Paulos includes some interesting, if recycled, ideas that could have been summarized in an extended essay rather than (what feels like) a bloated monograph. The discourse also wanders and offers a bit too much handholding. Readers who would be interested in Once Upon a Number (OUAN) aren't likely to suffer from an abject aversion to at least some mathematical hieroglyphics, and the book would have benefitted from even a slightly deeper dive into some of the technicalities. Worse, OUAN falters at the points that hold the most interest, offering allusions to connections between mathematics and both philosophy and sociology only to admit that sometimes the number of variables involved precludes a quantifiable approach. Right, well, tell that to the economists.
Unfortunately, OUAN should be indicted on more serious charges. The dismissive discussion on ELS probabilities (i.e., the "Bible codes") involves straw-man constructions on several fronts, all of which are wholly unworthy of Paulos's perspicacity. A few points need greater explication:
First, there's currently no consensus on how to calculate the probability of ELS tables. Programs like CodeFinder give tentative p-values for custom matrices, but those values are generally considered controversial. Determining these p-values isn't merely an issue of letter frequency; it's also about the distance of the terms within the table, a point Paulos completely ignores. A few terms spread out over hundreds of pages should be considered a trivial result. A table that has many terms packed together in a single passage or a page of surface text seems far less likely to occur by chance. Thus, letter frequency is insufficient as a metric for conjuring likelihoods. One can't treat letters as independent events based solely on frequency probabilities. Example: You're probably more likely to find the letters K, B, I, and L in books on serial killers and Bill Clinton than one on, say, noncommutative group theory, but Paulos blithely submits the nonsequitur of letter frequency as evidence to discredit ELS theory. (It's worth noting most modern code studies have revealed entire sentences as ELS strings, constructions that are far less likely to occur by chance than single terms.)
Second, serious researchers of ELS strings have long since acknowledged the fact that such sequences exist, by their design, in all texts, and Brenden McKay has done a fine job of elucidating the obvious counterpoints. You'll find "Kennedy," "assassination," and "Dallas" in Moby Dick, for example—though the ELS table might involve a large portion of surface text covering many pages—so the fact that simple ELS strings exist in other texts is hardly the "gotcha" moment Paulos thinks it is. What distinguishes a Torah ELS from, say, McKay's findings, however, is that it contains far more relevant terms than what we find in "dummy" texts (e.g., "Kennedy," "assassination," "Dallas," "November 22, 1963," "Lee Harvey Oswald," "shot," "conspiracy," "grassy knoll," "president," "rifle," etc.), all occurring within a small area of surface text. We might not be able to quantify the probability of that table happening by chance, but one cannot suppress the feeling these tables represent palpably different outcomes. The Torah also includes significant tables (i.e., at least 5 related terms) for a nearly transfinite number of historical events (e.g., the Holocaust, 9/11, U.S. presidential elections, the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, the Apollo moon landing, Covid-19, etc.), and arguing that all these intricate tables exist within a single, coherent surface text of moderate length as some function of stochastic serendipity begins to strain the bounds of reasonableness.
Third, search variability is a benign product of the commonality of ELS strings; yes, you could search for "John," "Johnathan," "Jonathan," and "Johnny," but only one search term will be associated with the principal table. This should not surprise you if you believe ELS strings are tantamount to astrological star chasing. But it does not follow that ELS tables are trivial because single-term ELS strings are trivial and admit spelling variations. Failing to make this logical connection would be bad enough, but Paulos doesn't even understand how ELS searches are conducted. He derisively refers to "diagonal" searches, intimating they are yet another way of admitting bias and diminishing the results, but that is surely the result of Paulos looking at finished ELS tables, which often include terms that are positioned "diagonally" on the page. These "diagonal" (as well as "vertical") terms are the result of breaking the single, horizontal string of letters into blocks of text so the terms fit into a single table (or matrix).
Whatever one might think of the ELS tables, Paulos fails to provide all the relevant details. He certainly doesn't need to come to the conclusion the tables are supernaturally inspired—and neither does the reader—but he should be required to understand the specifics of what he's criticizing if only to steel-man the opposing view and present readers with accurate, unbiased information. He bears at least that responsibility, and on that charge he is guilty.
The second, and more serious, problem with OUAN is the misunderstanding of the One-Time Pad (OTP). What Paulos describes is a simple substitution cipher (e.g., A for H, G for L, etc.), not an OTP. An OTP transforms the clear text into an unbreakable ciphertext by using a true random number generator (TRNG) to create a key that is at least as long as the message (it can be longer). One then implements modular arithmetic to build the encrypted message. Example: We want to encrypt the word "tunnel." The letter positions are 20, 21, 14, 14, 5, and 12. A TRNG creates the following random key: 5, 13, 8, 9, 18, and 1. The ciphertext is then (20 + 5), (21 + 13), (14 + 8), (14 + 9), (5 + 18), (12 +1) with all sums calculated mod 26: "Z H W X X M." Of course, this is not at all what Paulos describes in his book. The OPT has been mathematically proven (by Claude Shannon) to be unbreakable if the key (1) is truly random, (2) has a length at least as long as the clear text, and (3) is used only once—thus the "one-time" designation. The idea is that there exists an infinite number of possible messages derived from the ciphertext, and it's impossible to know which message is the correct one because they are all equally likely from a probability perspective. How Paulos bungled the mathematical details of such an important cryptographic system lies beyond all my cognitive powers.
In summary, OUAN enjoys a few isolated moments, but it suffers from serious flaws and doesn't provide much of a payoff for the effort. The substantive and technical errors are significant enough to prevent me from recommending it in any serious way.