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152 pages, Paperback
First published June 18, 1983
The nature of this [Western] Marxism could not but bear the impress of the disasters that accompanied and surrounded it. Above all, it was marked by the sundering of the bonds that should have linked it to a popular movement for revolutionary socialism. These had existed at the outset, as the careers of its trio of founding fathers show — Lukács, Korsch and Gramsci, each an active leader and organizer in the communist movement in his own country […] As these pioneers ended in exile or prison, theory and practice drifted fatally apart [..] The sites of Marxism as a discourse gradually became displaced from trade unions and political parties to research institutes and university departments. Inaugurated with the rise of the Frankfurt School […] the change was virtually absolute by the period of the High Cold War in the fifties, when there was scarcely a Marxist theoretician of any weight who was not the holder of a chair in the academy, rather than a post in the class struggle.
once the linguistic model becomes a general paradigm in the human sciences, the notion of ascertainable cause starts to undergo a critical weakening. The reason lies in the very nature of the relationship between langue and parole […] The supremacy of langue as a system is the cornerstone of the Saussurian legacy: parole is the subsequent activation of certain of its resources by the speaking subject […] An individual speech-act can only execute certain general linguistic laws, if it is to be communication at all. But at the same time, the laws can never explain the act. An unbridgeable gulf exists between the general rules of syntax and the utterance of particular sentences — whose shape or occasion can never be deduced from the sum of grammar, vocabulary or phonetics.
Written as a follow up to his previous work Considerations on Western Marxism, In the Tracks of Historical Materialism can also be viewed as the second volume in a triptych along with its successor volume, The Origins of Postmodernity. All 3 works are of roughly equal length and although there is some allusion to politics, they are fundamentally works of philosophy. Simplifying a great deal, Considerations on Western Marxism is a work of metaphilosophy - all at once it establishes the contours of the canon of Western Marxism, critiques it on its own terms, and then signals its exhaustion. Western Marxism is, as Anderson tells it, an aesthetic and epistemological discourse. There is an absence of concrete analysis of economics or politics or history, not to speak of a near complete absence of the strategic debates which preoccupied Lenin, Trotsky, and Luxemburg (Gramsci is something like a transitional figure from the heroic age of classical Marxism to defeated/defeatist “Western Marxism.”)
As a sequel to Considerations on Western Marxism, In the Tracks of Historical Materialism provides a balance sheet of the renaissance of concrete Marxist analysis of economics, politics, and history that Anderson believed was in process during the 1970s, while also despairing of the failure of any renewed revolutionary strategic discussion of merit. It also points to the general failure of Trotskyism to rise to the occasion of Western Marxism’s exhaustion.
The first chapter, “Prediction and Performance” serves two purposes, to broadly survey the then-current state of historical materialism, and to keep a scorecard of predictions made by Anderson in his previous essay. For the most part, this chapter is effectively a bibliography of what Anderson considers to be the most significant Marxist scholarship of the decade, and notes that the center of gravity for Marxist scholarship has shifted dramatically over the course of the decade from continental Europe to England and America.
Anderson notes that the era of Western Marxism is over and its major surviving luminaries are unlikely to produce any new significant work, a prediction which Anderson later qualifies in the 1990s when he asserts that Fredric Jameson’s work on postmodernism is, in fact, the crowning achievement of Western Marxism. Anderson thus completes his triptych on Western Marxism with a full monograph dedicated to Jameson’s treatment of postmodernity.
Anderson notes that Marxism has turned to a concern with the concrete as opposed to the fixation on aesthetics and epistemology in the classics of Western Marxism. He notes the staggering achievement of British Marxist historiography in particular, but also the incredible achievement by G.A. Cohen and renewed Marxist work in economics and political science.
It is here, however, that history has after all not vindicated Anderson at all - the analytic Marxism of G.A. Cohen and John Roemer that Anderson endorses here as one of the emerging currents of Anglophone Marxist renaissance would be more or less over by the end of the decade, its major voices not necessarily abandoning the left, but certainly abandoning Marxism. Analytic Marxism would likewise never capture the imagination of the radical young the way that (a highly distorted reading of) French post-structualism would. How many of the radical young today - Marxist or otherwise - know the name of G.A. Cohen or Adam Przeworski or John Roemer? Surely their apostasy or renegacy from Marxism is no more criminal than that of, say, Michael Foucault, a legendary misogynist who railed against Mitterand’s socialist government from the right.
Anderson also notes that while the turn to the concrete has been a positive development, it has failed to “meet up” with a mass Marxist political practice and, moreover, the truly mass Communist Parties in Italy and France have coexisted with a collapse of their respective national Marxisms. That is, for all the original and important work being done, none of it matches the significant work of political strategy conducted by Lenin, Trotsky, and Luxemburg in a previous era. Curiously, the countries with mass Communist Parties have faced a crisis of Marxism at the exact moment that the opposite trend occurs in England and the USA, an emergent powerful body of theory absent a mass proletarian party.
An interesting development in the decades since Anderson wrote - Ian Steedman’s book on the labor theory of value (published by Verso itself) has been out of print for decades and is nearly impossible to find if one doesn’t have access to a university library. Likewise, G.A. Cohen, whose work is heralded as the pinnacle of Marxist scholarship of the decade, would eventually disaffiliate entirely from Marxism (analytic or otherwise), if not disaffiliate with socialism altogether (a somewhat similar arc, it would seem, to Anderson’s own reflections on William Morris and non-Marxist socialisms).
The second chapter, “Structure and Subject” is a tour de force onslaught against structuralism and its successor -ism, poststructuralism, the couplet which comprises the Anglo-American invention of “French Theory”. Anderson offers one blunt critique of the entire structuralist enterprise after another - starting with the master of structuralism, Anderson points out that langue and parole are uniquely ill-fit as categories by which to understand society (in true Andersonian style, “a peculiarly aberrant compass”). Anderson points to the relatively slow rate of change within language, the relatively vast liberty of parole (although, curiously, he makes no reference here to Chomsky - it isn’t just that parole is tremendously volatile on the individual level. It is literally infinite), and that the subject of speech is individual whereas the stuff of social science in nearly always collective (nations, classes, and so on). Of course, with this final objection Anderson is also implicitly dismissing rational choice and any other paradigm within social sciences which uses the individual as a basic unit of account. (44)
Anderson then moves briskly to a dismissal of the remaining tetrarch of structuralism, as well as Derrida and Foucault in his poststructuralist phase. Following a line of critique common to left- and right-wing critiques of the French masters alike, Anderson faults them for “attenuation of the truth” (45). Having aggrandized language, structuralism then proceeds to attenuate truth itself. Having severed the link between signified and signifier, poststructuralism (and, crucially, Anderson points to antecedent ideas already present in Lévi-Strauss) eventually foreclosed any attempt to show correspondence between theory and reality altogether. Anderson thus arrives at the familiar critique of structuralism/poststructuralism, “it’s all a bunch of nonsense.”
Anderson does, however, suggest a more interesting critique, one the right-wing critics leave out altogether: the structuralist/poststructuralist discourse is incapable of accounting for the conditions of its own emergence, in stark contrast to the tradition of historical materialism. Indeed, the “immanent critique” of historical materialism from within is one of its most significant assets. Structuralism offers nothing like this and, indeed, the when discussing their own shifting understanding of the signifier, Foucault and Barthes both allude to the events of 1968 - external events simply happen. That structuralism was apparently incapable of surviving falsification by reality is all well and good - but rather than meaningfully theorize why, the underlying theoretical commitments of structuralism were simply modified to untether it from any claim to truth whatsoever. Thus structuralism/poststructuralism are incapable of accounting not just for the conditions of their own emergence, but also for the emergence of any change whatsoever. Instead of “genuine explanation, structuralist analysis constantly tends to tilt towards classification” (49). (A critique of structuralism which Anderson shares with Chomsky.) We are led, once again, to the foundational sin of structuralism, its focus on the static. As it can never meaningfully demonstrate causality, its pretensions to science can only derive from esoteric procedures that demonstrate homology between systems or structures.
Anderson’s critique is powerful, even if it is conducted at such a high level of abstraction that it necessarily glides over some of the theological subtleties within structuralism/poststructuralism (which Anderson himself was aware of, advising the reader to take note of Peter Dews’ then-forthcoming Logics of Disintegration). But Anderson curiously - as is often the case with the many reversals in his oeuvre - does not discuss his own pivotal role in the creation of “French Theory.” Perhaps a case of modesty? Under his editorial guidance, the New Left Review was, of course, at the forefront of publication for several of the luminaries of structuralist/post-structuralist thought. Their role in popularizing Althusser to an Anglo-American audience is most significant, but the NLR also translated important works by Lévi-Strauss and Lacan (the journal was never quite so sympathetic to Foucault, Derrida, or Deleuze). Having correctly excoriated structuralism’s inability to account for its own existence as a knowledge, Anderson seems to have a smidge of historical amnesia when it comes to his own priors.
Although Anderson dedicates a few pages to the vogue for Althusser in the decade 1965-1975, he does not mention his own previous enthusiasm for the Marxist variant of structuralism (37-39). While Anderson is under no obligation to divulge his biography, it is odd he provides so little insight here as to what could have made the structural problematique compelling in the first place, and, perhaps more specifically, why it should have gone into eclipse in its native land at the exact moment it began its meteoric ascent in the American academy. Anderson here refers primarily to the internal coherence and tensions of the structuralist problematique, it seems odd, given his own critique of structuralism’s weaknesses, not to also account for the broader social-historical conditions which obtained as Althusserianism met its timely end by the mid 1970s. Why should it be the case that “incoherent” Althusserianism would die on the vine while poststructuralism should “take off”? Why should the weakness in argumentation of the one led to its demise, but not the other?
The final chapter and the concluding postscript are the most powerful - and interesting - sections of the book, now that the dust of the structuralism/poststructuralism dust up that takes center in the first two chapters has settled. Although Anderson still cannot resist offering a series of capsule reviews along the way, he powerfully grapples with the nature and history of the relationship between nature and history. This is Anderson at his most reflective thus far - having speedran through the varieties of Marxism in the preceding two decades, he now concludes that Marxism isn’t, after all, the only game in town. This the moment of rapprochement with both Utopian socialism and feminism. Anderson, however, makes an important connection often neglected in discussions of materialist feminism - the great Utopian socialists that Marx criticized so fiercely in “The Communist Manifesto” were more attuned to “the woman question” than anything to be found in their own writings. And yet, as Anderson makes clear, any rapprochement with utopian or non-Marxist socialism through the route of feminism does not entail a rejection of the baseline of Marx’s scientific critique. However, anticipating Anderson’s later assessment of Fukuyama after the fall of Communism, we might wonder whether Marx’s critique of the Utopians has so much force to it after all. Further, we might puzzle over the omission of the ideology that would ultimately enjoy tremendous vogue of the left for the two decades directly after 1989: anarchism. The anarchist revival, after all, often involved an odd pairing of two superficially unlikely bedfellows, the classical anarchism of Goldman, Berkman, and Malatesta alongside the poststructural libertarianism of Deleuze, Guattari, and Foucault.
Anderson considers - and dismisses - the non-Marxist naturalism of Chomsky and Barrington Moore. He considers Sebastiano Timpanaro’s Marxist naturalism to be more powerful. Here Anderson considers that this naturalism is, ultimately, in service of an ethics, which ultimately is absent within the canon of historical materialism. Anderson concludes his reflections on the problem of a socialist ethics thus:
Edward Thompson and Régis Debray - two very contrasted thinkers, yet each once of committed Marxist background - have recently converged in proposing a virtually ontological dialectic of Self and Other, transhistorically inherent in collective human bonding as such, as the ultimate explanation of the multiplying national hatreds and escalating international arms race of the post-war world. All such notions will have to be very carefully, and coolly, examined. What they tell us, however, is that if the relations between structure and subject are the province par excellence of socialist strategy, the relations between nature and history bring us to the long overdue moment of socialist morality. Marxism will not complete its vocation as a critical theory unless and until it can adequately meet it. (84)
In the Tracks of Historical Materialism was published after G.A. Cohen’s foundational work of analytical Marxism, but still before the rush of future classics in the latter half of the decade, including John Roemer’s epochal edited volume on the subject. Curiously, Anderson never meaningfully engaged with analytical Marxism after this. Although the New Left Review published a handful of articles by Przeworski and Cohen, its final assessment of analytical Marxism was condemnation. Whereas in the last 15 years Anderson has published conciliatory articles on figures from his earlier career - Lévi-Strauss, Althusser, Timpanaro - he never again discussed what he had previously considered the Marxist classic of its decade.
Curiously, Anderson also did not, after In the Tracks of Historical Materialism, appear to treat any of these subjects with much depth himself in the following decades, instead of engaging in the kind of original work on ethics he himself had called for, his subsequent output was dedicated primarily, though not exclusively, to intellectual history and European politics. Anderson also takes time to correct what he considers to be the major intellectual oversight of Considerations on Western Marxism, its neglect of Jürgen Habermas, whom he now considers to be a powerful final representative of the tradition (an assessment later amended in Origins of Postmodernity, where Fredric Jameson is instead crowned as the pinnacle of the tradition).
Having explored new avenues for Marxist research in the final chapter and postscript, Anderson concludes with an encomium for feminism and for a non-Marxist socialism.
Precisely because it sought to deliver the human race ‘all at once’ from bondage, it could explore issues of sex as much as, or more than, issues of class; but for the same reason it had no way of locating the lines of division within humanity capable of bringing about the new civilization. Its irenic universalism - the gospel of a secular religion as its founders formulated it - precluded social conflict as a central principle of political change: hence its necessary resort to moral conversion as a substitute for it. (94)
Anderson earlier in the book notes that Western Marxism often relied on supplements from without - Althusser had structuralism and pre-critical philosophy, the Frankfurt School had Weber and Freud, and so on. Now Anderson calls for resources of a different nature, emerging either before or outside of Marxism but equally at a distance from the bourgeois academy. Curiously, Anderson’s own subsequent trajectory would continue the trope of Western Marxism itself - how often does Anderson engage with bourgeois social science and philosophy as opposed to the steady flurry of less learnéd radical pamphlets produced entirely outside the halls of the academy? There is perhaps something to be learned from anarchism, a milieu historically more concerned with how to act and how to live in the hic et nunc, and less concerned with critique on behalf of a future that may never arrive.