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Critique of Religion and Philosophy
The description for this book, Critique of Religion and Philosophy, will be forthcoming.
453 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1958
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About the author
Walter Kaufmann
108 books557 followersWalter Arnold Kaufmann was a German-American philosopher, translator, and poet. A prolific author, he wrote extensively on a broad range of subjects, such as authenticity and death, moral philosophy and existentialism, theism and atheism, Christianity and Judaism, as well as philosophy and literature. He served for over 30 years as a Professor at Princeton University.
He is renowned as a scholar and translator of Nietzsche. He also wrote a 1965 book on Hegel, and a translation of most of Goethe's Faust.
He is renowned as a scholar and translator of Nietzsche. He also wrote a 1965 book on Hegel, and a translation of most of Goethe's Faust.
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Displaying 1 - 22 of 22 reviews
August 13, 2016
I'm not sure I'll ever be capable of cohering the various strands of Kaufmann's extended, occasionally meandering argument and present it as a review—but I took fairly copious notes back in July during the reading of this, and am, here and there, going to be plopping them down below, perhaps to be assembled, at some point, into something substantive. This was, though, a superbly conceived and executed work of philosophy in that very Nietzschean vein—though not excessively so—which Kaufmann dearly treasured. Be ye religious or no, there is much worthy of being considered in all that Kaufmann set forth back in 1958. Above all, the author wanted to critique the syncretistic modern society around him, one wherein scholars from academia, and their perceived hardening truths and tenets, were elevated above those multi-sided sages of old in whom Kaufmann believed was found a wisdom for all ages; and, coeval to this evolution in the world of thought—and the language with which it was (mis)construed—a cooly impassioned foray against the ways in which our innate religious consciousness has been forced into deforming and misleading confinement through the dogmatic rigor of philosopher-theologians fully attuned to that modern academic meme of settling proclaimed truths with linguistic manipulations and straitjackets. I am in halting agreement with those who feel Kaufmann is not only anticipating the push back against religion undertaken by the (so-called) New Atheists, but doing so in a much more intellectually rigorous and temperamentally impressive manner—for this is the kind of subtle text that might require another read or two ere one could confidently deem the authorial scope to have been fully grasped.
Non mea culpa: Alas, with Kaufmann it is once again the case that a penetrating mind cannot conceive of the humanity he is probing as aught than the half what walk with fleshy protrusions dangling betwixt the lower limbs—women sure do get the business from the philosophy department. So it is that all of the He, Man, Him, and Mankind below come from the horse's mouth, and don't reflect my own acceptance of the possibility of our eventually righting this global boat being dependent upon that future date when females, having become fully fed-up with the state of the union and determined to suffer no more nonsense, shall collectively give the lads an extended time out over in the corner and take over the entire affair, including, but not limited to, all of those -isms which seem to preoccupy the minds and energies of those bearded boys obsessed with speed bags and soft tacos.
*************************************************
Brilliant second chapter wherein Kaufmann contrasts Positivism with Existentialism even while establishing them as philosophies of revolt which, studied together and separately, make problematic traditional philosophy as we know it from the works of Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and Hobbes, Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel; one setting store in symbolic logic, the other within the confines of ordinary language—but both are possessed of deeply unhistorical, even antihistorical outlooks.
Analytics and Existentialists view the errors of traditional philosophy as follows: not analytic enough or too analytic respectively. The Analytics think critically and question authority; the Existentialists opt as per Rilke: You must change your life.
Existentialism attracts the non-philosopher, while professionals can learn more from analysts. [This epigram seems oh-so-very true in regard to the posted confabulations of my own good self.]
Wittgenstein, more than Moore and Kierkegaard, came close to the Socratic ideal. He tended to view ordinary language as clarity-inhering, and that philosophers tended to confusion in their misuse of language, particularly in metaphysics. Kaufmann says that the opposite is also the case, and the clarification of the philosopher—in politics, art, etc, is a valuable and needed service.
Different philosophies are maps drawn from above that vary in details, routes, and emphasis, but which describe the same terrain and territory below in which man traverses.
An adherent of a philosopher is often a man who at first did not understand him at all.
Man aspires towards the Truth. Man resents convention and wants to escape from it because he experiences it as a prison. This generalization may seem to apply only to some men, only to a few, only to ourselves. But convention is imposed upon a child by force, and if anybody should be completely satisfied with it, without reservation, this would surely show that not only his will had been broken, but also his spirit. However, this desire for the unconventional, for originality and difficulty, is one prone to falsehood: a proposition can be original without being true.
Kaufmann on the difficulty of achieving entire correctness in an endeavor echoes Ortega y Gasset on Partial Truths of philosophy, and building on absence of errors in any portion of thought. WK: Correctness is useful, whereas proclaiming truth is nebulous and tends to introduce unhelpful and unnecessary confusion and problems.
To gauge a philosopher's propositions, we need to consider them in three kinds of meaning: Systematic, Developmental, and Symptomatic.
Truth is more than correspondence and coherence: it is also temporal: Truth is the correspondence of premise and performance, a consistency that is not established once and for all but continuing and open towards the future.
Language and emotions: all nouns serve to pull objects into a court of judgement by cognition and sensation, impose the individual will upon the world, force all to assume a confining mantle of identity, of nature enhanced by grammar. Art is the language of the emotions.
Our emotions—with love being the prime example—are bundles of morals, ideas, and inherent actions collected within an abstract label—language is an impressive mechanism for capturing the essence, the meaning of our emotions. Language and Art are also categories, and can express emotions, the latter even in nonverbal measures. Language, as a tool of man's sociality and social needs, serves to flatten experience and emotion to be readily communicated and in practical measure. Art can capture much of what our minds take in and conceive of, and can help make the future by establishing norms.
Poet, artist, scientist, philosopher all strive in opposition to common sense. Yet in its radical and revolutionary origins, each, especially science and words, can become the convention, settle into conservative usage and reactionary traditions—and here morality is the paradigm.
The most important question to ask of a philosopher is not what did he mean? but what has he seen?
To know vs to believe: inversion from Plato's absolute, eternal and immutable for the former, to Christianity's emphasis on the latter as the higher, perduring truth. Knowledge deconstructed as grasp of sensible, impermanent things.
What matters is not faith, but effort.
WK evinces great humour over John Wisdom's fecal determination of Berkeley's idealist faith.
It is the absence of natural belief that has led to the attempt to prove belief. In the previous section Kaufmann clearly showed how beliefs are held and maintained for a variety of purposes—custom, fear, encountering it without argument against, osmosis, apathy towards prior beliefs, rewards, personal gratification, or—separately—deduced from arguments adduced in its support. But faith-based truths come in many flavours and demand differing evidence and arguments for it.
There exist similarities between Aquinas' condemnation of heretics and Plato's Tenth Book of the Dialogue on Laws—but whereas Plato wrote in old age, without authority, Aquinas armed and fortified a powerful, all-encompassing institution against assaults upon its tenets and faiths.
Kaufmann makes the sardonic point that Aquinas would have had Kant and Hume burned at the stake for their philosophies against his Second Proof. In his First and Second proofs Aquinas postulates that the essence of the universe requires at least one occult entity—and the latter becomes interesting solely through the measures by which Aquinas garbs him in the vestments of God. It is easier to understand historically what has happened here than to be moved by the force of the argument. Interesting in how WK stresses Aquinas' difficulties in working with the anthropomorphic and Platonic Idea-form divinities bequeathed to him by the ancient Greeks; he deals with them by discarding all that fits not with his conception of One and One such Christian God only.
Kant's postulate of God's existence: reason demanded free will, the immortality of the soul and the evidence of God, although reason could not prove them and we could never know whether what reason demands is in fact the case. Although Kant was weakest here, he provided more than an idiosyncratic construction of his religious conscience. His could inform others of the necessity of divinity with that of free will—but it offers nothing in the way of proof about God's existence.
Religious belief generally starts as make-believe. Belief comes later, if at all.
WK delivers solid goods on God's existence, with theists opposing atheist's attempts to impose structure on God—and that, in labeling Him as Being-Itself, He then takes on Heideggerian attributes, and God as a label seems more a comfort than a logical identifier. But theists have problems with meaning here too. Those who say that God exists do not really mean that he exists in the same sense in which anything else exists...but if terms applied to God do not mean what they generally mean, if they have a unique meaning when applied to God, then all such talk about God is conducted in a peculiar language with rules of its own.
Most statements about God are essentially ambiguous. Theologians, mystics, scholars, monks, gospels, scripture, exegetes, Talmud, Midrash: all possess varying conceptions of God.
As in my own thoughts about Novikov, Kaufmann notes that Heaven is an analogy of the sky, but is non-spatial. Ambiguity and analogy thrive around the subject of God. The more God is pinned down with specifics, the more the subject lends itself to superstitions and to challenge as simplicity and heresy. Ambiguity leaves room for diversity and broad appeal.
WK is brilliant on Maimonides and his averring of the inability of God to be harnessed by possible predicates; he can only be determined by what he is not; along with how Aquinas acknowledged but ignored this in his work, especially in his five proofs, by embracing Aristotle and the Pseudo-Dionysius. Whatever He is, Aquinas' God is not the God of the Books of Job or Isaiah, of Abraham or Isaac.
Kaufmann objects to the theologists' usage of symbols and signs, as they declare the former to be universally applicable to religions to make them palatable by inferring they have a set meaning—but the author shows that they are actually ambiguous, just as religious myth is meant to be. And if the theologists are meaning symbols are ambiguous, that is true but misleading from what they say. Some parts of religion are meant to be literally true; others vague and interpretive; theologists, in trying to tame religion for modernity, misrepresent this mythological timber and ambiguous content: the validity and worthwhileness of theology become questionable. We might prefer overt myths.
The dominant note in the New Testament and ever since has been one of astounding callousness. Comparison of Christianity: both God's love and Jesus' salvational role as very equivocal in the human conception of love and compassion, and of how much Mahayana Buddhism compares favorably as a doctrine to account for and ease suffering. Christianity always seems more obsessed with Hell than with love.
Demythologization is required when dealing with such as Christianity and its tenets, that we may not only ask about the evidence for those beliefs, but their moral implications. Theology is the finding of dubious reasons for what the theologian has believed all along, and when the chips are down, he consults his conscience.
Presumably because the articles of the Christian faith do not stand up well under rational investigation, reason has been declared, again and again, incompetent to judge that which must be believed. Traditionally, Christianity has been suspicious of reason; and except at times when reason was safely enslaved by faith and rendered harmless by the potent threat of certain persecution of all heresies, reason was denounced.
Kaufmann contrasts the humanity and compromise of Judaic interpretations of Hell—agnostic in perdurance of term—with Christian fervor for pain, torment, and eternity, as well as how the more humane teachings of Origen, Arius, and Pelagius have been condemned and anathematized.
Nice summatory passage:
Christianity is the sole theological-religion, written to edify and teach and be read (in churches) and composed to suit the Greek order of the times. They take the ambiguity of scripture to make it universal—that is, weak and insufficient; or they maintain ambiguity, at which point one prefers the original overtness of the scriptures. All religions look quaint from the outside.
In Buddhism, the truth is mainly to be found by individuals—looking to one's teacher for answers greatly imposes their interpretation on the student, or else influences the student to a degree that the question is subsumed. Its masters wish to make clear that religion is not a matter of words or truths, but substantive experiences; and what is sought is not to be found by rote learning and memorization or guidance—for life is a hard slap in the face, a vessel of suffering: there is no substitute for hard experiences.
Judaism offers something the Christian is not offered: a religion without theology. Judaism preached law, not truth, and its Rabbis, though bound by the corpus of the Talmud, still were free to interpret scripture as they would, even against popular belief.
Christian truth was mostly that of belief, whereas that of Judaism was more of trust, even intimacy. But that intimacy, inherently capable of humour—of which belief most certainly is not—is challenged by the development of the Socratic Conscience, a mindset from which one cannot go back. It's a pietistic stance for which the Socratic Mindset introduces doubt and questioning.
Liberal Christianity, in rejecting traditional Christian ritual and beliefs in favour of adhering to science and truth, shows a marked disregard for historical truth and philosophy. Making Christ out to be a Moral Superman overlooks that He was quite ambiguous in his moral messages—and it was Paul who claimed what Christ preached is the need for faith in a believer, and that this alone would suffice to clear the way for salvation. If Jesus thought that those listening to him were headed for everlasting torment, but that some might be saved by following his directions, it remains deeply perplexing that he should have seen fit to give such equivocal directions. Those disciples who had heard his every word felt much less sure of what he wanted than did Paul, who had never heard him preach, and confronted with Paul's impassioned certainty they were utterly unable to present any clear alternative. Modern Liberal Protestant Christianity finds truth where Christ and his messages already reinforce what they now believe—there is no prospect of changing one's life, but rather confirming one in one's present beliefs.
Niebuhr exemplified what Kaufmann is critiquing—while admirably concerned with social ills and their eradication, he emulates the Liberal Protestant theologian's tendency to subjective over objective means, to project their own preferences and convictions onto Jesus, to allow conscience and personal desire to override history and scholarship. They ignore the rationality prominent in Christianity to pursue mundane truths in their passion to have it mirror their own Liberal Protestant values.
Non mea culpa: Alas, with Kaufmann it is once again the case that a penetrating mind cannot conceive of the humanity he is probing as aught than the half what walk with fleshy protrusions dangling betwixt the lower limbs—women sure do get the business from the philosophy department. So it is that all of the He, Man, Him, and Mankind below come from the horse's mouth, and don't reflect my own acceptance of the possibility of our eventually righting this global boat being dependent upon that future date when females, having become fully fed-up with the state of the union and determined to suffer no more nonsense, shall collectively give the lads an extended time out over in the corner and take over the entire affair, including, but not limited to, all of those -isms which seem to preoccupy the minds and energies of those bearded boys obsessed with speed bags and soft tacos.
*************************************************
Brilliant second chapter wherein Kaufmann contrasts Positivism with Existentialism even while establishing them as philosophies of revolt which, studied together and separately, make problematic traditional philosophy as we know it from the works of Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and Hobbes, Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel; one setting store in symbolic logic, the other within the confines of ordinary language—but both are possessed of deeply unhistorical, even antihistorical outlooks.
Analytics and Existentialists view the errors of traditional philosophy as follows: not analytic enough or too analytic respectively. The Analytics think critically and question authority; the Existentialists opt as per Rilke: You must change your life.
Existentialism attracts the non-philosopher, while professionals can learn more from analysts. [This epigram seems oh-so-very true in regard to the posted confabulations of my own good self.]
Wittgenstein, more than Moore and Kierkegaard, came close to the Socratic ideal. He tended to view ordinary language as clarity-inhering, and that philosophers tended to confusion in their misuse of language, particularly in metaphysics. Kaufmann says that the opposite is also the case, and the clarification of the philosopher—in politics, art, etc, is a valuable and needed service.
Different philosophies are maps drawn from above that vary in details, routes, and emphasis, but which describe the same terrain and territory below in which man traverses.
An adherent of a philosopher is often a man who at first did not understand him at all.
Man aspires towards the Truth. Man resents convention and wants to escape from it because he experiences it as a prison. This generalization may seem to apply only to some men, only to a few, only to ourselves. But convention is imposed upon a child by force, and if anybody should be completely satisfied with it, without reservation, this would surely show that not only his will had been broken, but also his spirit. However, this desire for the unconventional, for originality and difficulty, is one prone to falsehood: a proposition can be original without being true.
Kaufmann on the difficulty of achieving entire correctness in an endeavor echoes Ortega y Gasset on Partial Truths of philosophy, and building on absence of errors in any portion of thought. WK: Correctness is useful, whereas proclaiming truth is nebulous and tends to introduce unhelpful and unnecessary confusion and problems.
To gauge a philosopher's propositions, we need to consider them in three kinds of meaning: Systematic, Developmental, and Symptomatic.
Truth is more than correspondence and coherence: it is also temporal: Truth is the correspondence of premise and performance, a consistency that is not established once and for all but continuing and open towards the future.
Language and emotions: all nouns serve to pull objects into a court of judgement by cognition and sensation, impose the individual will upon the world, force all to assume a confining mantle of identity, of nature enhanced by grammar. Art is the language of the emotions.
Our emotions—with love being the prime example—are bundles of morals, ideas, and inherent actions collected within an abstract label—language is an impressive mechanism for capturing the essence, the meaning of our emotions. Language and Art are also categories, and can express emotions, the latter even in nonverbal measures. Language, as a tool of man's sociality and social needs, serves to flatten experience and emotion to be readily communicated and in practical measure. Art can capture much of what our minds take in and conceive of, and can help make the future by establishing norms.
Poet, artist, scientist, philosopher all strive in opposition to common sense. Yet in its radical and revolutionary origins, each, especially science and words, can become the convention, settle into conservative usage and reactionary traditions—and here morality is the paradigm.
The most important question to ask of a philosopher is not what did he mean? but what has he seen?
To know vs to believe: inversion from Plato's absolute, eternal and immutable for the former, to Christianity's emphasis on the latter as the higher, perduring truth. Knowledge deconstructed as grasp of sensible, impermanent things.
What matters is not faith, but effort.
WK evinces great humour over John Wisdom's fecal determination of Berkeley's idealist faith.
It is the absence of natural belief that has led to the attempt to prove belief. In the previous section Kaufmann clearly showed how beliefs are held and maintained for a variety of purposes—custom, fear, encountering it without argument against, osmosis, apathy towards prior beliefs, rewards, personal gratification, or—separately—deduced from arguments adduced in its support. But faith-based truths come in many flavours and demand differing evidence and arguments for it.
There exist similarities between Aquinas' condemnation of heretics and Plato's Tenth Book of the Dialogue on Laws—but whereas Plato wrote in old age, without authority, Aquinas armed and fortified a powerful, all-encompassing institution against assaults upon its tenets and faiths.
Kaufmann makes the sardonic point that Aquinas would have had Kant and Hume burned at the stake for their philosophies against his Second Proof. In his First and Second proofs Aquinas postulates that the essence of the universe requires at least one occult entity—and the latter becomes interesting solely through the measures by which Aquinas garbs him in the vestments of God. It is easier to understand historically what has happened here than to be moved by the force of the argument. Interesting in how WK stresses Aquinas' difficulties in working with the anthropomorphic and Platonic Idea-form divinities bequeathed to him by the ancient Greeks; he deals with them by discarding all that fits not with his conception of One and One such Christian God only.
Kant's postulate of God's existence: reason demanded free will, the immortality of the soul and the evidence of God, although reason could not prove them and we could never know whether what reason demands is in fact the case. Although Kant was weakest here, he provided more than an idiosyncratic construction of his religious conscience. His could inform others of the necessity of divinity with that of free will—but it offers nothing in the way of proof about God's existence.
Religious belief generally starts as make-believe. Belief comes later, if at all.
WK delivers solid goods on God's existence, with theists opposing atheist's attempts to impose structure on God—and that, in labeling Him as Being-Itself, He then takes on Heideggerian attributes, and God as a label seems more a comfort than a logical identifier. But theists have problems with meaning here too. Those who say that God exists do not really mean that he exists in the same sense in which anything else exists...but if terms applied to God do not mean what they generally mean, if they have a unique meaning when applied to God, then all such talk about God is conducted in a peculiar language with rules of its own.
Most statements about God are essentially ambiguous. Theologians, mystics, scholars, monks, gospels, scripture, exegetes, Talmud, Midrash: all possess varying conceptions of God.
As in my own thoughts about Novikov, Kaufmann notes that Heaven is an analogy of the sky, but is non-spatial. Ambiguity and analogy thrive around the subject of God. The more God is pinned down with specifics, the more the subject lends itself to superstitions and to challenge as simplicity and heresy. Ambiguity leaves room for diversity and broad appeal.
WK is brilliant on Maimonides and his averring of the inability of God to be harnessed by possible predicates; he can only be determined by what he is not; along with how Aquinas acknowledged but ignored this in his work, especially in his five proofs, by embracing Aristotle and the Pseudo-Dionysius. Whatever He is, Aquinas' God is not the God of the Books of Job or Isaiah, of Abraham or Isaac.
Kaufmann objects to the theologists' usage of symbols and signs, as they declare the former to be universally applicable to religions to make them palatable by inferring they have a set meaning—but the author shows that they are actually ambiguous, just as religious myth is meant to be. And if the theologists are meaning symbols are ambiguous, that is true but misleading from what they say. Some parts of religion are meant to be literally true; others vague and interpretive; theologists, in trying to tame religion for modernity, misrepresent this mythological timber and ambiguous content: the validity and worthwhileness of theology become questionable. We might prefer overt myths.
The dominant note in the New Testament and ever since has been one of astounding callousness. Comparison of Christianity: both God's love and Jesus' salvational role as very equivocal in the human conception of love and compassion, and of how much Mahayana Buddhism compares favorably as a doctrine to account for and ease suffering. Christianity always seems more obsessed with Hell than with love.
Demythologization is required when dealing with such as Christianity and its tenets, that we may not only ask about the evidence for those beliefs, but their moral implications. Theology is the finding of dubious reasons for what the theologian has believed all along, and when the chips are down, he consults his conscience.
Presumably because the articles of the Christian faith do not stand up well under rational investigation, reason has been declared, again and again, incompetent to judge that which must be believed. Traditionally, Christianity has been suspicious of reason; and except at times when reason was safely enslaved by faith and rendered harmless by the potent threat of certain persecution of all heresies, reason was denounced.
Kaufmann contrasts the humanity and compromise of Judaic interpretations of Hell—agnostic in perdurance of term—with Christian fervor for pain, torment, and eternity, as well as how the more humane teachings of Origen, Arius, and Pelagius have been condemned and anathematized.
Nice summatory passage:
The quotations from Aquinas, Tillich, Bultmann, and Niebuhr are plainly no compromising obiter dicta but represent central claims. Nor are these men picked for their shortcomings; on the contrary, they are, according to common consent, among the very best and foremost Christian theologians. Any critique of theology that would ignore them would certainly be accused of fighting a straw man. Still, this Critique emphasizes in some instances what has been systematically ignored and shows the utter inadequacy of the popular pictures, to see the familiar in new perspectives, to make suggestions for a new map—and to stimulate thought.A great polemic against theologians, whose greatest crime or original sin is that they use material that was dangerous, was meant to give offense, in an attempt to be ingratiating. Most theologians are priests who make a point of scorning priests and praising prophets. They endeavor to fit new wine into old skins that date quickly.
Christianity is the sole theological-religion, written to edify and teach and be read (in churches) and composed to suit the Greek order of the times. They take the ambiguity of scripture to make it universal—that is, weak and insufficient; or they maintain ambiguity, at which point one prefers the original overtness of the scriptures. All religions look quaint from the outside.
In Buddhism, the truth is mainly to be found by individuals—looking to one's teacher for answers greatly imposes their interpretation on the student, or else influences the student to a degree that the question is subsumed. Its masters wish to make clear that religion is not a matter of words or truths, but substantive experiences; and what is sought is not to be found by rote learning and memorization or guidance—for life is a hard slap in the face, a vessel of suffering: there is no substitute for hard experiences.
Judaism offers something the Christian is not offered: a religion without theology. Judaism preached law, not truth, and its Rabbis, though bound by the corpus of the Talmud, still were free to interpret scripture as they would, even against popular belief.
If some of the liberal Protestants were right in thinking that Jesus tried to establish a kind of Reform Judaism—and as a matter of historical fact they are probably wrong—then it would have to be said, and some of them have said, that Paul wrecked this early attempt with his effort at assimilation, with his fusion of this religion with the beliefs and practices then current in other religions. Paul used Haggadah to destroy Halachah; but he did not stop with that: having destroyed the "Law" he put into its place an intricate theology as well as all kinds of new beliefs.Paul mixed pagan and other religious elements together with Judaism in his conception of Christianity, that it would have more appeal to the non-Jewish masses.
Christian truth was mostly that of belief, whereas that of Judaism was more of trust, even intimacy. But that intimacy, inherently capable of humour—of which belief most certainly is not—is challenged by the development of the Socratic Conscience, a mindset from which one cannot go back. It's a pietistic stance for which the Socratic Mindset introduces doubt and questioning.
Liberal Christianity, in rejecting traditional Christian ritual and beliefs in favour of adhering to science and truth, shows a marked disregard for historical truth and philosophy. Making Christ out to be a Moral Superman overlooks that He was quite ambiguous in his moral messages—and it was Paul who claimed what Christ preached is the need for faith in a believer, and that this alone would suffice to clear the way for salvation. If Jesus thought that those listening to him were headed for everlasting torment, but that some might be saved by following his directions, it remains deeply perplexing that he should have seen fit to give such equivocal directions. Those disciples who had heard his every word felt much less sure of what he wanted than did Paul, who had never heard him preach, and confronted with Paul's impassioned certainty they were utterly unable to present any clear alternative. Modern Liberal Protestant Christianity finds truth where Christ and his messages already reinforce what they now believe—there is no prospect of changing one's life, but rather confirming one in one's present beliefs.
Niebuhr exemplified what Kaufmann is critiquing—while admirably concerned with social ills and their eradication, he emulates the Liberal Protestant theologian's tendency to subjective over objective means, to project their own preferences and convictions onto Jesus, to allow conscience and personal desire to override history and scholarship. They ignore the rationality prominent in Christianity to pursue mundane truths in their passion to have it mirror their own Liberal Protestant values.
Today, some Christians may still object: if morality is not of ultimate significance, what is? But it is far from self-evident that rules about permissible and impermissible sexual relations should be more crucial for religion than whether the earth revolves around the sun or whether man is a cousin of the gorilla. Reason and observation alone will never tell us what to do and how to live; whom, if anybody, we should marry; or how many, if any, children we should want. But it does not follow that religion must answer these questions. Nor does it minimize the crucial difference between informed and uninformed decisions or between responsible and irresponsible choices.The attempts to define and pigeon-hole religion rely upon dry criteria, usually theistic, that feasts on its given and deterministic elements rather than the personal interpretation and evaluation given to it by the person who experiences it—and this experience need not be theistic at all.
Christianity has been right in insisting on the limitations of reason and observation; but it has vastly exaggerated them while failing to recognize its own limitations: again and again it has claimed competence in areas where it has none. And from the very beginning it has conceived itself as an enemy of reason and worldly wisdom; it has exerted itself to impede the development of reason, belittled the achievements of reason, and gloated over the setbacks of reason.
December 26, 2012
"The Need for Negative Thinking" - with caveats
In his preface to the original edition, Kaufmann suggests this would be a worthy subtitle for the book.
The first part may be skipped if one is either quite familiar with analytic philosophy, or totally unfamiliar and not wanting to get overloaded.
Starting at page 100, we get into the meat of the book. He critically examines several conceptions of the "god of the philsophers" including Tillich and Bultmann of his own day, and finds them wanting.
He then looks beyond Christianity to claims for truth in Judaism, Buddhism and Zen, along with Platonic philosophy.
Next, he looks at possible candidates for what constitutes the core of religion, a key question in philosophy of religion.
He concludes by examining ways to read sacred scriptures, followed by a look at the age-old tussle between logic and emotions, and its playout in religion and philosophy.
Now, although I gave this a five-star rating, there are some caveats.
Caveat 1: A fair amount of what he says about the core of religion is dated or modified by recent studies in cognitive science and evolutionary psychology (with lowercase "e" and "p," in perspective. (Read my review of In Gods We Trust : The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion (Evolution and Cognition Series) by Scott Atran, to see just what is out there now.)
Caveat 2: By not looking at Islam, Hinduism or tribal religions and their comments on religious truth, Kaufmann somewhat constricted his view. (And, did everybody of his day and age cite Buddhist scriptures in large part from their apparent compatibility with existentialism?)
Caveat 3: The largest concern, and not a backward-looking one, as in No. 1, is that Kaufmann, like most mid-20th century existentialists, gives too much, even way too much, credit and credence to Freud. Now, I'm not saying everything Freud has said should be dismissed. But it should be taken with several grains of salt.
That said, this is still a very good book; beyond its title, it is a good introduction on how to engage in critical (or "negative") thinking in general.
In his preface to the original edition, Kaufmann suggests this would be a worthy subtitle for the book.
The first part may be skipped if one is either quite familiar with analytic philosophy, or totally unfamiliar and not wanting to get overloaded.
Starting at page 100, we get into the meat of the book. He critically examines several conceptions of the "god of the philsophers" including Tillich and Bultmann of his own day, and finds them wanting.
He then looks beyond Christianity to claims for truth in Judaism, Buddhism and Zen, along with Platonic philosophy.
Next, he looks at possible candidates for what constitutes the core of religion, a key question in philosophy of religion.
He concludes by examining ways to read sacred scriptures, followed by a look at the age-old tussle between logic and emotions, and its playout in religion and philosophy.
Now, although I gave this a five-star rating, there are some caveats.
Caveat 1: A fair amount of what he says about the core of religion is dated or modified by recent studies in cognitive science and evolutionary psychology (with lowercase "e" and "p," in perspective. (Read my review of In Gods We Trust : The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion (Evolution and Cognition Series) by Scott Atran, to see just what is out there now.)
Caveat 2: By not looking at Islam, Hinduism or tribal religions and their comments on religious truth, Kaufmann somewhat constricted his view. (And, did everybody of his day and age cite Buddhist scriptures in large part from their apparent compatibility with existentialism?)
Caveat 3: The largest concern, and not a backward-looking one, as in No. 1, is that Kaufmann, like most mid-20th century existentialists, gives too much, even way too much, credit and credence to Freud. Now, I'm not saying everything Freud has said should be dismissed. But it should be taken with several grains of salt.
That said, this is still a very good book; beyond its title, it is a good introduction on how to engage in critical (or "negative") thinking in general.
April 3, 2011
Probably I'm not in the target audience for this book, though I am interested in critiques of both philosophy and religion, and I gave up after approximately 60 pages so take my one-star review with a grain of salt.
This book is targetted at a working philosopher rather than a mere layperson. Asides and allusions to a pantheon of philosophers hindered my enjoyment but weren't the dealbreaker.
Sometimes Kaufmann translates German phrases, other times he assumes the reader knows German. But that also wasn't the deal breaker.
The real problem is that each sentence made sense on its own. And sometimes a paragraph would be coherent. But I rarely understood what point he was trying to make with his chapters: So what if few philosophers laugh at themselves?
Not only that but many of his claims and lines of argument strike me as dubious, lazy, or just plain unfair.
What does it even mean to say that "the problem with Sartre isn't that he has the conviction of his beliefs but that he doesn't have the conviction of attacks on his beliefs"?
What's the with ridiculous attack on Moore saying that he prefers reading a narrative to doing work?
I don't even really mind the constant undertone that no one (but the author?) is capable of reading or understanding any of the great philosophers -- it is somewhat amusing and endearing almost -- but he doesn't even seem to realise that (in my mind, at least) it raises the question of the value of their alleged insights if hundreds of years of commentary can't figure out WTF they meant.
(Also I found it amusing that he referred to it as "Socrates' Apology" rather than "Plato's Apology". He has a serious man-crush on Socrates.)
I gave up on the book in part because of its abstruseness but mostly because I just had no clue what point he was trying to make. Eventually I stopped caring about trying to figure it out.
This book is targetted at a working philosopher rather than a mere layperson. Asides and allusions to a pantheon of philosophers hindered my enjoyment but weren't the dealbreaker.
Sometimes Kaufmann translates German phrases, other times he assumes the reader knows German. But that also wasn't the deal breaker.
The real problem is that each sentence made sense on its own. And sometimes a paragraph would be coherent. But I rarely understood what point he was trying to make with his chapters: So what if few philosophers laugh at themselves?
Not only that but many of his claims and lines of argument strike me as dubious, lazy, or just plain unfair.
What does it even mean to say that "the problem with Sartre isn't that he has the conviction of his beliefs but that he doesn't have the conviction of attacks on his beliefs"?
What's the with ridiculous attack on Moore saying that he prefers reading a narrative to doing work?
I don't even really mind the constant undertone that no one (but the author?) is capable of reading or understanding any of the great philosophers -- it is somewhat amusing and endearing almost -- but he doesn't even seem to realise that (in my mind, at least) it raises the question of the value of their alleged insights if hundreds of years of commentary can't figure out WTF they meant.
(Also I found it amusing that he referred to it as "Socrates' Apology" rather than "Plato's Apology". He has a serious man-crush on Socrates.)
I gave up on the book in part because of its abstruseness but mostly because I just had no clue what point he was trying to make. Eventually I stopped caring about trying to figure it out.
January 4, 2009
This book actually made me doupt Christainity at one time and consider Judaism. It and it's comapnion book Faith of a Heretic are the great reading experiences of my life. Intellectual and spiritual dishonesty are under attack here, and Kauffmann finds plenty to fault in acamdemia and in churches and even mosques and synogagues. Ever now and then I still take it out and the dialoge begans again.
January 3, 2014
I always find Kaufmann a worthwhile commentator on other thinkers, and this book is chock full of such commentary. But he also provides more of the context of his own thought, and one begins to see the great gap (even more evident in his later Faith of a Heretic) between Kaufmann the critic and explicator, and Kaufmann the philosopher. He has no philosophy, strictly speaking, and in his exposition of his own conclusions about the great philosophical questions one can see the severe limitations of mere common sense, be it ever so acute and insightful.
June 15, 2018
I don't usually do this but after 100 or so pages I am putting this book down and walking away. Life is too short. I'm giving it two stars because Kaufmann's writing is extremely clear and well-written. It's just that to me he seems to take too long to not say enough. Or maybe not enough that feels important. The word pedantic kept coming to mind. I'm sure many have found this book informative and useful, and perhaps there's true meat on the bones of later chapters, but I'd much rather spend my time reading something I was getting more value out of. Oh well...
January 5, 2008
The best book in Kaufmann's pseduo-trilogy (w/ 'Tragedy & Philosophy' and 'From Shakespeare to Existentialism'). A very astute study of religion that goes further afield than the standard theist/atheist dialectic. This is by far the most even-handed of Kaufmann's general works, as it is absent his usual, emphatic 'Nietzscheanism'. Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Hegel do show up as usual, but they are mixed with a melange of competing approaches to religion. I highly, highly recommend this book.
December 4, 2013
This is nothing more than an apologia for “traditional” Judaism and a vitriolic attack on Christianity. There is a lack of intellectual honesty. This is the work of a philosopher trapped within one system who fails to question his own presuppositions and comes off as smug. It’s ironic that Kaufmann helped popularize Nietzsche, a philosopher who was critical of systems because they replicated prejudices.
December 19, 2011
The best book I've ever read on the intersections of philosophy and religion. Love Kaufmann's work.
May 10, 2015
"If you study the religions of the world to find corroboration for what you believe anyway, the inquiry is sterile. You are trying to bolster your ego with the agreement of the great. But is the only alternative to this to show what fools the great men of the past have been - another attempt to bolster the ego? .... Whoever reads a major work of literature without in any way becoming different or changing his outlook on the world has missed what matters most. To find confirmation of one's prior beliefs is futile: there is scarcely any error, prejudice or outright idiocy that could not be buttressed with a few quotations from great men. The thing to look for is disagreement."[p.406]
In his 1978 preface to the Princeton Edition, Kaufmann says of his Critique: "It is a voyage of discovery in which the author comes to grip with a multitude of points of view that seemed to call for a response."[p.xiv] This is not a history of religion - it does not attempt to tell the story of religion for example. I have the impression, instead, of a very experienced teacher who has had the opportunity over many years to read and re-read the great texts, and to debate their meaning with generations of students. What I see here - and others may disagree - is something like the legacy of his teaching notebooks, dealing with a whole range of relevant topics without setting out to be definitive on any.
I suspect that one legacy of his teaching history is a loss of patience with the endless recurrence of poor arguments. If there is an agenda to this voyage, beyond disinterested exploration, it is not by any means an attack on religion as such, but it is rather an attack on weak arguments and foolish opinions which have been expressed over time by highly respected commentators, whether those who favour or those who oppose religious belief. "Whatever philosophers take up nowadays tends to become scholastic, and the rigor of the scholastics is rigor mortis."
Kaufmann puts more enthusiasm into some topics than others. His slashing dismissal of the Higher Criticism, for example, does not present itself as a considered refutation so much as an impatient wave, though I found it illuminating all the same and I am not sure I needed more. He returns repeatedly to complain about the failings of William James, not so much (though partly) his Varieties of Religious Experience as his very unsatisfactory essay "The Will to Believe." I have given James a lot of weight in the past precisely because I have wanted a way to be more respectful to religions I do not share, but maybe I need to qualify my opinions here. He offers quite a lengthy commentary on Pascal's wager. He gives a very helpful insight into Aquinas' Summa Theoligica, not least to emphasise that for Saint Thomas, it was quite in order to execute anyone who persistently rejected his reasoning, because he recognised fully that his arguments were capable of being interpreted entirely differently and saw no better way to avoid dispute on such important matters. Intolerance is a concern in Christian history and not just for Catholicism. Naturally, all the rational proofs of God's existence receive good coverage - naturally, they all fail to satisfy but it is helpful to have their failings made clear. (The argument from design is included - an evergreen favourite on the internet.)
Even for Christianity, Kaufmann's coverage is not exhaustive. I do not notice Augustine getting the attention he probably merits in any serious account of Christian belief. For other religions, he makes some good comparative observations, especially regarding Judaism and the Old Testament, also referring to Buddhist teaching, but the primary focus is Christian and European. I do not think Christians will be especially pleased with his account. It is not just that so many specific aspects of Christian teaching are shown in quite a poor light here, but also that he suggests Christianity has some major defects that are not present in other faiths. I suspect he is saying very nicely what Nietzsche said with more punch: there is something seriously amiss in a religion that can only function on the basis that most of us (myself very much to the fore) are predestined for eternal torment. (Otherwise, why the need for and the huge relief of being saved?) He also takes the view that Christianity pins far too much on its theology and system of beliefs, not least since it has been evident from the earliest times that there can be no uniformity because rational thinking fails to establish sufficient confidence, something even Thomas Aquinas (to take an extreme case) had to accept. His Jewish authorities serve to point up the vast transformation from Judaism to Paul's Christianity and it has to be said, the comparison is not in the Christians' favour. (Which side of this divide Jesus belongs is a moot point indeed.)
"Of the spirit of the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, many theologians have felt no breath, but they play games parting his garments among them and casting lots for them"
Kaufmann does offer a personal opinion about the value and function of religion at the end but he spares us the embarrassment of saying too much about it. I stick with my impression that the value of this book is to guide readers through so many different types of debate about religious belief in a way that is informative, critical, and above all readable. It remains inevitable that religious debate will travel an endless circuit around all of these different topics to ensure that we fail to reach firm conclusions in our lifetimes but at least, with his help, it is possible to elevate the quality of debate.
"At the very least one might accord a religious scripture the same courtesy one extends to poetry and recall Goethe's dictum: "What issues from a poetic mind wants to be received by a poetic mind. Any cold analyzing destroys the poetry and does not generate any reality. All that remains are potsherds which are good for nothing and only incommode us." "
"A philosopher's insight may be a photograph taken in flight. Those who have never flown think they are wise when noting that two such pictures are not alike: they contradict each other; flying is no good; all hail to crawling. The history of philosophy is a photo album with snapshots of the life of the spirit. Adherents of a philosophy mistake a few snapshots for the whole of life."
In his 1978 preface to the Princeton Edition, Kaufmann says of his Critique: "It is a voyage of discovery in which the author comes to grip with a multitude of points of view that seemed to call for a response."[p.xiv] This is not a history of religion - it does not attempt to tell the story of religion for example. I have the impression, instead, of a very experienced teacher who has had the opportunity over many years to read and re-read the great texts, and to debate their meaning with generations of students. What I see here - and others may disagree - is something like the legacy of his teaching notebooks, dealing with a whole range of relevant topics without setting out to be definitive on any.
I suspect that one legacy of his teaching history is a loss of patience with the endless recurrence of poor arguments. If there is an agenda to this voyage, beyond disinterested exploration, it is not by any means an attack on religion as such, but it is rather an attack on weak arguments and foolish opinions which have been expressed over time by highly respected commentators, whether those who favour or those who oppose religious belief. "Whatever philosophers take up nowadays tends to become scholastic, and the rigor of the scholastics is rigor mortis."
Kaufmann puts more enthusiasm into some topics than others. His slashing dismissal of the Higher Criticism, for example, does not present itself as a considered refutation so much as an impatient wave, though I found it illuminating all the same and I am not sure I needed more. He returns repeatedly to complain about the failings of William James, not so much (though partly) his Varieties of Religious Experience as his very unsatisfactory essay "The Will to Believe." I have given James a lot of weight in the past precisely because I have wanted a way to be more respectful to religions I do not share, but maybe I need to qualify my opinions here. He offers quite a lengthy commentary on Pascal's wager. He gives a very helpful insight into Aquinas' Summa Theoligica, not least to emphasise that for Saint Thomas, it was quite in order to execute anyone who persistently rejected his reasoning, because he recognised fully that his arguments were capable of being interpreted entirely differently and saw no better way to avoid dispute on such important matters. Intolerance is a concern in Christian history and not just for Catholicism. Naturally, all the rational proofs of God's existence receive good coverage - naturally, they all fail to satisfy but it is helpful to have their failings made clear. (The argument from design is included - an evergreen favourite on the internet.)
Even for Christianity, Kaufmann's coverage is not exhaustive. I do not notice Augustine getting the attention he probably merits in any serious account of Christian belief. For other religions, he makes some good comparative observations, especially regarding Judaism and the Old Testament, also referring to Buddhist teaching, but the primary focus is Christian and European. I do not think Christians will be especially pleased with his account. It is not just that so many specific aspects of Christian teaching are shown in quite a poor light here, but also that he suggests Christianity has some major defects that are not present in other faiths. I suspect he is saying very nicely what Nietzsche said with more punch: there is something seriously amiss in a religion that can only function on the basis that most of us (myself very much to the fore) are predestined for eternal torment. (Otherwise, why the need for and the huge relief of being saved?) He also takes the view that Christianity pins far too much on its theology and system of beliefs, not least since it has been evident from the earliest times that there can be no uniformity because rational thinking fails to establish sufficient confidence, something even Thomas Aquinas (to take an extreme case) had to accept. His Jewish authorities serve to point up the vast transformation from Judaism to Paul's Christianity and it has to be said, the comparison is not in the Christians' favour. (Which side of this divide Jesus belongs is a moot point indeed.)
"Of the spirit of the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, many theologians have felt no breath, but they play games parting his garments among them and casting lots for them"
Kaufmann does offer a personal opinion about the value and function of religion at the end but he spares us the embarrassment of saying too much about it. I stick with my impression that the value of this book is to guide readers through so many different types of debate about religious belief in a way that is informative, critical, and above all readable. It remains inevitable that religious debate will travel an endless circuit around all of these different topics to ensure that we fail to reach firm conclusions in our lifetimes but at least, with his help, it is possible to elevate the quality of debate.
"At the very least one might accord a religious scripture the same courtesy one extends to poetry and recall Goethe's dictum: "What issues from a poetic mind wants to be received by a poetic mind. Any cold analyzing destroys the poetry and does not generate any reality. All that remains are potsherds which are good for nothing and only incommode us." "
"A philosopher's insight may be a photograph taken in flight. Those who have never flown think they are wise when noting that two such pictures are not alike: they contradict each other; flying is no good; all hail to crawling. The history of philosophy is a photo album with snapshots of the life of the spirit. Adherents of a philosophy mistake a few snapshots for the whole of life."
July 9, 2020
What a fantastic set of critical sections written by one of the best thinkers of the 20th century! Professor Kaufmann began his first section on "philosophical psychology" by stating that the Enlightenment actually failed man regarding his understanding of religion, art, feeling, and the mind. He further stated that romanticism added more damage alongside the existent crisis caused by the Enlightenment. The professor clarified the key purpose of a philosopher when he wrote "philosophers perform a major service by clarifying concepts which are often confused and breed further confusion" (Kaufmann, 1958, p. 2).
Kaufmann proceeded into criticizing the works of Nietzsche, Hegel, Goethe, existentialists, Kant, Kierkegaard, Moore, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger. In his section on common sense, Kaufmann (1958) argued that "most religion and morality involve and stress conformity and compliance; and the study of science and philosophy often consists in the appropriation of a tradition" (p. 97). This excellent point states that the most popular religions with claims of having ultimate moral teachings with universal applicability contain requirements of strict adherence to their doctrines, creeds, and scriptures. His point also indicated that scientific communities uphold their own beliefs, doctrines, traditions, and accepted methods of practice that require compliance and conformity, similarly to religious communities.
Of all religious groups, Professor Kaufmann focused much attention on the members of Liberal Protestantism. It was his conviction that Liberal Protestants do not practice the traditional Christianity passed down from the patristic period to the Reformed churches. Rather, he claimed that these Protestants invented their own, nontraditional theologies and God-images to the point of creating a pluralism of Christs (Grigg, 2000). Professor Grigg (2000) elaborated on this phenomenon that emerged within 20th-century Christianity in the Western world. Many liberal groups in Christianity developed their own images of Christ through their secular theologies and schismatic churches that arose from breaks with Reformed churches. For example, the United Methodist (UM) churches often prioritize an emphasis on hiring female pastors, approving gay marriages, and adopting other beliefs associated with the LGBT movement. The UM members represent a break from the Reformed church founded by John Wesley: the Free Methodists. It is such groups like the UM that Professor Kaufmann criticizes mostly. Other groups included communities that practiced liberation theology and feminist theology.
The best chapter I found was focused on man's ontological needs rooted in spirituality and religion. I suggest reading this whole book from beginning to end. His work will be praiseworthy for centuries to come.
Kaufmann proceeded into criticizing the works of Nietzsche, Hegel, Goethe, existentialists, Kant, Kierkegaard, Moore, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger. In his section on common sense, Kaufmann (1958) argued that "most religion and morality involve and stress conformity and compliance; and the study of science and philosophy often consists in the appropriation of a tradition" (p. 97). This excellent point states that the most popular religions with claims of having ultimate moral teachings with universal applicability contain requirements of strict adherence to their doctrines, creeds, and scriptures. His point also indicated that scientific communities uphold their own beliefs, doctrines, traditions, and accepted methods of practice that require compliance and conformity, similarly to religious communities.
Of all religious groups, Professor Kaufmann focused much attention on the members of Liberal Protestantism. It was his conviction that Liberal Protestants do not practice the traditional Christianity passed down from the patristic period to the Reformed churches. Rather, he claimed that these Protestants invented their own, nontraditional theologies and God-images to the point of creating a pluralism of Christs (Grigg, 2000). Professor Grigg (2000) elaborated on this phenomenon that emerged within 20th-century Christianity in the Western world. Many liberal groups in Christianity developed their own images of Christ through their secular theologies and schismatic churches that arose from breaks with Reformed churches. For example, the United Methodist (UM) churches often prioritize an emphasis on hiring female pastors, approving gay marriages, and adopting other beliefs associated with the LGBT movement. The UM members represent a break from the Reformed church founded by John Wesley: the Free Methodists. It is such groups like the UM that Professor Kaufmann criticizes mostly. Other groups included communities that practiced liberation theology and feminist theology.
The best chapter I found was focused on man's ontological needs rooted in spirituality and religion. I suggest reading this whole book from beginning to end. His work will be praiseworthy for centuries to come.
October 9, 2024
THE FAMED SCHOLAR CRITIQUES EVERYTHING FROM THE BIBLE TO EXISTENTIALISM
Walter Arnold Kaufmann (1921-1980) was a German-American philosopher, translator, and poet, who taught for over 30 years at Princeton University. He wrote/translated many other books, such as ;'Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist,' 'Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary,' etc.
He wrote in the Preface to the paperback edition of this 1958 book, “[this book] is very different from most scholarly books… It certainly did not fail to impede my career, but I have never regretted publishing it. What keeps surprising me is how many people … understood and appreciated it… [the book] is a voyage of discovery in which the author comes to grips with a multitude of points of view that seemed to call for a response... The aspect of the book about which I don’t have any second thoughts at all is that I feel more than ever that humanists should be concerned less with the opinions of their peers and elders than with the challenge of Rembrandt’s eyes.”
He states, “The esoteric meaning of philosophic propositions is revealed by their content. The unit of greatness in philosophy is never a proposition: rarely, it is a proof; a little more often, a refutation; usually, a book… We do not take a philosopher seriously enough if we are satisfied with the mere feel of his philosophy: if his propositions, taken at their face value, are false or contradict each other… all that is worth pointing out, though insufficient. The question remains whether his propositions are MEANT to be taken at their face value.” (Pg. 70-71)
He suggests, “If a man accepts a religious proposition as true, it is hardly ever after having first considered it as a hypothesis and found compelling evidence through an impartial inquiry. Few religious people have studied comparative religion, and hardly any have attained their beliefs as a result of such a study… The fact that the religious person frequently considers his religious propositions ever so much more important only aggravates the problem. The more important the issue at hand, the more it demands careful scrutiny.” (Pg. 104-105)
He states, “Some people think that the concept of ‘symbols’ which is fashionable in our day can do the job that ‘analogy’ has failed to do. It is argued… that religious propositions which are literally false are true when understood symbolically… [But] there is no nonsense whatever which may not be said to be symbolically true, especially if its symbolic meaning is not stated. To show that religious propositions are true when understood symbolically, one must… specify what each proposition symbolizes; show that the meaning one finds in it is not arbitrary… and show that other interpretations are not just as plausible.” (Pg. 189)
He argues, “Why should God have so ordered the world that all men were headed for everlasting damnation and that he was unable to help them except by begetting a son with a woman betrothed to Joseph, and by then having this son betrayed and crucified and resurrected, by having him fetch Abraham and a few of the damned out of hell while leaving the rest in their lot, and by saving only that small minority among men who first heard this story and then believed it? Surely, such a God is not an unequivocal symbol of love… he would appear to be at least as interested in bizarre effects… and in dire vengeance on all who fail to believe what is exceedingly difficult to believe… As long as we cling to the conception of hell, God is not love … in the human sense raised to the highest potency of perfection. And if we renounce the belief in hell, then the notion that God gave his son to save those who believe in the incarnation and resurrection loses meaning.” (Pg. 200-201)
He observes, “[Rudolf] Bultmann avoids the crucial question whether the writers of the New Testament always made the best possible choices among the ideas current in their time; whether parts of their ‘mythical world picture’ were not downright superstitious even then; and whether in their valuations, too, they did not sometimes inspire anything but confidence.” (Pg. 212)
He points out, “The Sermon on the Mount opens with the so-called beatitudes, and each of the nine promises a reward, culminating in the conclusion: ‘For great is your reward in heaven.’ In the Sermon that follows, promises of great rewards and threats of dire punishments alternate continually… And in the end… the moral is stated quite explicitly; those who do not do what Jesus commands ‘will be like a foolish man,’ while those to do as they are bidden are likened to ‘a wise man.’ St. Thomas was quite right in agreeing with Aristotle that prudence was a virtue from the Christian point of view… You Protestant theologians … are embarrassed by any talk of prudence in ethics.” (Pg. 240)
He comments, “The mystic’s insistence on the unique ineffability of his experience may prove no more than that he has never known any other intense experience. He may even have gone into a monastery to make sure of that.” (Pg. 318-319)
He asserts, “According to the Higher Criticism, the editors of the Biblical books took all kinds of liberties and carved up the received texts, moving half a sentence here a few sentences down… while altogether suppressing and omitting large portions of each source which could not be fitted into this mosaic. But on this hypothesis, though it is prompted by both real and alleged inconsistencies, such inconsistencies are all but inexplicable… the editor would have had to be an idiot if he ended up by offering a text as full of inconsistencies as the Higher Critics find it.” (Pg. 382-383)
The breadth of Kaufmann’s book is impressive, and its clarity of argumentation is refreshing. It is a most welcome change from the analytic philosophy and existentialism that was prevalent when he wrote the book.
Walter Arnold Kaufmann (1921-1980) was a German-American philosopher, translator, and poet, who taught for over 30 years at Princeton University. He wrote/translated many other books, such as ;'Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist,' 'Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary,' etc.
He wrote in the Preface to the paperback edition of this 1958 book, “[this book] is very different from most scholarly books… It certainly did not fail to impede my career, but I have never regretted publishing it. What keeps surprising me is how many people … understood and appreciated it… [the book] is a voyage of discovery in which the author comes to grips with a multitude of points of view that seemed to call for a response... The aspect of the book about which I don’t have any second thoughts at all is that I feel more than ever that humanists should be concerned less with the opinions of their peers and elders than with the challenge of Rembrandt’s eyes.”
He states, “The esoteric meaning of philosophic propositions is revealed by their content. The unit of greatness in philosophy is never a proposition: rarely, it is a proof; a little more often, a refutation; usually, a book… We do not take a philosopher seriously enough if we are satisfied with the mere feel of his philosophy: if his propositions, taken at their face value, are false or contradict each other… all that is worth pointing out, though insufficient. The question remains whether his propositions are MEANT to be taken at their face value.” (Pg. 70-71)
He suggests, “If a man accepts a religious proposition as true, it is hardly ever after having first considered it as a hypothesis and found compelling evidence through an impartial inquiry. Few religious people have studied comparative religion, and hardly any have attained their beliefs as a result of such a study… The fact that the religious person frequently considers his religious propositions ever so much more important only aggravates the problem. The more important the issue at hand, the more it demands careful scrutiny.” (Pg. 104-105)
He states, “Some people think that the concept of ‘symbols’ which is fashionable in our day can do the job that ‘analogy’ has failed to do. It is argued… that religious propositions which are literally false are true when understood symbolically… [But] there is no nonsense whatever which may not be said to be symbolically true, especially if its symbolic meaning is not stated. To show that religious propositions are true when understood symbolically, one must… specify what each proposition symbolizes; show that the meaning one finds in it is not arbitrary… and show that other interpretations are not just as plausible.” (Pg. 189)
He argues, “Why should God have so ordered the world that all men were headed for everlasting damnation and that he was unable to help them except by begetting a son with a woman betrothed to Joseph, and by then having this son betrayed and crucified and resurrected, by having him fetch Abraham and a few of the damned out of hell while leaving the rest in their lot, and by saving only that small minority among men who first heard this story and then believed it? Surely, such a God is not an unequivocal symbol of love… he would appear to be at least as interested in bizarre effects… and in dire vengeance on all who fail to believe what is exceedingly difficult to believe… As long as we cling to the conception of hell, God is not love … in the human sense raised to the highest potency of perfection. And if we renounce the belief in hell, then the notion that God gave his son to save those who believe in the incarnation and resurrection loses meaning.” (Pg. 200-201)
He observes, “[Rudolf] Bultmann avoids the crucial question whether the writers of the New Testament always made the best possible choices among the ideas current in their time; whether parts of their ‘mythical world picture’ were not downright superstitious even then; and whether in their valuations, too, they did not sometimes inspire anything but confidence.” (Pg. 212)
He points out, “The Sermon on the Mount opens with the so-called beatitudes, and each of the nine promises a reward, culminating in the conclusion: ‘For great is your reward in heaven.’ In the Sermon that follows, promises of great rewards and threats of dire punishments alternate continually… And in the end… the moral is stated quite explicitly; those who do not do what Jesus commands ‘will be like a foolish man,’ while those to do as they are bidden are likened to ‘a wise man.’ St. Thomas was quite right in agreeing with Aristotle that prudence was a virtue from the Christian point of view… You Protestant theologians … are embarrassed by any talk of prudence in ethics.” (Pg. 240)
He comments, “The mystic’s insistence on the unique ineffability of his experience may prove no more than that he has never known any other intense experience. He may even have gone into a monastery to make sure of that.” (Pg. 318-319)
He asserts, “According to the Higher Criticism, the editors of the Biblical books took all kinds of liberties and carved up the received texts, moving half a sentence here a few sentences down… while altogether suppressing and omitting large portions of each source which could not be fitted into this mosaic. But on this hypothesis, though it is prompted by both real and alleged inconsistencies, such inconsistencies are all but inexplicable… the editor would have had to be an idiot if he ended up by offering a text as full of inconsistencies as the Higher Critics find it.” (Pg. 382-383)
The breadth of Kaufmann’s book is impressive, and its clarity of argumentation is refreshing. It is a most welcome change from the analytic philosophy and existentialism that was prevalent when he wrote the book.
July 21, 2018
"The Psychology of Interpretation. To understand why some books elicit so many interpretations, one must consider not only the books but also those who interpret them. There are hosts of people who want to write—either because they enjoy it or because their career depends on it—but who have little of their own to say. So they write about what others have said.
"In giving an interpretation one indulges one's will to power—both over the text and over rival exegeses. Though one did not start with any great originality, one grows creative as one works out a new interpretation, pitting ones skill and perception against that of previous readers." (Walter Kaufmann, Critique of Religion and Philosophy, p. 370)
"In giving an interpretation one indulges one's will to power—both over the text and over rival exegeses. Though one did not start with any great originality, one grows creative as one works out a new interpretation, pitting ones skill and perception against that of previous readers." (Walter Kaufmann, Critique of Religion and Philosophy, p. 370)
January 5, 2026
I loved reading this book: erudite, polymathic, bold, pugnacious and takes no prisoners. On the face of it, Kaufmann can appear to be anti-Religion, but I found myself agreeing with his overall thesis as I kept reading on. A truly engaging read that made me think hard and think deeply.
I enjoyed this so much that my next read will be Kaufmann’s Nietzche, which is apparently his masterwork. Looks like it’s going to be a great year for readings in Religion and Philosophy for me in 2026!
I enjoyed this so much that my next read will be Kaufmann’s Nietzche, which is apparently his masterwork. Looks like it’s going to be a great year for readings in Religion and Philosophy for me in 2026!
August 16, 2022
I am on the verge of declaring myself a disciple of Mr. Kaufmann. This book really takes a good, long look at two very important topics and is able to speak to them in a very simple, relatable way. I would strongly recommend this book to anyone who studies philosophy, religion or theology.
June 20, 2021
Wide-reaching and profound.
May 31, 2024
Walter Kaufmann was a serious philosopher. By "serious," I mean that Kaufmann apparently read everything in the world that related to his concerns: philosophy, religion, art, and drama, thought about it, and commented on it. The Critique of Religion and Philosophy, originally published in 1958, is the first book in a trilogy. Yet, having read it again, I have to wonder what Kaufmann can have left to talk about in the later works.
Just the chapter headings from Critique of Religion and Philosophy cover a pretty broad waterfront of intellectualism: The Philosophic Flight; Positivism and Existentialism; Truth, Language, and Experience; Religion, Faith, and Evidence; The God of the Philosophers; God, Ambiguity, and Theology; Satanic Interlude, or How to Go to Hell; Truth in Three Religions; The Core of Religion; Scriptures and Poetry, or How to Read the Bible; Reason and Eros. In the discussion of these topics, we move from Plato to Sartre, Moses to Nietzsche, Jesus to Kant, Bultmann and Heidegger, and from Freud to Fromm. The bibliography to this work would supply anyone with reading matter for the rest of a natural existence.
A critique is a work which sets out the limitations, as well as the capabilities, of its subject. Kaufmann here is trying to draw a firm, though not impermeable, line between religion and philosophy. Interestingly for a man so strongly involved with Kant and Nietzsche, Kaufmann takes "philosophy" properly to mean analytic philosophic, while matters of feeling, passion, and aspiration are subsumed under religion. He spends a lot of time analyzing various major religions to show that, no, they don't all say the same thing. He also looks at separating idolatry from religion, and, largely in response to Erich Fromm, asserting that most religions have an authoritarian side. Even the contributors to the Talmud refuse to consider any source except Scripture.
The discussion of the poetic nature of Scripture and philosophy is very interesting. Someone once said that one cannot be a great philosopher without being a great writer. Kaufmann takes this point by noting that Plato wrote so well that he makes all later philosophers look bad. Plato, like Shakespeare, revealed his philosophy through dramatic dialogues. Nietzsche may have come the closest to this standard among more recent philosophers.
Take note that Kaufmann wrote a major biography of Nietzsche, a translation of Goethe's Faust, and edited (with his own translations) The Portable Nietzsche. This is a protean scholar, and one whose insights reach into almost every field of thought.
Just the chapter headings from Critique of Religion and Philosophy cover a pretty broad waterfront of intellectualism: The Philosophic Flight; Positivism and Existentialism; Truth, Language, and Experience; Religion, Faith, and Evidence; The God of the Philosophers; God, Ambiguity, and Theology; Satanic Interlude, or How to Go to Hell; Truth in Three Religions; The Core of Religion; Scriptures and Poetry, or How to Read the Bible; Reason and Eros. In the discussion of these topics, we move from Plato to Sartre, Moses to Nietzsche, Jesus to Kant, Bultmann and Heidegger, and from Freud to Fromm. The bibliography to this work would supply anyone with reading matter for the rest of a natural existence.
A critique is a work which sets out the limitations, as well as the capabilities, of its subject. Kaufmann here is trying to draw a firm, though not impermeable, line between religion and philosophy. Interestingly for a man so strongly involved with Kant and Nietzsche, Kaufmann takes "philosophy" properly to mean analytic philosophic, while matters of feeling, passion, and aspiration are subsumed under religion. He spends a lot of time analyzing various major religions to show that, no, they don't all say the same thing. He also looks at separating idolatry from religion, and, largely in response to Erich Fromm, asserting that most religions have an authoritarian side. Even the contributors to the Talmud refuse to consider any source except Scripture.
The discussion of the poetic nature of Scripture and philosophy is very interesting. Someone once said that one cannot be a great philosopher without being a great writer. Kaufmann takes this point by noting that Plato wrote so well that he makes all later philosophers look bad. Plato, like Shakespeare, revealed his philosophy through dramatic dialogues. Nietzsche may have come the closest to this standard among more recent philosophers.
Take note that Kaufmann wrote a major biography of Nietzsche, a translation of Goethe's Faust, and edited (with his own translations) The Portable Nietzsche. This is a protean scholar, and one whose insights reach into almost every field of thought.
June 7, 2016
This was a very heavy read. It was also a rewarding read. Kaufmann lays out a detailed foundation on the development of philosophic thought and theology. This is quite challenging, though far from impossible, to gain a full appreciation in a first reading. As the middle of the book is approached, the author approaches various theologies, faiths, and philosophic thought and poses some very valid questions and leads the reader to some very thoughtful answers to these questions. For those who make it the end, you should find that this book changes your view of the world, which epitomizes the ideal role of any good work of art.
July 11, 2008
A remarkable little book, offering an astute and even-handed look at a wide variety of religious and philosophical topics. Highly recommended to anyone with more than a passing interest in the Big Questions.
Read
January 22, 2008Very interesting but also rather dense. I've been coming back to this for several months now. Brings up some good questions.
Want to read
July 11, 2008d
November 8, 2016
Remarkable philosophical survey of the differences between Analytical and Continental philosophies without bias or obsession with fashion. Full of mature wisdom.
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