The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931

by Adam Tooze

A searing and highly original analysis of the First World War and its anguished aftermath—from the prizewinning economist and author of Shutdown , Crashed and The Wages of Destruction
 
Winner of the Los Angeles Times Book Prize - History
Finalist for the Kirkus Prize - Nonfiction

In the depths of the Great War, with millions dead and no imaginable end to the conflict, societies around the world began to buckle. The heart of the financial system shifted from London to New York. The infinite demands for men and matériel reached into countries far from the front. The strain of the war ravaged all economic and political assumptions, bringing unheard-of changes in the social and industrialorder.

A century after the outbreak of fighting, Adam Tooze revisits this seismic moment in history, challenging the existing narrative of the war, its peace, and its aftereffects. From the day the United States enters the war in 1917 to the precipice of global financial ruin, Tooze delineates the world remade by American economic and military power. Tracing the ways in which countries came to terms with America’s centrality—including the slide into fascism— The Deluge is a chilling work of great originality that will fundamentally change how we view the legacy of World War I.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Economics, Politics, War, American History, World War I

644 pages, Paperback

First published August 22, 2014

About the author

Adam Tooze is a British historian who is a professor at Columbia University. Previously, he was Reader in Modern European Economic History at the University of Cambridge and professor at Yale University.

After graduating with a B.A. degree in economics from King's College, Cambridge in 1989, Tooze studied at the Free University of Berlin before moving to the London School of Economics for a doctorate in economic history.

In 2002, he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize for Modern History. He is best known for his economic study of the Third Reich, The Wages of Destruction, which was one of the winners of the Wolfson History Prize for 2006.

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

“World War I had seen the first effort to construct a coalition of liberal powers to manage the vast unwieldy dynamic of the modern world. It was a coalition based on military power, political commitment, and money. Layer by layer, piece by piece, issue by issue, that coalition had disintegrated. The price that the collapse of this great democratic alliance would exact defies estimation. The failure of the democratic powers opened a strategic window of opportunity in the early 1930s. We know what nightmarish forces would tear through that window…”
- Adam Tooze, The Deluge: The Great War, America and the Remaking of the Global Order, 1916-1931

When my oldest daughter was around four or five, we had a nightly battle of wills at the dinner table regarding the eating of vegetables. I would put several baby carrots on her plate, and she would stare at them with disdain. The rest of the meal consisted of me trying to get her to eat them, and her refusing.

Eventually, she came up with a tactic for finishing the unpleasant chore in one swoop. She’d shove every carrot in her mouth and chomp them all up, until her cheeks were as swollen as a chipmunk. At that point, unable to swallow, she would hold the masticated shards in her mouth until directed to spit them out in the trash.

Why do I present you with this extra-special glimpse into my life? Because reading Adam Tooze’s The Deluge reminded me of my daughter and the carrots. In short: there were times it seemed I had bit off more than I could chew and swallow.

The Deluge is a massive book. It’s not simply the length, which is a not-inconsiderable 500-plus pages. It’s the content. This is as information-dense of a book as I’ve read. The ideas are packed in tight as sardines, while the scope is dazzling in its array. The topic is World War I and its aftermath, a tangled and complex web of events that – even with a century’s worth of hindsight – are often hard to interpret.

Tooze begins the book in 1916, with the Allies struggling to hold the line against the Central Powers. By 1917, with the French Army mutinying, with the Allies running out of men, and with the collapse of the Russian Empire, only one thing could possibly save Great Britain and France: the United States of America.

The war itself is drawn in broad strokes, because this is decidedly not a military history. In fact, Tooze’s major focus is on economics, and he deftly describes how America’s increasing financial entanglements with the Allies made her entry into the war a fait accompli. After loaning the Allies millions of dollars, there was no way America could simply allow them to be vanquished, resulting in massive defaults.

Despite the obvious financial motivations, President Woodrow Wilson – the conflicted, contradictory giant at the center of this tale – made it his mission to reframe the First World War into something noble. Essentially a garden-variety European power struggle gone mad – a redux of the Napoleonic Wars, with the sides shuffled, and poison gas added to the mix – Wilson tried to convince everyone this was actually a conflict to make the world safe for democracy. To that end, he delivered his famous (or infamous) Fourteen Points, led the colonized peoples of the world to believe (futilely) in self-determination, and tried to use America’s leverage to bend the old powers of Europe to his moral vision. In Tooze’s telling, Wilson was not an internationalist, but a “high nationalist,” who believed in American exceptionalism as a global force that wielded the dollar rather than guns, bombs, or battleships.

A great deal of time is spent on the postwar settlements, beginning with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which Tooze finds pretty fair in terms of self-determination (arguing that it formed a number of independent countries that still exist to this day).

Obviously, the Treaty of Versailles – as snarled a saga as you can imagine – dominates long portions of The Deluge. I give Tooze a lot of credit for refusing to make bold accusations or bottom-line judgments. His treatment of the subject is nuanced, refusing to artificially label “good guys” and “bad guys.” On one page he might castigate German conservatives for their risible “stab-in-the-back” narrative, noting that the Germans were lucky to have maintained their sovereignty at all (a unified Germany was less than fifty years old, and could easily have been dismembered along with the Austro-Hungarians and the Ottomans). On the next page, though, he might be defending Germany against France’s monetary demands, or the land-hunger of the Poles.

The breadth of the coverage here is really head spinning. Tooze travels all over the map. There is an extended discussion of the rise of Japan and the emergence of China onto the global stage. Even as China tried to unite, Japan took over Germany’s Chinese concessions, setting the stage for a titanic war beginning in 1937. Tooze also covers the aftershocks of the Russian Revolution, Ireland’s struggle for home rule, the Indian independence movement under Gandhi, and the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire. While interesting, it can be a lot to digest.

As Tooze writes, the postwar – or interwar – period does not contain a seamless story. It was not one long plunge from one war to the next. Of course, there were more than a few low points. Chief among them is the tragedy of the League of Nations, which President Wilson worked hard to establish, but could not convince his own country to accept. Notwithstanding the setbacks, Tooze also points to moments of international cooperation that might have paved the way for a better world. These moments included the Washington Naval Treaty, which prevented a naval arms race, and the Dawes Plan of 1924, which was meant to resolve the issue of war reparations. All these good works came to naught when the Great Depression began its stranglehold on the international economy. According to Tooze, this calamity was compounded by the uniform decision among the economic powers to tackle the Depression by deflationary measures. Tightening the money supply in this context was not unlike putting leeches on a man who just had his throat cut.

The First World War tore down the old order in Europe. What followed was a search among the ruins for a new order to replace it. The Deluge asserts that President Wilson and the United States entered the war to organize the world along capitalist lines, replacing autocracy and militarism with free markets. Unfortunately, America was – in Tooze’s words – too “immature” to accept its responsibilities. After putting its fingers decisively on the scale of military victory, it retreated from a central role in securing the peace. As a British diplomat aptly put it, America was “the ghost at all our feasts.”

The Deluge is not popular history. It was, at times, an extremely difficult and exhausting read. Yet it was also worthwhile. Approached with patience – and a prior understanding of the background against which the book is set – it is a valuable exploration of events that have markedly shaped the world we inhabit today.

[Mike · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was an excellent and comprehensive examination of America's ascent to the center of geopolitics in the WWI and post-WWI world. Of course we all know how this song ends: Depression, isolationism, rise of Fascism, WWII. But the path to get there was much more interesting than what we learned in school (WWI-Versailles-"Return to Normalcy"-Depression-WWII). There were genuine democratic revolutions occurring in Russia and China, the Entente were rarely on the same page as each other, and America's insistence of the full repayment of inter-ally debt caused more problems then most history books give it credit. This was a dense but rewarding read and opened my eyes to an fascinating period of history I was not very familiar with.

I don't think our (American) educational system does a very good job in impressing on its students just how dynamic the first third of the 20th century was. These was a massive remaking of the globe as centuries old empires (Russia, Austria, Ottoman, Chinese) were swept away and new powers were on the rise (America, Japan) to contend with the surviving Great Powers, Britain and France (sorry Italy). But more than that that financial history of the period really alters how it is viewed. To give you an idea of just how powerful America was right after the war:

But what no one disputed was that at the time of the Washington Naval Conference in November 1921, the British government owed the American taxpayer $4.5 billion, whilst France owed America $3.5 billion and Italy owed $1.8 billion. Japan’s balance of payments was seriously deteriorating and it was anxiously looking for support from J. P. Morgan. At the same time, 10 million citizens of the Soviet Union were being kept alive by American famine relief. No other power had ever wielded such global economic dominance...

The most powerful states of Europe were now borrowing from private citizens in the United States and anyone else who would provide credit. Lending of this kind, by private investors in one rich country to the governments of other rich developed countries, in a currency not controlled by the government borrower, was unlike anything seen in the heyday of late Victorian globalization.

The War exhausted the European powers (winners and losers) and provided America an unprecedented opportunity to remake the World Order. But instead of having visionary leaders who could grasp this opportunity to make the world a better place we were stuck with Wilson and Hooer:

For all their forward-looking vision, progressives both of Wilson’s and Hoover’s generation were fundamentally committed not to a radical overcoming of these limitations, but to preserving the continuity of American history and reconciling it with the new national order that had begun to emerge in the wake of the Civil War. This then is the central irony of the early twentieth century. At the hub of the rapidly evolving, American-centred world system there was a polity wedded to a conservative vision of its own future...

However, the world he [Wilson]wanted to create was one in which the exceptional position of America at the head of world civilization would be inscribed on the gravestone of European power. The peace of equals that Wilson had in mind would be a peace of collective European exhaustion. The brave new world would begin with the collective humbling of all the European powers at the feet of the United States, raised triumphant as the neutral arbiter and the source of a new form of international order. Wilson’s vision was neither one of gutless idealism nor a plan to subordinate US sovereignty to international authority. He was in fact making an exorbitant claim to American moral supremacy, rooted in a distinctive vision of America’s historic destiny.

Of course the European Powers did their part to stymie American goals and preserve their own share of power. Basically the post war process was a giant clusterfuck with the Allies having difficulty agreeing to anything. The French were out for blood, the Americans wanted a sustainable peace driven by disarmament, and the British wanted to regain their place as the preeminent world power. Then you had the Spanish Flu, a world wide recession, a bunch of repayment crises among the Allies, political disruptions across the globe, and just a general sense of unease all led to a backlash against any sort of interventionalist American policy

Senator Warren G. Harding had coined the phrase that was to define not only his campaign but his presidency: ‘America’s present need is not heroics but healing; not nostrums but normalcy.’ But he went on to add another telling line. What was called for was ‘not submergence in internationality but sustainment of triumphant nationality’. Triumphant nationalism is as apt a description of the policies of the Republican administrations in the 1920's as it was of Wilson’s own administration. Triumphant nationalism was not inward-turning or isolationist. It was by definition addressed to an outside world, but it spoke in terms that were unilateral and exceptionalist.

The European powers faced issues with their colonies and the economic disruptions the War economy caused them. Nascent democratic movements in Russia and China withered on a vine from Western neglect, and France continued to put the screws to Germany, going so far as to seize the Ruhr and Rhineland, isolating them from the rest of Germany and reaping the benefits of its natural and industrial resources. Things were a bloody mess. As the book puts it:

World War I had seen the first effort to construct a coalition of liberal powers to manage the vast unwieldy dynamic of the modern world. It was a coalition based on military power, political commitment and money. Layer by layer, piece by piece, issue by issue, that coalition had disintegrated. The price that the collapse of this great democratic alliance would exact defies estimation.

I am really only skimming the surface here (I barely spoke at all about how contentious and devastating Inter-Allied debt was or how things were unfolding during this time in East Asia) but I cannot recommend this book highly enough. It links together many important events and trends that seem to go ignored in most mainstream discussions of the period ignore. I can assure you that you're view of the time period will be expanded and enriched greatly while giving you an new perspective of just how we got into the mess of the 1930's and 40's.

(Also be sure to check out the many passages I have highlighted to get a good sample of some of the ideas and concepts I touched upon in my review)

[Robyn · Rating 4 out of 5]

Finally done! I learned a great deal about a period I've never studied in any great detail. I particularly liked the inclusion of China and Japan, given that so often books on these subjects skim over what was happening in non-Western countries. For more detailed summaries, etc - the reading notes will have to suffice!

[Mark · Rating 5 out of 5]

Readers of the February 17, 1941 issue of Life magazine were treated to a lengthy editorial written by its publisher, Henry Luce. In it, the Republican internationalist denounced the isolationist tendencies of the American people and called upon them instead to embrace their nation’s responsibilities in a world plagued by war. Branding the twentieth century as “an American Century,” Luce exhorted them not to repeat the mistake the nation made two decades before by turning their backs on the world. “In 1919,” he declared, “we had a golden opportunity, an opportunity unprecedented in all history, to assume the leadership of the world . . . We did not understand that opportunity. Wilson mishandled it. We rejected it. The opportunity persisted. We bungled it in the 1920's.”

What Luce described was something that many Americans refused to acknowledge. A quarter of a century earlier, the First World War had changed utterly the world order as it had existed for decades. The traditional European empires of Great Britain, France, Russia, and Germany had been displaced by the United States, which emerged from the conflict as the world’s dominant economic and financial power. By joining the side of the Entente, the United States ensured the defeat of Imperial Germany and a major voice in the shaping of the postwar settlement. Yet while the postwar settlement the United States helped to forge ultimately failed to hold, it was not for want of effort. For though the United States rejected involvement with the postwar organizations devised by the victors to maintain the peace, as Adam Tooze demonstrates in this sweeping book American leaders nevertheless embraced a role commensurate with its strength, which they used to try to shape a postwar world according to their values.

Tooze begins his book not at the start or the end of the First World War, but in the middle of it. It was in 1916, he notes, when the economic capacity of the United States exceeded that of the British Empire for the first time, at a moment when Great Britain and France were reaching the limits of their ability to draw upon the American financial resources thy needed to support their war effort. Recognizing this, the newly-reelected American president, Woodrow Wilson, sought to use his nation’s growing influence to bring an end to the conflict. Calling for a “peace without victory,” he urged both sides to accept the futility of waging a stalemated conflict and instead accept a peace between equals that would be mediated by the United States. Tooze sees this as the first assertion of American global leadership, one that was nonetheless rejected by both sides before being superseded by Germany’s decision to resume unrestricted submarine warfare.

America’s entry into the war in April 1917 soon provided them with an even greater opportunity to assert its leadership globally. While liberals worldwide hoped that the United States would become a champion for their causes, the narrowness of Wilson’s focus soon became evident. His vision for a freer and more democratic world was tempered by his racial and cultural prejudices, as Wilson was skeptical about the prospects for democracy in imperial Germany and had little interest in burgeoning liberal movements in the Far East. This was easy to overlook, however, in the flood of changes taking place throughout the world. As empires fell in Europe and Asia, demonstrators embraced Wilson’s Fourteen Points as the symbol of a better future. In the peace talks in Paris following Germany’s surrender in November 1918, however, the limits of the Wilsonian vision became evident, as his aspirations clashed with the conflicting agendas of his erstwhile allies.

While Wilson faced resistance from a number of quarters, perhaps the greatest challenge came from France, whose wily premier, Georges Clemenceau, sought to adapt Wilson’s proposals for his country’s own ends. Tooze is sympathetic towards the French agenda, noting their understandable insistence on their security given the toll the war had taken upon their country. Clemenceau’s efforts to turn his proposed League of Nations into a transatlantic security system, however, were frustrated by the commitment-shy Americans, and the thorny question of reparations defied easy solution. The latter was particularly problematic for France due to the twin costs of reconstruction and the debt burden they accrued in waging the war, with the need for money leading France to occupy the Ruhr in 1923 in order to take in goods the payments on which Germany was defaulting.

France withdrew their soldiers only after a financial arrangement was negotiated with Germany through American offices. This reflected the approach favored by Wilson’s successors as president, who preferred to rely on financial diplomacy rather than the League he had worked so hard to create. By insisting that American private lenders took precedence over French reparations demands, however, the United States undermined the enforcement provisions of the Versailles Treaty. The growing amount of American loans to Germany also turned American investors into powerful advocates for the revision of Germany’s reparations obligations. While the Dawes Plan their negotiators produced set the stage for the economic restoration of the postwar system, this and their pursuit of cost-saving naval disarmament measures represented the limit of America’s interest in European affairs. This was sufficient until the Great Depression discredited the arrangements for the postwar order, leading both Germany and Japan to make their momentous break from it.

Though on the surface this outcome seemingly validates Luce’s claim, Tooze’s book offers a more magnanimous assessment of the postwar order the United States championed, noting its resiliency during a tumultuous decade. Nevertheless, he acknowledges its many flaws and limitations, the foremost of which was a fundamentally conservative outlook that failed to take into consideration the scale and depth of the changes that had taken place across the world. These he recounts in a work of enormous scope, one that touches upon a wide-ranging amount of economic, political, and diplomatic developments over a pivotal fifteen-year period in world history. It is a revisionist work at its finest, one that takes in a formidable amount of scholarly research and synthesizes it into a provocative study that causes readers to rethink many of their assumptions about the interwar era. It is necessary reading for anyone who wants to better understand the failures of the Versailles peace settlement and how the United States sought unsuccessfully to employ its new global power in ways that conformed to their traditional values.

[Olethros · Rating 4 out of 5]

-Hay palos para todos, pero lo del presidente Woodrow Wilson es una auténtica paliza.-

Género. Historia.

Lo que nos cuenta. El libro El diluvio (publicación original: The Deluge, 2014) intenta explicar las razones (mediante hechos, eventos y situaciones acontecidas en la época) por las que los Estados Unidos de América se convirtieron, en muy poco tiempo y a partir de los sucesos de la Primera Guerra Mundial, en una superpotencia de una nueva estirpe, una que no solo podía intervenir en el campo militar a nivel global sino que, además, podía (y lo hacía) a nivel diplomático y, sobre todo, financiero. Y todo ello, además, desde la perspectiva de que muchos de los planes liberales de los USA no salieron como estaban previstos pero implicaron cambios espectaculares (algunos de carácter diametralmente opuesto).

¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:

http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...

[Caroline · Rating 5 out of 5]

Outstanding.

Tooze has amassed and presented a tremendous amount of political and economic information to buttress his arguments about how complex the period between 1916 and 1931 was. First he explains the financing and end-game of the the war. This forms the foundation for the real argument, that any view of the period from 1918 to the mid-thirties as fairly consistent ‘between the wars' is missing the convulsions that played out as the war-time loans between entente countries, the destruction of northern France during the war, and the creation and destruction of nations that occurred in 1917 and during the Versailles conference led to impossible-to-resolve conflicts of interest. The next fifteen years were a roller coaster of domino economic crises that fueled the nationalist movements and resulted in continuing instability of ministries and traditional parties.

Tooze is particularly strong on the finance and economic aspects of this period. He details how they influenced every political decision. American banks had financed the war, and that let them call a lot of shots afterward. But an isolationist Congress often blocked the logical soltuion. Fans of Woodrow Wilson will come out black and blue, if not hemorrhaging. Tooze cites dozens of instances of his blundering during the war, the Versailles conference, and back home.

One can’t hope to really cover this book in a short review. I recommend it highly, as still very relevant.

[Preetam Chatterjee · Rating 5 out of 5]

Mission 2026: Binge reviewing all previous Reads, I was too slothful to review back when I read them.

When I first encountered ‘The Deluge’ by ‘‘Adam Tooze’’—many years after my initial dives into World War I and its prelude—I felt as though I had finally reached the ‘middle’ of that vast historical horizon I’d been slowly charting.

After reading narrative histories of the war’s outbreak and course, diplomatic studies of causation, and social-military accounts of lived experience, Tooze’s sprawling reinterpretation invited me to ‘see the war’s consequences as the real story.’ Not the battles, not the politics of 1914, but the ‘reordering of the world’ that emerged out of the ruins: economically, politically, and psychologically.

Like its title suggests, ‘The Deluge’ portrays the First World War not as a momentary rupture but as a colossal convulsion—an earthquake of finance, power, and ideology that reshaped global structures for decades.

The word ‘deluge’ itself was famously used by British statesman David Lloyd George to describe the war’s overwhelming force, and Tooze builds a narrative worthy of the metaphor—one in which war becomes the catalyst not just for a new geopolitical map, but for a transformed global order whose echoes we still feel today.

At its core, this is a book about ‘‘America’s ascent’’. Tooze locates the origin of the U.S. century in the years between 1916 and 1931—before America had even fully embraced its future role as a superpower and long before 1945 made that role hegemonic.

By 1916, American industrial output had eclipsed that of the British Empire; by the end of the war, Wall Street had financed the Entente powers with billions in loans, and Washington had become the pivot of global economic life.

For many older histories, the narrative of American rise begins in the aftermath of “World War II”—but Tooze unsettlingly shows that the foundation was laid much earlier.

The war’s financial strain propelled London’s financial center across the Atlantic, while Europe’s exhausted empires sank under the weight of debt, inflation, and structural decay. What followed was not merely a shift in power but a ‘remaking of global economic architecture,’ anchored in the United States.

This central thesis had a profound impact on how I now read the First World War’s legacy. Earlier books had taught me ‘how the war started’ and ‘what it did to the societies that fought it’.

Tooze’s work taught me ‘why those outcomes mattered in the long run’—why the peace settlement, the interwar economy, and the climate of power politics that emerged were not accidents, but consequences of America’s unprecedented economic leverage.

Where Margaret MacMillan’s ‘The War That Ended Peace’ emphasizes the fragility of prewar stability and individual agency in decision-making, and Christopher Clark’s ‘The Sleepwalkers’ foregrounds the shared blind spots that led Europe into catastrophe, Tooze takes us beyond agency and structure into what happens when ‘a world reorganizes itself around a single ascending power’’.

The war, in this telling, becomes less a closure and more an ‘‘opening act of the American century.’’

Tooze begins his story in mid-war—not in 1914, but in 1916—when the global balance was already shifting. The battles of Verdun and the Somme were bruising Europe, but it was America's industrial capacity that now tipped global economic scales.

What followed was a period in which Washington’s financial dominance became intertwined with diplomatic influence that, in Tooze’s phrase, was habitually exercised through ‘economic means rather than direct military force.’

One of the book’s most striking features is the way it intertwines ‘high finance and geopolitics.’ Tooze does not reduce history to numbers, but he shows how the machinery of credit, debt, and monetary policy shaped destinies as surely as treaty negotiations.

European powers, already battered by unprecedented wartime expenditures, found themselves beholden to American credit even as they attempted to rebuild. Washington, in turn, leveraged this economic centrality to push for a new order—one grounded in liberal economic cooperation but rooted in U.S. primacy.

It is in this economic reframing that Tooze’s interpretation diverges sharply from many older narratives of the interwar period. For decades, historians have often attributed the collapse of the interwar international order to punitive clauses at Versailles, hyperinflation, the rise of fascism, or the Great Depression. Tooze acknowledges these elements, but reframes them as symptoms of a deeper systemic shift: ‘‘Europe’s structural dependence on American capital and policy direction.’’ When the Great Depression struck—triggered by the Wall Street crash of 1929—this dependency became a weakness as much as it was a source of influence.

Countries that had relied on American loans now found themselves without the means to stabilize their economies, leading to political upheaval and the rise of radical movements.

Tooze’s narrative here is unsettling in its moral complexity. He does not paint the United States as a malevolent hegemon deliberately exploiting its position. Instead, he shows how ‘‘American leadership was both a promise and a problem’’: powerful enough to shape global structures, but reluctant to fully assume the responsibilities of that role.

Wilson’s dream of ‘peace without victory’ and a League of Nations was, in Tooze’s telling, a pale reflection of what the United States could have achieved had it embraced its economic leverage more strategically.

It was not isolationism alone that undermined the interwar order; it was a combination of structural reluctance and domestic priorities that kept Washington from stabilizing the postwar world.

Reading ‘The Deluge’ after Meyer, MacMillan, Clark, Watson, and others transformed my sense of the First World War from a discrete event to ‘‘a hinge of modern global history’’. Meyer’s narrative breadth and MacMillan’s moral weight were essential for understanding the war’s scale; Clark’s focus on contingency and agency clarified why no single nation was entirely to blame; Watson’s socio-economic examination of Germany and Austria-Hungary showed how war reorganized societies from within.

Tooze completes this intellectual constellation by placing ‘‘the United States at the centre of the global transformation’’ that followed—not just as a military actor, but as an economic and structural force.

For all its brilliance, ‘The Deluge’ is not without challenges. It is a demanding read, densely packed with economic and diplomatic detail. The narrative moves swiftly across continents and institutions, and Tooze assumes a fair amount of background knowledge about the period.

As some reviewers have noted, readers unfamiliar with interwar history may find themselves propelled through a succession of complex events without much atmospheric or anecdotal breathing room.

This is not a book of trenches and individual lives; it is a book of ‘systems and structures’, and its rigour sometimes requires persistent focus.

There have also been debates about some of Tooze’s interpretations. Critics have pointed to occasional inconsistencies or contentious readings of specific political events, especially in British history, suggesting that the broader narrative may sometimes overshadow nuanced factual accuracy.

Yet even where one might quibble over details, the underlying thesis—that World War I catalysed the transfer of financial and structural pre-eminence to the United States—is compelling and hard to dismiss.

On a personal level, ‘The Deluge’ reframed not just my understanding of the war’s aftermath, but of the ‘‘nature of global power itself’’. It made me see the interwar era not as a “failed peace” bracketed awkwardly between wars, but as a ‘distinct historical project’—an attempt, however flawed, to construct a new order out of cataclysm.

In Tooze’s reading, the interwar period was less an intermission than the ‘first act of a new world epoch’, driven by a power that was still finding its own feet.

Where other histories made me feel the tragedy and futility of 1914–1918, Tooze made me see the ‘structural logic’ that followed: how devastation demanded reconstruction, how reconstruction demanded leverage, and how leverage, in turn, created expectations that shaped politics for decades.

The United States did not conquer the world through force; in Tooze’s argument, it ‘‘reordered the world through finance, credit, and economic pre-eminence’’.

That is a lesson not just about the past, but about how power ‘operates in the world’—quietly, persistently, and often invisibly.

In the end, ‘The Deluge’ did for the First World War’s legacy what ‘The War That Ended Peace’ did for its causes and ‘A World Undone’ did for its narrative arc.

Tooze’s masterpiece stands as a ‘‘bridge between the war and the modern world’’, showing us that the First World War did not end at the armistice—but ‘began again,’ reshaped under different names and forces, in the decades that followed.

Most recommended.

[A.L. Sowards · Rating 4 out of 5]

The simplified version of history I’ve always heard goes something like this: “after WWI, the US retreated into isolationism, went through the Roaring Twenties and the Great Depression, and then got involved in WWII.” Of course, the real story is a lot more complicated, and Tooze did a good job exploring the final years of the Great War up to the coming of the Great Depression. The book covered a good portion of the world, focusing on the combatants from WWI, including Japan and China. It also covered events across the British Empire like what was happening in India and Ireland. It shed light on how interconnected so many things were--across borders and domestically for the various countries. He talked a lot about diplomacy, treaties, and monetary policy--subjects that, frankly, could have been really dry. But he made it interesting. (Also, the audiobook had a good narrator.) I don’t think this book is for everyone, but I enjoyed it.

[Pieter · Rating 4 out of 5]

If one were to be a fly against the wall of the Versailles palace in 1919. What were US president Roosevelt's reasons to design a new, liberal world order? Which countries supported him and which were against? It is clear that the seeds of WW II were sown during that time. The Fourteen Points may have had some obvious good intentions, no doubt Roosevelt used them to push US on the front of the international political scene. Stripping Germany and other Central powers geographically and financially did not bring world peace nor were in line with the principle of self determination (Sudeten Germany, Eupen, South Tyrol).

The author highlighted the imbalance between president Wilson's liberal foreign agenda and his domestic Southern past. More than that, I doubt whether his foreign agenda was as anti-imperialistic as Mr Tooze states. Several authors have pointed out that before the sinking of Lusitania, US government was preparing for war and already heavily engaged in support to the Entente.

PS: the Dutch edition has a lot of typos.

[Cool_guy · Rating 5 out of 5]

A gripping, that's right, gripping account of how US finance capital came to dominate the world, at times dragging the American government along behind.

Having grown up on the myth that the US rode the ever expanding wave of industrial output to global supremacy, it was eye opening to learn that it's always been about finance. Loans to the allies did more than drag America into the war, they completely shaped the postwar landscape. The punitive French settlement pursued at Versailles was about more than revenge, or even reconstruction; they had to pay back the United States.

Helps clarify why the Depression was so devastating - the entire post WWI order was built on a foundation of debt. As soon as the debt stopped circulating, that order collapsed.

[Marks54 · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is an ambitious interpretive history of WW1 and its impact. The starting point is that claim that we have come to understand the war from the perspective of it being followed by WW2 and the Cold War, leading to a modern world that is hugely different from the world of 1914 and dominated eventually by the United States after the fall of the Soviet Union. Adam Tooze's claim is that course of world history was far from certain after WW1 and that world observers saw matters very differently from how they eventually turned out. The book then attempts to explain how the world got from 1916 to the present (or really 1931) while steering clear of the story that has become accepted and often taken for granted.

Tooze argues that the key players involved in this complicated story were not stupid or even narrow. They all realized the important role of the US as the new super state that would soon dominate the world. In response, the protagonists, including such extreme actors as Trotsky and Hitler, all sought an international solution that transcended narrow nationalism and provided a counterweight to the foreseen dominance of the US.

Why didn't it work out? Well, to the normal dynamics of politics and economics and chance, it is first necessary to add megatraumas that constrained what everyone else could do. The first was the catastrophic slaughter of WW! and the political crisis and each of the warring states had to surmount. A second reason was the great depression, which threw stabilization plans out the window and ruined the efforts of moderate reasonable efforts to stabilize the world. This left the door open for the extremist totalitarians. Tooze provides an interesting perspective on Wilson here too and how he was constrained at home. One of the more interesting ideas in the book is the linkage of Progressivism and Wilson with the reaction of the US attempt to adapt to modernity following the Civil War - and the reactions to those efforts. Another strength of the book is the author's command of the economic issues ranging from war loans, reparations, the hyperinflations, the gold standard, and the transatlantic role of Wall Street and JP Morgan in interwar finance.

The book ends in 1931-1932, with the onset of the Great Depression, and the rise of Hitler and Roosevelt. This makes the book a soulmate of the Ira Katznelson book "Fear Itself" which uses a similar analytic/interpretive strategy to examine how FDR and the New Deal took the US from the depths of the depression to the Cold War. The similarities are general. The Katznelson book is focused, with a deep look at US Congressional history. The Tooze book is broader in scope and breathtakingly complex, in that it is linking multiple levels of analysis both domestic and international, along with military, political, and economic for the US, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, USSR, China, and Japan.... and it works very well.

This review only scratches the surface of this amazing book. It is a dense history infused by a nice argument that the author keeps going and ocncludes well. It is not for the timid but is very worthwhiile. The move from the twenties to depression to the early 1930s is covered quickly and I am unsure I followed how the interpretive story was concluded. I have to think about it more. It is wonderful to finish a book the forces you to do that.

[Pete H · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ambitious, and with a breathtaking scope, I can't help but feel that Tooze bit off a bit more than he could chew-even a 500 page book isn't adequate space to cover the development of the entire international order from 1916 through 1933. His characterization of Wilson as a man seeking to assert American fiscal hegemony may be criticized by some, but I find it hard to disagree with his thesis.

The author often makes assertions that he seems to lack the time or space to fully explore, and there are a few boggling factual errors that he or his editor really should have caught- for example, he describes the Japanese battleship Mutsu as a cruiser, which may seem like nitpicking but, as Tooze himself asserts, battleships were seen as a sign of national pride and strength, and this error is therefore significant. Despite these flaws,this is a well-written and readable book, recommended to all serious history fans.

[Boudewijn · Rating 1 out of 5]

Interessant onderwerp, maar geschreven in zulk een academische taal dat ik (als leek) al snel de bomen door het bos niet meer wist te zien. Een historicus zal dit boek zeker kunnen waarderen, maar als niet academische lezer levert dit boek te weinig aanknopingspunten op.

Het boek valt daarmee in een valkuil die ik wel vaker tegenkom: boeken die dermate droog en zonder begrijpende thematiek zijn geschreven, dat de geinteresseerde leek als snel afhaakt.

Jammer, want zijn eerdere klassieker over de Nazi-economie kon ik zeer waarderen.

[Carlos Wang · Rating 4 out of 5]

第一次聽到亞當‧圖澤(Adam Tooze)這個名字，是我在找一些關於納粹德國的經濟史的書時發現的，他寫了一本《The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy》，不過由於英文不好，傳聞的簡體中文版又沒下落，只好作罷。結果，沒多久八旗就出了他寫的《崩盤》跟簡體的《滔天洪水》，後者，也就是今天我想討論的主題。一開始，我猶豫著是要全買還是先挑一本(不便宜啊)，上網看了前者的評論，加上講的主題是2008年的金融危機，感覺比較沒那麼濃厚興趣，於是挑了後者。

本書的副標題“第一次世界大戰與全球秩序的重建”已經很清楚講明了主旨：自維也納會議以來，不列顛和平的終結。不過，其實巴黎和會並沒有真正的重建秩序，它只是“一紙停戰協議”，為何會如此？為什麼在經歷過四年的大戰後，人們依然無法真正恢復國際秩序？本書要敘述的就是這過程與原因。

我直接先講簡評好了。亞當‧圖澤的文筆不差，可是他的寫法需要讀者有充足的背景知識來應付。作者在每一章開始會簡單的提要一下，然後就展開他的敘事，有時是東拉西扯一堆，看起來會茫無重點，如果你對圖澤說的事情沒概念，就完全看不懂了。簡單來說，作者預設自己作品面向的，不是一般的讀者。我在查《崩盤》的評論時，發現最多的抱怨就是「看不懂」，現在��一點都不意外了。要注意的是，這並不是對圖澤作品的負評，只是說，它不適合當入門讀物。


近三百年來，世界秩序急劇變動了四次，1918、1945、1989跟2022(沒錯，如今的當下是)，每次的原因都跟「霸主」寶座有關。兩次大戰之後的秩序調整其實可以視為一個連續，因為它之所以在短短的三十年內發生了兩次，只是因為前一次的變更沒有完成所致。1918年，大英帝國儘管看似贏得了世界大戰，但其實它的龐大家產都在這場戰爭中消耗殆盡，倫敦金融若非華爾街伸出援手，可能早在前一年就瀕臨破產，至於法國、義大利就更不用說，早就在靠盟友輸血度日了。由此可見這場戰爭奢侈至極，不只讓兩個佔領大半地球的老牌帝國搖搖欲墜，也讓好幾頂皇冠墮地，寶座易主。戰前有一位英國作家安吉爾(Norman Angell)出版了一本《大幻覺》，內容是說以當時的歐洲列強在金融貿易上的緊密關係，是不可能也不該打仗，一旦不小心擦槍走火，必然是兩敗俱傷，損失慘重，根本是無利可圖的行為。他的這番預言只對了一半：預言後果的那部分。戰爭的影響沒有隨著砲火的停歇而結束，戰後的經濟重建才是更讓各國主管財務的官員失眠的絕大難題，也是戰後秩序難以恢復的關鍵原因之一。

1917年下半葉，各主要參戰國都已經打的筋疲力盡，美國總統威爾遜，這位著名的理想主義者，帶著一個「沒有勝利者的和平」的倡議，希望各國坐下來討論停戰，結束這場鬧劇。然而，他面臨的難題是，如果各國就這樣收手不打，它們該怎麼向人民交代過去三年付出的代價所為何來？而這些已經造成的犧牲跟損失，又該由誰買單？

這兩大政治跟經濟上的難題，就是造成戰後秩序難以重建的關鍵原因。儘管戰勝國把這些都強加在德國身上並不讓人意外，但這就為之後的衝突埋下了種子，特別是那龐大的戰爭賠款，更讓日耳曼人有一種被殖民的羞辱感，同時也拖垮了其經濟復甦，連帶影響歐洲乃至世界。戰後兩次世界經濟危機，都是跟德國以及債務息息相關，也是因此，才讓各國不是在政治上變的虛弱無力，就陷入極端份子的掌控之中。我們可以更直接地說，沒有經濟大蕭條，沒有希特勒。

但是，如果因此苛責英、法兩國愚蠢，又是過於無視歷史背景。前面說過，堂堂大英為了打這場仗，已經搞得幾近破產。他們在戰爭期間，為了讓個自治領出錢出力，讓渡了許多權利，帝國也開始出現崩塌的跡象。(勞合‧喬治提出了聯邦制的計劃，但沒有成功) 最明顯的徵兆，就是倫敦居然接受了《華盛頓海軍條約》的限制：噸位數只跟美國平起平坐，要知道他們以前可是要求“兩強標準”啊。

法國人更慘，國土被破壞，財政上負債累累，他們怨氣沖天的企圖要肢解德國，一來是想要拿魯爾等重工業區當戰後賠償，二來是避免這個惡鄰居再次崛起來報仇。不過這個提案太過激進，被驚駭不已的英美給否決了。(不過作者說，現在的歐盟創始成員，戰後西德總理艾德諾當時就曾提議讓萊茵河區域成為“自治區”，一來避免法國併吞，二來可以反過來經濟合作；法方的莫內也在當時意識到了歐洲的未來在於合作而不是對抗。不過兩位當時都還人微言輕，要發揮作用還要多等數十年) 法國人只能退而求其次，要求鉅額賠償，跟自己在中歐搞個小包圍圈來對付德國，但在國內的政爭跟財政上的虛弱下，這些都在未來被證明無法長久。

18年，德軍開始兵敗如山倒的時候，國內的議和派終於佔了上風。社民黨議員們主張向美國而不是英法是有道理的，後兩國都是堅決要打到柏林才罷休。(後來事實證明他們是對的，因為魯登道夫等軍方一直在散播「背後捅一刀」的謠言，這在未來二十年內一直影響德國人民，它們始終相信自己國家沒有真的戰敗) 但威爾遜以德皇退位以及民主化為條件接受了談判，迫使另外兩國也不得不同意。這位總統對柏林來說確實是個機運，如前所述，他曾在前一年提出了「沒有勝利者的和平」，確實一度讓各國政要一度動搖，認真的考慮。但就在此時戰局急轉，沒多久，俄國發生革命，德皇決定發動無限制潛艇戰並引發著名的齊默爾電報激怒美國，終於讓此提案徹底死亡。作者在內文中就感慨若非命運如此，是否威爾遜有機會成功，歐洲史是否就此改寫？

如果拿對二戰時的印象來看待一戰時的美國，那就大錯特錯了。1917年的美國，流水線生產還沒有普及，工業潛力還只是潛力，軍隊也是多年沒打仗的菜鳥，人們雖然畏懼，但要真正產生影響還需要時間。在世界秩序上也是。十九世紀末的時候，就有學者預言美國跟俄國將主宰地球，考慮到這兩國的疆域、人口跟資源，這並不令人意外。但是，在那個時間點，美國還沒準備好，俄國剛革命成為蘇維埃，還在為了求生掙扎。威爾遜儘管帶著理想：「民族自決」跟「十四點和平原則」，但這些都在現實中逐漸被摧毀，淪為笑柄。例如所謂的民族自決，以日後造成大風波的蘇台德，那邊確實住滿了德裔，但各國出於私利，卻直接將之劃歸捷克斯洛伐克(雖說該國在自由主義的總統帶領下對待多元族裔是廣受好評的)。連勞合‧喬治都承認：「這根本埋了滿滿的戰爭導火線！」然後，日本人在國際聯盟憲章提議加入「各民族平等」，結果遭到英國強烈反對，最後退而求其次到「善待國民」都被拒絕。我想那時候日本菁英應該看透白種人的偽善而徹底失望了吧，這或許就是他們在後來逐漸蔑視國聯跟主張亞洲人自決的理由。扯遠了，反正，威爾遜對世界秩序的計畫，基本上是破產了，而他的國民對於接管這個世界還沒有心理準備。然而，英、法等老牌列強也有心無力，這就是二、三零年代世界秩序的真實寫照。

作者整本書最讓我詫異的是他對列寧的評價。眾所周知，列寧是接受德國援助回國革命，當然，對方也沒安什麼好心。柏林的期盼成功了，蘇維埃革命終結了民主政府，也引起了更大的騷動與混亂，讓俄國退出戰爭。由於列寧相信德國會贏得這場大戰，掌權的他不僅割讓了大片土地，甚至不惜讓俄國成為經濟殖民地。(這點倒讓我想起了一位叫做孫文的似乎也幹過差不多的事情) 幸好德國最終落敗了，列寧逃過了可能的“俄奸”罵名。然後，隨著戰後的各種不滿的爆發，西歐掀起了共產革命的騷動，而俄共也在亞洲各地搧風點火，蘇聯紅軍把波蘭推回了邊境，一時間大有1848年的氣勢。不過這場風波來的快去的也快，隨著經濟困境稍微緩解，各國政府也騰出手來對付革命，就逐漸被壓下去；而紅軍自己也成畢蘇斯基手下敗將，無奈的和談，列寧、托洛斯基到史達林便逐漸的由“國際共產主義”，轉向“一國的社會主義”了。

日本跟義大利是對這個戰後秩序失望的。前者是名符其實的一戰「勝利者」，沒被砲火波及，經濟因趁虛而入在國際市場海撈了一票而欣欣向榮，因此開啟了大正民主的浪潮。那段期間的東京是由一群親西方的政客執政，積極的加入這個新秩序，它們響應了國際聯盟，也同意了華盛頓海軍公約的限制。但英、美、法等國在「民族自決」跟面對經濟危機時的一些偽善面如貿易壁壘等，讓日本人感到失望與不安，這使得極端分子軍人的許多訴求變的鏗鏘有力。義大利也一樣，且不管它們在戰爭中的實際表現如何，但當在和會上眾多訴求遭到忽視時，羅馬的反應是失望與憤怒的，墨索里尼的上位顯然不那麼讓人意外。


結論，作者雖然說得有些隱晦，但他明顯認為：「蛇無頭不行」，國際秩序要能穩定和平，還是需要有大國來維繫。一次世界大戰結束之後，明顯能夠扮演這個角色的是美國，但它們還沒做好準備。威爾遜式的理想主義不僅被歐洲老牌帝國主義嗤之以鼻，在國內也不受青睞。山姆大叔們還謹記著開國先輩的教誨“不要淌歐洲人的混水”，決定轉身回孤立主義。然而，即便不想管國際事務，但經貿的聯繫卻也讓他們早就難以置身事外。或許時代在等一個人，羅斯福與他的「新政」改變了美國，進而左右了世界。這位美國任期最長的總統，帶著他的現實主義觀重整世界秩序。儘管他未能看到這一切的降臨，但至少其後輩某種程度上都是延續著這份遺產前行。冷戰時人們壟罩在核威脅之中，但至少都還在1945年以後奠定的一些對國際秩序的新觀念中前行，聯合國也比國際聯盟相對成功。由強權主導是否是維持國際秩序的好方法，這似乎還無法肯定。

[Graeme Newell · Rating 3 out of 5]

Reading Adam Tooze is a bit like running a marathon; it's challenging, sometimes overwhelming, but when you’re done, you feel like you’ve really accomplished something...despite all the suffering. Tooze is undeniably brilliant, and his insights are nothing short of stunning. But honestly, reading his books can make you feel like you're back in high school, struggling to keep up with the smartest kid in class.

The insights Tooze offers are extraordinary. He operates on a level that can feel miles above the average reader's understanding. This isn't just a book; it's a scholarly expedition through history, politics, and economics. But this is also where the challenge lies. Tooze doesn't just expect you to keep up; he expects you to be right there with him, grasping every intricate detail and nuance.

Despite being a major history buff, I found myself struggling to keep track of all the information. Tooze's narrative isn't just a river; it's an ocean of facts, figures, and concepts. It's not that the book isn't well-written – it is, in a scholarly way – but it's so packed with information that you might feel lost in the deluge of details.

One of the most fascinating aspects of the book is how Tooze details the U.S.'s rise to global dominance, not just in military terms, but economically and politically. He delves into the intricacies of financial policies, the reshaping of international relations, and how the U.S. leveraged its newfound position. His analysis of the economic strategies adopted by the U.S. and how they impacted both domestic and international politics is particularly interesting. Tooze doesn't just give you the what; he explains the why and the how, making connections that aren't immediately obvious.

Another standout section is his exploration of the Treaty of Versailles and its implications. Tooze doesn't just look at the treaty as a historical document; he examines its long-term effects on international relations and national economies. He meticulously analyzes how the treaty's terms and the economic decisions made during this period set the stage for future conflicts and economic crises.

Tooze is also great at discussing the lesser-known aspects of this era, like the role of smaller nations and how the global shifts affected them. This isn't a Eurocentric or U.S.-centric narrative; it's genuinely global. He brings in perspectives and events from around the world, shedding light on parts of history that are often overlooked.

What's good about "The Deluge" is also what makes it tough. It's thorough, exhaustive, and intellectually stimulating. It pushes you to think, to connect dots, and to understand complex global dynamics. But let's be real, it's not a light read. You can't breeze through it; you have to dive in, focus, and maybe even take notes.

If you're up for the challenge, it's a rewarding read. But if you're looking for a casual history book, this is definitely not the one for you. It's a workout for your brain, and just like a tough workout, you might not enjoy every moment of it, but you'll come out stronger in the end.

[sube · Rating 4 out of 5]

A "muscular" liberal history of the first attempt to also create a proper international order in the aftermath of WW1 and its main failure: the lack of USA's commitment to it. Showing the transformative nature of the post-WW1 arrangement, the USA however saw itself unwilling to commit to it fully and instead in its vision of a "peace without victory" regularly sought to disentangle from Europe in the aftermath of Wilson's loss.

Wilson himself is the main character of the book in the first half, one who is treated seriously while also showing his (political) faults. Wilson sought in 1916 to achieve a peace without victory, i.e. one based on democracy - and was close to achieving it, yet ultimately the only path for USA was to align with the Entente.

The second half is the history of trying to achieve the post-WW1 international order and its slow unravelling, alongside its successes in part - showing how Europe & Japan acknowledged US leadership, yet it itself was unwilling to accept it.

Convincingly written, it however has faults: it does not show the contradictions at hand among US leadership at this point, which would have made points stronger though arguably undermined the political vision (one supportive of US hegemony), as US vision was both 1) supportive of racial colour line (something Tooze is willing to admit, yet never systemasises and even puts imperialist in quotemarks at times) and 2) that the economic order was based on a deflationary system which was unsustainable as the Great Depression showed. Lastly, Europe nonetheless remained an economic powerhouse of its own - the UK remained its own great power, which undermined USA. As such, Tooze is unable to directly explain *why* USA remained uncommitted beyond incidental explanations - the biggest fault. Nonetheless, highly worth reading.

[Liam Ostermann · Rating 5 out of 5]

Unfortunately it is too long since I read this brilliant book to write an adequate review but there are many on GR and, you could read my review of his earlier 'The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy' because Professor Tooze does as a fine a job in this book as did in that.

[Nils · Rating 5 out of 5]

A brilliant account of America's arrival as the greatest of the Great Power as a result of the calamities of the Great War. The best account available of the riven internal politics within each of the Great Powers as an explanation for the desperation-driven strategic and negotiating shifts in the last two years of the war and then in its aftermath. Tooze's beautifully written synthesizes a vast literature about the war and its aftermath, and weaves it together with a thoroughly original thesis.

Tooze is an economic historian by background, and this tells in this classic piece of diplomatic history that focuses above all on the way that debates over loans and debt drove America to the center of global influence. Methodologically, it is a classic piece of diplomatic history, focused above all on the great powers involved in the war (Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Russia, China, Japan, the Ottomans, and the United States) and the negotiations that took place over the major treaties and war strategies. Several things set Tooze's account apart. First, he is exquisitely attentive to the internal political battlelines within each country that drove their leaders' strategy and bargaining positions both on war aims in the second half of the war, and in the various negotiations that took place after the war. Second, as an economic historian, he is wonderfully deft at showing the singular importance of financial matters in driving strategic concerns -- the way that financial concerns drove the U.S. into the war (to make sure that the enormous loans that Morgan was giving to the Entente would be repaid), and how in the aftermath of the war, as the U.S. emerged as a huge creditor, and Britain and France as huge debtors to the U.S., that this became an enormous driver for these latter countries (especially France's) insistence on reparations from Germany in order to cover their debts to the Americans. How debt and its associated inflations and deflations drove different factions out of and into power within countries, and therefore affected their negotiating positions, is always clearly delineated.

At the same time, however, Tooze is no economic determinist. He has a wonderful eye for personality and telling quotes, and has deep sensitivity to how the contingency of decisions and sequences of events determined world-historical outcomes. The role of emotional vectors like humiliation (a word that re-appears dozens of times, and not just in reference to the politics of East Asia) is made centrally clear. Nor is Tooze shy about making moral judgements about different regimes: the word "odious" appears ten times, mostly to describe the Bolsheviks. Worth the price of admission alone is his brilliant revisionist reading of Woodrow Wilson not (as the dominant narrative has it) as a Presbyterian prig prmoting starry-eyed cosmopolitan internationalist idealism, but rather as a mournful Southerner attempting to forge a non-punitive peace that would allow the master races of Europe to make up their differences in order to be able to renew on liberal terms their collaborative domination of the benighted races.

As with any book that takes on such a vast terrain, there are omissions and occasional missteps. It focuses almost exclusively on the major powers, taking only relatively quick glances at the positions of other players, like the Irish, Poles, Indians, Ukranians, Arabs, or Balkans of various stripes. While the book cannot help but be written with the backward shadow of impending Nazism and postwar Stalinist and Maoist domination of the East, he takes pains to emphasize that the actors at the time could of course not have known the horrors that were coming and were therefore not interpretting the course of events in that light. Still, he himself lapses into occasional anachronisms. For example using the term "third worldist" to describe the global revolutionary faction at the Baku Comintern meeting of 1920 (the term "third world" only arises after WWII and "third worldist" is a term from the 1970s). And he describes the confrontational labor politics of 1919 in the United States as being led by the AFL-CIO -- though the CIO was not formed until 1935, and then in opposition to the perceived lack of radicalism on the part of the American Federation of Labor (the two organizations would merge only in 1955).

But these are obviously minor quibbles in a book of such ambitious scope and marvelous execution. A tour de force. Highest recommendation.

[BertieRussell · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great book: hugely informative, with the material dramatically presented and almost no dull patches. Some of the very fascinating events that Tooze describes are the following:

1) Up to mid-1916 the Entente borrowed money through J.P Morgan mainly, from the US's private capital market, thereby committing a substantial part of the US economy to the Entente's war effort, without the US government's permission. Wilson discouraged americans from buying anymore of the Anglo-French bonds issued by J.P Morgan, in order to impose his vision of 'peace without victory'. The war may have ended then, if the Germans weren't convinced that too much was at stake for the US economy for them to remain neutral. After the US entered the war, the Entente powers borrowed directly from the US government in an unprecedented scale.

2) Nowhere did taxation keep up with rising war expenditure, so governments issued bonds to pay for the war effort. Some of those were bought by banks, who later resold them to Central banks for cash. Thus indirectly the supply of money was expanded leading to inflation. The post-war inflation all over the world, decreased the buying power of the workers, and thus led to strikes and renewed class war. Powers like the US and Britain that had issued government bonds, got into a competition of who would deflate more drastically, to restore their credibility, and honour the people who had devoted their money to the war effort. Plans to spend money on social welfare were scrapped in the UK. Lloyd George wanted to make the Germans pay for widow's pensions through reparations. What if they had resorted to a capital levy instead ?

3)The Great Deflation, as Tooze calls the squeeze on economic activity to fight inflation that the British and US governments carried out, had the effect of pacification both on the left and on the far-right: by decreasing military spending it resulted in the demobilization of the paramilitaries, and surging unemployment weakened the trade unions.

4) Since the US did not commit itself to military collective security, the next best thing was to prevent 'knaves'(aggressive nationalists, socialists etc.) from coming into power by adherence to the gold standard. Post WW1 economies thus falled into three categories a)those who had aggressively deflated(US, Britain) b)those that had just stabilized after the massive inflation (France, Italy, Japan) and c) the basket cases or those who were experiencing hyper-inflation.

5)Nationalists had to break the fetters of economic liberalism to implement their plans(Stalin , Hitler, Hirohito)

6) What implications does this analysis have for Greece's options within the EU today ?

[DC Palter · Rating 2 out of 5]

I read the book. The entire book. All 518 pages. I don't feel like I learned much. Not because there wasn't much to learn--those 518 pages were chock full of information, but because the level of detail on every page was overwhelming.

518 pages is both too long and too short. It's too long because it went into far more detail than someone who isn't already intimately familiar with all the events and people can follow. But also too short because it covers 15 years of often day-by-day events in something like 10 different countries from US, Britain, France, Germany and UK, to China, Japan, India, Italy, Poland, Turkey, Greece plus the politics of the Baltics, Caucuses, Ottoman, and Slavic regions. It ties the inability of the British to deal with Indian protests against British rule to decisions made to strip Turkey of its Middle Eastern territories. Which by itself would be fascinating, but gets a single page. There are a lot of events in 15 years. Not just the big things, like the war and the depression and the battle between capitalism, communism, and fascism, but who said what at a conference (and there seemed to be a conference nearly every day) that boxed himself in at the next conference or with his political rivals back home. So it ends up feeling like a 518 page wikipedia article. Better written, of course, but without links to focus on the interesting parts. And it ends in 1931, just when things start to happen.

Overall, a great book for someone who is already highly familiar with the politics of the post-WW1 period. It is a highly detailed analysis of how the rise of the US as a superpower that relied on economics instead of soldiers but had no interest in leading the world. It asserts how the US gave hope to the promise of peace, then dashed it by ignoring the details of maintaining peace and resolving the contradictions and instability inherent in the transition from colonialism to self-determination.

[postmodern putin · Rating 4 out of 5]

A fantastic re-examination of allied diplomacy during the interwar period. Tooze lays out his thesis with thoroughly detailed precision: that the end of WW1 marked not just the end of european dominance, but a truly unprecedented transformation in world order with America taking center stage as the new global hegemon. This runs counter to the prevailing narrative that America retreated into isolation and instead shows how the unparalleled nature of american economic power solidified its position as the new central force in international affairs.

The book explores how democratic movements worldwide looked to Woodrow Wilson's vision of self-determination, creating a "wilsonian moment" that raised expectations for political change globally. The economic sections detail how the war destroyed the pre-1914 global economy based on the gold standard and free trade, replacing it with a system dependent on American financial stability. With the 1920s boom and bust cycle becoming the crash test dummy of this new liberal order.

The book ends with the 1931 financial crisis, which Tooze sees as the moment when the American-dominated system established after WWI began to collapse, setting the stage for the even greater catastrophes of the 1930s and 1940s.

A few of the chapters get a bit slow and redundant but otherwise Tooze's writing kept me engaged through most of the 500+ pages. A highly informative and valuable read for any student of politics, economics or history alike.

[Jonathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Pecunia nervus belli est. Not for the faint of heart, Adam Tooze describes and analyses the interplay between politics and finance in the final years of the First World War and the post-war era in this vast and detailed work. The short version is that the Europeans were involved in a war they really couldn't afford and the Detente (essentially Britain and France) turned to America to finance and eventually win the war. The problems of the post-war settlements were made vastly more difficult by America's refusal to consider forgiving those debts to allow their allies to get back on their feet, by the huge financial burdens of reparations placed on Germany, which before the war had been the engine of the European economy, and by the rise of the Soviet Union as a player in the new world system. The narrative also covers developments in China and Japan, thus illustrating the global nature of the political and financial instabilities of the time. All this is grist for Tooze's thorough mill. It's also an entertaining read - not something one can say about every economic history - despite its length and the depth of his coverage. A very very good book indeed.

[Frank Kelly · Rating 5 out of 5]

A sweeping, rich historical (both political and economic) of the impact of the First World War on the world. Tooze brings a keen analysis of how economics as we know it today completely changed due to the outcome of World War I, how Wilsonian foreign policy failed and American engagement in the world was forever set. It is not simple beach reading here - extraordinary research and thought went into writing this fascinating tome. It does not disappoint.

[David · Rating 2 out of 5]

Exhaustive and exhausting. Not so much a reading as a beating.
And yes, all the other reviews are correct. It is an academic work of monumental research. It covers many topics that are too often ignored. It lays the groundwork for understanding the period between the wars. etc. etc. I guess I needed the abridged version for my small brain.

[CasaJB · Rating 5 out of 5]

Beware: kosher.

[Frank Theising · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a very demanding read, epic in scope and at times overwhelming. In The Deluge, economic historian Adam Tooze explores the unprecedented pace, scope, and violence of change experienced in world affairs from the late nineteenth century onwards. The defining feature of this change was the sudden emergence of the United States as a novel kind of super-state, exercising veto power over the financial and security concerns of the other major states of the world (6). It is common in books on international relations to speak of the United States as inheriting the mantle of British hegemony. Yet the author argues that this was not a succession but a paradigm shift (15). Great Britain had created an empire on which the sun never set but lacked the hegemonic capacity to preside over it (20). The United States alone had the diplomatic, economic, and military potential to anchor a new global order (21). According to the author, the central preoccupation of this book is tracing the ways in which the world came to terms with America’s new centrality during this restructuring of world order.

The chief value of this book (in my humble opinion) is not based on any bold new arguments, insightful interpretations, or original discoveries. Rather its true value lies in the light it shines on the extraordinary complexity of world affairs that shaped the decisions made during this turbulent time. People look back on the events of WWI and its aftermath and ask questions that presuppose nations are unified, rational actors: “why did France demand such harsh treatment of Germany at Versailles?” or “why did Great Britain draw new national boundaries (Poland, Middle East) that way?” This book, more than any other I’ve read on the period, reveals how so many important decisions were shaped not only by the contest between winners and losers, but by intense inter-Allied disagreements and fierce infighting amongst political factions of just about every country involved (U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, China). The most famous of course is the U.S. Senate’s decision not to ratify the League of Nations agreement, even though it was championed by President Woodrow Wilson. This book is so voluminous and covers so many different areas that it would be futile to accurately summarize all the important points contained within. Nevertheless, I have tried to capture some of the key points that I found interesting or that demonstrate that interconnected, complex web of relationships and their impact on decisions following the war.

The author starts his book in 1916, the year when the economic output of the United States exceeded that of the British Empire. America’s economic ascendancy would have far reaching consequences during WWI and the inter-war period that followed. The author argues that America’s impending global dominance was so pervasive that Hitler and Trotsky both hoped the British Empire would rise up and challenge it lest they all become vassal states (26). Ironically, America had little interest in assuming this mantle. It would take the devastating Second World War before America’s massive power was married with a sense of providential purpose to become a truly transformative force in world affairs (27). While America’s economy had been rising for years, it did not become the center of global finance until WWI as the most powerful states in Europe became dependent on foreign creditors (36-38).

The vast majority of this foreign credit came from the United States. By late 1916, American investors had wagered two billion dollars on an Entente victory (48). The Central Powers had no comparable source of external credit to draw on. Consequently, they made their fateful decision to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare. Although they judged correctly that the United States was fully committed (economically) to the Entente, their decision would prove disastrous (48). Woodrow Wilson, desperately desired to play the role of peacemaker. Deeply influenced by Reconstruction in the South following the Civil War, he believed that lasting peace in Europe could only be established if it was accepted by all parties. The only way to produce such an outcome was through a “Peace without Victory” (53). Any peace forced upon the loser would only produce grievance to justify future conflict (54). Unfortunately, the Germans sabotaged the best opportunity for American arbitration by their unrestricted submarine warfare and the Zimmerman telegram seeking to draw Mexico into the war (66-67). In hindsight, these decisions were even more imprudent than they originally appeared. France and Russia were both physically exhausted and the British (in summer 1917) were within days of insolvency. The U.S. entry into the war removed that risk of disaster as it upended British reliance on private capital markets and opened up the politically driven government-to-government lending (78). The author also explores the counterfactual possibility of a democratic future for Russia. Russia was facing the challenges of civil war. Had the Allies responded positively to some of the peace initiatives floated by some voices from within Germany, Russia, and the Vatican, then Russia could have extricated themselves from the war and may never have fallen to the Bolsheviks (87).

In December 1917, the Bolshevik regime and the Central Powers began negotiations for peace. Four months later they signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (108). This treaty stripped Russia of territory containing 55 million people, a third of the empire’s pre-war population. The decision to sign these harsh terms were one of those decisions driven by complex interactions among participants. The Bolsheviks needed to consolidate power but did not want to suffer the embarrassment of surrender. Withdrawing from the war would also draw the ire of the rest of the Entente. Trotsky proposed a policy of “no peace, no war”…i.e. they were not quitting but would not fight either. Unfortunately, Germany refused to accept that decision, expanding military action to drive the Russians back to the negotiating table (132-136). By March, the Germans advancing unopposed had captured Kiev. Trotsky’s gamble backfired. Lenin however desperately pressed for Russia to sign the treaty without delay or qualification, despite the embarrassment and shame it brought, in order to save the communist movement (136). While Brest-Litovsk should have been considered a glorious peace of stupendous dimensions, it actually fractured German unity as some political parties labeled it a “peace of violation” (139). The very harsh terms for Russia would later be used against the Germans when discussing the Treaty of Versailles.

In the lead up to the signing of Brest-Litovsk, the British general staff feared that Germany would impose hegemony on all of Russia, forcing upwards of 2 million men into the war on behalf of the Central Powers (156). This could drag the war out for another year or longer. To avoid that fate, they pressed for intervention in Russia itself. A force of 50,000 Czech POWs (in Siberia) seemed like a core force to spearhead this effort. In the midst of Russian infighting, this force captured much of the transcontinental railway. In return for their efforts, they demanded a quid pro quo from Wilson, namely the death of the Hapsburg Empire (158). To screen the Czech withdraw, Wilson authorized U.S. and Japanese forces to enter Siberia (159). The British hoped to use this intervention to bring about a democratic Russia but Wilson refused to commit to such an audacious scheme. Lenin continued to press for signing the Brest-Litovsk treaty but infighting amongst Russian factions prevented it. Brutal waves of assassinations and repressions were carried out by the Bolsheviks (including the murder of the Romanov family) (165). Following this Red Terror, Lenin got the treaty signed averting a total collapse in the face of German advances.

U.S. funds loaned to London, Paris, and Rome gave the Entente their crucial margin of advantage over the Central Powers (206). Unfortunately, accumulating such debt put them at the mercy of the U.S. (207). The Allies could have fought without U.S. financial backing but it would have been a different kind of war. They chose a deliberately high-risk strategy as part of an all-out effort to deliver a knock-out blow (208). This would have ramifications that impacted the rest of the 20th century in dramatic ways. Realizing, their hopeless position, in October 1918, German Chancellor Max von Baden asked Wilson to negotiate a peace based on the principles laid out in his 14 Points. This opened the window back up for a chance at “Peace without Victory”. Wilson’s unilateral diplomacy outraged the Allies, creating a huge amount of friction within the Entente. After England, France, and Italy had gone into massive debt to win, Wilson was on the verge of letting Germany off the hook (224). Wilson pressed ahead, demanding proof of German moves toward democracy. This amounted to a demand for the Kaiser’s abdication which caused an incendiary mutiny amongst the German officers. Their failed attempt to bring about an apocalyptic final confrontation led to revolution within Germany and the breakdown of the Kaiser’s regime (225). The newly formed Reichstag revolutionary government would sign the armistice terms set by Wilson. Had the British and French known how close Germany was to total collapse due to the ongoing revolution, they could have derailed Wilson’s coup. Germany would not have been unable to resist any military advance (228). While Clemenceau (France) and Lloyd George (UK) couldn’t really challenge Wilson, his domestic opponents did. His decision to negotiate with the enemy while our boys were dying in the fields of France caused outrage back home (230).

For the Entente there was nothing that was more clear in the wake of the war than that it’s economic and financial position had changed forever. France future position of subordination was already more definitely marked out by 1919 than was that of Germany’s (289). France tried to rebalance the European economy at the expense of Germany. However, finding a realistic (how much could Germany actually pay) and politically acceptable solution amongst the Big Three (US, UK, France) proved to be divisive. France having suffered the worst of the war and needing to rebuild demanded 55% of all German reparations. While the UK had not been invaded they had suffered huge losses in shipping and had run down its stock of capital to finance France. They feared their less visible losses would go unacknowledged (292-3). Several nations, notably the UK, France, and Italy floated the proposal that Washington consider forgiveness of foreign debt (298). The Europeans argued that the U.S. could afford this seeing they were relatively unscathed and rich. The U.S. swiftly dismissed these proposals.

As the Allies haggled over these matters, the situation in Germany continued to deteriorate. Many of the military officers called for military action rather than submit to some of the more humiliating demands (especially those that gave swaths of Prussian heartland to the new state of Poland, especially since they had been victorious on the Eastern Front). These events would culminate in the Kapp Putsch that attempted to overthrow the Weimar Republic. The negotiations at Versailles would have impacts on the other side of the world as well. The refusal to insert a racial equality clause in the League of Nations had embarrassed the Japanese. To secure their signature, they essentially traded away Chinese territory (which resulted in China’s refusal to sign the charter) (322-329).

While the U.S. appeared to be best situated to escape the impacts of the war, the cost of living was rising dramatically (343). This economic dislocation created friction within the U.S. The Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board were at odds on how to respond. The Fed wanted to increase interest rates to attract investors but the Treasury resisted such calls as gold was draining out of the U.S. (because it was the last stable currency convertible to gold) (344). As the U.S. was dangerously close to leaving the Gold Standard the Treasury reversed course and agreed to jack rates up to 6%. The deflationary impact was drastic resulting in an abrupt tightening of credit and sending the US economy over a cliff (345). The author argues this event was probably the most underrated event in the twentieth century (354). This rippled across the world. France owed $3 billion to the US and $2 billion to the UK…all of which had to be repaid in dollars or gold. With the deflationary pressure brought on by the US, they could do nothing to promote a growth in exports to bridge the gap. So, they turned to the only source left to them…reparations from Germany (367).

While the UK was victorious in the war, their global empire came to be seen as a landscape of rebellion. The talk of rights and self-determination proposed by Wilson created a common political language exploited by smaller nations the world over (374). The UK quickly found themselves dealing with uprisings in Ireland, Egypt, and India at a time when they were trying desperately to reduce military expenditures. While the US had proven unwilling lead in Europe, having failed to ratify the League of Nations agreement, in 1921 the US surprisingly hosted a conference to discuss disarmament in the Pacific. This agreement fixed the ratio of battleships for the US, UK, and Japan at 5:5:3 (Japan agreed to the lower number because their very inclusion conferred on them the status as one of the great powers). The UK tried to build on this success with a conference in Genoa in 1922 in hopes of restoring the European economy. Lloyd George envisioned a grand (and convoluted) scheme whereby aid to Russia would allow them to rebuild (and return to the capitalist fold), this would open a market for German exports and increase their capability to make reparations payments to France. France in turn would be able to repay debts owed to the US (428). The conference would prove a failure.

The French, caught in the middle, threatened (and eventually did) use force to occupy the Ruhr region of Germany (440-441). In occupying the Ruhr, France could now extract coal to recoup $850 million gold francs a year. The Germans watched this invasion with growing resentment. The Germans responded with passive resistance refusing to work in the mines. When the government in Berlin declared official support for the strike the German economy tanked. Eventually, the German government gave in (448). However, Germany’s long-simmering civil war was coming back to boil. The German Communist Party claimed to have 113,000 men ready for to launch an uprising (449). When the uprising was put down, Hitler (himself serving 15 months in prison for revolutionary activity) concluded that the only way to topple the system was from within.

If economists agree on anything, it was that the deflationary consensus and collective austerity of the early 1930s was disastrous (487). The issue was larger than fear of Weimar-style inflation or conservative efforts to cut welfare. The Gold Standard was tied to visions of international cooperation...the “golden fetters” also constrained the militarists (487-8). A cyclical recession was a small price to pay to uphold international peace and order. The perverse consequence was that advocates of economic growth found themselves increasingly in the insurgent nationalist camp (488). The Germans began top secret negotiations with Vienna on forming a customs union (494). It was intended to widen Germany’s room to maneuver but in effect narrowed it as domestic and international pressure began to grow (495). Growing economic tensions led President Hoover to step in and announce a freeze on all debt payments. As this would benefit Germany at the expense of France they vetoed this proposal. During the ensuing debate, Germany’s financial system collapsed (497).

In Japan, participation in the various disarmament talks had angered Army and Navy lobbies (499). In the following months, prominent internationalists in the government were assassinated. Misery across industrial swaths of the Great Britain forced them to abandon the gold standard (500-501). This started a global event causing banks to fail in America and panic in Berlin. Britain had initiated a death spiral of protectionism and currency wars (501). This collapse unfettered the Japanese militarists. The Japanese defense budget doubled from 1930-1934. Politicians trying to slow the growth were gunned down. By 1937, military spending was five times what it was in 1930 (502). The consequences for Germany would become unbearable. Germany had no reserves to weather the storm and could not devalue their currency because their debt was denominated in dollars. Hitler’s Nazi party, promoting work-creation programs, swept to victory with 37% of the vote (503). By 1933, FDR announced that the US would be leaving the Gold Standard. This depreciation of the dollar made it hard to export to the US (505). By July, FDR stated that he would not stabilize the value of US currency, rather it would float to whatever level suited the US economy regardless of its impact on the rest of the world. Hitler took the hint, withdrew from the League of Nations and announced a default on all international obligations (506). Great Britain and France followed suit, suspending payment on billions of dollars of debt (507).

This failure of the Democratic alliance opened a strategic window of opportunity in the early 1930s. A window that nightmarish forces in Germany, Japan, Italy, and the Soviet Union would rush through (511).

[Peter Zinkovsky · Rating 5 out of 5]

Incredibly well written. Tooze’s writing style is very unique in that he is one of the few historians able to interweave a broad set of world events into a seemingly connected narrative. This is one of the few history books I feel would be worth rereading since it covers such a broad surface and explains a huge chunk of world affairs, not just on a national level but internationally.
Furthermore, I would recommend this book along with Lords of Finance to anyone who wants to learn more about 20th century history, given that the events of the early 20th century are crucial to understanding the proceeding period of world history and the modern day world order.

[WaldenOgre · Rating 4 out of 5]

这本厚厚的书可是不太容易读的。

它涉及了历史、军事、经济学、那个时期国际间的政治角力，以及各国国内政治的纠葛，然后着眼点又散布于包括东亚和印度在内的全球各处，同时还在这些领域和地理位置里反复切换。这个阅读门槛就颇不低了。

在宏大的写作框架之余，Adam Tooze似乎也预设了读者对他诸多的着墨议题都已有相当的了解。因此，在各个主要版块之间，许许多多的缝隙就需要读者自行去填满了。

然而，瑕不掩瑜。本书对一战后世界秩序的建构进行了有力的重新审视。虽然得胜的协约国、尤其是美国提出的许多国际政治的主张，它们的价值考量在一定程度上都是真诚的，但欧洲大陆复杂的历史和利益冲突、英国其殖民帝国的身份、美国自身的保守理念和脆弱内政，以及它们所共享的种族偏见，都对这种世界秩序的重建产生了致命的阻碍。

只有当世界再度经历一次规模空前的浩劫，并吸取了前车之鉴后，美国才最终将行动的意愿、自身的天命感和强大的实力结合起来，打造出了一种前所未见的国际秩序。

于是，无论褒贬如何，事实就是：我们所生活的这个世界，至今都处在这种“自由的霸权”或紧或松的主导之下。

[Chrisorc · Rating 3 out of 5]

Inte alls lika bra som ’Wages’.
Den saknar den tydliga röda tråden jag förväntade mig.
Första hälften äger dock.

[Josh Friedlander · Rating 2 out of 5]

Tooze knows an enormous amount of facts. His history is global, and economically informed. But he's not the most fun to read. His sentences are crisp and learned, but this book is lumpy, crooked. It presents fascinating anecdotes which abruptly end. I kept asking myself what the central thesis is, and though I have some ideas, I'm still not sure. In an odd twist, most of the book covers a few years around WWI in great detail, while the last bit rushes through about a decade in almost no time, skipping the rise of Stalin and the Great Depression.

But here is what I think is his point: between WWI and the 1930s, the world shifted from being a multilateral sphere of competing imperial Great Powers, to one of tenuous international organisations with the dominant presence of American might (and Wall Street finance) overshadowing it. Much of the war was paid for by loans from JP Morgan and his friends, and afterwards the victors were in nearly as bad financial shape as the losers. Much of the German repayments from the Versailles Treaty went straight from Britain and France to America, where at some points they were lent back to Germany. And the book ends with Ramsey McDonald's courageous decisions to go off the gold standard and finally, unthinkably, default on war debts, saying:

Payments that would upset the financial order such as it is would be treason to the whole world. We have to take upon ourselves the thankless task of putting an end to the folly of continuing to pay

Mr Tooze is sympathetic to the pacifists and liberal internationalists, the animating spirit behind the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand ban on war, and Woodrow Wilson's desire for American influence to obtain "peace without victory" in the Great War, a New World Order rather than an intervention in favour of one side. Such ideas in his view weren't utopian folly but a way of dealing with new conditions: imperial might was untenable when everyone but the US was drowning in debt (and later when even the US looked ropy). Prior to the war, the Prussian or Westminster models of government (or "Liberal Imperialism") were seen as superior to democracy, but the tumultuous forces of nationalism, liberalism among imperial subjects, and the crushing economic depression eviscerated that order and set the stage for the violence of the next war, and the arrangement of the present time.