Panzer Operations: Germany's Panzer Group 3 During the Invasion of Russia, 1941

Die Wehrmacht Im Kampf #11

by Hermann Hoth, Linden Lyons (Translator)

A German commander’s “very readable and thought-provoking” study of Operation Barbarossa (Military Review).   This book unveils a wealth of experiences and analysis about Operation Barbarossa, perhaps the most important military campaign of the twentieth century, from a perspective rarely encountered.   Hermann Hoth led Germany’s 3rd Panzer Group in Army Group Center—in tandem with Guderian’s 2nd Group—during the invasion of the Soviet Union, and together, these two daring panzer commanders achieved a series of astounding victories, encircling entire Russian armies at Minsk, Smolensk, and Vyazma, all the way up to the very gates of Moscow.   This work begins with Hoth discussing the use of nuclear weapons in future conflicts. This cool-headed postwar reflection, from one of Nazi Germany’s top panzer commanders, is rare enough. But then Hoth dives into his exact command decisions during Barbarossa—still the largest continental offensive ever undertaken—to reveal new insights into how Germany could, and in his view should, have succeeded in the campaign.   Hoth critically analyses the origin, development, and objective of the plan against Russia, and presents the situations confronted, the decisions taken, and the mistakes made by the army’s leadership, as the new form of mobile warfare startled not only the Soviets on the receiving end but the German leadership itself, which failed to provide support infrastructure for their panzer arm’s breakthroughs.   Hoth sheds light on the decisive and ever-escalating struggle between Hitler and his military advisers on the question of whether, after the Dnieper and the Dvina had been reached, to adhere to the original idea of capturing Moscow. Hitler’s momentous decision to divert forces to Kiev and the south only came in late August 1941. He then finally considers in detail whether the Germans, after obliterating the remaining Russian armies facing Army Group Center in Operation Typhoon, could still hope for the occupation of the Russian capital that fall.   Hoth concludes his study with several lessons for the offensive use of armored formations in the future. His firsthand analysis, here published for the first time in English, will be vital reading for every student of World War II.

Genres: World War II, Military History, History, Military Fiction, War, German Literature

259 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 1956

Reviews

[William · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is an excellent recounting of war by a highly respected German general. Although it starts very slowly, it gets better as one reads along. While providing valuable details it makes for tedious reading since the referenced maps are hard to follow and match to the monologue. Perhaps this is merely an issue of translation as one familiar with German can read the German’s mind reflected in the stilted and archaic English explanation; but still, it does not make for a comfortable understanding reading. The most interesting information is the objective doctrinal, military decision-making and intelligence comments at the operational level of war. The conclusions, clearly framed in the circumstances of 1941, are excellent. Less so are the early self-serving quips about Hitler (common among German general writers of this era), Bolshevism (as an adjective as well as a noun) and justification for the harsh treatment of captives. There is much to learn here from a very experienced commander one must work through the entire book to achieve that end.

[Vic Lauterbach · Rating 4 out of 5]

This operational study is part memoir and part history. Published in 1956 (in German), it was written by Hoth without full access to the German records (and no access to Soviet records), so it has major historiographical limitations. It does provide important insight into how Hoth (and many of his peers, other Wehrmacht/Heer generals) viewed and rationalized their service during the Second World War. As political relations between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union degenerated, the military situation in Europe became a standoff, forcing Allied planners to envision defending Europe against a foe with overwhelming superiority in conventional forces. This challenge made learning from the experience of the Wehrmacht fighting the Red Army a priority. From the later perspective of a world dominated by Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), the relevance of Unternehmen Barbarossa to U.S. defense policy seems non-existent, but for a decade after VE Day, neither side possessed a strategic nuclear strike capability potent enough to be an effective deterrent. That raised the specter of a conventional war in Central Europe, although one influenced by the presence of tactical nuclear weapons. What men like Hoth really provided, at least in theory, was insight into the Soviet military mind. Fortunately, nothing learned from them ever had to be put into practice. Recommended for those interested in one German officer's view of why incredible operational successes in Russia during 1941 failed to bring about the defeat of the USSR.

[Joseph Raborg · Rating 5 out of 5]

This rather short book gives an in-depth description of the events of Operation Barbarossa. The author is very precise in detailing the military operations of the opening of the German war on the Russian front. The maps can be a little hard to decipher for someone not familiar with Poland and the western part of Russia, but they are a great aid to the text. One wishes that the book was longer and covered Hoth’s entire career in WWII. But, within its narrow focus, this book counts as a must read for those interested in this part of the war.

N.B. Hoth strictly concerns himself with the military battles and maneuvers. If you want to learn about the political or human aspects of the war, this book covers very little of the former and none of the latter.

[Mick Maye · Rating 4 out of 5]

The book is interesting from a senior command position and outlines the thought decisions for various actions up to the last stages before the final push for Moscow. It is reasonably straightforward without too much elaboration. The only point that was difficult was the position of the maps in the Kindle version. This is a complaint with most books. The maps would have been better placed in the chapters as he was discussing it as the book quite rightly mentions a lot of sites etc. Otherwise, the book showed the constraints put on decisions by events elsewhere and his thoughts on the impact that these caused either to his command or overall the invasion.

[Teodor Hossu-Longin · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very interesting book to understand how the tank battles took place on the eastern front in 1941.