In Syria, the image of President Hafiz al-Asad is everywhere. In newspapers, on television, and during orchestrated spectacles Asad is praised as the "father," the "gallant knight," even the country's "premier pharmacist." Yet most Syrians, including those who create the official rhetoric, do not believe its claims. Why would a regime spend scarce resources on a cult whose content is patently spurious?
Wedeen concludes that Asad's cult acts as a disciplinary device, generating a politics of public dissimulation in which citizens act as if they revered their leader. By inundating daily life with tired symbolism, the regime exercises a subtle, yet effective form of power. The cult works to enforce obedience, induce complicity, isolate Syrians from one another, and set guidelines for public speech and behavior. Wedeen's ethnographic research demonstrates how Syrians recognize the disciplinary aspects of the cult and seek to undermine them. Provocative and original, Ambiguities of Domination is a significant contribution to comparative politics, political theory, and cultural studies.
Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago specializing in comparative politics, the Middle East, political theory, and feminist theory. Wedeen received her Ph.D. in political science at the University of California, Berkeley, where she studied with Hanna Pitkin. She has taught courses on nationalism, identity formation, power and resistance, and citizenship. Her work on the Middle East includes Ambiguities of Domination, an ethnographic study of the culture of the spectacle in Syria under Hafez al-Assad. In addition to writing and teaching, Wedeen sits on the Editorial Collective of Public Culture, an interdisciplinary journal of transnational cultural studies.
في فصل خاص من كتابها: "السيطرة الغامضة؛ السياسة، الخطاب، والرموز في سورية المعاصرة" تفرد الباحثة ليزا وادين عدة صفحات ثمينة للحديث عن مظاهر الطاعة التي كان نظام حافظ الأسد يطالب بها مواطنيه، أو يقوم بها مواطنيه دون أن يطلب منهم أحد ذلك. في حالات كثيرة ذكرتها الباحثة تتم المبالغة بوضع صورة حافظ على السيارة أو مدخل المتجر أو كتابة دعاء له، أو المزايدة أثناء نقاش ما يحدث فيه تمجيد لشخصية تاريخية كبيرة كصلاح الدين فيخرج التساؤل تلقائيًا ولماذا لا تكيل هذا المديح للقائد حافظ الأسد؟!!ـ هذه الحاجة الأبدية لدى الطاغوت للإعتراف من جانب من يعانون من ظلمه، بل وإظهار ذلك من خلال بعض المظاهر المضحكة التي يستطيع أصغر طفل أن يدرك كذبها خط طويل ممتد. إن شبكة كاملة من الأكاذيب تنشأ وتترسخ بالممارسة اليومية العملية رغم إدراك الجميع بما فيهم أعضاء الحزب الحاكم مدى هشاشتها وبعدها عن أفكار ومشاعر الناس الحقيقية تجاه حافظ ونظامه. انها "مظهر النظام"، ومظهر النظام هذا ليس مجرد الصورة الظاهرية التي يحاول النظام أن يشير بها إلى نفسه باعتباره نظامًا شرعيًا محبوبًا من شعبه، بل إنه عمليًا ونتيجة الممارسة المستمرة للأكاذيب يصبح الأساس الوحيد الذي يبرر به النظام شرعيته، فتتحول إلى عملية نفسية معقدة من إنكار الكذبة وتصديقها. إنه أمر أشبه بالجنون.
في سياق أخر يروي محمد المخزنجي في "لحظات غرق جزيرة الحوت" عن مواطن أوكراني أو سوفييتي لا أذكر على وجه التحديد هرب إلى "الغرب" عن سر هروبه فقال: أود حماية أولادي من نتائج الكذب
الكتاب ليس سردا تاريخيا (وان كان يستعين بذكر بعض الحوادث التي تساعد في ايصال الفكرة) ، هو دراسة أكاديمية و تفكيك لطرق سيطرة النظام السوري عبر التحكم بالخطاب و لما لظاهرة تقديس الأسد من دور في هذه السيطرة (الناعمة) .. الترجمة لم تعجبني كثيرا
A very interesting look at the cult of Hafiz al Assad in Syria during the 1990s. Calls up interesting questions about state control, censorship, and dissidence. One has to ask what keeps the Syrian populace, who, by Wedeen's argument are almost universally opposed to Assad, in check? Somehow the system of control exerted by the party has become a self-perpetuating system. Particularly liked Wedeen's look at humor, satire and parody to illustrate oppositional sentiment.Ultimately she doesn't satisfactorily answer he own question. She does not address whether the people capitulate out of fear for violence or because of this societal norm of acting "as if." It's fascinating, but incomplete. Would like to see a follow-up to this one, now that Bashar is in power.
تتحدث الكاتبة، وفقاً لمشاهداتها ومراقبتها للحياة اليومية في سوريا، عن بداية ظهور الصورة المقدسة لحافظ الأسد، وتحلل آلية دعاية النظام وطرق تفاعل الشعب السوري مع تلك الدعاية.
وصلت دعاية النظام السوري إلى ذروتها في منتصف الثمانينات، بعد أن قضى النظام على كل فرصة لمعارضة سلمية أو مسلحة إثر أحداث حماة. وتعززت الصورة المقدسة لحافظ الأسد بعد المحاولة الانقلابية الفاشلة التي قادها شقيقه رفعت الأسد.
ظهر أول تمثال لحافظ الأسد في مكتبة الأسد عام 1984، وتوجت دعاية النظام بصورتها المثالية في دورة ألعاب البحر الأبيض المتوسط التي أُقيمت في اللاذقية عام 1987.
إن تفاعل الشعب السوري مع هذه الدعاية كان يعتمد على مبدأ "كما لو"، وهو اتفاق غير معلن بين النظام والشعب السوري، حيث يتظاهر الشعب بالولاء والتصديق لرواية النظام "كما لو" أن الشعب مقتنع بتلك السردية. وحتى في بعض الأحيان، كان هناك مبالغة في إظهار الولاء والنفاق العام. في المقابل، كان النظام يتظاهر "كما لو" أن رواياته فعلاً مقنعة.
ورغم هذا الاتفاق غير المعلن، قاوم الشعب السوري هذه السردية عبر تجاوزها وانتهاكها من خلال الفن والحياة اليومية، وهو ما تطرقت إليه الكاتبة في الفصل الرابع من الكتاب. تبدأ قائمة المقاومة من النكات التي يستخدمها الشعب السوري في الحياة اليومية للسخرية من سذاجة الطرح الرسمي للأحداث، حتى للسخرية من الصورة المقدسة لحافظ الأسد. تمتد المقاومة أيضاً إلى الفنون بأشكالها المختلفة، مثل الأعمال الكوميدية في المسرح والتلفزيون، وأيضاً في السينما. وتطرح الكاتبة أمثلة وتحليلات لهذه الأعمال، مثل أعمال الثنائي المسرحي دريد لحام ومحمد الماغوط، والمسلسل التلفزيوني "مرايا" لياسر العظمة، وأفلام أسامة محمد وعبد اللطيف عبد الحميد ومحمد ملص وغيرهم. بالإضافة إلى الأعمال الكاريكاتيرية لعلي فرزات وغيرها من أشكال المقاومة.
الكتاب جيد في إظهار عقلية ودعاية النظام السوري السابق، كما أنه يُعد توثيقاً جيداً لتفاعل الشعب السوري مع هذه الدعاية وطرق مقاومته لها.
This was published in 1999, but there's a lot in it you can bring into what's been happening in Syria, or at least how it started. Really fascinating analysis of resistance in culture and art - and fascinatingly, though I don't think Wedeen intended this, it kind of shows to me how this resistance is kind of pointless/difficult when under the framework of state-cult rule. Total bummer; well-written, engaging, and with really interesting illustrative examples that shows you what the cult and society were working with here.
It is a deep well written academic political book by a western eyewitness. The book expands in the details how the symbols work in any political system, and then digs deeper when it comes to the Syrian case. The author also has tried to concentrate on what makes the Syrian symboling case is so exotic, and why it does not follow some of the rules known here. Frankly speaking, what has provoked me to read the book was the controversial book’s title “ The Ambiguities of Domination “, and found myself asking one question about the Syrian regime needs to an ambiguous tools to dominate his people even though the extreme ways he approaches his power not only in the country, but even to the extent to his neighbors in the region.
Succinct and useful in outlining the symbolic politics. "On the level of representation, Asad's cult registers the paradox between state-formation and nation-building. "Every citizen in this country is Hafiz al-Asad." Would love to have more on the comparative angle, but there isn't much there. c.f. "Asad's cult and the spectacles that animate it seem to derive their aesthetic inspiration from the socialist realism of Stalin's cult"
One of the finest works on politics in Syria during Hafez Al-Asad's rule. A very comprehensive study on how cults operate as a very cost-effective yet an ambiguous and powerful strategy of domination, where obedience becoms a public norm in which citizens comply with the official rhetoric and act "as if", and by doing so each citizen is nothing more than a compliant to the regime or state or party or the cult.
I hope that Lisa doesn't see this review (as she teaches in my program) BUT, I really don't see the use of poststructuralism. I tried to read this with an open-mind but it masks so many things rooted in production and access to the needs of material life itself that I just couldn't.
Wedeen’s Ambiguities of Domination is a fascinating and seminal ethnographic study of Syrian political communication during the presidency of Hafiz al-Asad. In the book Wedeen argues al-Asad’s regime secured and asserted its political dominance through the use of symbols, operating as spectacles, which formed a larger personality cult built around the president
For Wedeen, the cult perpetuated an environment in which the regime’s supposedly legitimacy derived from its ability to control and dominate political discourse. This provided a means of undertaking simultaneous nation building and state building, a significant challenge to a post-colonial state like Syria whose borders had no historical precedent (pp.16-7). She sketches ways in which its domination spanned the Syrian public sphere, notably in the form of statue building and organised public rallies, before then looking in detail at films, jokes, and cartoons that demonstrate attempts by Syrians to subvert government rhetoric through subtle transgressions (pp.19-21).
Ultimately, however, Wedeen makes clear that the extent and limit of these transgressions was defined by the regime, which channelled ‘potentially regime-destructive energies along regime-constructive lines’ by specifying ‘the parameters of the permissible, communicating acceptable forms of speech and behaviour to citizens’ (pp.45, 144). In essence, it was the participation in the cult, the acting ‘as if’, which served to frame the conduct of Syrians in public life and thus limited the bounds of their transgression.
The book has stood the test of time, with the Damascus Spring (the period following Hafiz's death, characterised by a flourishing of various oppositional civil society groups calling for reform and pushing the boundaries of authorised transgression) offering a chance to reassess its conclusions. During this period, as demonstrated in Wedeen’s book, the limits of opposition in Syria ultimately remained in the control of the regime, which repressed the civil society forums after an initial period of tolerance.
The post 2011 uprisings gave us another opportunity to reflect on the work. Indeed, Wedeen addressed the initial protests in an updated preface in a 2015 reissue. She attested that ‘[t]he complexities of the first decade of the twenty-first century stand in contrast to this earlier period’. Whereas during the time of the elder al-Asad, and indeed during the Damascus Spring, oppositional groups tested but never greatly exceeded the limits of transgression set by the cult, in 2011 public demonstrations gave way to mobilised oppositional groups that directly challenged the regime. Often these groups subverted the very government rhetoric that had commanded hegemonic dominance for decades.
A valuable book, readable (despite its deep engagement with critical theory), and concise. Despite its primary focus on political communication during Hafiz's presidency, it remains an essential work for anyone wishing to further their understanding of Syrian history and contextualise the events leading up to the war.
Very interesting read- relevant for understanding not only the Syrian conflict but also the current political environment in the states. A bit heavy on the theory but relatable and relevant to anyone with a light understanding of Syria and/or a critical eye for current political powers. Worth your time if you're interested in the power of rhetoric/symbols in politics but NOT a primer for the Syrian conflict or even Syrian history as a whole.
"This book argues that Asad's cult is a strategy of domination based on compliance rather than legitimacy. The regime produces compliance through enforced participation in rituals of obeisance that are transparently phony both to those who orchestrate them and to those who consume them. Asad's cult operates as a disciplinary device, generating a politics of public dissimulation in which citizens act as if they revere the leader. A politics of 'as if' while it may appear irrational or foolish at first glance, actually proves politically effective...guidelines for acceptable speech and behavior...specific type of national membership...enforcement of obedience, complicity, isolates syrians from one another...clusters public space with monotonous slogans and empty gestures..."
Fascinating read. I read this for a course on professional historical study as well as for a class on Modern Syria; both courses had more than enough to talk about and on totally different subjects, for the entire 3 hour seminar. Applicable to many different settings, and a very engaging read which is high praise for an academic work.