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Czas Kondora. Jak Pinochet i jego sojusznicy zasiali terroryzm na trzech kontynentach
Ta historia zaczęła się 11 września 1973 roku w stolicy Chile, kiedy generał Augusto Pinochet zbombardował pałac prezydencki, stanowiący symbol najtrwalszej demokracji parlamentarnej na kontynencie południowoamerykańskim. Według oficjalnej wersji Stany Zjednoczone nie były zaangażowane w zamach, wiadomo jednak, że zaledwie trzy lata wcześniej próbowały zorganizować w Chile pucz w celu obalenia rządu. Zarówno amerykańska próba zamachu stanu, jak i przewrót Pinocheta miały ten sam cel: obalenie Salvadora Allende.
Służby wywiadowcze Chile i kilku innych krajów Ameryki Południowej obawiały się lewicowych ugrupowań zbrojnych i potencjalne zagrożenie z ich strony było głównym bodźcem dla stworzenia sojuszu, któremu nadano nazwę Operacja Kondor. Oficjalnie przy cichym wsparciu USA sojusz miał prowadzić działalność antyterrorystyczną.
John Dinges stawia dziś pytanie: jak wielu tysiącom morderstw popełnionych w Chile, Argentynie, Urugwaju, Boliwii, Paragwaju i Brazylii można było zapobiec, gdyby Stany Zjednoczone zajęły jednoznaczne stanowisko i zdecydowanie sprzeciwiły się zabójstwom, torturom i porwaniom? Żeby na nie odpowiedzieć, poszukiwał byłych funkcjonariuszy służb bezpieczeństwa, członków lewicowych ugrupowań zbrojnych oraz pracowników rządu amerykańskiego. Okazało się, że część osób już nie żyje, a wielu wojskowych i urzędników nadal nie chce ujawnienia prawdy. Niektórzy odważyli się jednak przerwać zmowę milczenia. Ich relacje oraz dokumenty, które w ostatnich latach udostępniono opinii publicznej, złożyły się na historię wydarzeń z lat 1973–1980.
Służby wywiadowcze Chile i kilku innych krajów Ameryki Południowej obawiały się lewicowych ugrupowań zbrojnych i potencjalne zagrożenie z ich strony było głównym bodźcem dla stworzenia sojuszu, któremu nadano nazwę Operacja Kondor. Oficjalnie przy cichym wsparciu USA sojusz miał prowadzić działalność antyterrorystyczną.
John Dinges stawia dziś pytanie: jak wielu tysiącom morderstw popełnionych w Chile, Argentynie, Urugwaju, Boliwii, Paragwaju i Brazylii można było zapobiec, gdyby Stany Zjednoczone zajęły jednoznaczne stanowisko i zdecydowanie sprzeciwiły się zabójstwom, torturom i porwaniom? Żeby na nie odpowiedzieć, poszukiwał byłych funkcjonariuszy służb bezpieczeństwa, członków lewicowych ugrupowań zbrojnych oraz pracowników rządu amerykańskiego. Okazało się, że część osób już nie żyje, a wielu wojskowych i urzędników nadal nie chce ujawnienia prawdy. Niektórzy odważyli się jednak przerwać zmowę milczenia. Ich relacje oraz dokumenty, które w ostatnich latach udostępniono opinii publicznej, złożyły się na historię wydarzeń z lat 1973–1980.
418 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2004
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1193 people want to read
About the author
John Dinges
10 books28 followersI am a journalist who writes mostly about Latin America, dictators, intelligence agencies (usually secret ones) and human rights. I have a previous career as a theologian--not incompatible with journalism. I am the Godfrey Lowell Cabot professor of international journalism at Columbia University. Previously I worked for the Washington Post and NPR (as foreign editor and managing editor at the latter.) Current writing: democracy and media in Latin America.
I founded the nonprofit Center for Investigation and Information (CIINFO), which runs projects on investigative journalism in Latin America. Founded the Chilean on-line media organization CIPER (www.ciperchile.cl). Currently run ArchivosChile (www.archivoschile.org).
I founded the nonprofit Center for Investigation and Information (CIINFO), which runs projects on investigative journalism in Latin America. Founded the Chilean on-line media organization CIPER (www.ciperchile.cl). Currently run ArchivosChile (www.archivoschile.org).
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 39 reviews
January 10, 2019
John Dinges' The Condor Wars focuses on the efforts of the CIA, Pinochet's Chile and assorted South American allies (Argentina, Paraguay, etc.) to exterminate political opponents through a multinational death squad. Dinges, a journalist who experienced many of the events firsthand (he was kidnapped and detained by Pinochet's goons several times), gives an unsparing portrait of this unholy Cold War conglomerate, which started as an anti-terror group (targeting real groups like the Tupamaros) before spiraling into worldwide assassinations of leftist and liberal critics. Dinges demonstrates the undeniable complicity of American officials in this campaign; the savage tactics practiced by Pinochet's DINA and allied agencies; their self-appointed mandate for assassinations across South America, Europe and ultimately into the United States. The program only failed, Dinges argues, due to overreach: the murder of Orlando Letelier in downtown DC, and an alleged plot against Ed Koch, torpedoed it more than any scruples about state-sponsored terrorism, proving that if you're a tinpot dictator you'd best not cross your benefactor. A disturbing book that ought to be required reading for students of the Cold War, South America and American foreign policy.
February 2, 2022
Kawał bardzo dobrej dziennikarskiej roboty. Wnikliwej, skrupulatnej i niezmiernie szczegółowej, ujawniającej mało znane wcześniej fakty, bazującej na wiarygodnych i solidnych źródłach. Dziennikarz John Dinges nadzwyczaj ciekawie, posługując się przystępnym językiem przybliża czytelnikowi kierowaną przez chilijskiego dyktatora i generała Augusto Pinocheta słynną Operację Kondor, w którą zamieszane były niemal wszystkie reżimy państw Ameryki Łacińskiej. Dinges drobiazgowo opisuje również szersze tło i wydarzenia historyczne, polityczne i terrorystyczne tego mającego miejsce głównie w latach 70 najkrwawszego i najbrutalniejszego okresu w najnowszych dziejach regionu. Autor prowadząc swoje śledztwo dziennikarskie przekopał się przez kilometry archiwów, setki teczek i tysiące pojedynczych dokumentów, dotarł do osób osobiście uczestniczących i zamieszanych w samą operację, do licznych śledczych, do polityków będących ówcześnie na najwyższych szczeblach władzy jak i do przypadkowych świadków masowych mordów czy podejrzanie licznych wypadków przeciwników reżimu. Dinges - Amerykanin nie tylko z urodzenia, ale i sercem i duszą, nie przemilcza kolosalnej roli jaką USA, a w szczególności pełniący wtedy urząd sekretarza Stanu Henry Kissinger, odegrało w latynoamerykańskich aktach terroryzmu, świadomie na nie przyzwalając, w tym również godząc się i przymykając oko na zlecane i popełnianie przez dyktatorskie reżimy morderstwa na terenie swoich stanów.
Książka Dingesa przeładowana jest najróżniejszymi nazwiskami, datami, stowarzyszeniami i organizacjami, zawikłanymi i skomplikowanymi sojuszami i powiązaniami politycznymi, w związku z czym od owego nadmiaru momentami pęka głowa i nawet przystępny, zrozumiały dla laika w temacie styl nie sprawia, że lektura “Czasu Kondora” jest płynna i szybka. Z drugiej strony te wszystkie spiski i gierki polityczne, sama operacja jak i luźniej powiązane z nią wydarzenia są niczym wyjęte z najlepszej powieści sensacyjnej. I jak taką powieść znaczną część “Czasu Kondora” się czyta - pasjonująco, z wypiekami na twarzy i nieodłącznie towarzyszącym napięciem.
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Książka Dingesa przeładowana jest najróżniejszymi nazwiskami, datami, stowarzyszeniami i organizacjami, zawikłanymi i skomplikowanymi sojuszami i powiązaniami politycznymi, w związku z czym od owego nadmiaru momentami pęka głowa i nawet przystępny, zrozumiały dla laika w temacie styl nie sprawia, że lektura “Czasu Kondora” jest płynna i szybka. Z drugiej strony te wszystkie spiski i gierki polityczne, sama operacja jak i luźniej powiązane z nią wydarzenia są niczym wyjęte z najlepszej powieści sensacyjnej. I jak taką powieść znaczną część “Czasu Kondora” się czyta - pasjonująco, z wypiekami na twarzy i nieodłącznie towarzyszącym napięciem.
February 6, 2009
A very grim but essential book about the cooperation between the dictatorships in Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Bolivia in the '70s to track down, apprehend, torture, and murder political dissidents. Operation Condor was a centralized intelligence gathering point aimed at getting dissidents who fled their own country into neighboring ones in South America. The official reason given was to stop leftist groups like the Tupamaros, but by the time Operation Condor started their had already been mass killings of leftists in Chile, so that premise is a little thin. American complicity is documented, with an American official who observed its founding at the Villa Grimaldi actually writing in official correspondence that it's organization resembled the Gestapo.
Operation Condor became well known in the U.S. through orchestrating the car bombing of Orlando Letelier, a critic of the Pinochet regime, and his assistant Ronnie Moffitt, in Washington D.C.
Operation Condor became well known in the U.S. through orchestrating the car bombing of Orlando Letelier, a critic of the Pinochet regime, and his assistant Ronnie Moffitt, in Washington D.C.
April 18, 2013
Excellent overview of the Pinochet years and their context. Well written and well researched. Every now and then I would get a bit overwhelmed by the level of detail and have to go back and re-read, but that was me, not anything that was Dinges' fault.
Read this if you want to see why the U.S. is so hated around the world. I was completely enraged at the role that our government had in partnering with this mass murdering monster and at our meddling in the political self-determination of the people of South America.
Read this if you want to see why the U.S. is so hated around the world. I was completely enraged at the role that our government had in partnering with this mass murdering monster and at our meddling in the political self-determination of the people of South America.
August 18, 2022
Interesting enough to keep reading, but not what I was expecting.
This was more political science than history. More bureaucracy than storytelling.
It’s a good book, but not exactly what I was looking for.
This was more political science than history. More bureaucracy than storytelling.
It’s a good book, but not exactly what I was looking for.
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September 8, 2025Quería leer sobre esto porque para un trabajo tuve que buscar las cifras de desaparecidos y asesinados durante "los años del Cóndor". Cuando a uno le enseñan historia latinoamericana el nombre de Plan Cóndor u Operación Cóndor queda en la cabeza de forma más o menos general: hubo dictaduras aliadas a Estados Unidos que cometieron innumerables crímenes de lesa humanidad; pero realmente, o al menos eso me pasó, uno no sabe cuál o cómo fue el supuesto plan. Este libro responde esa pregunta.
Primero lo bueno. Hay una documentación asombrosa. La rigidez con la que se aborda la fuente primaria, llegando hasta telegramas o comunicaciones olvidadas por varios de los implicados, es de alabar. Dinges es un periodista de investigación de esos escritos por novelistas, que ven en la profesión casi que su misión en el mundo. También es de destacar la forma de contar la historia, la estructura narrativa es lo suficientemente específica con los hechos sin caer en un bombardeo de datos irrelevantes, y estar repitiendo constantemente las fases o los proyectos más puntuales de la cooperación permite que uno no se pierda.
Ahora lo no tan bueno. Dinges, con fundamento, parece intentar suavizar el impacto de los gringos en los crimenes y en todo lo que ocurrió. Sus argumentos giran en torno a algunas comunicaciones (que en efecto hubo) desde USA hacia los funcionarios latinoamericanos, las cuales fueron omitidas, ignoradas o directamente rechazadas. El capítulo de Luz verde, luz roja, donde se aborda más a fondo cómo se hacían estas "advertencias" desde la experiencia de Kissinger en Chile, intenta demostrar hasta qué punto se sabía en Washington la forma en que la alianza de dictaduras operaba; pero incluso en esta parte del libro, a mi parecer, el autor peca de limitarse a los hechos. Todo bien con la idea de que los hechos hablan por sí solos en estos relatos, pero por favor, no nos pueden intentar vender la idea de que si fuera por Kissinger las cosas en América Latina hubieran sido más pacíficas. Para mí hace falta una mayor problematización de por qué los gringos llegaron a advertir a los gobiernos sobre sus excesos militares (se pudo haber dicho más explícitamente, por ejemplo, que lo primordial eran las relaciones internacionales). Otro aspecto que pudo tratarse más, y que claramente no deja muy bien parados a los Estados Unidos, es el tema ideológico y cómo el discurso anticomunista lleva inminentemente a la represión más cruel y exagerada de la diferencia; discurso proveniente precisamente del norte del continente.
Creo que es un buen libro, y me pongo de pie ante Dinges por severo trabajo, pero en el fondo sí siento que pudo ser más vocal y crítico en su rechazo a lo ocurrido. La pregunta que plantea el libro no se responde diciendo que el Plan Cóndor fueron los excesos de los gobiernos, y lo problemático no es únicamente que se hayan violado los derechos de miles de personas en interrogatorios o en aeropuertos y terminales. La respuesta es clara: el Plan fue la aceptación a nivel internacional de que bajo la idea de una amenaza "terrorista" se entraba en un terreno de "todo vale", y Estados Unidos mantiene a día de hoy esta forma de ser de cara al exterior. No se pueden expiar los pecados de quien, aunque no cometa el crimen, le dice al criminal por qué la víctima debe morir.
Primero lo bueno. Hay una documentación asombrosa. La rigidez con la que se aborda la fuente primaria, llegando hasta telegramas o comunicaciones olvidadas por varios de los implicados, es de alabar. Dinges es un periodista de investigación de esos escritos por novelistas, que ven en la profesión casi que su misión en el mundo. También es de destacar la forma de contar la historia, la estructura narrativa es lo suficientemente específica con los hechos sin caer en un bombardeo de datos irrelevantes, y estar repitiendo constantemente las fases o los proyectos más puntuales de la cooperación permite que uno no se pierda.
Ahora lo no tan bueno. Dinges, con fundamento, parece intentar suavizar el impacto de los gringos en los crimenes y en todo lo que ocurrió. Sus argumentos giran en torno a algunas comunicaciones (que en efecto hubo) desde USA hacia los funcionarios latinoamericanos, las cuales fueron omitidas, ignoradas o directamente rechazadas. El capítulo de Luz verde, luz roja, donde se aborda más a fondo cómo se hacían estas "advertencias" desde la experiencia de Kissinger en Chile, intenta demostrar hasta qué punto se sabía en Washington la forma en que la alianza de dictaduras operaba; pero incluso en esta parte del libro, a mi parecer, el autor peca de limitarse a los hechos. Todo bien con la idea de que los hechos hablan por sí solos en estos relatos, pero por favor, no nos pueden intentar vender la idea de que si fuera por Kissinger las cosas en América Latina hubieran sido más pacíficas. Para mí hace falta una mayor problematización de por qué los gringos llegaron a advertir a los gobiernos sobre sus excesos militares (se pudo haber dicho más explícitamente, por ejemplo, que lo primordial eran las relaciones internacionales). Otro aspecto que pudo tratarse más, y que claramente no deja muy bien parados a los Estados Unidos, es el tema ideológico y cómo el discurso anticomunista lleva inminentemente a la represión más cruel y exagerada de la diferencia; discurso proveniente precisamente del norte del continente.
Creo que es un buen libro, y me pongo de pie ante Dinges por severo trabajo, pero en el fondo sí siento que pudo ser más vocal y crítico en su rechazo a lo ocurrido. La pregunta que plantea el libro no se responde diciendo que el Plan Cóndor fueron los excesos de los gobiernos, y lo problemático no es únicamente que se hayan violado los derechos de miles de personas en interrogatorios o en aeropuertos y terminales. La respuesta es clara: el Plan fue la aceptación a nivel internacional de que bajo la idea de una amenaza "terrorista" se entraba en un terreno de "todo vale", y Estados Unidos mantiene a día de hoy esta forma de ser de cara al exterior. No se pueden expiar los pecados de quien, aunque no cometa el crimen, le dice al criminal por qué la víctima debe morir.
February 7, 2017
A disingenuous view of an indeed dark episode of history
While we can all agree that the dictatorships that flourished on the Southern Cone of South America were brutal and their methods ran counter to human rights, the author of this book sins by being one-sided and "romantic" in his assessment. True, Allende was elected democratically by the Chilean people, but as in many cases in history, the presence in his cabinet of communist ministers as well as the increased pressure in the streets by radical elements (such as strikes and forcible takeovers of factories) did not bide well for the continuity of democracy in Chile. While we cannot speculate on this matter, Allende's weakness would have become a liability in the longer term and a communist takeover could have occurred, which would have thrown off-balance this region of South America, already threatened by the massive presence of the Montoneros in Argentina, the remnants of the pro-Castro guerrillas in Bolivia, and the Tupamaros in Uruguay. Che Guevara's doctrine of "multiple vietnams" would have been catastrophic if it had been allowed to run its course (Vid. The FARC ongoing conflict in Colombia) and would have entangled the United States in a sovietization of Latin America, with all the socioeconomic disasters this would have brought (vid. The Cuban quagmire). Therefore, the historian has to have a dispassionate view of these events and understand that the actions of Kissinger and the state department during that period have to be read and understood in the context of the Cold War and the imbalance previously mentioned. Unfortunately, the author fails in that aspect and indicts Kissinger and the US administration of complicity in this drama. I, unfortunately, cannot agree with this assessment: if Kissinger is guilty of anything, it is of being a proponent of realpolitik and being a man of his time.
While we can all agree that the dictatorships that flourished on the Southern Cone of South America were brutal and their methods ran counter to human rights, the author of this book sins by being one-sided and "romantic" in his assessment. True, Allende was elected democratically by the Chilean people, but as in many cases in history, the presence in his cabinet of communist ministers as well as the increased pressure in the streets by radical elements (such as strikes and forcible takeovers of factories) did not bide well for the continuity of democracy in Chile. While we cannot speculate on this matter, Allende's weakness would have become a liability in the longer term and a communist takeover could have occurred, which would have thrown off-balance this region of South America, already threatened by the massive presence of the Montoneros in Argentina, the remnants of the pro-Castro guerrillas in Bolivia, and the Tupamaros in Uruguay. Che Guevara's doctrine of "multiple vietnams" would have been catastrophic if it had been allowed to run its course (Vid. The FARC ongoing conflict in Colombia) and would have entangled the United States in a sovietization of Latin America, with all the socioeconomic disasters this would have brought (vid. The Cuban quagmire). Therefore, the historian has to have a dispassionate view of these events and understand that the actions of Kissinger and the state department during that period have to be read and understood in the context of the Cold War and the imbalance previously mentioned. Unfortunately, the author fails in that aspect and indicts Kissinger and the US administration of complicity in this drama. I, unfortunately, cannot agree with this assessment: if Kissinger is guilty of anything, it is of being a proponent of realpolitik and being a man of his time.
September 16, 2012
Truly exhausting and exhaustive. Yet much of the cloak and dagger remains cloaked, at least on the U.S. side.
Are we to believe the CIA and U.S. military extensively trained hundreds of Argentine and Cuban-exile military men, reaped the rewards of their savage interrogations, and bent over backwards to cover up and pardon their misdeeds, while remaining innocent as lambs while these crimes against humanity were committed? The U.S. model of arming reprehensible characters continues through Guatemala, Bosnia, Iraq . . . yet the problem with unaccountability is that such power is often applied indiscriminately, beyond militants to mere political or even business rivals.
Dinges strikes a balanced tone here, compared to some of the other Dirty War literature, but the "green-light, red-light" approach he describes of CIA/military/Kissinger on one hand and the pro-human rights elements of the State Department and Justice Department on the other were probably more divergent than has been documented. Still, a rare, comprehensive account and told with uncommon style and grace.
Are we to believe the CIA and U.S. military extensively trained hundreds of Argentine and Cuban-exile military men, reaped the rewards of their savage interrogations, and bent over backwards to cover up and pardon their misdeeds, while remaining innocent as lambs while these crimes against humanity were committed? The U.S. model of arming reprehensible characters continues through Guatemala, Bosnia, Iraq . . . yet the problem with unaccountability is that such power is often applied indiscriminately, beyond militants to mere political or even business rivals.
Dinges strikes a balanced tone here, compared to some of the other Dirty War literature, but the "green-light, red-light" approach he describes of CIA/military/Kissinger on one hand and the pro-human rights elements of the State Department and Justice Department on the other were probably more divergent than has been documented. Still, a rare, comprehensive account and told with uncommon style and grace.
January 10, 2021
If any history book can be termed "encyclopedic", this one's it. Author Dinges covers the entire Southern Cone of the South American nightmare of military juntas, dictatorships, international assassinations, CIA corruption, Kissinger's cowardice, Pinochet's declaration of himself as an "angel", etc. and there's a reasonable amount of characterization to all the parties involved. But not enough to make it an easy experience reading. Not as confusing as some books about all the events, but it lacks a human voice. Only near the end of the 1970s, when 3 tons of documents and ID cards of missing victims, caches of torture reports (many with evidence of USA acknowledgment), and other lost materials are incredibly discovered, does your jaw drop. The courageous journalists who pushed for these discoveries deserve medals of honor, yet no profiling of them appears. A dense but worthy book.
May 16, 2017
la responsabilidad de la CIA y el gobierno americano, en alentar, patrocinar y hacerse de la vista gorda con la Operación Cóndor es indudable... Lo peor es que criminales como Strossner, Pinochet, Videla y Contreras, no pagaron como debieron de pagar sus crímenes de lesa humanidad... poco a poco saldrán mas datos y documentos que revelen el alcance del "Cóndor", sus atrocidades y la cantidad de asesinados... Por lo que respecta al libro, una joya periodística e investigativa de amena lectura más que recomendable a todo aquel que quiera saber que hicieron esos gobiernos derechistas militares latinoamericanos de los años 70...
December 10, 2018
One of the few books focused on Operation Condor that I have found. Quite thorough in explaining how it comes into being and the author avoids being overly political. Dinges knows when to pull his punches due to lack of hard evidence. An important text or an important Cold War event for people to know about. Should excite further interest in the trials of the perpetrators who devastated their populations via kidnappings, torture and executions from the mid-1970s to 1980s.
October 27, 2023
Very good Journalist’s work, shoving that the author spent enormous time to find proofs of US’ support for awful murders and artrocities in the Cono Sur during military’s regimes times in Chile/Argentina/Uruguay/Paraguay.
But for me it was a bit too focused on details and there was not enough story behind the facts.
Overall- worth of reading.
But for me it was a bit too focused on details and there was not enough story behind the facts.
Overall- worth of reading.
July 25, 2021
Biased book on Pinochet and the battle against communism in South America.
March 10, 2019
Before all, I appreciate the chapter that clarified whether the USG was permissive in the acts of terror and horror committed by Operation Condor. It is somewhat less disappointing to understand USA’s involvement in this difficult period of Latin American history. What blows my mind about it is the whole red-light/green-light nature of the involvement, and how the Nuremberg Code was essentially established to punish enemies and not allies. The moral fluidity of how governments view and treat Human Rights is rather sickening. I also find it difficult to digest the role that venerated figures in USG History (Kissinger and Poppy Bush, i.e.) played a role in training the Military Governments in Intelligence Operations that made it possible for the hundreds of people implicated by participation/association with Operation Condor to cause the deaths, internment and disappearances of many thousands of people. And that opposition to what was occurring in the southern cone of South America only came after assassinations were happening/being planned for outside Latin America. What kind of moral flexibility do/did these people have?
This is a heavily detailed, comprehensive and somewhat exhausting account of the Pinochet years. Some of it was interesting and engaging; much of it involved too many players and groups at the same time. I am sure someone who is trained in analyzing and interpreting historical events/documents would have an easier time digesting the material. I, on the other hand, am versed in the maths/sciences/arts and so I struggled. Forty percent of the book is bibliography, notes and index, yet it is so laden with information that it took a while to complete. The timeline loosely, very loosely, follows a chronological timeline; meanwhile chapters themselves appear to strive addressing more thematic coverage but it left me feeling confused. Might be worthy of a read-once-a-few-days kinda book. If I were to reread it (I won’t), id follow along with pencil and paper to visually reconstruct the extensive work the author did.
This is a heavily detailed, comprehensive and somewhat exhausting account of the Pinochet years. Some of it was interesting and engaging; much of it involved too many players and groups at the same time. I am sure someone who is trained in analyzing and interpreting historical events/documents would have an easier time digesting the material. I, on the other hand, am versed in the maths/sciences/arts and so I struggled. Forty percent of the book is bibliography, notes and index, yet it is so laden with information that it took a while to complete. The timeline loosely, very loosely, follows a chronological timeline; meanwhile chapters themselves appear to strive addressing more thematic coverage but it left me feeling confused. Might be worthy of a read-once-a-few-days kinda book. If I were to reread it (I won’t), id follow along with pencil and paper to visually reconstruct the extensive work the author did.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
September 27, 2022
This is an excellent look at the released documents and consequences of Operation Condor in South America. I knock I a star for two reasons, however:
1. The author seems to go to great rhetorical lengths to excuse US complicity in the support, training, and encouragement of DINA's practices, seemingly excusing the US because we had *some* congressional figures who were opposed. Given that Pinochet was eventually tried because without him, despite never directly dirtying his hands, it never would have happened - one should rightfully conclude that the institutional green/red light's ambiguity could be read as anything other than consent and even encouragement of Operation Condor by the United States making them complicit in the atrocities that occurred.
2. The author validates the dictatorship's rhetoric of Marxist groups as 'terrorists' which seemingly provides readers a level of understanding/sympathy for why the Condor nations did what they did. The problem with calling the JCR and associated organizations terrorists is that they were in fact insurgent forces fighting for revolution. By that metric we can label even the early US fighters against British colonial rule as also terrorists. We can't just label any and all opposition forces as "terrorists." War is violence, and they were waging war against fascist dictatorships. Were Jews and their allies in Germany 'terrorists' for sabotaging and fighting Nazi forces? I think not. Regardless of how you may feel about communism, this is an unacceptable rhetorical acquiescence to the Pinochet and other dictatorships.
Other than these two images the author promulgates I find this a really important read for understanding the nature and extent of oppressive forces in the Southern Cone of South America.
1. The author seems to go to great rhetorical lengths to excuse US complicity in the support, training, and encouragement of DINA's practices, seemingly excusing the US because we had *some* congressional figures who were opposed. Given that Pinochet was eventually tried because without him, despite never directly dirtying his hands, it never would have happened - one should rightfully conclude that the institutional green/red light's ambiguity could be read as anything other than consent and even encouragement of Operation Condor by the United States making them complicit in the atrocities that occurred.
2. The author validates the dictatorship's rhetoric of Marxist groups as 'terrorists' which seemingly provides readers a level of understanding/sympathy for why the Condor nations did what they did. The problem with calling the JCR and associated organizations terrorists is that they were in fact insurgent forces fighting for revolution. By that metric we can label even the early US fighters against British colonial rule as also terrorists. We can't just label any and all opposition forces as "terrorists." War is violence, and they were waging war against fascist dictatorships. Were Jews and their allies in Germany 'terrorists' for sabotaging and fighting Nazi forces? I think not. Regardless of how you may feel about communism, this is an unacceptable rhetorical acquiescence to the Pinochet and other dictatorships.
Other than these two images the author promulgates I find this a really important read for understanding the nature and extent of oppressive forces in the Southern Cone of South America.
October 27, 2023
Książka bardzo encyklopedyczna, przypomina podręcznik akademicki a nie reportaż. Ciężko mi się ją czytało i był to bez wątpienia wysiłek umysłowy. Wielokrotnie musiałam czytać ten sam fragment kilka razy aby w pełni go zrozumieć. W pracy przewija się mnóstwo imion, nazwisk, nazw organizacji oraz skrótów. Nie jest również zachowana chronologia wydarzeń. Dla osoby, która nie jest zorientowana w temacie polityki ameryki południowej może to sprawiać kłopot. Wrażenie robi ogromny research, który wykonał autor, jego wiedza, rozeznanie w temacie i rozmiar bibliografii. Na polskim rynku jest bardzo mało publikacji na temat operacji kondor oraz działalności Pinocheta co sprawia, że pozycja jest tym bardziej wartościowa i warta przeczytania. Niestety autor w ogóle nie opisał nastrojów społecznych oraz przedstawionych wydarzeń w kontekście globalnej sytuacji politycznej. Cała praca jest bardzo faktograficzna i napisana nieco topornym językiem. Nie wiem czy to kwestia tłumaczenia czy po prostu styl autora. Pomimo tego, że nie była to łatwa lektura z pewnością uczyniła mnie mądrzejszą. Chętnie sięgnęłabym po nią ponownie, aby móc w pełni zrozumieć poruszany w niej temat jednak nie wiem czy wystarczy mi na to mocy. "Czas kondora" zainteresował mnie tematem krajów południowego stożka i będę go dalej zgłębiać.
October 28, 2017
It's refreshing to read primary source material pertaining to the construction of that brutal system. These letters, cables, interviews, letters, pictures, and other materials are broken down and put in context of Cold War politics and North American economic interests. A web is gradually built -intricate yet stable- using different events, classified communications, military and state officials' discourse on and off the record, resistance groups' actions, assassinations, and victims' testimony along with juridical implications and terrifying outcomes.
November 13, 2025
A harrowing account of one of the most heinous chapters in the history of Latin America, the book accounts the torrid years of the 60 and 70 dictatorships in the South Cone of LA, murder torture and repression were “solutions” to political dissention and the fear of communism, the Cold War take its share in blood and terror in those years end this book takes us for a look at the cold blooded conspiracy that stain the history of our societies. A stark account by any means but one that cannot be forgotten.
September 25, 2022
This is a gripping history of Operation Condor, an international conspiracy among South American governments during the 1970s that led to assassinations in Latin America, Europe, and even Washington D.C.
This book would benefit from a map outlining the Condor and leftist countries in Latin America, and a map showing where Condor assassinations and kidnappings took place.
This book would benefit from a map outlining the Condor and leftist countries in Latin America, and a map showing where Condor assassinations and kidnappings took place.
June 15, 2017
This book provides excellent insight to the Chilean coup and dictatorship, and specifically US involvement. Often with these types of subjects, histories end up being skewed or biased, and I think this book does a good job of simply laying out the facts.
January 5, 2020
John Dinges’ account of the Condor operations and their attendant attrocities was highly informative. His work, along with other investigators, is necessary to uncover the horrors that would otherwise remain secret.
June 10, 2017
excelente investigación. Un libro revelador y lleno de detalles que se lee como un thriller solo que, lastimosamente todo fue verdad. ¡Nunca Más!
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October 12, 2020I enjoyed the book. A little one sided I think. But a good book.
January 25, 2021
Well documented book - very good investigative work to uncover the information. However the writing is dry. I learned a lot on a subject worthy of attention and for that I am glad I read it.
June 14, 2021
It's a good thing Operation: Condor leaked like a sieve. 6 secret intelligence agencies working to kill political leftists and ends up killing thousands.
May 30, 2022
Very detailed analysis and citation of sources. Compelling read.
June 10, 2023
A very well-researched and detailed exploration of an extremely dark period in history -- a government-run international terror organization meant to quash any vestige of opposition abroad.
January 21, 2024
Gran trabajo de investigación. Es necesario documentar para la historia estas atrocidades.
November 27, 2025
More examples, as if we needed any, as to why the world despises the US!
August 18, 2013
I just happened to run across this book while browsing Amazon for something to read. I was intrigued by the title and I wanted to learn more about Pres. Pinochet in Chile back in the 1970s. He was an unsavory type who got together with five or so other countries of the Southern Cone in South America and developed Operation CONDOR (condor is the national bird of Chile). As a part of Operation Condor, these countries (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, etc.) who exchange info about leftist groups that they considered terrorists. They would help one another to find such individuals on one another's countries. Eventually, Operation Condor worked its way to conducting assassination missions across South America and ultimately into Europe and the United States. One such mission resulted in the death of Orlando Letelier (sp?) and an American in Washington D.C.; they put a remote-control bomb under his car.
Anyway, I don't want to go through the whole story, but it was very interesting, especially considering that the CIA knew about the mission to kill the man in D.C. This book would lead into a deep discussion on 'rendition' and other aspects of fighting against those you consider terrorists. There is a lot to be said about turning a blind eye to threats to civil liberties in the pursuit of a goal (such as fighting terrorists). The book also makes a good point and not speaking out of both sides of your mouth diplomatically. For example, Henry Kissinger would send mixed signals to the South American military leaders by telling them that they are doing a good job fighting communism while only paying lip service to civil rights violations (death squads, round-ups, torture, throwing live people into the ocean from helicopters, etc.)
If you are interested in spy craft, South America during the 1970s, international courts, and counterinsurgency techniques, then this is a good book to check out.
The scholarship of the book is very good and makes a compelling read.
Anyway, I don't want to go through the whole story, but it was very interesting, especially considering that the CIA knew about the mission to kill the man in D.C. This book would lead into a deep discussion on 'rendition' and other aspects of fighting against those you consider terrorists. There is a lot to be said about turning a blind eye to threats to civil liberties in the pursuit of a goal (such as fighting terrorists). The book also makes a good point and not speaking out of both sides of your mouth diplomatically. For example, Henry Kissinger would send mixed signals to the South American military leaders by telling them that they are doing a good job fighting communism while only paying lip service to civil rights violations (death squads, round-ups, torture, throwing live people into the ocean from helicopters, etc.)
If you are interested in spy craft, South America during the 1970s, international courts, and counterinsurgency techniques, then this is a good book to check out.
The scholarship of the book is very good and makes a compelling read.
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