In Malaise of Modernity, Charles Taylor focuses on the key modern concept of self-fulfillment, often attacked as the central support of what Christopher Lasch has called the culture of narcissism. To Taylor, self-fulfillment, although often expressed in self-centered ways, isn't necessarily a rejection of traditional values and social commitment; it also reflects something authentic and valuable in modern culture. Only by distinguishing what is good in this modern striving from what is socially and politically dangerous, Taylor says, can our age be made to deliver its promise.
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Charles Margrave Taylor CC GOQ FBA FRSC is a Canadian philosopher, and professor emeritus at McGill University. He is best known for his contributions to political philosophy, the philosophy of social science, history of philosophy and intellectual history. This work has earned him the prestigious Kyoto Prize, the Templeton Prize, the Berggruen Prize for Philosophy, and the John W. Kluge Prize, in addition to widespread esteem among philosophers. (Source: Wikipedia)
To Charles Taylor’s credit, he recognizes that his Massey Lecture "The Malaise of Modernity" is rendered deficient by its own constraints. He has neither the time nor the space to fully develop his argument, and even the first premise , that the search for individual “authenticity” in Western civilization is a malaise, doesn’t move beyond a skeletal outline.
It seems almost disingenuous, therefore, to criticize his work, but Taylor himself would not likely want to shut down discourse, for any reason, and I feel compelled to make a few observations.
The first is about Taylor’s seeming criticism of the inherent anthropocentrism of individual self-actualization or personal authenticity. He implies that the focus on humanity as the end goal of the universe is a great weakness in our culture’s drive to authenticity, then suggests that this anthropocentrism is unique to the postmodern world. Perhaps there is a subtlety missing in Taylor’s lecture because of its constraints, but every viewpoint Taylor discusses has anthropocentrism at its core, yet he only seems to see it as a weakness in the one.
The second is the way Taylor sees the tension between the two extremes of the authenticity debate. His position is that these two poles are the debate, implying that the two sides of the debate are populated by nearly equal sized groups. One side is filled with those who believe in and practice self-actualization, and the other side is filled with those who are opposed to the “narcissism” of self-fulfillment. Because these two sides are the debate, they cancel each other out, making the key to overcoming the malaise of self-actualization the retrieval of a supposedly hidden middle ground.
What Taylor’s book fails to address (and I suspect this is a genuine constraint of the book and not a downfall of Taylor’s) is that this “middle ground” doesn’t need to be retrieved because it already exists, although their population is minimal. In fact, there are really very few people who are capable of true authenticity, and even fewer are capable of authenticity devoid of anthropocentrism (and they are those who make up the pole of anthropocentric self-actualization). So those few who are truly engaged in self-actualization, those in touch with the “authentic” ideal, are not of the pole but the equator. They DO exist, and they are acted on upon by the poles on a regular basis. Which suggests that Taylor is not dealing with the real issue involved in his first malaise. He calls for a “retrieval” of this equatorial situation, but since it already exists one needs to ask how and why it is ineffective. What does that say about Western humanity? What does that say about the first malaise? How do we overthrow the malaise and make this equatorial “ideal” a potent rather than impotent element of the debate? How do we stop the poles from silencing the equator?
The Malaise of Modernity is a fine starting point, as Taylor himself suggests, and it does much to generate thought (particularly in the final chapter, “Against Fragmentation”), making it a book well worth reading. But if you are looking to Taylor for answers you will be disappointed. The Malaise of Modernity should generate questions. Use as directed and you will be just fine.
This is a very insightful book diagnosing (correctly) the issues of modern society. It looks in particular at individualism, instrumentalism and techno-bureaucracy’s hold on us and attempts to reframe the critiques that many levy at contemporary culture. While many sociologists, philosophers and cultural critics grasp at low-hanging fruit, Taylor decides to change the way we think of individualism as narcissistic, of pure instrumentalism as abusive and self-centered and, of technology as our supposed “iron cage”. In a certain way, Taylor has alleviated my cynicism and my “temptation to discern irreversible trends” where actually: “we see that there is a struggle here, whose outcome is continually up for grabs”.
We’ve got the diagnosis, now we just we need the right prescription.
Lots of people are critical of modernity and how it's made us selfish moral relativists. Charles Taylor agrees that this is possible, but he also thinks that's not necessarily a part of modernity. Instead, there's an ethic of authenticity that we should reclaim—one that values personal freedom, our own way of finding happiness, self-fulfillment, and communities that help us find these goals.
I enjoyed this, but I'm only gonna give it 3 stars because of how similar it was to the last Charles Taylor book I read. Also, this was a lecture Charles Taylor gave, so I just listened to the whole thing, my first audiobook.
I love the mission Taylor hands to us: "restoring the ideal of authenticity" to modern culture.
It's too easy to dismiss liberals as a lost cause. More often than not, a left-wing millenial strikes a thinking traditionalist as nonsensical, and one can easily conclude these kids are idiots and not worth bothering with. It's easy to sympathize with this conclusion, I think. The modern ideal of "authenticity", as Taylor puts it, too often manifests itself as "my right to do whatever I want without morality being forced upon me" (cough, Planned Parenthood, cough). It takes a discerning, patient, and benevolent mind to rummage through the crap our culture glamorizes and find the best in it. Taylor does this beautifully. Despite the intellectual rigor usually associated with emotionless academia, I sensed that what Taylor wanted to do here, more than make an insightful point or put forward a cogent argument, was give us *hope*.
"Authenticity is a valid ideal," he writes: the liberals and sentimental millenials aren't entirely driven by more than irrational self-indulgence. "You can argue in reason about ideals and about the conformity of practices to these ideals," he goes on: relativism and subjective definitions of "self-fulfillment" can be ostensibly proven nonsense; and finally, "these arguments can make a difference." He's writing for a reason. He wants to help our culture. The liberal millenials aren't a lost cause, and it's time to sit down and have a real conversation about how to live our lives.
"Articulacy here has a moral point, not just in correcting what may be wrong views but also in making the force of an ideal that people are already living by more palpable, more vivid for them; and by making it more vivid, empowering them to live up to it in a fuller and more integral fashion."
The last two chapters of this book were actually decent. But Charles Taylor tends to writes as if he just wants to sound smart. Most of his sentences could be simplified and shortened (especially in the first few chapters). The entire book was based off 3 points. He spends about 90 of those mainly talking on one and then puts the other 2 points in the last 30ish pages. I wish he would have done something similar with the first point. It could have been a good 50 page book. He was also very repetitive, and sentences were very hard to read. Technically this book was based off of his 5 lectures and other book. It probably would have been easier to listen to the book than read it, just because of the vocabulary he uses. It’s more difficult to try and engage in a book with long unnecessary words and ongoing sentences than to listen to it. He did address many modern problems that should be recognized by everyone. He definitely got me thinking about my own priorities and what I can do in my own life to change or help change some of these problems. He also got me self reflecting on my authenticity. He was able to use many examples which was good but it just wasn’t my writing style. I normally wouldn’t read a book like this but it was for a class I’m taking so I had to read it. If it weren’t for the in-class discussions we had after we read, I would have been completely lost after certain chapters. If you have a hard time staying focused on long hard to read sentences I would recommend listening to the 5 lectures he did. But if you can engage your brain on complex writing then this book is for you.
The perfect introduction to the great man's magisterial works (Sources of the Self or A Secular Age). Good news! We are not cultural orphans drifting aimlessly on the waves of history. In fact, our present condition has an admirable philosophical heritage and Taylor means to introduce us to our cultural family tree. Things are not all bad although they are somewhat confused. This book brings new hope for the wretched.
If you're looking to get your fix of pompous high-sounding postmodern mumbo-jumbo, look no further. If you're looking for logically developed argument with clear definitions of terms used, look elsewhere...
Taylor examines three problems with the overall modern societal structures and cultures, and argues that these reinforce a more fundamental, problematic ethical ideal of authenticity. These problems are that (1) 'Disenchantment': there is no supernatural or higher purpose built into the universe, but any meaning given is human-made and contingent, (2) The primacy of instrumental, rational thinking: being reasonable amounts to maximizing efficiency and output with respect to any decision-making process at hand, and (3) Increasing lack of participation in the political sphere: people retreat to the private sphere and are politically passive, as long as the government can continue to provide their familiar material goods.
Taylor argues that (1) has lead to a moral relativism or subjectivism. We think that there are no objective, ethical values, but every person is entitled to her own way of life, as long as she doesn't make it impossible for others to live their own ways of life. In the lacuna of particular, ethical values, the only ethical 'value' that is deemed universally respectable is the formal, empty value of being able to choose for oneself. This value of self-determination and choice is implicit in and drives the position of moral relativism. The glorification of individual choice is coupled with a certain ethical ideal regarding how we ought to live. Individuals ought to live authentically; that is, we should be 'in touch' with our inner feelings, be true to our own desires, and shake off the constraints imposed by others.
There have been heated debates over whether this ethical ideal is a good one. Critics argue that we should reject the ideal of authenticity altogether; it leads to narcissism and egoism, distracting us from the genuine ethical ideals of helping one another and merging into something greater than ourselves. Supporters argue that this ideal is the highest calling a human being can satisfy, and it stands for ultimate freedom. Taylor side-steps this debate. Instead of supporting or critiquing the ideal of authenticity, he redefines authenticity.
Taylor argues that our modern understanding of authenticity is shallow and confused. In order to be able to pursue authenticity at all, we must be able to choose values for ourselves. Values must exist. But where do values come from? They come from our social groups and interpersonal interactions. Our sense of who we are, and all that defines or character, is sculpted by the dialogic relations we have with others in our communities. This new definition of authenticity - that the values that are true to ourselves are not totally self-created in a vacuum, but rather depend on our heritage and embeddedness in certain social groups and - is not prone to the problems critiques of authenticity identify with the distorted, mainstream notion of authenticity. This new definition cannot lead to retreat into the ego, but requires interaction with others and embrace of our common histories.
When this richer sense of authenticity is recognized, we see that purely calculative thinking does not lead to a good life. We do not choose values on the basis of efficiency and output maximization, but we are beholden to our communities for our values. In order for something's maximization to be good, we must already first have a determinate value in mind; so culture precedes calculative thinking. Nurturance of our heritage and traditions is necessary in order for calculative thinking to have any usefulness in helping us achieve greater happiness and freedom. It goes without saying that this richer sense of authenticity also places community and political participation at the forefront.
Taylor concludes with a strong hopefulness. He thinks that rationally understanding the true nature of authenticity can change our collective attitudes and ameliorate those three 'malaises' of modernity. This project is critical for our personal well-being, political harmony, and ecological standing.
Overall, this was an interesting read. Many of the points are intuitive or well-known. But Taylor puts the puzzle pieces together, to a gripping and convincing effect. Moreover, the book as a transcription of a lecture is very easy and quick to read. I'd recommend this book to anyone who wants a clear-eyed overview and critique of the broad-sweeping complaints we hear all the time about the increasing fragmentation of society, increasing meaninglessness, etc.
Here's a side-note regarding my thinking at this time. I feel a tremendous unease with Taylor's conclusion. I am skeptical about preserving authenticity as the highest ethical ideal, even if it is expanded. Taylor defends authenticity in this way. When people live authentically, they are thoughtful regarding how they want to live, and this makes them more responsible for their lives; such responsibility is a good. Moreover, authenticity makes possible cultural progress and. Only when we question the values handed down to us can we possibly critique and change them.
I find this defense unsatisfying. Why think being more responsible for one's own life is a good in itself? Why think continuous cultural change is a good in itself? Taylor fails to examine these goods any further, to see what about them makes them good. I think it's implicit that responsibility is good only insofar as it might increase the chances that people will not treat one another cruelly, or live more morally, in accordance to a deeper set of moral norms regarding the importance to protect sentient beings. The same goes for continuous cultural change; such change is good only insofar as it makes it possible to correct certain cultural states that lead to unnecessary suffering.
Moreover, I think the value of critical thinking can accomplish these two goods Taylor names. When we reflect and think critically, we take responsibility for our actions, and we enable cultural change. There is no need to throw the rhetorical of authenticity into the mix. In fact, a minimal necessary condition of the legitimacy of the concept of authenticity is that there is a self at all. The nature and existence of the self is disputable, and there are philosophical traditions that deny its existence. So authenticity does not stand hand-in-hand with genuine liberalism; it cuts out the voices of those who stand outside the western tradition of reifying the self.
Perhaps it's just my dogma or bias, but I think the ultimate ethical ideal should be that of attending to and alleviating human suffering. It should not be authenticity, defined in any way. Authenticity only serves this ethical ideal.
The reason why people hesitate from endorsing any ethical ideal other than that of authenticity is that in liberalism we want to preserve people's individual freedom to choose the way of life that they want. I do not have enough background in moral or political philosophy to make a coherent argument for the misguidedness or incompleteness of this formulation of liberalism. But I could sketch out a few points perhaps. First are the points made above; we should examine why we think freedom of choice matters at all, and the notion authenticity comes with its own cultural baggage. Second, I think there's a chance of showing that the ideal of alleviating human suffering is a necessary condition for the achievement of liberalism; for example, survival and living above certain minimal material conditions is a precondition for pursuing any value at all.
It is very dangerous to be parochial to certain industrialized societies in which these minimal living conditions are almost universally met, and so the ethical troubles at hand are only those that can arise downstream of satisfaction of those conditions. There are many places in the world, and many targeting communities in industrialized societies, in which these minimal conditions are not met. An immediate task that falls from the ethical ideal of the alleviation of suffering is to attend to that injustice. And then, even in wealthy communities, suffering is abundant. Choosing one's own values does not guarantee fulfillment and freedom from suffering by any means.
I'm not making an argument here, but just spelling out the unease I have with discourses like Taylor's that focus on authenticity above all else. Perhaps the ultimate malaise of modernity is the insensitivity to the suffering of others that can easily follow from having one's own life be materially comfortable...
In this book Taylor goes around and around in circles, constantly repeating himself. I understand trying to use a dialectical approach to the book but by the end of the book I still can’t agree with most of what he’s said and I just got annoyed of reading the same thing over and over again. This could easily have been condensed into 50 pages. He highlights 3 issues but only really discusses one of them for almost 100 pages. He highlights important social problems and tries to get to the root of them; He makes interesting points for sure but much of this book is based on gross generalizations and I’m still confused as to what his suggestions to surmount these issues are. He got into some interesting points that hinted to solutions in the last chapter but he didn’t explore them beyond the surface, I was left disappointed.
180614: yes i love this work but i am nowhere near as able to explain why. i look at other critiques. i read this some time past. i am not a prof. possibly i was most impressed it seems to me not simplifying arguments but not drowning in having no authentic pov...
finally got around to buttoning this one up. far better than fellow canadian jr saul's the unconscious civilization (though people are still telling me they're saulpilled, john gray-pilled, charles taylor-pilled...how many pills can one person take?).
that said, this is a nifty little critique of the seemingly hopeless reactionary critique of the culture of narcissism. taylor accepts that that ship has sailed and wants to focus on "en-framing" technology appropriately, countering rawlsian "neutral" legalism + atomistic individualism with mass democratic movements rather than single-issue battles for specific things that have characterized a US in the thrall to courts and administrative agencies. he admits in the text that the chances for the success of this modest proposal are slim, but as with all of these folks, he's got to throw something out there.
useful material if you're covering topics like individualism, communitarianism, narcissism, &c. in a lecture or some other project. taylor's got longer works, like the sources of the self, but i'm knee-deep in an endless book queue and it'll be ages before i get to that. this short book, like most books adapted from lectures, can be read in a few hours.
I am getting the urge to write that history doesn’t go back and be done with it but I already did most of the work already. His project seems too forced for me, maybe ok on paper but without any chance of ever actually working, because it is just a philosopher playing simcity or civilization with concepts. Here is my too detailed summary:
Taylor describes three malaises of modernity, one, individualism that resulted from the loss of social orders that gave us meaning and now has resurfaced as a culture of narcissism, two, the primacy of instrumental reason or the culture of maximum efficiency, that converts even lives to technical problems and three, that institutions restrict our choices so much that it seems that we were helpless against them.
For Taylor it all starts because we have accepted relativism as a moral position but fail to see that it is a moral and not an epistemological position. Nowadays, it is immoral to argue that people are not free to do whatever they want, but we think that it is not something that we decided to accept as as a value but something “objective”. The first step then is to understand that it is something that can be open to argument. It is connected to the ideal of authenticity but for Taylor it is its degraded form. It is a combination of Rousseau’s and Herder’s idea that everyone has a unique way of being human and that they should be willing to cut all societal ties that prevent them from realizing it. The problem is that it’s hard to convince anyone that follows this ideal to abandon it, in favor of one that stresses that we are all part of the same community.
Taylor unfortunately thinks that the way to do it is by showing that it is a self-defeating position (as if anyone has ever changed his mind because of that), meaning that acting this way destroys the conditions of authenticity. The first argument for this is that the way we define ourselves is based on what is significant, but we can’t decide on our own what is significant; it must always come from culture. Something can be important only if there is a horizon of other things that one decides not to choose. It also requires reasoning and justification and those too always come from culture. Moreover our identity depends on the recognition of others.
What he hopes to achieve is to keep self-fulfilment powered by the ideal of authenticity but not the prevalent degraded self-centred, nihilistic one. Critics are wrong to find a necessary connection between egoism and self-fulfilment. Egoism always existed, the change is that now it doesn’t come with shame because hierarchies were destroyed and we were led to social atomism that has no ties to history, tradition, nature and so on. It is also reinforced by the idea that we have to look inside us to discover ourselves, which happened in parallel with the move from imitation to creation in art, some sort of rebellion, and by the idea that beauty is independent to moral excellence. Both these variants of authenticity go against morality. So authenticity involves creation, discovery, authenticity and opposition to rules of society, but also openness to horizons of significance and self-definition in dialogue and ignoring the latter makes it incoherent. For this we should be conscious that direction of history can easily change, resisting the temptation of pessimism, the idea that we are on a way that can’t be changed, and try to promote dialogue instead. Also, to avoid the necessity of subjectivity he notes that though authenticity is self-referential, the goals that one has are not. One can choose what they likes but what they like must be publicly available, for example God or politics or the environment.
He sketches a similar solution for the idea that instrumental reason and technology cause us to be divided and leads to an atomistic outlook that is inescapable, by focusing on the fact that there are still points of resistance, like the romantic era or current environmentalism. Instrumental reason, though it started with Descartes and is a way of getting what one wants, it is also connected to freedom and self-generating thought, and because of its emphasis on production it improved the conditions of life. It also lead us into universal solidarity (in theory), even thought it also serves domination and greater control. So again we have to retrieve the non-degraded form of instrumental reason that lead to the good effects. Disengaged reason is only an ideal and not how human agency works, as we live in dialogical conditions, so we must embrace the latter instead of looking pictures as numbers and not as stories.
And though instrumental reason encourages free market which limits democracy, we are not helpless. The problem is lack of common purpose and inability to create majorities as politicians became more self-serving. We need to stop this fragmentation and accept diversity.
A brilliant introduction to Taylor's thought on the inconsistencies of Modernity. He is focused upon 3 features: Individualism, Instrumental Reasoning & Political Alienation towards "soft despotism". Taylor gives special attention to the first of the three. Contrary to many of his interpreters, Taylor does not discard authenticity as a whole, but the most self-centred versions of it. His point is exactly to suggest an alternative to the modes he was perceiving in 1991.
As a whole, this is an easier book to grasp—when compared to other of Taylor's writings—, so it's a good entry point to reading Taylor. In my view, the chief weakness of the book is well-known, and recognized by the author himself: he didn't have time/space to develop his argument, so the flow of thought tends to look elusive or shallow.
A summary of each chapter's argument:
In chapter 1, Taylor's introduces his discussion by setting out that individualism, instrumental reason and political alienation towards "soft despotism" are three characteristics of our society that people experience as a loss or a decline, even as our civilization develops." (p.1) Off the beginning, Taylor emphasizes his interest in the first characteristic and suggests that it is the source of the other two.
In chapter 2, Taylor argue that the modern ideal of authenticity—being true to oneself as means for self-fulfilment—is based on a valid principle of individualism. However, in Taylor's interpretation, authenticity has sinked towards being an axion in a context of (supposed) neutrality, which renders an extraordinary inarticulacy about any discussion on alternative modes of individualism.
In chapter 3, the author proposes that being true to oneself and to one's originality—the idea that the voice within has something of its own to say in order to make me fully human— is a well-established culture that developed from social changes since the end of the 18th century (see esp. Taylor's take on Rousseau).
In chapter 4, Taylor argues that, considering the dialogical character of human life, the ideal of self-fulfilment and self-definition based on human desires alone is completely self-defeating. Things and actions can only take on importance and significance against a background of intelligibility—what he calls a "horizon" (p. 37)—which is formed in dialogue. Extreme subjectivism, thus, is unreasonable.
Chapter 5 concludes that the need for recognition becomes essential for modern identity-shaping with the collapse of hierarchical attributions of value in previous societies. This tends to make relationships—both broader social and strictly intimate—instrumental for self-definition.
In chapter 6, Taylor affirms that the culture of authenticity is reinforced by social factors—e.g. the heritage of 19th century individualism, as described in previous chapters—and the forces of both high and popular culture—e.g. switch towards expressionism in art in the early 20th century.
Chapter 7 brings forth that the worth of authenticity as an ideal—and Taylor is quite positive about it—should move one away from both blind critique (the "knockers" attitude) and deaf support (the "boosters" attitude), in order to see the tension/struggle in current self-centred modes of authenticity.
In chapter 8, Taylor argues that an analysis of "subjectivation" as exemplified in modern art indicates a shift in refentiality from objective reality to self and its sensibilities. However, there is still a search for exploring an order beyond the self—something Taylor falls short of demonstrating. For the author, it is from this search that a legitimate form of authenticity can spring.
In chapter 9, Taylor shifts the focal point from the first malaise—individualism—to the second, technological (or instrumental) reason. After describing its rise from the last three centuries, Taylor exhorts for a rescue of technology from a merely rationalist framework in order to put it "in the service of an ethic of benevolence towards real flesh and blood people." (p. 107)
Finally, chapter 10 outlines the political implications of the attitudes described thus far. For Taylor, the modern tendency to "self-despotism"—the idea that people in modern democracies feel alienated from large-scale political powers—is to reduce large, centralized and bureaucratic states to more federal models, in which powerlessness is amended and greater identification is possible. Although the idea seems interesting, Taylor is limited by space to propose or illustrate his point—his example of Canada is insufficient for different political contexts such as, say, a Latin-American country like Brazil.
I first encountered Charles Taylor (the political scientist and philosopher from McGill, not the Liberian Dictator) at University through his book Sources of the Self and found his writing style rather dense, verging on inscrutable, but with underlying value (rare in assigned University readings).
But much like the 1990s cover, much inside the book has aged rather poorly. The ideas remain important (perhaps now more than ever) but a serious update would be beneficial as the world grapples with new attacks on identity, from trangenderism to neo-marxist identity politics.
The Malaise of Modernity grew from the 1991 Massey Lectures and reads much lighter and is only a taste of the previously mentioned Sources of the Self. In the United States the lectures are published under the title The Ethics of Authenticity and I think that this title is much more illuminating than the Massey lecture title The Malaise of Modernity because the book discusses how "modern western man" (can I still say that in this PC world?) views the self.
The book aims to deal, or at least outline three areas of tension in modern society: "These, then, are the three malaises about modernity that I want to deal with in this book. The first fear is about what we might call a loss of meaning, the fading of moral horizons. The second concerns the eclipse of the ends, in face of rampant instrumental reason. And the third is about a loss of freedom." (p. 10)
Taylor notes that "Modern freedom was won by our breaking loose from older moral horizons...But at the same time as they restricted us, these orders gave meaning to the world and to the activities of social life." (p. 3)
This leads into "instrumental reason" which I take to be something akin to Aristotle's practical reason, separated from theoretical reason. Instrumental reason does not have the truth as the ends but whatever is useful. And the highest usefulness in this relativistic culture is the pursuit of authenticity, which Taylor notes has an internal tension. The heavy emphasis on subjectivism leads people to speak in the same breath of discovering their true identity while maintaining that your true identity is something you (or society, but better you if you are to be free) freely build. How this tension is resolved in our society is not fully addressed in the book because it isn't fully addressed in society. I am reminded of the Chesterton quote about people today all believing in soulmates and no one believing in souls.
Of course building a self-indentity (for the modern man) needs to be done in opposition to something. And modern education has perpetuated the lie that it is against conservativism. As if conservativism has had a monopoly on society since the 1960s! We are left with a group of progressives insisting on progressing from a position which was already a rebellion from conservativism, furthering and furthering society from its roots in each generation. Take the highschool stapple Animal Farm which holds (and so did Orwell) that the major problem with the animal rebellion was not the circular nature of revolution, but that the revolution did not go far enough and a Trotsky figure is the true hero.
Taylor tries to avoid the twin pitfalls of either blind opposition to this new culture or blind adherence to progress for progress and the shallow narcissism of the "authenticity" movement (tied to Romantic art) by stepping back. He calls these "knockers" and "boosters", two terms which might be good for radio but are a serious come-down from much of the high diction. The alternative Taylor attemps is intentionally not a middle ground but a step back, and I am reminded of Alasdair McIntyre's return to virtue ethics in After Virtue. Taylor does not go so far in the short book to examine the Greek concept of eudaimonia though I feel that that would be the general thrust of an expansion on the book.
The book closes with a discussion of the capitalism, democracy and atomism which is producing a fragmentation in society and is also a symptom of such fragmentation. The serpent eats its tail again here.
The closing section on Canadian federalism and the Meech Lake accords reads as an interesting historical period insight but desperately in need of modernisation.
Смислена кратка книга, включваща 10 лекции на значимия канадски хуманитарист. Основното в книгата е как Тейлър очертава някои неприятности, които произтичат от стремежа към автентичност, завладял хората в модерната епоха, и от индивидуализма като господстващо морално течение на местата, където либерализмът е надделял като политическа доктрина. Тейлър критикува и инструментализацията на междуличностните отношения, задълбочаващото се отделяне на индивида от социума и прави връзка между тези явления и отслабването на демократичните процеси.
Taylor seeks to counter pronouncements of the death of Man by the likes of Allan Bloom’s Closing of the American Mind. He seeks to do this with practical reality and a genealogy of “authenticity” at the root of individualism’s latest quest for identity. Taylor argues that origins of authenticity have moral foundations in Enlightenment that all moderns, including Bloom, would see as indispensable. However, Taylor agrees with Bloom that the current state of this authenticity is a narrowed and flattened individual. Individuals self-defined, without community, by the exercise of free choice alone. Where choice trumps substance based on the hollowness of “moral subjectivity,” mere difference, and the predictable disconnection from others and a higher calling (the very conditions for significance) that individualism is bound to foster. All “deviant products of the ideal of authenticity,” he writes.
But excess individualism is only half the problem. Maximized efficiency, what Taylor calls “instrumental reason” is seen as the other half. Together these form Max Weber’s disenchantment of the world where sacred structure is dead, relations with men and nature are lost to utility, and “creatures that surround us lose significance in the chain of being, open to treatment as raw materials,” writes Taylor. His goal is to show while our social structure tilts strongly in these directions (dehumanization of over population, mega cities, capitalistic urge, etc.), we can fight uphill against them. But to do that we’ll have to reject moral subjectivity, realizing some ways are superior, built on values substantiated by reason.
Taylor submits that “authenticity” was born around 1800 based on Descartes earlier individualist ideal of “dispassionate rationality.” A kind of self-responsible thought for oneself, and the root of scientific investigation. Locke’s political individualism prior to social obligations, authorities, and creeds also played a role. It was around this time that authenticity was part of an evolution in morality. That humans come with an internal moral sense as opposed to calculating the consequences of divine reward and punishment. Modernity takes us from St. Augustine to Rousseau. It says our moral sensibility is in us, not external (inklings of humanism, secularity, and agnosticism). But at the same time, authenticity gets mixed in with the passions of Rousseau’s Romanticism, critical of disengaged rationality, atomized community, and death of awe.
As a practical matter, Taylor says we don’t want to lose the benefits of individualism or efficiencies that make life easier to tolerate. Marxism demonstrated what happens when trying to force modern individuals back into the commune. Which is not to say we shouldn’t file off modernity’s sharp edges, and if we don’t the West will continue its path to big trouble of another sort. But free societies will never be monolithic unless we fancy tyranny again. Rational argument can revive authenticity by what it was based on, but not everyone’s going to come along. What’s needed is what’s in shortest supply: leaders with a clue of what’s going on. With echoes of Toynbee, Taylor writes, “Governing a contemporary society is continually recreating a balance between requirements that tend to undercut each other, constantly finding new solutions as the old equilibria become stultifying. There can never be…a definitive solution.”
In his 1991 CBC Massey Lecture, The Malaise of Modernity, Charles Taylor touches on some of the common anxieties that have been expressed about modernity. He narrows those anxieties down to three generalized forms: a fear of “individualism” and the adjacent culture of “authenticity”; a fear of “instrumental reason” and unrestrained technological progress; and, finally, a fear of the moral degradation which results from the combination of excessive individualism with purely instrumental reason at the political and institutional level.
Taylor argues that one cannot understand the supporters or critics of modernity – what he refers to as “boosters” and “knockers”, respectively – without grasping what exactly they are struggling over. He therefore wants to offer a definition of modernity which incorporates the polarizing dialogue between its critics and advocates. However, for Taylor, the dialogue surrounding questions of modernity have largely been characterized by mutually exclusive and highly divisive thinking. More often than not, people frame their opinions about modernity in sweeping, all-or-nothing moral claims – that is, modernity is either hopeful or fearful, good or bad, positive or negative, progressive or regressive, and so on. This kind of thinking not only ignores the nuances and deeper complexities of the modern age, but it also fails to support any meaningful dialogue between individuals.
The real “malaise of modernity”, then, is the breakdown of communication between individuals. For Taylor, people in the early 1990s were talking passed one another, like ships in the night. What they need is a clearly defined understanding of modernity, and an honest assessment of its promises and trappings. The dual purpose of his lecture is therefore one of retrieval and restoration. In the first sense, Taylor attempts to clarify the boundaries of modernity and salvage what’s worthwhile about the project. In the latter sense, by retrieving some clarity on the breadth and depth of modernity, Taylor wants dialogue to perform a restorative function for democracy – that is, he hopes that the clarification of modernity and its potential can return “boosters” and “knockers” to a place of informed, free and open conversation on the issues.
Taylor argues that a real dialogue can only occur if both parties share a common set of definitions and assumptions about the subject. Without a common framework or basic level of mutuality – a “background”, as he puts it – conversation breaks down. Since Taylor situates dialogue at the core of any good liberal democracy, when conversations stop among the citizens, democracy becomes threatened. This makes a certain amount of sense, and I tend to agree with Taylor, especially when I reflect back on the polarizing echo-chambers of party politics and the increasingly digital (mis-)information age of recent years. Although this lecture is dated from today’s perspective – Taylor is responding to concerns that were contemporary to the late 1980s-early 1990s – there are still a number of relevant take-aways for the citizen of 2022. A thought-provoking and admirable set of lectures that will likely resonate with cultural critics today.
1. Individualism 2. Instrumental reasoning 3. Loss of political liberty
“Boosters and knockers of contemporary culture”
Some parts of the book are repetitive, and I feel the author could have made the book shorter and still gotten his points across. A new genre for me, so I was happy to read parts of this.
Society may have crossed off God, but they still turn to spiritual teachers for transcendence. Why?
A very good book - actually part of lectures Taylor gave. But if you're familiar with his work, this is just an abbreviated account of it, tweaked to fit the cultural context within which is originated. If you're good with intricate philosophy I'd recommend his other, longer work. But I've you're more of a general reader, this is a good Taylor primer.
Canada's best known public intellectual, Charles Taylor is a steadfast defender of modern liberalism. This book is based on his 1991 Massey lectures and are loosely based on his 1989 book, The Sources of the Self. I reviewed it in some depth on my blog. http://jollylibertarian.blogspot.com/...
A novel and perspicacious approach to establishing meaningful and authentic dialogue (on both the personal and political level) between seemingly rival factions of individualism and social responsibility. A brief yet inspiring and empowering work.
The last chapter is one of lucidity and great importance to understanding modern times. Everything before it comes off as the disjointed ramblings of someone who likes to reference past points without identifying what they are. This was a painful read, and I forced myself to finish it.
Charles Taylor complicates the view that individuals are hopelessly atomistic, self-centered as well as narcissistic in modernity and that the empowerment of state-bureaucracy-market leads to some sort of 'iron cage' that trap people to behave in such ways. As a result, people lose the ability to act collectively by transcending their narrow self-interests. Though Taylor takes this view sympathetically, he offers a nuanced interpretation of modernity by bringing to fore the moral sources that underpin individualism. He differentiates between two kinds of individualism. The first kind is driven by sheer egoism and the second kind is driven by an ideal of authenticity (that is in touch with its moral sources). The individualism of the latter kind is attuned to social reality as well as its obligations and thereby, informing projects of self-fulfillment. This individualism may use instrumental reason, but the moral foundation of instrumental reason, such as self-responsibility and affirmation of ordinary life, is stressed. Taylor sees the contemporary challenge under modernity is to retrieve the hidden moral sources of various taken-for-granted positions and tendencies prevalent today.
I would give it 3.5 stars if that were possible in GR. The argument that Taylor puts forth is that modernity’s malaise can be treated by balancing individual creativity with shared social values and balancing capitalism with socialism. Too far in either direction results in the disenfranchisement of the people from political power and meaning. He thinks that our modern pursuit of authenticity is worthwhile if our pursuit of individual fulfillment is embedded in some sense of shared external values that serve to give the search for authenticity significance. So Taylor describes the tensions and argues that we need to balance them with each other. They serve to keep each other in check so that we do not devolve in meaningless insignificant pursuits and feeling disempowered from the political forces we have set up.
So interesting ideas worth reading. But I couldn’t give five stars and wanted to give it somewhat less than five stars because Taylor’s articulation of his argument is difficult. Maybe that is my own shortcoming in ability to understand a philosophical treatise like this. But I wonder if it is possible to write this so that it is more easily understandable by the general public. Don’t expect to read this short book quickly if you really do intend to understand it.
Charles Taylor's "Malaise of Modernity" is a powerful & short treatise based upon a series of lectures given at Massey Hall in the late 1980s.
Taylor correctly highlights the condition of acute narcissism that characterizes & in important ways paralyses post-modern societies & which, in turn, leads to the near universal adoption of instrumentalism as a mode of being, thinking & acting.
This is perhaps the most lively & profound of all important concepts he adduces through this brief survey; namely, our tendency to see other individuals as a means to an end - rather than an end unto themselves.
Such is the nature of modern society, politics & economy that varying degrees of instrumental behaviour are both necessary & tolerable. But Taylor argues that it has gone perhaps too far, that individuals should back-stop their narrow interests with some foundational concern for their fellow men & women.
Lovely read, a lot of important philosophical concepts rendered understandable for a reader seeking deeper meaning of what it means to be fully human.
What an incredibly insightful writer. I’m inspired to go on to other books he has written. Taylor reflects with a vast breadth of exploration and investigation. He doesn’t rely on philosophy but seems to hold an extensive awareness of it. He invites further reflection in the manner in which he presents his argument always suggesting that a fragmented thinking is always a challenge at the heart of modern social individualistic thinking. He questions the movement towards extreme individualistic values and perceives reflection regarding the concept of “authenticity” and how we understand and apply it to our own existence to be of fundamental importance.
I picked this up at a thrift shop while I was already thinking it was time to finally get around to reading Taylor’s A Secular Age. It’s a short book that originally was a series of Massey Lectures in 1991. It focuses on what appears to have later become a small part of A Secular Age’s argument: a way to navigate our age’s focus on authenticity, allowing what Taylor sees as the moral ideals that belong to authenticity to correct and challenge the selfish versions of the quest for authenticity that its knockers often bemoan. I hope this will prove to have been a good gateway to the larger book, which I’d like to read soon.