 1930s.'
And the single currency helps furthermore to combat competition from the US, similar to American complaints about the RMB:
'European policymakers were most frustrated by the American authorities' unreceptiveness to complaints from Europe about the dollar's gyrations. John Connally, who served as secretary of the treasury under Richard Nixon, told European leaders complaining about the dollar's freefall in 1973-74 that "the dollar is our currency and your problem."'
Ultimately I believe, as does the author, that the EU will survive but never really thrive as the United States of Europe that Montesquieu once dreamed of. I don't see true cultural or political unification between such different member states ever coming to fruition (i.e. the ability of governments nor the people to ever compromise their own individual short-term desires for a longer term good), and without such a Nash Equilibria, the EU will likely remain as a strong body of power that continues to tread lightly on thin ice, but never able to combat the American or Chinese spheres of common influence.
'On the occassion of his eightieth birthday in May 2010, Helmut Kohl told a German audience, "Today I'm convinced more than ever that European unification is a question of war and peace for Europe and for us, and the euro is part of our guarantee of peace."'
Though well-publicized challenges are all around that the EU must weather through today as it did in its infancy. Just as the US constitution was a bundle of compromises, so was the original EU formation (France giving up many of its cultural legacies, Germany giving up its central bank authority) - though we have seen many violations over the years that have led us to where we are today.
Ultimately, the EU started unraveling on account of the lack of truly political unity that made broadband policy coordination impossible:
'The Germans still stood squarely behind the opinion voiced by Bundesbank president Karl Blessing in the early 1960's that monetary union required a "common trade policy, a common finance and budget policy, a common economic policy, a common social and wage policy - a common policy all around" - in short, the kind of policy coordination that is hard to imagine without a full-scale political union.'
Further support for the benefit of political, cultural, and monetary unification:
'The United States, after all, can be considered "the world's most successful single currency union." "American," wrote Paul Krugman, "has a currency union that works, and we know why it works: because it coincides with a nation - a nation with a big government, a common language, and a shared culture. Europe has none of these things."' - although many within our country today would gladly throw this all away were it to help benefit their own individual financial situation (yes I'm talking about you Tea Partiers)
As well as violations to the rules/regulations:
'Nearly every country aiming for acceptance into the EMU applied statistical manipulation and creative accounting. These tricks included: keeping expenses out of the books; selling government assets and booking them as recurrent receipts; blatant exaggeration of expected income from the fight against fiscal and social fraud; announcing savings in expenditures that would never be executed and tax increases that would never become truly effective; ingenious manipulation of data on nominal GDP so as to make deficits and debt levels look smaller as a percent of GDP. Although Italy, Greece, Spain, and Belgium topped the list of suspects, even the German government tried to bend the rules by taking advantage of the Bundesbank's stock of gold.'
The benefits of a monetary union are undeniable:
'For example, the absence of currency conversion costs contributes to economic efficiency. Greater price transparency across countries helps the competitive process and lowers prices, keeping inflation in check and interest rates low [...] The single currency bans competitive devaluations, reducing trade tensions and protectionist inclinations in the common market for goods and services. Wild fluctuations in currency exchange rates had contributed to the devastating economic and political disruptions of the 1920s and 1930s.'
And the single currency helps furthermore to combat competition from the US, similar to American complaints about the RMB:
'European policymakers were most frustrated by the American authorities' unreceptiveness to complaints from Europe about the dollar's gyrations. John Connally, who served as secretary of the treasury under Richard Nixon, told European leaders complaining about the dollar's freefall in 1973-74 that "the dollar is our currency and your problem."'
Ultimately I believe, as does the author, that the EU will survive but never really thrive as the United States of Europe that Montesquieu once dreamed of. I don't see true cultural or political unification between such different member states ever coming to fruition (i.e. the ability of governments nor the people to ever compromise their own individual short-term desires for a longer term good), and without such a Nash Equilibria, the EU will likely remain as a strong body of power that continues to tread lightly on thin ice, but never able to combat the American or Chinese spheres of common influence.
August 26, 2018
I learned a lot about the Economic and Monetary Union. Specifically the past and current roles of Germany, France, the ESB and the IMF. After reading this, I am frustrated that 7 years after the book's publishing, the ESB is still lending more money to Greece and pushing off their interest payments another 10 years and calling their bailout "complete." The only thing that is complete is that northern European (German) banks and investors have been bailed out. Greece will be making payments on those loans for 50 or more years. The money that was lent to Greece was fronted by mostly Northern European (German) taxpayers. It's a giant public Ponzi scheme run by big regional banks. Taxpayers in the north and south both lose their money and get nothing. Greece (along with Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and maybe even France) should leave the Euro, create and then devalue their currencies and then fleece the ECB and private creditors. They will never jumpstart their economies otherwise unless the European Monetary Union seizes control and makes it a political union (think northern Europeans actually running the southern European governments and actually collecting taxes, reducing corruption, and eliminating public sector good-ol-boy jobs).
The bigger question is why don't German citizens who already don't like the Euro and Brussels vote to leave and bring back the Deutschmark or the "neumark?" I feel like it is inevitable that a domino-effect of southern European countries leave the Euro, devalue their currencies and fleece investors. Even more likely, Germany/Finland/Netherlands will leave first to the same end.
Informative book but less prescient read seven years after the fact.
The bigger question is why don't German citizens who already don't like the Euro and Brussels vote to leave and bring back the Deutschmark or the "neumark?" I feel like it is inevitable that a domino-effect of southern European countries leave the Euro, devalue their currencies and fleece investors. Even more likely, Germany/Finland/Netherlands will leave first to the same end.
Informative book but less prescient read seven years after the fact.
May 29, 2017
it was informative and somewhat of a fast read. the book provides a quick basic understanding of how the EMU (European Monetary Union) came to be and it's life up to 2011.
June 13, 2020
14/06/20
3.6/5 actually
nice overview of the situation in Europe with a special emphasis on Greece Spain Germany France and Portugal
3.6/5 actually
nice overview of the situation in Europe with a special emphasis on Greece Spain Germany France and Portugal
January 10, 2024
Very dry, long-winded, and uninformative narrative on Monetary Union and Europe. A very weak thesis.
November 6, 2014
a simply great book depicting the impossible have been forced to become something "a train wreck". With different spending habits, culture, financial discipline, the forming of EU was simply politically driven and packaged by the evil Goldman Sachs who lied about their client countries financial status in order to cheat their ways to become EU members. After 10+ years, EU is on the verge of meltdown with massive debt vs GDP in various countries. Most noticeably would be France. I cannot wait for Neumark to be born because EU is a load of crackpots coming together aiming to loot citizen's savings, pension funds from the global arena. And most importantly, when one country's sovereign right to create their currency is taken away, it also means the greedy bankers are taking away the right to survival for the country. Exactly what Rothschild family has been doing to England, Prussia, Germany....a must read for people who need a slap on the face to see what is to come within 10 years. EU QE will collapse!
August 27, 2013
Fascinating reading. A little obtuse but informative and well documented. You don't need to know all the people or acronyms that populate this study to gain valuable insight into the craziness relating to the crisis with the Euro. What I took away from this reading was the amazing machination and deception that government and policy makers will stoop to in response to a crisis.
Another interesting point was the degree to which the financial sector desires to dictate to the political sector. Certainly the tension between the financial system, the politicians and the public is evident in the text.
Another interesting point was the degree to which the financial sector desires to dictate to the political sector. Certainly the tension between the financial system, the politicians and the public is evident in the text.
February 1, 2012
If you want to know what has lead to the current mess named Euro, Van Overveldt's book is the perfect answer providing a thorough analysis of this experiment.
December 10, 2013
Factual context is helpful and literary review is correct. Future projections make sense, but they are not the only options, more of an author's personal projections. A decent read.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews