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One War at a Time
One War at a Time —Lincoln's axiom for Union diplomacy—refutes the opinion of most historians and biographers that Lincoln played only a minor role in U.S. foreign relations. Rather, the book shows that Lincoln skillfully conducted a dangerous diplomatic balancing act, avoiding war with England and France while using the threat of war to prevent European recognition of Confederate independence. No other book offers such a thorough review of Union and Confederate relations with Britain. Author Dean B. Mahin also provides the first full analysis of U.S. and Confederate reactions to the French intervention in Mexico. His review of Civil War foreign policy adds a new dimension to our understanding of the great conflict.
344 pages, Paperback
First published December 1, 1999
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
February 29, 2016
Most know the American Civil War as the war/rebellion between the North and South. Few of us know the International aspects of this time period and those that do merely know the importance of Gettysburg. From the start, Great Britain and France enjoyed the fight, but for different reasons. England long feared that the US wanted to take the 8 British Colonies to the north (Canada was not a country at the time and was made up of different colonies that reported to London). France wanted an independent Confederacy as a buffer between France's design on Mexico and other places. After invading Mexico, France even went so far as to get Texas to secede from the South to form an independent country as a buffer between the potential expansionist South and Mexico.
The North was somewhat adept at Foreign Affairs. Lincoln and Seward's goal was to keep Europe and Russia out and with zero recognition of the South. The South was less sophisticated, having 3 Secretary of States in the first 2 years. The South needed weapons, supplies, money and recognition and wrongly believed that if all cotton was cut off from Europe, the countries would fold and recognize the South. While over 2 million European factory workers lost there jobs for 2 years or more from this boycott, the factory owners did not lose money and Egypt, the Ottoman Empire and India benefited from new cotton harvests.
Well researched, well written.
The North was somewhat adept at Foreign Affairs. Lincoln and Seward's goal was to keep Europe and Russia out and with zero recognition of the South. The South was less sophisticated, having 3 Secretary of States in the first 2 years. The South needed weapons, supplies, money and recognition and wrongly believed that if all cotton was cut off from Europe, the countries would fold and recognize the South. While over 2 million European factory workers lost there jobs for 2 years or more from this boycott, the factory owners did not lose money and Egypt, the Ottoman Empire and India benefited from new cotton harvests.
Well researched, well written.
June 23, 2022
I ordered this book two years ago when I became curious about how other nations viewed the American Civil War. A quick search brought me to this book, which did satisfy my curiosity. I remembered seeing A World on Fire by Amanda Foreman advertised in a History Book Club flier about a decade ago and had that book in mind. However, that book is 1,000+ pages and primarily focused on Great Britain while I wanted a broader view (and shorter read).
Dean Mahin’s book is a concise and readable overview of the international aspects of the American Civil War. This really isn’t the most lively of subject matters, but Mahin makes the most out of a rather dry subject, producing a generally enjoyable and informative read.
While I was aware of the Trent Affair and the troubled reign of the Emperor Maximillian in Mexico, but that was about the extent of my knowledge. I wasn’t too surprised to learn from Mahin’s work that Britain and France were the primary parties in the diplomatic war as the other powers had little to no ability to influence events in North America either through weakness (Spain, the Ottoman Empire), other focuses (the German states and the newly formed Italy) or general lack of interest (Russia, the Austro-Hungarian Empire).
Great Britain was, of course, the nation that could have the greatest impact on the Civil War. I was struck by all the conflicting dimensions within Great Britain regarding the war. The British upper class was generally pro-Confederacy, interested in seeing two weakened American states but unwilling to be seen as supporting a slave nation after ending the Atlantic slave trade. The British middle and lower classes were generally pro-Union, seeing in the United States hope that they would one day have a greater say in their own government but also suffering the most from the loss of Southern cotton. It really came down to the fact that Britain realized that it had much to lose (Canada) and relatively little to gain (Southern cotton was eventually at least partially replaced by other sources in Egypt and India.
France, which was focused on propping up the regime of Maximillian, recognized the benefit of the Confederacy serving as a buffer between Mexico and the Union, but greatly feared greater American involvement in the ongoing conflict south of the Rio Grande.
It was also surprising how long the European powers maintained the belief that the Union had no chance to defeat the Confederacy. While the repeated Southern victories prior to Gettysburg seemed to validate this belief, neither Britain nor France understood that material differences between the Union and the Confederacy that made a Union victory inevitable in a war of attrition.
Mahin’s intent with this book was to prove that Abraham Lincoln had a greater grasp of and more influence on US international relations than other historians have previously granted. Indeed, the title “One War At A Time” is very Lincoln-esque and accurately reflects US policy for the duration of the war. While it is true that Lincoln was content to let his secretary of state, William Seward, handle most of the Union’s diplomacy, I think Mahin adequately proves that Lincoln was not ignorant of the topic, did frequently consult with Seward and was well-aware that direct conflict with one or both major European powers would be counter-productive to the Union effort.
All in all, I would recommend Mahin’s book to anyone curious about the international aspects of the American Civil War. While not a definitive examination like A World on Fire, Mahin’s book provides a much deeper view of the topic than is typically found in general histories of the war or in Lincoln biographies.
Dean Mahin’s book is a concise and readable overview of the international aspects of the American Civil War. This really isn’t the most lively of subject matters, but Mahin makes the most out of a rather dry subject, producing a generally enjoyable and informative read.
While I was aware of the Trent Affair and the troubled reign of the Emperor Maximillian in Mexico, but that was about the extent of my knowledge. I wasn’t too surprised to learn from Mahin’s work that Britain and France were the primary parties in the diplomatic war as the other powers had little to no ability to influence events in North America either through weakness (Spain, the Ottoman Empire), other focuses (the German states and the newly formed Italy) or general lack of interest (Russia, the Austro-Hungarian Empire).
Great Britain was, of course, the nation that could have the greatest impact on the Civil War. I was struck by all the conflicting dimensions within Great Britain regarding the war. The British upper class was generally pro-Confederacy, interested in seeing two weakened American states but unwilling to be seen as supporting a slave nation after ending the Atlantic slave trade. The British middle and lower classes were generally pro-Union, seeing in the United States hope that they would one day have a greater say in their own government but also suffering the most from the loss of Southern cotton. It really came down to the fact that Britain realized that it had much to lose (Canada) and relatively little to gain (Southern cotton was eventually at least partially replaced by other sources in Egypt and India.
France, which was focused on propping up the regime of Maximillian, recognized the benefit of the Confederacy serving as a buffer between Mexico and the Union, but greatly feared greater American involvement in the ongoing conflict south of the Rio Grande.
It was also surprising how long the European powers maintained the belief that the Union had no chance to defeat the Confederacy. While the repeated Southern victories prior to Gettysburg seemed to validate this belief, neither Britain nor France understood that material differences between the Union and the Confederacy that made a Union victory inevitable in a war of attrition.
Mahin’s intent with this book was to prove that Abraham Lincoln had a greater grasp of and more influence on US international relations than other historians have previously granted. Indeed, the title “One War At A Time” is very Lincoln-esque and accurately reflects US policy for the duration of the war. While it is true that Lincoln was content to let his secretary of state, William Seward, handle most of the Union’s diplomacy, I think Mahin adequately proves that Lincoln was not ignorant of the topic, did frequently consult with Seward and was well-aware that direct conflict with one or both major European powers would be counter-productive to the Union effort.
All in all, I would recommend Mahin’s book to anyone curious about the international aspects of the American Civil War. While not a definitive examination like A World on Fire, Mahin’s book provides a much deeper view of the topic than is typically found in general histories of the war or in Lincoln biographies.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews