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Warrant #1
Warrant: The Current Debate
Known for distinguished work in the fields of metaphysics and philosophy of religion, Alvin Plantinga ventures further into epistemology in this book and its companion volume, Warrant and Proper Function . Plantinga examines the nature of epistemic warrant; whatever it is that when added to true belief yields knowledge. This present volume surveys current contributions to the debate and paves the way for his own positive proposal in Warrant and Proper Function . This first volume serves as a good introduction to the central issues in contemporary epistemology.
- GenresPhilosophyNonfiction
240 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 1992
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348 people want to read
About the author
Alvin Plantinga
50 books367 followersHe is an American analytic philosopher, the John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Notre Dame and the inaugural holder of the Jellema Chair in Philosophy at Calvin College.
Plantinga is widely known for his work in philosophy of religion, epistemology, metaphysics and Christian apologetics.
He has delivered the Gifford Lectures three times and was described by TIME magazine as "America's leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God"
Plantinga is the current winner of the Templeton Prize.
Plantinga is widely known for his work in philosophy of religion, epistemology, metaphysics and Christian apologetics.
He has delivered the Gifford Lectures three times and was described by TIME magazine as "America's leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God"
Plantinga is the current winner of the Templeton Prize.
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
January 16, 2023
Boy, this was tough. I really want to read the third book in Plantinga’s warrant trilogy, and even though he says that you don’t need to read the first two books to understand the third, I thought the background information would be helpful. And I’m sure that will prove to be true, but man, analytic philosophy is a slog. I can’t remember the last time I needed to read most passages in a book twice and many passages three, four, five times to grasp their meaning. But onward I charge. Book two, I’m coming for you.
January 20, 2008
This book the first in what is now known as "Plantinga's warrant trilogy." (I review the other books as well.) This book was very helpful in my epistemological development, influential as well.
In this book Plantinga searches for that ellusive condition(s) that when added to true belief yields knowledge. Plantinga surveys major answers to the question, and concludes that they all fail. Plantinga uses many thought experiments to show that putative approaches to this question do not provide necessary or sufficient conditions for knowledge. He looks at prominent positions like internalism and externalism - he ultimatley sides with externalists who are reliabilists, but claims this isn't enough.
Plantinga ends by briefly tossing out what he will develop later into a theory of warrant that makes the cut. Specifically, a belief B has warrant if it is produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties, functioning in a congenial epistemic enviornment, according to a design plan successfully aimed at true belief, and B is subject to no undefeated-defeaters (this latter constraint isn't developed in the book. Also, see Michael Sudduth's paper on Plantinga, internalism and defeaters for an argument that this constriant adds an internalist character to Plantinga's position).
Lastly, Plantinga's prose in anything but arid. If philosophical explication was a stand-up comedy show (which some argue that it is!), Plantinga would headline nightly.
In this book Plantinga searches for that ellusive condition(s) that when added to true belief yields knowledge. Plantinga surveys major answers to the question, and concludes that they all fail. Plantinga uses many thought experiments to show that putative approaches to this question do not provide necessary or sufficient conditions for knowledge. He looks at prominent positions like internalism and externalism - he ultimatley sides with externalists who are reliabilists, but claims this isn't enough.
Plantinga ends by briefly tossing out what he will develop later into a theory of warrant that makes the cut. Specifically, a belief B has warrant if it is produced by properly functioning cognitive faculties, functioning in a congenial epistemic enviornment, according to a design plan successfully aimed at true belief, and B is subject to no undefeated-defeaters (this latter constraint isn't developed in the book. Also, see Michael Sudduth's paper on Plantinga, internalism and defeaters for an argument that this constriant adds an internalist character to Plantinga's position).
Lastly, Plantinga's prose in anything but arid. If philosophical explication was a stand-up comedy show (which some argue that it is!), Plantinga would headline nightly.
March 12, 2024
Alvin Plantinga's writing style is clunky and unnecessarily obtuse. His examples tend to use uncommon wording for which there are much more approachable options. For instance, I still do not know how to interpret his oft repeated "I am appeared to redly".
Another problem in his style is the use of "she" as the pronoun of an arbitrary person. This goes against the grain of the typical use of "he" to represent an arbitrary person of either sex. By using "she", his examples seem to refer to a specific female instead of an arbitrary man or woman.
As for the content, I was able to glean bits of philosophical insight here and there.
Another problem in his style is the use of "she" as the pronoun of an arbitrary person. This goes against the grain of the typical use of "he" to represent an arbitrary person of either sex. By using "she", his examples seem to refer to a specific female instead of an arbitrary man or woman.
As for the content, I was able to glean bits of philosophical insight here and there.
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October 13, 2020Edmund Gettier, in his short, landmark 1963 paper, demonstrated that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge. He gives a few counterexamples which rely mainly on the justification part.
In this book, Plantinga examines different suggestions which have been made for theories of knowledge. These all focus on justification or, as Plantinga prefers to call it, warrant. He demonstrates that each of the theories have their own problems.
In the sequels, Plantinga suggests his own epistemic framework and also discusses why it should be paired with a theistic worldview.
In this book, Plantinga examines different suggestions which have been made for theories of knowledge. These all focus on justification or, as Plantinga prefers to call it, warrant. He demonstrates that each of the theories have their own problems.
In the sequels, Plantinga suggests his own epistemic framework and also discusses why it should be paired with a theistic worldview.
February 20, 2015
And so begins Plantinga’s vaunted “Warrant Trilogy.” Reviewing this work presents some challenges for me. I read the books in reverse order (WCB, WPF, and finally WCD). Therefore, I have to resist the urge to fault Plantinga in WCD for leaving some points undeveloped when I know he developed them in WPF.
Plantinga begins his work by outlining what “internalism” entails. Internalism implies knowledge as “justification.” I am justified in knowing something if I have fulfilled my epistemic duty with regard to that knowledge. It is “internal” because it suggests special epistemic access.
Justification:
Connection between justification and knowledge
Connotes epistemic responsibility
Internal cognitive access
Match up with evidence
Internalism is often linked with classical or modern foundationalism. The ground of a belief’s justification is the same as the property by which I determine if I am justified in holding it (Plantinga 21).
Ordinary Foundationalism: The evidence of basis on which I form a belief is taken from other, logically prior beliefs. Beliefs that I do not accept on the basis of other beliefs are basic beliefs (68). A foundationalist will reject circular reasoning.
Another epistemological model is coherentism. Coherentism is not foundationalism. A coherentist will hold that belief B is properly basic for person S [iff] B coheres with the rest of S’s noetic structure. Coherentism is not concerned about the transmission of warrant but of its source (79).
Plantinga gives a number of reasons on why these internalist models fail. He then moves to externalist models.
EXTERNALISM
I do not have to have some internal access to truth-making functions. Plantinga lists Aristotle (de Anima and Posterior Analytics II) and Aquinas (ST 1 q. 84, 85) as externalists (183ff). Externalism is correct about warrant (if only as a denial of internalism). Most externalist models, however, do not (yet) offer strong enough systems.
What is “reliabilism” then?
1.1 Alstonian Justification
A person is justified in believing a proposition only if she believes it on the basis of a reliable indicator. But what is justification? A belief is justified if it is accepted on rational grounds accessible to the knower.
B. Questions about Alstonian Justification
B.1. Where does justification come from? Alston tries to distance himself from the received tradition which locates justification with deontological norms. Alston does not seem to think that justification (or warrant) is necessary for knowledge (“An Internalist Externalism,” Synthese 74 no. 3, p. 281).
B.2 Not sufficient for warrant. S’s belief that p is Alston-justified if it is accessible to S and is a reliable indicator of the truth of p. Plantinga points out that a number of beliefs could meet this condition but have no warrant (Plantinga 191). Something could be a reliable indicator of the truth but I could believe it on the basis of cognitive malfunction. A belief can be reliable by accident.
Evaluation:
Pro--Plantinga does a masterful job in what the title suggests: he summarizes the “current debate” concerning warrant and justification. In that he succeeds. Further, no matter how arcane or technical a discussion is, Plantinga always begins the chapter by reviewing what internalism, deontology, justification, and warrant mean at said point in the discussion.
Further, Plantinga’s discussion of key individuals can also serve as an entry-point for the reader to continue the study.
Con--I am not persuaded that some chapters were entirely relevant. Coherentism as an epistemology is important, but nobody cares about Bayesianism Coherentism. I seriously doubt the reader will come across a person who really understands Bayes’ Theorem and why it matters for your life. As such, the book could have been 40 pages shorter.
Plantinga begins his work by outlining what “internalism” entails. Internalism implies knowledge as “justification.” I am justified in knowing something if I have fulfilled my epistemic duty with regard to that knowledge. It is “internal” because it suggests special epistemic access.
Justification:
Connection between justification and knowledge
Connotes epistemic responsibility
Internal cognitive access
Match up with evidence
Internalism is often linked with classical or modern foundationalism. The ground of a belief’s justification is the same as the property by which I determine if I am justified in holding it (Plantinga 21).
Ordinary Foundationalism: The evidence of basis on which I form a belief is taken from other, logically prior beliefs. Beliefs that I do not accept on the basis of other beliefs are basic beliefs (68). A foundationalist will reject circular reasoning.
Another epistemological model is coherentism. Coherentism is not foundationalism. A coherentist will hold that belief B is properly basic for person S [iff] B coheres with the rest of S’s noetic structure. Coherentism is not concerned about the transmission of warrant but of its source (79).
Plantinga gives a number of reasons on why these internalist models fail. He then moves to externalist models.
EXTERNALISM
I do not have to have some internal access to truth-making functions. Plantinga lists Aristotle (de Anima and Posterior Analytics II) and Aquinas (ST 1 q. 84, 85) as externalists (183ff). Externalism is correct about warrant (if only as a denial of internalism). Most externalist models, however, do not (yet) offer strong enough systems.
What is “reliabilism” then?
1.1 Alstonian Justification
A person is justified in believing a proposition only if she believes it on the basis of a reliable indicator. But what is justification? A belief is justified if it is accepted on rational grounds accessible to the knower.
B. Questions about Alstonian Justification
B.1. Where does justification come from? Alston tries to distance himself from the received tradition which locates justification with deontological norms. Alston does not seem to think that justification (or warrant) is necessary for knowledge (“An Internalist Externalism,” Synthese 74 no. 3, p. 281).
B.2 Not sufficient for warrant. S’s belief that p is Alston-justified if it is accessible to S and is a reliable indicator of the truth of p. Plantinga points out that a number of beliefs could meet this condition but have no warrant (Plantinga 191). Something could be a reliable indicator of the truth but I could believe it on the basis of cognitive malfunction. A belief can be reliable by accident.
Evaluation:
Pro--Plantinga does a masterful job in what the title suggests: he summarizes the “current debate” concerning warrant and justification. In that he succeeds. Further, no matter how arcane or technical a discussion is, Plantinga always begins the chapter by reviewing what internalism, deontology, justification, and warrant mean at said point in the discussion.
Further, Plantinga’s discussion of key individuals can also serve as an entry-point for the reader to continue the study.
Con--I am not persuaded that some chapters were entirely relevant. Coherentism as an epistemology is important, but nobody cares about Bayesianism Coherentism. I seriously doubt the reader will come across a person who really understands Bayes’ Theorem and why it matters for your life. As such, the book could have been 40 pages shorter.
January 31, 2014
I will admit at the start that I am not smart enough to read this book. That said, I do think Plantinga is definitely on to something with his idea of Warrant. Unfortunately, this book hardly does it justice.
Plantinga is certain that Warrant is the fountainhead of knowledge, and that is fine, because he is writing the book, but he hardly does a good job of distinguishing this with the common idea of justification. In fact, through the whole book the reader is somewhat confused by what Plantinga means by justification and by warrant, as well. Plantinga doesn't seem to reject justificatory principles in epistemic wholeness, or what have you, but at the same time he doesn't seem to adhere to them either.
Instead of tackling this problem head on, what you find is a rather lengthy diatribe of fellow epistemologists who Plantinga finds displeasing. He could argue for his case much better by simply stating clearly what he thinks justification is, what he thinks warrant is, and why justification does not fit the bill for warrant, and further where justification does fit into our noetic structure. But what we find is a book full of Plantinga complaining about other epistemologists.
And this may be enlightening if in fact Plantinga actually evolved during the book to progress his arguments further. Instead what we find is the same trick used in ever single chapter, and just about on every single page. Take one epistemologists ideas about warrant and apply them to some impossible scenario that hardly makes any sense, and then determine that according to this persons understanding these impossible scenarios do in fact generate warrant for a person. Thus, the whole book is Plantinga calling every epistemologist guilty of almost a conspiracy of ad absurdum.
I would not recommend this book, and in fact I am sorry I read it myself. It seems to have little to do with Plantinga's main argument, which is found in the second book of this series. As I understand it, the Warrant series is an authority for any sense of rational epistemology, and I look forward to truly being able to understand it and take to heart its meaning. I only wish Plantinga could step down to the level of people who could still learn a great deal from him, who do not have the technical prowess his clearly possesses. That said, do not waste your time. Start with Warrant and Proper Function.
Plantinga is certain that Warrant is the fountainhead of knowledge, and that is fine, because he is writing the book, but he hardly does a good job of distinguishing this with the common idea of justification. In fact, through the whole book the reader is somewhat confused by what Plantinga means by justification and by warrant, as well. Plantinga doesn't seem to reject justificatory principles in epistemic wholeness, or what have you, but at the same time he doesn't seem to adhere to them either.
Instead of tackling this problem head on, what you find is a rather lengthy diatribe of fellow epistemologists who Plantinga finds displeasing. He could argue for his case much better by simply stating clearly what he thinks justification is, what he thinks warrant is, and why justification does not fit the bill for warrant, and further where justification does fit into our noetic structure. But what we find is a book full of Plantinga complaining about other epistemologists.
And this may be enlightening if in fact Plantinga actually evolved during the book to progress his arguments further. Instead what we find is the same trick used in ever single chapter, and just about on every single page. Take one epistemologists ideas about warrant and apply them to some impossible scenario that hardly makes any sense, and then determine that according to this persons understanding these impossible scenarios do in fact generate warrant for a person. Thus, the whole book is Plantinga calling every epistemologist guilty of almost a conspiracy of ad absurdum.
I would not recommend this book, and in fact I am sorry I read it myself. It seems to have little to do with Plantinga's main argument, which is found in the second book of this series. As I understand it, the Warrant series is an authority for any sense of rational epistemology, and I look forward to truly being able to understand it and take to heart its meaning. I only wish Plantinga could step down to the level of people who could still learn a great deal from him, who do not have the technical prowess his clearly possesses. That said, do not waste your time. Start with Warrant and Proper Function.
November 12, 2016
Upon re-reading I've upped my rating to five stars.
September 3, 2013
if you want to be caught up on epistemology, there is no better book
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews