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Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy
On June 6, 1944, American and British troops staged the greatest amphibious landing in history to begin Operation Overlord, the battle to liberate Europe from the scourge of the Third Reich. With gut-wrenching realism and immediacy, Hastings reveals the terrible human cost that this battle exacted. Moving beyond just the storming of Omaha beach and D-Day, he explores the Allies’ push inward, with many British and American infantry units suffering near 100 percent casualties during the course of that awful summer. Far from a gauzy romanticized remembrance, Hastings details a grueling ten week battle to overpower the superbly trained, geographically entrenched German Wehrmacht. Uncompromising and powerful in its depiction of wartime, this is the definitive book on D-Day and the Battle of Normandy.
684 pages, Kindle Edition
First published June 6, 1984
493 people are currently reading
6727 people want to read
About the author
Max Hastings
112 books1,729 followersSir Max Hugh Macdonald Hastings, FRSL, FRHistS is a British journalist, editor, historian and author. His parents were Macdonald Hastings, a journalist and war correspondent, and Anne Scott-James, sometime editor of Harper's Bazaar.
Hastings was educated at Charterhouse School and University College, Oxford, which he left after a year.After leaving Oxford University, Max Hastings became a foreign correspondent, and reported from more than sixty countries and eleven wars for BBC TV and the London Evening Standard.
Among his bestselling books Bomber Command won the Somerset Maugham Prize, and both Overlord and The Battle for the Falklands won the Yorkshire Post Book of the Year Prize.
After ten years as editor and then editor-in-chief of The Daily Telegraph, he became editor of the Evening Standard in 1996. He has won many awards for his journalism, including Journalist of The Year and What the Papers Say Reporter of the Year for his work in the South Atlantic in 1982, and Editor of the Year in 1988.
He stood down as editor of the Evening Standard in 2001 and was knighted in 2002. His monumental work of military history, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944-1945 was published in 2005.
He is also a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature.
Sir Max Hastings honoured with the $100,000 2012 Pritzker Military Library Literature Award for Lifetime Achievement in Military Writing.
Hastings was educated at Charterhouse School and University College, Oxford, which he left after a year.After leaving Oxford University, Max Hastings became a foreign correspondent, and reported from more than sixty countries and eleven wars for BBC TV and the London Evening Standard.
Among his bestselling books Bomber Command won the Somerset Maugham Prize, and both Overlord and The Battle for the Falklands won the Yorkshire Post Book of the Year Prize.
After ten years as editor and then editor-in-chief of The Daily Telegraph, he became editor of the Evening Standard in 1996. He has won many awards for his journalism, including Journalist of The Year and What the Papers Say Reporter of the Year for his work in the South Atlantic in 1982, and Editor of the Year in 1988.
He stood down as editor of the Evening Standard in 2001 and was knighted in 2002. His monumental work of military history, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944-1945 was published in 2005.
He is also a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature.
Sir Max Hastings honoured with the $100,000 2012 Pritzker Military Library Literature Award for Lifetime Achievement in Military Writing.
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August 19, 2025
Feet in the Sand
In the early hours of 06/06/1944 over 150,000 allied soldiers invaded Normandy, France in the largest seaborne operation in history. It was risky, took a huge amount administrative and logical planning with a divided command and an army unsure of itself. But it was a huge success and turned the tide of the war in Europe on the west. For the Third Reich, this was the beginning of the end. Max Hastings brilliant book describes this battle and pivotal point in the Second World War in masterful storytelling. Sobering, well written, with the right amount of detail, Hastings pulls no punches in describing ‘what it was really like’. He does not hold back with the shortcomings of the allied armies, or the strengths of the Wehrmacht, or the horrors faced by and committed by soldiers on each side. This is a warts and all biography of a battle, which I feel has given me a well rounded perspective of the events described.
Hastings first wrote Overlord in 1982 and as such many of those who took part were still alive and available to interview or write to. This is exactly what Hastings did and so is able to bring to life that realistic feeling of history. He tells of the differences between the British (and dominion) and American armies, where the Wehrmacht distinguished itself and fell behind and asks the question, could the attack have been repelled? He shows that the allies had huge self doubt over the plans, with some high command as late as 02/1944 still feeling 1944 was too early for an invasion of Europe. That they thought they had no stomach for the fight and thought the German ‘liked soldiering’. In fact the achievements of the Germans, the efficiency of their army and the ability to hold off and frustrate the allies advance the way they did is held in high regard by Hastings. They had in many cases better equipment and tanks (Albert Speer’s brainchild), with the British having best artillery of not much else (artillery shells is what killed the majority of soldiers). It is pointed out that during the whole war the only land battle that they won on their own was El-Alamein and there was a huge void in decent middle level officers, due to the potential being killed off in the WWI.
Hastings also shows how General Dwight D Eisenhower was selected as supreme allied commander, with three British generals under him. This frustrated many Americans on both accounts. Eisenhower was not a battlefield commander, there were many perhaps more qualified than him, but as Hastings shows he was able to organise the attack and bring together two major armies. The assaults themselves did not go entirely to plan, with boats being blown off course and nervous, green pilots dumping airborne soldiers in dangerous conditions. He also explains the struggles of the infantry, 85% of all casualties came from there! Because the officers and NCOs were young men (average age of 18.5) they had no idea how to motivate the men and deal with the horrors they faced. Everything in a man’s body compels him to take cover and not move when under fire and the officers have to get them moving. It was clear that leadership lacked on the ground. In fact there are widespread sources in the US army which Hastings provides, showing the lack of respect for officers. Compared to the British and Canadian troops who still respected them.
General Bernard Montgomery’s shortcomings are also laid out to bare. Alongside the success of the American breakout of COBRA versus the failure of GOODWOOD. But also gives credit to pinning down the SS and other divisions whilst the US swept them up from behind at Cou tances. Within the backdrop of all of this we have the fanatical Adolf Hitler who would not allow German commanders to make their own decisions and as such made disastrous decisions 100s of miles away from the front. The July Plot also took place, in an attempt to kill Hitler and bring about a favourable peace for Germany. This of course failed, but as Hastings shows, the German army was defeated in the field and not betrayed at home (where have we heard this before?). Things went wrong, such as the British reluctance to expend men, following from the last war and the American basic misunderstanding of battle tactics. But a lot went right and ultimately as Hastings shows they managed to get a foothold in Europe and push back the greatest war machine the world has ever seen. This is military history at its best and I highly recommend this book.
In the early hours of 06/06/1944 over 150,000 allied soldiers invaded Normandy, France in the largest seaborne operation in history. It was risky, took a huge amount administrative and logical planning with a divided command and an army unsure of itself. But it was a huge success and turned the tide of the war in Europe on the west. For the Third Reich, this was the beginning of the end. Max Hastings brilliant book describes this battle and pivotal point in the Second World War in masterful storytelling. Sobering, well written, with the right amount of detail, Hastings pulls no punches in describing ‘what it was really like’. He does not hold back with the shortcomings of the allied armies, or the strengths of the Wehrmacht, or the horrors faced by and committed by soldiers on each side. This is a warts and all biography of a battle, which I feel has given me a well rounded perspective of the events described.
Hastings first wrote Overlord in 1982 and as such many of those who took part were still alive and available to interview or write to. This is exactly what Hastings did and so is able to bring to life that realistic feeling of history. He tells of the differences between the British (and dominion) and American armies, where the Wehrmacht distinguished itself and fell behind and asks the question, could the attack have been repelled? He shows that the allies had huge self doubt over the plans, with some high command as late as 02/1944 still feeling 1944 was too early for an invasion of Europe. That they thought they had no stomach for the fight and thought the German ‘liked soldiering’. In fact the achievements of the Germans, the efficiency of their army and the ability to hold off and frustrate the allies advance the way they did is held in high regard by Hastings. They had in many cases better equipment and tanks (Albert Speer’s brainchild), with the British having best artillery of not much else (artillery shells is what killed the majority of soldiers). It is pointed out that during the whole war the only land battle that they won on their own was El-Alamein and there was a huge void in decent middle level officers, due to the potential being killed off in the WWI.
Hastings also shows how General Dwight D Eisenhower was selected as supreme allied commander, with three British generals under him. This frustrated many Americans on both accounts. Eisenhower was not a battlefield commander, there were many perhaps more qualified than him, but as Hastings shows he was able to organise the attack and bring together two major armies. The assaults themselves did not go entirely to plan, with boats being blown off course and nervous, green pilots dumping airborne soldiers in dangerous conditions. He also explains the struggles of the infantry, 85% of all casualties came from there! Because the officers and NCOs were young men (average age of 18.5) they had no idea how to motivate the men and deal with the horrors they faced. Everything in a man’s body compels him to take cover and not move when under fire and the officers have to get them moving. It was clear that leadership lacked on the ground. In fact there are widespread sources in the US army which Hastings provides, showing the lack of respect for officers. Compared to the British and Canadian troops who still respected them.
General Bernard Montgomery’s shortcomings are also laid out to bare. Alongside the success of the American breakout of COBRA versus the failure of GOODWOOD. But also gives credit to pinning down the SS and other divisions whilst the US swept them up from behind at Cou tances. Within the backdrop of all of this we have the fanatical Adolf Hitler who would not allow German commanders to make their own decisions and as such made disastrous decisions 100s of miles away from the front. The July Plot also took place, in an attempt to kill Hitler and bring about a favourable peace for Germany. This of course failed, but as Hastings shows, the German army was defeated in the field and not betrayed at home (where have we heard this before?). Things went wrong, such as the British reluctance to expend men, following from the last war and the American basic misunderstanding of battle tactics. But a lot went right and ultimately as Hastings shows they managed to get a foothold in Europe and push back the greatest war machine the world has ever seen. This is military history at its best and I highly recommend this book.
October 27, 2017
Hastings has a unique talent for testimonials with the battle history. Literally. Whereas LynnMacDonald & Peter Hart merely insert eyewitness accounts into the battle history (which tends to frame the eyewitness accounts rather than the other way around), Hastings gives a technical fact about Panzers followed by two sentences from a contemporary, without interrupting the flow. As a result, his OVERLORD can hold his own as a study of strategy & tactis in the Normandy campaign, enlivened by the words of those who served.
April 5, 2024
Another outstanding work by Hastings on a WWII campaign, which in this case includes the Normandy invasion through the Breakout, approx. Jan-Aug 1944.
As always the author is extremely detailed. This is particularly valuable when he compares and contrasts opposing weapons (more below). It does become a little wearisome to follow as, it seems, every battalion-level or below action during the campaign is described. But this is only a minor complaint.
Hastings maintains that the German "Army" was significantly superior in battle to the inexperienced American formations, and greatly superior to the battle worn British Army. Elite units such as Panzer Lehr and SS units were especially effective. He makes a compelling case, but does acknowledge that US elite units (e.g., Airborne divisions) were as good (or better) as anything the Germans had.
He also maintains that success in ground combat is due to the vigorous actions of a few (15%, he maintains). By assigning superior recruits to the Air Force or the other combat arms, the infantry received far less talented personnel, and their performance showed.
He is especially critical of the performance of the British and American Air Forces. Their unstinting focus on the combined bomber offensive against the German homeland led to a disgraceful performance when required to support ground troops. They also absorbed a major portion of both talented recruits and industrial production.
Hastings is also critical of specific Allied weapons, such as the Sherman tank. I think he is pretty much on the mark with this, but he appears to miss some considerations. Since all US armor had to be transported great distances, smaller size and weight was desirable if not necessary.
In his critique of Allied ground combat weapons, he is strangely muted in praise of the Garand M-1. Most American battlefield commanders recognized this semiauto rifle as a critical advantage for the American soldier. Hastings rationalizes his position by his claim that only a small percentage of the forces use their weapons effectively anyway. Also, he unfavorably compares the German MG 42 with the BAR. This is a little unfair, since the BAR is a squad level, shoulder weapon, while the MG 42 crew served, mounted machine gun. He also has little to say about the outstanding Allied artillery, but has high (and deserved) compliments for the 88mm dual purpose gun. Essentially, I think his overall point about the superiority of German arms is well taken, but only to a point.
As always the author is extremely detailed. This is particularly valuable when he compares and contrasts opposing weapons (more below). It does become a little wearisome to follow as, it seems, every battalion-level or below action during the campaign is described. But this is only a minor complaint.
Hastings maintains that the German "Army" was significantly superior in battle to the inexperienced American formations, and greatly superior to the battle worn British Army. Elite units such as Panzer Lehr and SS units were especially effective. He makes a compelling case, but does acknowledge that US elite units (e.g., Airborne divisions) were as good (or better) as anything the Germans had.
He also maintains that success in ground combat is due to the vigorous actions of a few (15%, he maintains). By assigning superior recruits to the Air Force or the other combat arms, the infantry received far less talented personnel, and their performance showed.
He is especially critical of the performance of the British and American Air Forces. Their unstinting focus on the combined bomber offensive against the German homeland led to a disgraceful performance when required to support ground troops. They also absorbed a major portion of both talented recruits and industrial production.
Hastings is also critical of specific Allied weapons, such as the Sherman tank. I think he is pretty much on the mark with this, but he appears to miss some considerations. Since all US armor had to be transported great distances, smaller size and weight was desirable if not necessary.
In his critique of Allied ground combat weapons, he is strangely muted in praise of the Garand M-1. Most American battlefield commanders recognized this semiauto rifle as a critical advantage for the American soldier. Hastings rationalizes his position by his claim that only a small percentage of the forces use their weapons effectively anyway. Also, he unfavorably compares the German MG 42 with the BAR. This is a little unfair, since the BAR is a squad level, shoulder weapon, while the MG 42 crew served, mounted machine gun. He also has little to say about the outstanding Allied artillery, but has high (and deserved) compliments for the 88mm dual purpose gun. Essentially, I think his overall point about the superiority of German arms is well taken, but only to a point.
February 24, 2018
Overlord - Max Hastings
I quite enjoyed this over 400 page historical piece on the Battle of Normandy. It’s the second book from Max Hastings I have read, the first being The Secret War in 2017. His writing style is what prompted me to pick up Overlord. The Secret War was not a favorite of mine, as can be seen in my review I had rather mixed thoughts but that was, in hindsight, primarily due to the subject matter. Espionage, ciphers and spies interest me far less than the finer points of field combat. Hastings even acknowledges in The Secret War that intelligence and code-breaking efforts are futile without the necessarily field capabilities and response time. Thus, it piques my interest far more to read over the specifics of battle. So to this end, I thoroughly found Overlord to be a compelling retelling and analysis of the famed battle.
The issues I took up with Hastings writing style in his previous book, namely his absolute intensity of analysis and disputes with previously popular notions, became an absolute positive in this edition. The result is a completely new and fresh look at the events so many of us are already so familiar with. The Battle for Normandy has been covered in so many Movies, TV Shows, Video Games and Books that at this point one wonders what is left to cover? In this Hastings thrives, mixing his fresh retelling of the day by day events with enlightening analysis and evaluations of points not previously explored in depth. Tied with his expert use of sources throughout the pages of his book and his trademark essayist style of writing, Max Hastings’ Overlord pushes itself in my own opinion to the best book written on the subject of Normandy since The Longest Day, surpassing perhaps even that.
I’ll no doubt start with my favorite aspect of the book, its composition. Hastings presents an amazing set of content in every Chapter he puts forward. No single chapter is simply a retelling of the events that transpired, each contains expert analysis and evaluations. I honestly believe that it is an impressive feat to include such refreshing insights on a topic that even by 1984 had been one of the most covered Battles/Campaigns in the history of mankind. 1984 marked 40 years since the Battle for Normandy, a point where many mistruths and rumors still persisted about the battle. The more junior elements involved, Officers, NCOs and Soldiers, were still alive and well to debate them.
But where Hastings sets himself apart from other Historians such as Beevor, Schama and Lewis is his distinct refusal to adhere to a narrative writing style. His works are in a methodical essayist style, true to form. His writings rarely, if ever, contain a storyteller’s embellishment and every point he makes is articulated and smooth. I really enjoyed how well he structures his writing, and how tastefully he utilizes quotes and evidence. A lot of History writers effectively let evidence and quotes tell the story, whereas Hastings uses them as a vital ally in what is very clearly his work. In essence, if I was to summarize, Hastings acts like a Lawyer, sometimes prosecuting, sometimes defending, sometimes both. It’s this form that he employs from start to finish and what gives his work its most unique strength. Not to mention, he wins my heart with plenty of well placed maps and diagrams.
Sourcing is a subject I wanted to touch on further. There exists many works so devoid of solid sources that one does begin to poke holes in their legitimacy. David Talbot’s The Devil’s Chessboard bordered on this. While being a supremely entertaining read, its subject matter lent itself more to the side of conjecture and theory than solid fact based evidence. That book was, however, a book supremely based in theory all the way to its conclusion, being about the Kennedy murder after all. Then again, there are books that rely supremely on sources and external work far too much. Beevor falls in this category often in his work, as do many other less popular writers. No great history book lends itself simply to recording evidence and events from primary and secondary sources. How does Hastings exactly avoid either of these categories and establish a style that is uniquely his own? It definitely starts with his sourcing.
Make no mistake, Hastings makes great and numerous use of sources, especially first hand ones. At the back of his book is direct sources, statistics and a glossary extending almost 100 pages, but it is between his chapters that counts the most. His quotes are not cut and spread, they are delivered in paragraph size, with the subject matter rarely straying from the point. I could have learned a lot from this kind of writing in my own exams! Whenever he seeks to make a point of his own, something he does quite often, he’s sure to back up any claim he makes with evidence and commendable theory. He also employs the most important asset a historian has, his own opinion. Anyone can formulate a certain opinion on any historical event, but Hastings does so in the only way I assume he can, with expertise. This isn’t the easiest to explain, so I will take one quote from the book to demonstrate my meaning:
“The principal problem in almost every attack on every battle-field is to maintain momentum. Every instinct, especially among inexperienced soldiers, is to take cover under fire. Instinct is reinforced when the bodies of others who have failed to do so lie all around. It requires a considerable act of will to persuade limbs to act which have suddenly acquired an immobility of their own. Inexperienced troops find it notoriously difficult to assess the extent of resistance and risk. On some occasions this can be to their advantage – or rather, that of their commanders – because it leads them to perform acts that more seasoned soldiers would not be so foolhardy as to attempt. But on Omaha the 29th Division, in its first experience of combat, deprived in the first hours of many of its officers, dismayed by its losses and confused by its predicament, became dangerously paralyzed. The veteran 1st Division, on its left, performed significantly better – indeed, most Americans later agreed that without ‘The Big Red One’ the battle would have been lost.”
Where other Historians may simply explain events and draw simple evaluations of the circumstances, Hastings employs his own unique evaluations and insights, that one’s mind doesn’t immediately come to when reading the raw events. Despite being so honed, Hastings makes pains to avoid burrowing into an emotional narrative structure, and is sure to keep himself straight to the point throughout the book. All this, through my somewhat incoherent structure, you can tell I really enjoyed.
Without spoiling the ‘story’, which is a convoluted concept considering this is human history I’m reviewing, my final points will be on the subject matter itself. As I touched on before the Battle of Normandy, also known as Operation Overlord or slightly incorrectly as ‘D-Day’, has been covered possibly more than any other wartime event in history. It’s associated images and outcomes are iconic, and places itself possibly as the most popularly revered battle in human history. This is as true today as it was in 1984 upon the books writing, with a good majority of influential works on the topic being written in the 1950s and 60s. Hence, the subject matter itself lends to the more overdone topics in history. By the time I was 10 years old, through simply movies and TV, I was already familiar with what the Battle for Normandy was, before any other historical event ever. Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan is more than likely the most influential war film ever made which, for those who haven’t seen it, touches on the exact same areas. The point I’m making is it is no small task to generate new and interesting discussion on a subject so written, recorded and filmed to death it is unlikely to even be forgotten, even in an apocalypse. Yet somehow, I truly found Max Hastings’ Overlord to excel at just that. It presents viewpoints I had never even considered, even with information I was previously familiar with. Within the Book’s 12 Chapters, nothing makes itself more prominent. I honestly felt as if I was learning about something completely new a majority of the time, which isn’t magic: I honestly believe good history writers can turn familiar topics into wondrous new discourse. The Battle for Normandy is given a new lease on it’s exhilarating months of tension with this book, and it certainly deserves it.
To summarize what has been a rather joyous review for me, I will admit that I find no wrong with this book. It does it’s job quite well. Non-fiction for me is judged very differently to fiction, but Hastings work here is nothing other than beautiful. I think it would be accessible for all levels of History readers, it contains insights and information for everyone to enjoy, as well my classic love: maps and diagrams! I must say, this is certainly going on my favorites list. I think I need to find some bad books to review, or I’ll look to biased! Either way, such a wonderful title. Combines fine-tuned insights and analysis as well as impartial retelling to paint a picture unique from any other work on the subject. The book itself counts over 500 pages, but the content is contained in about 420 of these. I finished in a little under two weeks with light reading. It’s getting a 10/10 for me.
I quite enjoyed this over 400 page historical piece on the Battle of Normandy. It’s the second book from Max Hastings I have read, the first being The Secret War in 2017. His writing style is what prompted me to pick up Overlord. The Secret War was not a favorite of mine, as can be seen in my review I had rather mixed thoughts but that was, in hindsight, primarily due to the subject matter. Espionage, ciphers and spies interest me far less than the finer points of field combat. Hastings even acknowledges in The Secret War that intelligence and code-breaking efforts are futile without the necessarily field capabilities and response time. Thus, it piques my interest far more to read over the specifics of battle. So to this end, I thoroughly found Overlord to be a compelling retelling and analysis of the famed battle.
The issues I took up with Hastings writing style in his previous book, namely his absolute intensity of analysis and disputes with previously popular notions, became an absolute positive in this edition. The result is a completely new and fresh look at the events so many of us are already so familiar with. The Battle for Normandy has been covered in so many Movies, TV Shows, Video Games and Books that at this point one wonders what is left to cover? In this Hastings thrives, mixing his fresh retelling of the day by day events with enlightening analysis and evaluations of points not previously explored in depth. Tied with his expert use of sources throughout the pages of his book and his trademark essayist style of writing, Max Hastings’ Overlord pushes itself in my own opinion to the best book written on the subject of Normandy since The Longest Day, surpassing perhaps even that.
I’ll no doubt start with my favorite aspect of the book, its composition. Hastings presents an amazing set of content in every Chapter he puts forward. No single chapter is simply a retelling of the events that transpired, each contains expert analysis and evaluations. I honestly believe that it is an impressive feat to include such refreshing insights on a topic that even by 1984 had been one of the most covered Battles/Campaigns in the history of mankind. 1984 marked 40 years since the Battle for Normandy, a point where many mistruths and rumors still persisted about the battle. The more junior elements involved, Officers, NCOs and Soldiers, were still alive and well to debate them.
But where Hastings sets himself apart from other Historians such as Beevor, Schama and Lewis is his distinct refusal to adhere to a narrative writing style. His works are in a methodical essayist style, true to form. His writings rarely, if ever, contain a storyteller’s embellishment and every point he makes is articulated and smooth. I really enjoyed how well he structures his writing, and how tastefully he utilizes quotes and evidence. A lot of History writers effectively let evidence and quotes tell the story, whereas Hastings uses them as a vital ally in what is very clearly his work. In essence, if I was to summarize, Hastings acts like a Lawyer, sometimes prosecuting, sometimes defending, sometimes both. It’s this form that he employs from start to finish and what gives his work its most unique strength. Not to mention, he wins my heart with plenty of well placed maps and diagrams.
Sourcing is a subject I wanted to touch on further. There exists many works so devoid of solid sources that one does begin to poke holes in their legitimacy. David Talbot’s The Devil’s Chessboard bordered on this. While being a supremely entertaining read, its subject matter lent itself more to the side of conjecture and theory than solid fact based evidence. That book was, however, a book supremely based in theory all the way to its conclusion, being about the Kennedy murder after all. Then again, there are books that rely supremely on sources and external work far too much. Beevor falls in this category often in his work, as do many other less popular writers. No great history book lends itself simply to recording evidence and events from primary and secondary sources. How does Hastings exactly avoid either of these categories and establish a style that is uniquely his own? It definitely starts with his sourcing.
Make no mistake, Hastings makes great and numerous use of sources, especially first hand ones. At the back of his book is direct sources, statistics and a glossary extending almost 100 pages, but it is between his chapters that counts the most. His quotes are not cut and spread, they are delivered in paragraph size, with the subject matter rarely straying from the point. I could have learned a lot from this kind of writing in my own exams! Whenever he seeks to make a point of his own, something he does quite often, he’s sure to back up any claim he makes with evidence and commendable theory. He also employs the most important asset a historian has, his own opinion. Anyone can formulate a certain opinion on any historical event, but Hastings does so in the only way I assume he can, with expertise. This isn’t the easiest to explain, so I will take one quote from the book to demonstrate my meaning:
“The principal problem in almost every attack on every battle-field is to maintain momentum. Every instinct, especially among inexperienced soldiers, is to take cover under fire. Instinct is reinforced when the bodies of others who have failed to do so lie all around. It requires a considerable act of will to persuade limbs to act which have suddenly acquired an immobility of their own. Inexperienced troops find it notoriously difficult to assess the extent of resistance and risk. On some occasions this can be to their advantage – or rather, that of their commanders – because it leads them to perform acts that more seasoned soldiers would not be so foolhardy as to attempt. But on Omaha the 29th Division, in its first experience of combat, deprived in the first hours of many of its officers, dismayed by its losses and confused by its predicament, became dangerously paralyzed. The veteran 1st Division, on its left, performed significantly better – indeed, most Americans later agreed that without ‘The Big Red One’ the battle would have been lost.”
Where other Historians may simply explain events and draw simple evaluations of the circumstances, Hastings employs his own unique evaluations and insights, that one’s mind doesn’t immediately come to when reading the raw events. Despite being so honed, Hastings makes pains to avoid burrowing into an emotional narrative structure, and is sure to keep himself straight to the point throughout the book. All this, through my somewhat incoherent structure, you can tell I really enjoyed.
Without spoiling the ‘story’, which is a convoluted concept considering this is human history I’m reviewing, my final points will be on the subject matter itself. As I touched on before the Battle of Normandy, also known as Operation Overlord or slightly incorrectly as ‘D-Day’, has been covered possibly more than any other wartime event in history. It’s associated images and outcomes are iconic, and places itself possibly as the most popularly revered battle in human history. This is as true today as it was in 1984 upon the books writing, with a good majority of influential works on the topic being written in the 1950s and 60s. Hence, the subject matter itself lends to the more overdone topics in history. By the time I was 10 years old, through simply movies and TV, I was already familiar with what the Battle for Normandy was, before any other historical event ever. Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan is more than likely the most influential war film ever made which, for those who haven’t seen it, touches on the exact same areas. The point I’m making is it is no small task to generate new and interesting discussion on a subject so written, recorded and filmed to death it is unlikely to even be forgotten, even in an apocalypse. Yet somehow, I truly found Max Hastings’ Overlord to excel at just that. It presents viewpoints I had never even considered, even with information I was previously familiar with. Within the Book’s 12 Chapters, nothing makes itself more prominent. I honestly felt as if I was learning about something completely new a majority of the time, which isn’t magic: I honestly believe good history writers can turn familiar topics into wondrous new discourse. The Battle for Normandy is given a new lease on it’s exhilarating months of tension with this book, and it certainly deserves it.
To summarize what has been a rather joyous review for me, I will admit that I find no wrong with this book. It does it’s job quite well. Non-fiction for me is judged very differently to fiction, but Hastings work here is nothing other than beautiful. I think it would be accessible for all levels of History readers, it contains insights and information for everyone to enjoy, as well my classic love: maps and diagrams! I must say, this is certainly going on my favorites list. I think I need to find some bad books to review, or I’ll look to biased! Either way, such a wonderful title. Combines fine-tuned insights and analysis as well as impartial retelling to paint a picture unique from any other work on the subject. The book itself counts over 500 pages, but the content is contained in about 420 of these. I finished in a little under two weeks with light reading. It’s getting a 10/10 for me.
August 12, 2011
So far this is my favorite book on the subject because Hastings does not favor any side in his analysis. Instead, he points out mistakes made by all sides. The reader comes away with the idea that the Germans were masters of the tactical battlefield, but strategically incompetent.
June 13, 2025
Among a plethora of companions, this is one of the landmark books written about D-Day (at least in Britain) and is an excellent summary of the greatest seaborne invasion in the history of warfare. As Sir Max himself comments, the planning for D-Day was extraordinary, and “its accomplishment remains the greatest organizational achievement of the Second World War, a feat of staff-work that has dazzled history, a monument to the imagination and brilliance of thousands of British and American planners and logisticians which may never be surpassed in war.”
The more I have reflected on D-Day and the Second World War in general, the more I want to modify Max Hastings' central idea that the German soldier was measurably superior to his Allied counterpart. I would contend that the Allies aimed to win the war at the minimum cost in men’s lives, and to use to the full their main resource: money and materiel. On the other hand, while the Germans were often courageous tactically to the point of extinction, such actions make little military sense and seem to inevitably lead to defeat. This, indeed, is the outcome in Normandy. It is also striking that the Germans, on the rare occasions they switched to the attack in Normandy, faced the same challenges as the Allies did. Hastings does make many of these points in passing, but overall, I feel he is a little too disparaging of the military abilities of the Allies and rather too generous to the Germans. In the end, I think these differences come down to the radically different ways the Allies and Germans approached the war and are reflective of the differences between liberal democracies on the one hand and a brutal, dictatorial and morally bankrupt regime on the other.
One aspect of this book that I appreciated was how it handles Monty. I think it’s fair to say that Monty was his own worst enemy, and I think Sir Max hits the nail on the head when he says that, “Throughout his military career, a worm of self-destruction in the austere, awkward little man in the beret caused him to disparage the contribution of his peers, shamelessly to seize the credit for the achievements of others, and rewrite the history of his own battlefield planning to conform with the reality of what took place. These were weaknesses which would come close to destroying him, for they gained him few friends. His staff and subordinates admired and were fascinated by him; few found it possible to like him…Montgomery’s self-esteem, at its most conspicuous in his dealings with Americans, rested upon his faith in himself as a supreme professional, a monkish student of war who understood the conduct of military operations in a way that escaped less dedicated commanders, such as Alexander and Eisenhower, who did not aspire to his summits of military intellectualism.”
Again, “Many senior officers in his armies went through the war quite unaware of the dark side of Montgomery’s character, the conceit and moments of pettiness, the indifference to truth where it reflected upon himself, the capacity for malice. And perhaps these very vices contributed to Montgomery a quality lacking in many brave and famous British generals – the iron will to prevail...this essentially cold, insensitive man was devoted to winning.”
And again, “A great professional soldier caused so much of the controversy about the Normandy campaign to focus upon his own actions. By his determination to reap the maximum personal credit for victory and to distort history to conform with his own advance planning, he also heaped upon himself the lion’s share of responsibility for much that went wrong in Normandy…part of Montgomery’s exceptional quality as a commander lay in his ability to retain an atmosphere of poise, balance and security within his armies when a less self-disciplined general could have allowed dismay and disappointment to seep through the ranks. Montgomery served his own interests and those of his men very well by maintaining his insistence to his subordinates that all was going to plan. But he did himself a great disservice by making the same assertions in private to Eisenhower, Churchill, Tedder and even his unshakeable patron, Brooke.”
Hastings also highlights the importance of a powerful patron to Montgomery’s enduring success, as without Brooke, it is unlikely that Montgomery would ever have gained the chance to display his qualities in the highest commands.
In the end, Montgomery and the campaign in Normandy are completely inseparable, and Sir Max rightly highlights that much attention since the war has been focused on the issue of whether Montgomery’s strategy in Normandy did or did not work as he had intended. The implicit assumption is that if it did not, his methods were unsound. “Yet his initial plan to seize Caen, and his later movements to envelop the town, seem admirably conceived. The failure lay in their execution…the British experience during the June battles gave their commanders little cause for satisfaction about the fighting power of many of their troops, the tactics that they had been taught to employ, or the subordinate commanders at divisional and corps level by whom they were led…Montgomery’s massive conceit masked the extent to which his own generalship in Normandy fell victim to the inability of his army to match the performance of their opponents on the battlefield…it proved too much to ask a citizen army in the fifth year of war, with the certainty of victory in the distance, to display the same sacrificial courage as Hitler’s legions, faced with the collapse of everything that in the perversion of Nazism they held dear.”
In drawing these strands together, I again let Sir Max speak for himself: “It is not that the Allied armies in Normandy were seriously incompetent; merely that the margin of German professional superiority was sufficient to cause the Allies very great difficulties…They [Bradley and Montgomery] had not been sent to Normandy to demonstrate the superiority of their fighting men to those of Hitler, but to win the war at tolerable cost – a subtly but importantly different objective…Normandy was a campaign which perfectly exemplified the strengths and weaknesses of the democracies. The invasion was a product of dazzling organization and staff work, and marvelous technical ingenuity, Once the armies were ashore, there was no firework display of military brilliance. Instead, for the armies, there was a steady, sometimes clumsy learning process. Each operation profited from the mistakes of the last, used massed firepower to wear down the Germans, absorbed disappointment without trauma. This last was a true reflection of the nature of the struggle: most German commanders, amidst the insuperable difficulties of grappling both with Hitler and the Allies, declined towards a state bordering on hysteria. Among the Allied armies, however, there was sometimes gloom, but never real alarm or nervousness.” It is hard to argue with the substance of that paragraph, my reservations above notwithstanding. Nevertheless, I for one am glad that the liberal democracies remained true to themselves and waged war in a way that was in keeping with their basic decency, and in a way that was consented to (broadly) by those involved. Nazi Germany had to be defeated, and while I have little interest in counterfactuals it is hard to conceive of a way in which it could have been defeated more quickly and with less loss of life. This book will undoubtedly deepen your understanding of one of the key periods in the journey to that victory, and it certainly has deepened mine.
The more I have reflected on D-Day and the Second World War in general, the more I want to modify Max Hastings' central idea that the German soldier was measurably superior to his Allied counterpart. I would contend that the Allies aimed to win the war at the minimum cost in men’s lives, and to use to the full their main resource: money and materiel. On the other hand, while the Germans were often courageous tactically to the point of extinction, such actions make little military sense and seem to inevitably lead to defeat. This, indeed, is the outcome in Normandy. It is also striking that the Germans, on the rare occasions they switched to the attack in Normandy, faced the same challenges as the Allies did. Hastings does make many of these points in passing, but overall, I feel he is a little too disparaging of the military abilities of the Allies and rather too generous to the Germans. In the end, I think these differences come down to the radically different ways the Allies and Germans approached the war and are reflective of the differences between liberal democracies on the one hand and a brutal, dictatorial and morally bankrupt regime on the other.
One aspect of this book that I appreciated was how it handles Monty. I think it’s fair to say that Monty was his own worst enemy, and I think Sir Max hits the nail on the head when he says that, “Throughout his military career, a worm of self-destruction in the austere, awkward little man in the beret caused him to disparage the contribution of his peers, shamelessly to seize the credit for the achievements of others, and rewrite the history of his own battlefield planning to conform with the reality of what took place. These were weaknesses which would come close to destroying him, for they gained him few friends. His staff and subordinates admired and were fascinated by him; few found it possible to like him…Montgomery’s self-esteem, at its most conspicuous in his dealings with Americans, rested upon his faith in himself as a supreme professional, a monkish student of war who understood the conduct of military operations in a way that escaped less dedicated commanders, such as Alexander and Eisenhower, who did not aspire to his summits of military intellectualism.”
Again, “Many senior officers in his armies went through the war quite unaware of the dark side of Montgomery’s character, the conceit and moments of pettiness, the indifference to truth where it reflected upon himself, the capacity for malice. And perhaps these very vices contributed to Montgomery a quality lacking in many brave and famous British generals – the iron will to prevail...this essentially cold, insensitive man was devoted to winning.”
And again, “A great professional soldier caused so much of the controversy about the Normandy campaign to focus upon his own actions. By his determination to reap the maximum personal credit for victory and to distort history to conform with his own advance planning, he also heaped upon himself the lion’s share of responsibility for much that went wrong in Normandy…part of Montgomery’s exceptional quality as a commander lay in his ability to retain an atmosphere of poise, balance and security within his armies when a less self-disciplined general could have allowed dismay and disappointment to seep through the ranks. Montgomery served his own interests and those of his men very well by maintaining his insistence to his subordinates that all was going to plan. But he did himself a great disservice by making the same assertions in private to Eisenhower, Churchill, Tedder and even his unshakeable patron, Brooke.”
Hastings also highlights the importance of a powerful patron to Montgomery’s enduring success, as without Brooke, it is unlikely that Montgomery would ever have gained the chance to display his qualities in the highest commands.
In the end, Montgomery and the campaign in Normandy are completely inseparable, and Sir Max rightly highlights that much attention since the war has been focused on the issue of whether Montgomery’s strategy in Normandy did or did not work as he had intended. The implicit assumption is that if it did not, his methods were unsound. “Yet his initial plan to seize Caen, and his later movements to envelop the town, seem admirably conceived. The failure lay in their execution…the British experience during the June battles gave their commanders little cause for satisfaction about the fighting power of many of their troops, the tactics that they had been taught to employ, or the subordinate commanders at divisional and corps level by whom they were led…Montgomery’s massive conceit masked the extent to which his own generalship in Normandy fell victim to the inability of his army to match the performance of their opponents on the battlefield…it proved too much to ask a citizen army in the fifth year of war, with the certainty of victory in the distance, to display the same sacrificial courage as Hitler’s legions, faced with the collapse of everything that in the perversion of Nazism they held dear.”
In drawing these strands together, I again let Sir Max speak for himself: “It is not that the Allied armies in Normandy were seriously incompetent; merely that the margin of German professional superiority was sufficient to cause the Allies very great difficulties…They [Bradley and Montgomery] had not been sent to Normandy to demonstrate the superiority of their fighting men to those of Hitler, but to win the war at tolerable cost – a subtly but importantly different objective…Normandy was a campaign which perfectly exemplified the strengths and weaknesses of the democracies. The invasion was a product of dazzling organization and staff work, and marvelous technical ingenuity, Once the armies were ashore, there was no firework display of military brilliance. Instead, for the armies, there was a steady, sometimes clumsy learning process. Each operation profited from the mistakes of the last, used massed firepower to wear down the Germans, absorbed disappointment without trauma. This last was a true reflection of the nature of the struggle: most German commanders, amidst the insuperable difficulties of grappling both with Hitler and the Allies, declined towards a state bordering on hysteria. Among the Allied armies, however, there was sometimes gloom, but never real alarm or nervousness.” It is hard to argue with the substance of that paragraph, my reservations above notwithstanding. Nevertheless, I for one am glad that the liberal democracies remained true to themselves and waged war in a way that was in keeping with their basic decency, and in a way that was consented to (broadly) by those involved. Nazi Germany had to be defeated, and while I have little interest in counterfactuals it is hard to conceive of a way in which it could have been defeated more quickly and with less loss of life. This book will undoubtedly deepen your understanding of one of the key periods in the journey to that victory, and it certainly has deepened mine.
August 16, 2023
I've read quite a few Max Hastings' books and this is among the best. The story is a concentrated one, running from June through to August 1944. And this allows Hastings the time and space to cover events in some detail. First written in 1984 - my edition is a 1993 one (original price: £25!) - Hastings was able to interview some of the people involved in the D-Day operations. Including Germans. I don't know if his analysis of events has been surpassed and challenged by a more up-to-date study of the Normandy landings - given that Hastings' book is nearly forty years old, I'm sure this must be the case - but many of the conclusions he draws seem sensible and even-handed. As a patriot it must've been hard for him to acknowledge the fighting abilities of the Germans over the Allies. Time after time he makes the point that the Germans were better fighters, had better equipment and were better led. And that when the Allies met the Germans on equal terms it was the Germans who almost always won. There were many incredible acts of bravery by Allied individuals and regiments. But Hastings makes the claim at the end that the Wehrmacht - from a fighting point of view and nothing else - was one of the greatest army's ever assembled. Attrition, air-power, artillery and an over-abundance of materiel saved the day for the Allies. Plus the sacrifices and hard-fighting endured by the Russians on the Eastern Front. And thank goodness for that!
April 12, 2023
Very thorough account of D Day and the battle for Normandy. Copious bloodshed and horror, bravery, and perennial human folly. It can be repetitive at times, but this is the outcome of Hastings' thrive to be objective, I think. The nature of the piece of history he is telling.
July 16, 2023
Muy interesante el hecho de que el ejército alemán era muy superior a los ejércitos aliados. Y que luchaban contra éstos y contra Hitler y sus locas órdenes.
September 4, 2018
Opera in realtà del 1982 , risente, parte finale del periodo della Guerra fredda in cui fu scritta, vedasi esaltazione dello spirito bellico del sodato tedesco che, all'epoca della scrittura, avrebbe dovuto affrontare i soldati della Armata Rossa.
Molti qui avrenno letto/visto il giorno più lungo (film invero anche un pò noioso) ma ben pochi sanno cosa accadde nei giorni successivi, dato che agli alleati occorsero 2 mesi per uscire dalla sacca normanna.
Superiorità - dovuta a anni di guerra - dei tedeschi, ma gli americani impareranno in breve tempo, mentre gli inglesi della guerra ne erano stanchi.
Spuperiorità dei Mezzi tedeschi (carri,Artiglieria etc...) ma ahiloro la macchina bellica americana sfornava 10 Carri per uno distrutto, mentre quella tedesca faticava a sostituirne 1 ogni uno distrutto...
Molti qui avrenno letto/visto il giorno più lungo (film invero anche un pò noioso) ma ben pochi sanno cosa accadde nei giorni successivi, dato che agli alleati occorsero 2 mesi per uscire dalla sacca normanna.
Superiorità - dovuta a anni di guerra - dei tedeschi, ma gli americani impareranno in breve tempo, mentre gli inglesi della guerra ne erano stanchi.
Spuperiorità dei Mezzi tedeschi (carri,Artiglieria etc...) ma ahiloro la macchina bellica americana sfornava 10 Carri per uno distrutto, mentre quella tedesca faticava a sostituirne 1 ogni uno distrutto...
June 16, 2024
This book is an immensely satisfying presentation of the details of D-Day and the invasion of Normandy.
It intersperses quotes from the era, via personal letters, diaries, and memoires (by both the Allies and the Germans).
You hear about the influx of Americans and Canadians to wartime Britain and many snapshots and comments illuminating the array of social interactions that brought about. You see the preparation and training, the embarkation, every moment of the Landing and the struggle for the Beaches.
I was reading, thinking, well, soon they'll get past the beaches, how much of the book have I read? I tapped the Percentage Read, and it was 12% lolol. Great! It tells the whole story until the Germans are driven out of France, including terribly frank and even-handed analysis of strengths and failures along the way.
This is a very subtle book, providing excellent, clarifying interpretation of events and the persons involved.
It intersperses quotes from the era, via personal letters, diaries, and memoires (by both the Allies and the Germans).
You hear about the influx of Americans and Canadians to wartime Britain and many snapshots and comments illuminating the array of social interactions that brought about. You see the preparation and training, the embarkation, every moment of the Landing and the struggle for the Beaches.
I was reading, thinking, well, soon they'll get past the beaches, how much of the book have I read? I tapped the Percentage Read, and it was 12% lolol. Great! It tells the whole story until the Germans are driven out of France, including terribly frank and even-handed analysis of strengths and failures along the way.
This is a very subtle book, providing excellent, clarifying interpretation of events and the persons involved.
April 18, 2017
4.5 Stars
Short, but detailed history of the famous battle and the aftermath. Hastings goes through the planning succinctly and gets to the landings pretty quickly. Most of the book, and most of the fighting was in the hedgerows in the Battle for Normandy, and this is really the focus of the book.
Highly recommended, with a couple of nits:
Hastings mentions other classics that cover areas more comprehensively, so he spends little time on most difficult landing at Omaha Beach. Pont du Hoc, where the Rangers scaled the heights isn't mentioned at all until a few chapters later when in one sentence he states that they still held the area at +5 days.
The book is well written, and the maps are very detailed, but there is a lack of coordination between the excellent writing and the great maps. Many of the villages mentioned in a section with an accompanying map are not on the map....and many troop movements are mentioned by compass direction, but none of the maps have N-S axis.
Short, but detailed history of the famous battle and the aftermath. Hastings goes through the planning succinctly and gets to the landings pretty quickly. Most of the book, and most of the fighting was in the hedgerows in the Battle for Normandy, and this is really the focus of the book.
Highly recommended, with a couple of nits:
Hastings mentions other classics that cover areas more comprehensively, so he spends little time on most difficult landing at Omaha Beach. Pont du Hoc, where the Rangers scaled the heights isn't mentioned at all until a few chapters later when in one sentence he states that they still held the area at +5 days.
The book is well written, and the maps are very detailed, but there is a lack of coordination between the excellent writing and the great maps. Many of the villages mentioned in a section with an accompanying map are not on the map....and many troop movements are mentioned by compass direction, but none of the maps have N-S axis.
August 28, 2022
Un enorme relato del desembarco aliado en Normandía y de los días posteriores, claves en el desenlace de la II Guerra mundial, escrito a principios de los años 80 y lleno de testimonios de protagonistas directos. Además de tener algunas narraciones que no desmerecen a la mejor novela bélica deja también bastantes reflexiones: la falta de coordinación entre la aviación y el ejército de tierra, la impulsividad estadounidense y la prudencia británica, el heroísmo alemán y lo difícil que fue el avance aliado en los días posteriores al desembarco y la ceguera de Hitler y sus fanáticos al negarse a aceptar una derrota inevitable. La verdad es que no entiendo cómo ha tardado tanto en ser publicado en español. Y para mí una conclusión: las guerras las gana siempre, no quién tiene un ejército más disciplinado o unos mandos más eficaces, sino quién tiene más recursos. Siempre. (Sigamos comprando gas a Rusia)
September 22, 2018
A very good account of the Normandy campaign, from the successful landings on June 6, through the two months of bloody warfare of attrition in the bocages of France, to the breakouts by the Americans that finally broke the German resistance in France. Casualty rates above 100% were common in units on both sides.
Hastings is not enthusiastic about the performance of Americans and British. Neither had really been fighting—even the bulk of the British men had spent the war defending the isles against an invasion that never came. They were generally outfought by the Germans. Generals at the top made decisions both good and bad but in Hastings view, with the army they had, avoiding the brutal slog was likely impossible.
There’s an interesting take on Montgomery’s self destructive behavior. Bradley comes out well, Patton and Eisenhower more or less mediocre, and the leadership of the air forces of both allied armies as totally dysfunctional.
Hastings is not enthusiastic about the performance of Americans and British. Neither had really been fighting—even the bulk of the British men had spent the war defending the isles against an invasion that never came. They were generally outfought by the Germans. Generals at the top made decisions both good and bad but in Hastings view, with the army they had, avoiding the brutal slog was likely impossible.
There’s an interesting take on Montgomery’s self destructive behavior. Bradley comes out well, Patton and Eisenhower more or less mediocre, and the leadership of the air forces of both allied armies as totally dysfunctional.
February 18, 2025
A friend lent me this book, only disappointment was that it added to my “Must Read” pile. Decided to put it to the front as I was almost up to date with the Book Club books and the desire to return it reasonably quickly.
I have read a number of books by Max Hastings and have”enjoyed” them all, and this is no exception. He has the ability to cover the strategic and tactical detail, as well as highlight individual combatants comments.
There is a realistic assessment of the merits of the respective armies, must admit that many of my assumptions were proved wrong, my defence is that this is the first book I have read specifically on D Day.
The version I read was the third edition, 1989, with the Postscript, worth the read on its own..
I have read a number of books by Max Hastings and have”enjoyed” them all, and this is no exception. He has the ability to cover the strategic and tactical detail, as well as highlight individual combatants comments.
There is a realistic assessment of the merits of the respective armies, must admit that many of my assumptions were proved wrong, my defence is that this is the first book I have read specifically on D Day.
The version I read was the third edition, 1989, with the Postscript, worth the read on its own..
November 9, 2020
A heroic piece of war time propaganda in preparation for future glorious wars.
July 15, 2021
Superb account of D-Day and the Battle for Normandy in 1944. Sir Max Hastings writing is balanced and powerful. His conclusion that the German fighting soldier was significantly superior to their allied counterparts is still contentious but his argument remains persuasive.
August 18, 2023
Um livro extraordinário para obter conhecimento, espírito crítico e capacidade de análise dos eventos do Dia D e da Batalha da Normandia.
March 21, 2013
Read a lot of this on my January trip, then got bogged down with the second half until the last few weeks or so. I was far more familiar with the initial landings so I found that section to be initially easier to digest. Hastings is a fine writer who makes thinks understandable even for a layman like myself, someone interested but not terribly knowledgable about WWII. I found Hastings perspective to be unique and quite different from the version of the events I grew up with (i.e. Heroic, brilliant Patton and stoic, beloved by his men Bradley being held up by despised Monty and political, pleasing Eisenhower). Hastings lays the blame for the slow advance on Allied deficiencies in all material except artillery and air power (my father would have conceded only tanks, and especially the American refusal to up gun Shermans), tactics, and, to some extent leadership and motivation (Allied forces fighting a war they felt they could win via superior resources vs. Nazis fighting for their lives and an apocalyptic battle for their race). Hastings argument seems sound, though he does not concentrate enough on the motivation or tactics but more on the Germans training and soldierly qualities. I'm told detractors called him von Hastings and I can see why, even if I don't fully share the sentiment. Most of all I desperately need to read more if I were to really weigh in, and I fervently wish I could have lent the book to my late father, who would have either argued with me tooth and nail about the details or would have gleefully antagonized more patriotic, jingoistic types with new arguments aimed at their sacred cows. Or maybe he would have just proclaimed the American Army and Air Force deficient as compared to his beloved Marines. Certainly the lack of cooperation between the two would be belittled when compared to USMC focus on close air support. I thank Edward for the excellent read.
July 10, 2022
'It has been the central theme of this book that the inescapable reality of the battle for Normandy was that when Allied troops met Germans on anything like equal terms, the Germans almost always prevailed. If the campaign is studied as an abstract military exercise, then all manner of possibilities become acceptable: the British could and should have got men into Caen on D-Day; they could and should have broken through at Villers-Bocage on 13 June; EPSOM and GOODWOOD should have led to decisive advances and the collapse of the German defences. As it happened, of course, nowhere did the Allies achieve decisive penetrations against high-quality German formations until these had been worn down by attrition and ruined by air attack. COBRA was a superb example of American dash and movement, but the vast American attacking force met only the shattered remains of Panzer Lehr and a few flanking battle-groups. Even these gave Collins’s men a hard time on the first day. The British began to make significant ground gains in August only when the Germans in front of them were greatly outnumbered and reduced to a few score tanks and guns.
The Allies in Normandy faced the finest fighting army of the war, one of the greatest that the world has ever seen. This is a simple truth that some soldiers and writers have been reluctant to acknowledge, partly for reasons of nationalistic pride, partly because it is a painful concession when the Wehrmacht and SS were fighting for one of the most obnoxious regimes of all time. The quality of the Germans’ weapons – above all tanks – was of immense importance. Their tactics were masterly: stubborn defence; concentrated local firepower from mortars and machine-guns; quick counter-attacks to recover lost ground. Units often fought on even when cut off, which was not a mark of fanaticism, but of sound tactical discipline, when such resistance in the rear did much to reduce the momentum of Allied advances, as in GOODWOOD. German attacks were markedly less skilful, even clumsy. But they adapted at once to the need for infiltration in the bocage, a skill of which few Allied units proved capable, even at the end. Their junior leadership was much superior to that of the Americans, perhaps also to that of the British.
The British were superior to the Americans in regimental leadership and staffwork. But they proved unable to generate the weight of fighting power – combat power, as the Americans call it – to smash through unweakened German defences. Germans who fought in the desert often expressed their surprise at the willingness of the British soldier to do what he believed was expected of him, and then to stop – even to surrender – when ammunition ran low, petrol ran out or he found himself encircled or deprived of officer leadership. Again and again in Normandy, British units fought superbly, with great bravery, only to lack the last ounce of drive or follow-through necessary to carry an objective or withstand a counter-attack. The inexperience of American, British and Canadian formations must be measured against the performance of 12th SS Panzer. This, too, was a ‘green’ division, which had never fought a battle before 7 June. The Canadian official historian wrote: ‘One suspects that the Germans contrived to get more out of their training than we did. Perhaps their attitude towards such matters was less casual than ours.’9 An ethos, a mood, pervades all armies at all times about what is and is not acceptable, what is expected. Within the Allied armies in Normandy in 1944–45, the ethos was that of men committed to doing an unwelcome but necessary job for the cause of democracy. The ethos of the German army, profoundly influenced by the threat from the east, was of a society fighting to the last to escape Götterdämmerung.
It is not that the Allied armies in Normandy were seriously incompetent; merely that the margin of German professional superiority was sufficient to cause the Allies very great difficulties.
Montgomery accomplished as much in Normandy as he could with the forces available to him. He is owed a greater debt for his performance than has been recognized in recent years, when his own untruths and boastfulness have been allowed to confuse the issue; and when the root problem of the limited abilities of his troops, and the dynamism of the Germans, has often been ignored.
One lesson from the fighting in Normandy seems important for any future battle that the armies of democracy might be called upon to fight. If a Soviet invasion force swept across Europe from the east, it would be unhelpful if contemporary British or American soldiers were trained and conditioned to believe that the level of endurance and sacrifice displayed by the Allies in Normandy would suffice to defeat the invaders. For an example to follow in the event of a future European battle, it will be necessary to look to the German army; and to the extraordinary defence that its men conducted in Europe in the face of all the odds against them, and in spite of their own demented Führer.
Liddell Hart described Normandy as ‘an operation that eventually went according to plan, but not according to timetable’.10 A good case can be made that the Allies’ disappointments and delays in gaining ground eventually worked to their advantage. Just as in Tunisia, more than a year earlier, Hitler’s obsessive reinforcement of failure caused him to thrust division after division into the cauldron for destruction. By the time the breakout came, no significant forces lay in front of the Allies before the German border. Paris fell on 25 August, Patton crossed the Meuse on 31 August, and was at Metz on the Moselle the next day. The Guards Armoured Division reached Brussels on 3 September, after advancing 75 miles in a single day. 11th Armoured reached Antwerp on the 4th, to find the port intact.
On 1 September, Eisenhower assumed direct control of the Allied armies in the field – to Montgomery’s bitter frustration, disappointment and chagrin. The Commander-in-Chief himself was the only man at 21st Army Group unable to understand the imperative by which American dominance among the armies demanded American command in the field. Williams and de Guingand attempted to explain this reality to him, and the fact that his loss of control was inevitable, ‘even if the Americans thought you the greatest general in the world – which they do not.’
At this juncture, there were perhaps 100 German tanks on the entire western front against over 2,000 in the Allied spearheads; 570 Luftwaffe aircraft against the Allies’ 14,000.'
The Allies in Normandy faced the finest fighting army of the war, one of the greatest that the world has ever seen. This is a simple truth that some soldiers and writers have been reluctant to acknowledge, partly for reasons of nationalistic pride, partly because it is a painful concession when the Wehrmacht and SS were fighting for one of the most obnoxious regimes of all time. The quality of the Germans’ weapons – above all tanks – was of immense importance. Their tactics were masterly: stubborn defence; concentrated local firepower from mortars and machine-guns; quick counter-attacks to recover lost ground. Units often fought on even when cut off, which was not a mark of fanaticism, but of sound tactical discipline, when such resistance in the rear did much to reduce the momentum of Allied advances, as in GOODWOOD. German attacks were markedly less skilful, even clumsy. But they adapted at once to the need for infiltration in the bocage, a skill of which few Allied units proved capable, even at the end. Their junior leadership was much superior to that of the Americans, perhaps also to that of the British.
The British were superior to the Americans in regimental leadership and staffwork. But they proved unable to generate the weight of fighting power – combat power, as the Americans call it – to smash through unweakened German defences. Germans who fought in the desert often expressed their surprise at the willingness of the British soldier to do what he believed was expected of him, and then to stop – even to surrender – when ammunition ran low, petrol ran out or he found himself encircled or deprived of officer leadership. Again and again in Normandy, British units fought superbly, with great bravery, only to lack the last ounce of drive or follow-through necessary to carry an objective or withstand a counter-attack. The inexperience of American, British and Canadian formations must be measured against the performance of 12th SS Panzer. This, too, was a ‘green’ division, which had never fought a battle before 7 June. The Canadian official historian wrote: ‘One suspects that the Germans contrived to get more out of their training than we did. Perhaps their attitude towards such matters was less casual than ours.’9 An ethos, a mood, pervades all armies at all times about what is and is not acceptable, what is expected. Within the Allied armies in Normandy in 1944–45, the ethos was that of men committed to doing an unwelcome but necessary job for the cause of democracy. The ethos of the German army, profoundly influenced by the threat from the east, was of a society fighting to the last to escape Götterdämmerung.
It is not that the Allied armies in Normandy were seriously incompetent; merely that the margin of German professional superiority was sufficient to cause the Allies very great difficulties.
Montgomery accomplished as much in Normandy as he could with the forces available to him. He is owed a greater debt for his performance than has been recognized in recent years, when his own untruths and boastfulness have been allowed to confuse the issue; and when the root problem of the limited abilities of his troops, and the dynamism of the Germans, has often been ignored.
One lesson from the fighting in Normandy seems important for any future battle that the armies of democracy might be called upon to fight. If a Soviet invasion force swept across Europe from the east, it would be unhelpful if contemporary British or American soldiers were trained and conditioned to believe that the level of endurance and sacrifice displayed by the Allies in Normandy would suffice to defeat the invaders. For an example to follow in the event of a future European battle, it will be necessary to look to the German army; and to the extraordinary defence that its men conducted in Europe in the face of all the odds against them, and in spite of their own demented Führer.
Liddell Hart described Normandy as ‘an operation that eventually went according to plan, but not according to timetable’.10 A good case can be made that the Allies’ disappointments and delays in gaining ground eventually worked to their advantage. Just as in Tunisia, more than a year earlier, Hitler’s obsessive reinforcement of failure caused him to thrust division after division into the cauldron for destruction. By the time the breakout came, no significant forces lay in front of the Allies before the German border. Paris fell on 25 August, Patton crossed the Meuse on 31 August, and was at Metz on the Moselle the next day. The Guards Armoured Division reached Brussels on 3 September, after advancing 75 miles in a single day. 11th Armoured reached Antwerp on the 4th, to find the port intact.
On 1 September, Eisenhower assumed direct control of the Allied armies in the field – to Montgomery’s bitter frustration, disappointment and chagrin. The Commander-in-Chief himself was the only man at 21st Army Group unable to understand the imperative by which American dominance among the armies demanded American command in the field. Williams and de Guingand attempted to explain this reality to him, and the fact that his loss of control was inevitable, ‘even if the Americans thought you the greatest general in the world – which they do not.’
At this juncture, there were perhaps 100 German tanks on the entire western front against over 2,000 in the Allied spearheads; 570 Luftwaffe aircraft against the Allies’ 14,000.'
March 1, 2009
A good battle book. What distinguishes Hastings’ book from some earlier efforts is his unwavering insistence that the German army was the best army on the field. He doesn’t dismiss the American, British, and Canadian forces, but simply sees them for what they were: conscript armies from western democracies with huge advantages in supplies and air power. This emphasis blunts some of the criticism of Montgomery, and implicitly suggests, pomposity aside, that for the most part Montgomery made the most of what he had to work with. On the other hand, Arnheim, a real (and bloody) monument to the British general's vanity, is not part of this story.
Interestingly, despite all the material wealth of the allies, the Germans also possessed advantages in equipment, especially in match-ups with American and British tanks. For example, the predominant American tank, the Sherman, was little match for any of the German tanks. However, the Americans had a zillion of them, and the Germans couldn’t replace in any remote way what they lost. As the June invasion stretched into the dog days of August, attrition would end up being the real killer of the German army. The final pages of this book, which focuses on the horrific killing ground of the Falaise gap, leaves you amazed that the Germans were able to recover at all. There are some dry patches in the book, due largely to the static nature of the battle, but Hastings is a master of battlefield stories, and Overlord has a treasure trove of heartbreak from all involved.
Interestingly, despite all the material wealth of the allies, the Germans also possessed advantages in equipment, especially in match-ups with American and British tanks. For example, the predominant American tank, the Sherman, was little match for any of the German tanks. However, the Americans had a zillion of them, and the Germans couldn’t replace in any remote way what they lost. As the June invasion stretched into the dog days of August, attrition would end up being the real killer of the German army. The final pages of this book, which focuses on the horrific killing ground of the Falaise gap, leaves you amazed that the Germans were able to recover at all. There are some dry patches in the book, due largely to the static nature of the battle, but Hastings is a master of battlefield stories, and Overlord has a treasure trove of heartbreak from all involved.
November 19, 2013
In Overlord, Max Hasting gives provides a very good overview of the Normandy campaign from the landings to the closing of the Falaise Gap. He focuses very little of the book on the preparation for D-Day and relatively appropriate treatment to the landings themselves which I appreciated since hey are covered in great detail in other books dedicated solely to those topics. While I know this book is a classic and provides a great history of the campaign I found Hasting's opinions and views (analysis is too strong a word) to be somewhat disappointing. Hastings does a good job of pointing out the bias in the views of other but his own at times show through. I found his tendency to make make sweeping generalizations without providing supporting evidence somewhat disappointing and frustrating. (Like the statement I just made, see how annoying it is) By the time I reached the last chapter, I was ready to write this book off. It was at this point that Hastings redeemed himself. The final chapter provides an excellent comparative analysis of the fighting quality of the individual soldiers of the Allied vs. German armies which was very really quite good. I might even recommend reading this book just for the last chapter it was so good. In summary, good historical overview of the Normandy campaign, great analysis of fighting quality of the soldiers, poor quality historical analysis in other regards. A solid 3.
December 4, 2018
In general I enjoy this book since as per usual , Max Hastings gives an unbiased view of the campaign while also writing a balanced book between the story of the ordinary soldier and the grand strategic and political conflicts of the general staffs.
However I found that a few of the quotes from various witnesses of the campaign that Max Hastings included in the book seemed to lack relevance or connection to the actions or argument they were intended to support.
I also deducted another star due to a few minor factual or what I believe is a sloppy or off hand comment.
For example the author makes a small mention that is somewhat critical about the deployment of the Mulberry harbour’s and how Mulberry harbour A was destroyed in the storm of June the 19th-21st. The author makes a quick mention ( and or insinuation) of how the harbour must have been badly built as the force of the storm was no more then force 6. However a little bit of research shows that the Phoenix cassions were only designed to last three-six months in summer weather. Also, records of the storm show that in two periods where force 7 winds were present.
The author exaggerates the length of a June day at one stage ( author states 18.5hr when in reality it is closer to 16hr) and somewhat falls into the trap of perpetuating a few Sherman Tank myths at times.
Minor issues I know but as I hold Max Hastings writing in great esteem I am probably a bit more critical.
Still, it’s a fine book and worth the read.
However I found that a few of the quotes from various witnesses of the campaign that Max Hastings included in the book seemed to lack relevance or connection to the actions or argument they were intended to support.
I also deducted another star due to a few minor factual or what I believe is a sloppy or off hand comment.
For example the author makes a small mention that is somewhat critical about the deployment of the Mulberry harbour’s and how Mulberry harbour A was destroyed in the storm of June the 19th-21st. The author makes a quick mention ( and or insinuation) of how the harbour must have been badly built as the force of the storm was no more then force 6. However a little bit of research shows that the Phoenix cassions were only designed to last three-six months in summer weather. Also, records of the storm show that in two periods where force 7 winds were present.
The author exaggerates the length of a June day at one stage ( author states 18.5hr when in reality it is closer to 16hr) and somewhat falls into the trap of perpetuating a few Sherman Tank myths at times.
Minor issues I know but as I hold Max Hastings writing in great esteem I am probably a bit more critical.
Still, it’s a fine book and worth the read.
November 25, 2023
An excellent overview.
Much has been said about D-Day - miles of column inches, and forests of trees have died to give us a wealth of information on a crucial campaign of WW2.
Subsequently, any new article or work on the subject, will always struggle to offer any new insights. Overlord falls into this category, but as an introductory text for the layman, I can think of none better.
With his usual verve, Hastings presents a well written, concise account. Unlike some of his peers, and the prevalent post war jingoism, Hastings takes the view that the German army was a superior fighting force to the Western Allies.
It's this appraisal that sets this work above its contemporaries. On the downside, however, Hastings fails to highlight that for all their fighting prowess and tactical skill, a war of attrition doomed the German army to defeat in Normandy.
Nor does Hastings highlight that when the Germans were able to launch a major offensive against the allies later in the war (Battle of the Bulge) the Germans were soundly beaten.
None the less, it does raise some good points and tackles other issues. As has been famously quoted, a Tiger tank was worth ten Shermans, but the Americans always had eleven...
Despite this, Overlord is a powerful piece of historical writing, and the descriptions of the struggle at the Faliase gap, are amongst this book's strengths.
Much has been said about D-Day - miles of column inches, and forests of trees have died to give us a wealth of information on a crucial campaign of WW2.
Subsequently, any new article or work on the subject, will always struggle to offer any new insights. Overlord falls into this category, but as an introductory text for the layman, I can think of none better.
With his usual verve, Hastings presents a well written, concise account. Unlike some of his peers, and the prevalent post war jingoism, Hastings takes the view that the German army was a superior fighting force to the Western Allies.
It's this appraisal that sets this work above its contemporaries. On the downside, however, Hastings fails to highlight that for all their fighting prowess and tactical skill, a war of attrition doomed the German army to defeat in Normandy.
Nor does Hastings highlight that when the Germans were able to launch a major offensive against the allies later in the war (Battle of the Bulge) the Germans were soundly beaten.
None the less, it does raise some good points and tackles other issues. As has been famously quoted, a Tiger tank was worth ten Shermans, but the Americans always had eleven...
Despite this, Overlord is a powerful piece of historical writing, and the descriptions of the struggle at the Faliase gap, are amongst this book's strengths.
February 21, 2016
Max Hasting's account of the first months of the Allies invasion of France is outstanding. At first, I thought the book would be a bashing of the Allies - that's what the liner notes suggested. Wht Hastings does, however, is to dissect the invasion, and the decisions of command in the field during the subsequent months. He examined both the Allied and the Nazi side, and found both to be wanting.
The detail is thorough, and some of the information was corroborated by my 93-year old neighbor, who landed at Normandy, and whom I had the pleasure to take to the French Embassy in 2015 to receive the French Legion of Honor for his service in France during WWII. One of the things Doug has told me was that they were deathly afraid of the American and British air support during the march to Paris. He said they would rather see the Luftwaffe, because they knew the German planes would shoot at them. When they saw American planes, they were never sure if they would be bombed or strafed by their own - and they eventually came to think that they would.
The detail is thorough, and some of the information was corroborated by my 93-year old neighbor, who landed at Normandy, and whom I had the pleasure to take to the French Embassy in 2015 to receive the French Legion of Honor for his service in France during WWII. One of the things Doug has told me was that they were deathly afraid of the American and British air support during the march to Paris. He said they would rather see the Luftwaffe, because they knew the German planes would shoot at them. When they saw American planes, they were never sure if they would be bombed or strafed by their own - and they eventually came to think that they would.
December 15, 2016
Hastings' book complements excellently Antony Beevor's more recent history of the Normandy campaign.
Hastings spends a good deal of time on the hardware of war and there are a number of pen and ink drawings of the large and small weapons used by both sides. Like Beevor he covers the D Day campaign from inception to the Allied break out but, unlike the more recent publication, dwells only fleetingly on the terrible effect of the battles of the Norman non-combatants and the deaths of Allied troops from friendly fire. Hastings, on the other hand, gives superb descriptions of the troops, weaponry and state of mind of the Germans and the Allies, as well as lengthy passages of the conflict between Montgomery and the American Generals.
Read both books and Ben McIntyre's book on Plan Fortitude and you have all you need to know about one of the greatest land battles in history.
David Lowther. Author of The Blue Pencil, Liberating Belsen and Two Families at War, all published by Sacristy Press
Hastings spends a good deal of time on the hardware of war and there are a number of pen and ink drawings of the large and small weapons used by both sides. Like Beevor he covers the D Day campaign from inception to the Allied break out but, unlike the more recent publication, dwells only fleetingly on the terrible effect of the battles of the Norman non-combatants and the deaths of Allied troops from friendly fire. Hastings, on the other hand, gives superb descriptions of the troops, weaponry and state of mind of the Germans and the Allies, as well as lengthy passages of the conflict between Montgomery and the American Generals.
Read both books and Ben McIntyre's book on Plan Fortitude and you have all you need to know about one of the greatest land battles in history.
David Lowther. Author of The Blue Pencil, Liberating Belsen and Two Families at War, all published by Sacristy Press
July 22, 2016
Es un libro entretenido pero no es nada de otro mundo. Tengo leidos otros libros sobre el Dia D y lo unico que podríamos decir "agrega" es testimonios realmente interesantes. El autor no hay duda que sabe como narrar los acontecimientos pero en los momentos de explicar las maniobras y los dias segun puedo interpretar no fue claro, si uno no tiene idea antes creo que podria llegar a pensar cualquier cosa.
June 11, 2018
Clear Eyed View
There are fewer heroes in this balanced appraisal of the allied attacks of the summer of 1944. The genius of the allies and the US was organizational, not tactical.
It is an important read to help reflect on our current attitudes toward the military and the use of force. We need to be more modest about our capabilities versus our current enemies.
There are fewer heroes in this balanced appraisal of the allied attacks of the summer of 1944. The genius of the allies and the US was organizational, not tactical.
It is an important read to help reflect on our current attitudes toward the military and the use of force. We need to be more modest about our capabilities versus our current enemies.
April 5, 2015
well written military historian's account of Overlord / battle for normandy. hastings draws upon his personal experience as a military officer to offer a cogent, tightly-written account of one of the most famous attacks in Western history.
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