Lots to chew on: science, illusion, the meaning of the world; politics, representation, art, and being real. Great read!
Ultimately, science has never stopped churning out a reassuring scenario in which the world is being progressively deciphered by the advances of reason. This was the hypothesis with which we ‘discovered’ the world, atoms, molecules, particles, viruses and so forth. But no one has advanced the hypothesis that things may discover us at the same time as we discover them, and that there is a dual relationship in discovery. This is because we do not see the object in its originality. We see it as a passive, as waiting to be discovered -- a bit like America being discovered by the Spaniards. But things are not like that. When the subject discovers the object -- whether that object is viruses or primitive societies -- the converse, and never innocent, discovery is also made: the discovery of the subject by the object. Today, they say that science no longer ‘discovers’ its object but ‘invents’ it. We should say, then, that the object, too, does more than just ‘discover’ us; it invents us purely and simply -- it thinks us. It seems that we have victoriously wrenched the object from its peaceful state, from its indifference and the secrecy which enshrouded it. But today, before our very eyes, the enigmatic nature of the world is rousing itself, resolved to struggle to retain its mystery. Knowledge is a duel. And this duel between subject and object brings with it the subject’s loss of sovereignty, making the object itself the horizon of its disappearance.
For reality, it is all merely a superficial and provisional ‘enframing’ [Gestell] in the Heideggerian sense. Reality itself has become simulative, and leaves us with a sense of its fundamental unintelligibility, which has nothing mystical about it, but would seem, rather, to be ironic. Having reached the paroxystic state (which is, as the name implies, the state just before the end), reality slips over of its own accord into the parodic -- irony and parody being the last glimmer reality sends out to us before disappearing, the last sign the object sends out to us from the depths of its mystery.
The object-thought is no longer reflective, but reversible.
Object-thought, thought become inhuman, is the form of thinking which actually comes to terms with impossible exchange. It no longer attempts to interpret the world, nor to exchange it for ideas; it has opted for uncertainty, which becomes its rule. It becomes the thinking of the world thinking us. In so doing, it changes the course of the world. For though there is no there is no possible equivalence between thought and the world, there does occur, beyond any critical point of view, a reciprocal alteration between matter and thought. So the situation is reversed; if, once, the subject constituted an event in the world of the object, today the object constitutes an event in the universe ofo the subject. If the sudden emergence of consciousness constituted an event in the course of the world, today the world constitutes an event in the course of consciousness, in so far as it now forms part of its material destiny, part of the destiny of matter, and hence of its radical uncertainty.
Physical alteration of the world by consciousness, metaphysical alteration of consciousness by the world; there is no cause to ask where this begins, or ‘who thinks whom.’ Each is simultaneously in play, and each deflects the other from its goal. Has not humanity, with its inborn consciousness, its ambiguity, its symbolic order and its power of illusion, ended up altering the universe, affecting or infecting it with its own uncertainty? Has it not ended up contaminating the world (of which it is, nevertheless, an integral part) with its non-being, its way of not-being-in-the-world?
We have lost the original. The destiny of the individual soul has lost much of its grandeur. In the past, the human being was not doomed to be merely what he is. God and Satan wrestled over him. In the past, we were important enough to have a battle fought over our souls. Today, our salvation is our own affair. Our lives are no longer marked by original sin but by the risk of failing to fulfil their ultimate potential; so we accumulate plans, ideals and programmes; we constantly pass the buck and seek to outdo each other in a universal effort to perform. And we subside into the condition of those who, as Kierkegaard put it, are no longer capable of facing the Last Judgement in person.
Since no one fights over our souls any longer, it is up to us to fight over ourselves, to put our own existences on the line, to be endlessly trying things out and competing in a perpetual, infernal contesting of ourselves -- though there is no Last Judgement anymore, and there are no longer any real rules.
In the final stage of his ‘liberation’ and emancipation through the networks, screens and new technologies, the modern individual becomes a fractal subject, but subdivisible to infinity and indivisible, closed on himself and doomed to endless identity. In a sense, the perfect subject, the subject without other -- whose individuation is therefore not at all contradictory with mass status. Quite the contrary, indeed: he is the dispersal of the mass-effect into each individual parcel -- each encapsulating in itself the seriality, the crazed [étoile], metonymic structure of the mass, the characteristic feature of which is that it is at any one point substitutable for itself. Or, alternatively, the individual himself forms a mass -- the mass structure being present, as in a hologram, in each individual fragment. In the virtual and media world, the mass and the individual are merely electronic extensions of each other. We have thus become virtual monads, free electrons, individuals left to ourselves, desperately seeking the other. But the particle has no other. The other particle is always the same. All that can exist is an anti-particle, which, on impact, would make the first particle disappear. Perhaps this is the only last eventuality there is: the destiny of the disappearance of matter into anti-matter, of sex into the other sex, of the individual into the mass. Reduced to nuclear identity, we no longer have any alternative destiny except a collision with our antagonistic double. This is, pretty much, the curse which afflicts the species -- this latter breaking up first into individuals, then these in their turn breaking up into scattered particles by a process of inexorable fragmentation. Like matter, which saw itself split first into atoms, then into increasingly elusive particles -- in such a way that you sense there will never be a final, truly elementary stage of matter, any more than there will be a definitive reference stage of the human being.
* * *
It gradually dawns on you that you have only to look at the political and social world to see that it is made up of countless parallel, ‘rigged’ careers, of speculation and crookery which is never denounced, of perfectly impenetrable insider deals, of mystifications we shall never see unmasked.
May 1968 was still faithful in its gestures and speech to that cultural rhetoric (which in no way detracts from the symbolic violence of the event). Our age, however, is no longer capable of providing a stage and actors. We shall even seem faintly ridiculous to those who come after us, in the way 1950s characters do to us. We have thrown off that old existential garb.
Then there is nothing to rule out the paradoxical hypothesis that it is indeed our thought which governs the world, on condition that we first think that it is the world which thinks us.
Homogenize and integrate as much as you like; separation will still occur.
Any regime of control and prohibition creates an irregular, clandestine, anomalous situation: a black market. Prohibition and its consequences has become nature to our system.
Everything -- or, at least, most essential things -- already takes place outside the official circuits. And there is something heartening about this. There is something spiritual in this double game, in this perversion which resists any normalization, in these occult structures which flout established authority, in this black market of the social. And, in any case, what hope would there be for a society that had purged itself of all clandestinity? In the end, the last word goes to Mandeville, for whom the social body operates only through its immorality and its vices -- but that immorality cannot be acknowledged: it, too, is part of the black market in truth.
This thoroughgoing dissociation of all the forms of society amounts to a veritable silent insurrection. It provides an echo of those peoples exiled behind the mirrors by the victorious Emperor, destined in the future to be merely a reflection of their conqueror. But one day, says Borges, these subject peoples begin to look less and less like their masters. They end up breaking the mirrors and bursting forth into the empire, laying waste to it. Soe we see entire populations rebelling -- albeit in some cases silently -- against the principle of representation. For them, the exercise of that particular freedom has become enforced bitpart playing and a shabby hoax.
This is a very deep rebellion, which goes to the heart of the political system. What interest does the modern individual have in being represented -- the individual of the networks and the virtual, the multifocal individual of the operational sphere? He does his business, and that is that. What does he care for transcendence? He lives very well in immanence and interaction. What does a political will mean to him, a collective will, that glimmer of sovereignty he delegated to the social organization? There is no longer any delegation of the will, or of desire. The screen of communication has smashed the mirror of representation. Now only statistical shaws circulate - on the opinion-poll screens. There is no social contract any longer: on the media screens, only the image-play-back functions. The citizen’s only symbolic capital is that of his disaffection and political poverty, that very poverty managed by our official representatives (that is the secret of their corruption).
The political insurrection of people who no longer want to be represented, the silent insurrection of things which no longer want to signify anything. The contract of signification - that kind of social contract between things and their signs - itself seems broken, like the political contract, with the result that we find it increasingly hard to represent the world to ourselves and decipher its meaning. Things themselves rebel against decipherment - or perhaps we no longer wish to decipher them? It is the very imagining of meaning that is sick.
Yet we still play-act representation. A good illustration was provided by the Kassel Documenta of 1997 with ‘Pigsty’ Installation ~ a work by Carsten Höller and Rosemarie Trockel, ‘Ein Haus für Schweine und Menschen’ ( A House for Pigs and People).
Not only do people no longer want to be represented, they do not even want to be ‘liberated.’ Liberated from what, and in terms of what? To say what they have to say, they do not need to be represented. To be what they are, they no longer even need to recognize themselves as such.
Cioran has written: What a pity that to find God you have to go via faith!
What still distinguishes the functioning of human beings from that of machines is the intoxication of functioning, of living - pleasure. All kinds of aids can increase human pleasure, but human beings cannot invent any that would feel pleasure like themselves, or better than themselves - that would feel pleasure in their stead.
Leaving intelligence to machines is, in teh end, relinquishing the responsibility of knowing, just as leaving it to politicians to govern us relieves us of the responsibility of power.
...you do not belong to yourself. What one is, one does not have; and what one does not have, one cannot sell.
Lacan: love is giving what you do not have -- that is to say, what you are, which no one has at their disposal.
The best way to seduce is still to have someone do something in your stead: he or she will then keep on coming back to occupy that place.
Cioran says: we are not failures until we believe life has a meaning -- and from that point on, we are all failures, because it hasn’t.
Money becomes the universal transcription of a world bereft of meaning. This fetish money, around which global speculation revolves - far about and beyond the reproduction of capital - has nothing to do with wealth or the production of wealth. It expresses the breakdown of meaning, the impossibility of exchanging the world for its meaning, and at the same time, the need to transfigure that impossibility into a sign of some kind - indeed of the most nondescript kind: the sign which will best express the meaninglessness of the world.
If you wanted to put a brake on the total extrapolation of the world into money, you would first have to eliminate the demand for meaning. We are thus torn between the imagining of meaning, the demand for truth, and the increasingly probably hypothesis that the world has no final truth, that it is a definitive illusion. Money allows us to find a universal compromise.
Money might be said to be the equivalent of the universal circulation of the Nothing.
There are 2 ways of breaking the law: to deny it or to be seized with a passion for it.
Most current photographs merely reflect the ‘objective’ misery of the human condition. The more we are told about poverty and violence, and presented with them openly, the less effect they have on us. This is the law of the imaginary. The image has to affect us on its own account, to impose its specific illusion, its original language, for any content whatsoever to move us. For there to be an affective transference onto the real, we need the counter-transference of the image, and we need that counter-transference to be resolved.
We deplore the disappearance of the real, arguing that everything is now mediated by the image. But we forget that the image, too, disappears, overcome by reality. What is sacrificed in this operation is not so much the real as the image, which is dispossessed of its originality and doomed to a shameful complicity. Rather than lament the loss of a reality surrendered to the superficiality of the image, we should lament the loss of an image surrendered to the expression of the real. It is only by freeing the image from teh real that we shall restore its potency, and it is only by restoring to the image its specificity (its idiotie’ as Clément Rosset has it) that the real itself can recover its true image.
This so-called realist photography does not capture what is but, rather, what should not be: the reality of destitution. For preference, it photographs not what exists but what, from a moral, humanitarian viewpoint, should not exist - while making perfectly immoral aesthetic and commercial use of this misery. It is a photography which attests not so much to the real as to a profound disavowal of its object, and also a disavowal of the image, which is assigned to represent what does not wish to be represented, assigned to commit a ‘rape of the real.’ So the cult of the image at all costs most often entails an unhappy destiny for the image, namely, the fate of imprisoning the real in its reality principle, where the point is to free the real from its reality principle. Instead of this, we have been inoculated with the realist virus of the image. Every time we are photographed, we spontaneously size up the photography as he in turn takes stock of us. And ‘savages’, to spontaneously adopt a pose. Everything strikes a pose in an imaginary reconciliation.
Mike Disfarmer’s photographs of Arkansas farmers from the 1940s and 1950s: people of lowly origins, posing conscientiously, almost ceremoniously, and the lens doesn’t attempt to surprise or understand them. There is no pursuit of ‘naturalness,’ but no idea what they should look like either. They are what they are, and they do not smile.
The image reveals not something moral or related to ‘objective’ conditions, but that which remains indecipherable within each one of us; it is not of the order of reality but of the evil genius of reality, happy or otherwise. It is that which is of the order of the inhuman within us, and bears no witness to anything.
Photography appeared as a technical medium in an age - the industrial era - when reality began to disappear.
All our technologies - fatal progeny that they are - arise from teh progressive extenuation of reality.
The world lacks nothing before being thought, but thereafter, it can be explained only on that basis.
Thought as illusion, as seduction, is no doubt an imposture. But imposture (and language itself is one) is not the opposite of truth: it is a more subtle truth which enwraps the former in a sign of its parody and its erasure.
In the end, what is the point of thought, what is the point of theory. Between them and the world, it is a relationship of ‘the Other by itself’ [L'Autre par lui-même’]: suspense and reversibility, an asymmetrical duel between the world and thought. Bear in mind three basic theorems:
The world was given to us as something enigmatic and unintelligible, and the task of thought is to make it, if possible, even more enigmatic and unintelligible.
Since the world is evolving towards a frenzied state of affairs, we have to take a frenzied view of it.
The player must never be bigger than the game itself, nor the theorist bigger than theory, nor the theory bigger than the world itself.