Panzer Leader

by Heinz Guderian, B.H. Liddell Hart (Foreword by), Kenneth John Macksey (Introduction)

General Heinz Guderian’s revolutionary strategic vision and his skill in armored combat brought Germany its initial victories during World War II. Combining Guderian’s land offensive with Luftwaffe attacks, the Nazi Blitzkrieg decimated the defenses of Poland, Norway, France—and, very nearly, Russia—at the war’s outset. But in 1941, when Guderian advised that ground forces should take a step back, Hitler dismissed him. In these pages, the outspoken general shares his candid point of view on what would have led Germany to victory, and what ensured that it didn’t. In addition to providing a rare inside look at key members of the Nazi party, Guderian reveals in detail how he developed the Panzer tank forces and orchestrated their various campaigns, from the breakthrough at Sedan to his drive to the Channel coast that virtually decided the Battle of France. Panzer Leader became a bestseller within one year of its original publication in 1952 and has since been recognized as a classic account of the greatest conflict of our time.

Genres: History, Military History, War, Military Fiction, Biography, World War II, Nonfiction

528 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1950

About the author

Military theorist and innovative General of the German Army during the Second World War.

Guderian is considered to be the brain behind the Blitzkrieg strategy and one of the leading tank warfare tacticians.

After the war, the allies failed to find any war crimes committed by Guderian.

Reviews

[Nooilforpacifists · Rating 3 out of 5]

Fluid writer; kudos to the translator.

According to Guderian, every decision he made led to a brilliant breakout; any other order -- especially Hitler's -- stayed his Panzers, likely at the cost of winning the war. (Though at one point, he wonders just how anyone expected to beat England without an aircraft carrier.)

It's a literate book, though his hand-drawn sketches of each section of each battle are near incomprehensible. And I don't really blame him for not questioning the underpinnings of National Socialism--he was a professional soldier; there was a war. But Guderian repeats, over and over, about the orders he did NOT pass to the troops: not the one about shooting Russian civilians; not the one about starving Russian soldiers; certainly nothing about the Jews. Methinks he doth protest too much.

Guderian's reputation rests on five things: (1) he was the blue-eyed perfect *looking* Nazi: no brown hair or clubbed foot; (2) his writing is lucid (although solipsistic); (3) he was one of the creators of Germany's most successful war weapon--the Blitzkrieg; (4) Hitler fired him often enough to create the scintilla of doubt that this charming man ever could have been a committed National Socialist; and (5) he didn't end his days as a block of ice on the Eastern Front, but in an ex-Berlin Staff position, so lived to tell the tale. Of these, #3 is the most interesting take-away.

But that doesn't mean his book isn't devoted to explaining why he could have won the war, were it not for high command and Hitler's interference, and settling scores on old comrades who blamed him for the defeat. The second is a particularly dull read because the parties involved are dead, and few care.

Guderian's most infuriating technique is passive voice. When directing troops against the enemy, action verbs (and first person pronouns) are shot from a howitzer. The engine switches off when discussing responsibility for the war (things were done) plus the civilian casualties and the Holocaust (orders were given; always by another). Meanwhile, Guderian decries actions Nazis took in defiance of "our Christian religion."

As an example of his mendacity, Guderian protests Hitler's decision to move Army Group Center (of which he was part) to capture Ukraine (its ports, agriculture fields, and petroleum wells) before winter. Those and other tactical disagreements brought Guderian into near-daily infighting with headquarters staff. Yet, Hitler's revised plan (including securing Stalingrad) probably was the wiser--Charles XII and Napoleon proved that General Winter could defeat almost any army advancing on Moscow.

The problem was Hitler's original plan, with three Army Groups, the first of which with a vague objective of Moscow. Yet, even had the Nazis captured Moscow (as Napoleon briefly did), that was only about 1/4th of the territory of the Soviet Union. Between the Reds' T-34 tanks (better than anything but the last few Panzers built) and the ability to retreat, the unlimited objectives of Operation Barbarossa remain astonishing to this day.

Hitler disagreed, and when the advance began to be rolled-back, sacked Guderian in retribution for…cold and comparatively crappy tanks. The book continues with a interesting short section, seemingly based partly on post-war writings, about Hitler's meddling in tank and armor design. But once Hitler recalls General G to active service in Russia, we're treated to the most nauseating comparison of Germany's war aims on the one hand, and Churchill/Roosevelt/Truman's abandonment of the Poles, pushing the Polish parallelogram 700 miles West, and displacing millions of Germans, on the other. Don't cry for me, Adolf Eichmann.

Guderian had the good luck to be fired by Hitler six weeks before the end of the war. The book ends there, but it's worth noting that although he spent several years in custody, no charges ever were filed. It's not a war crime to invent the Blitzkrieg: a better weapon--ask anyone in Los Alamos.

[MacWithBooksonMountains Marcus · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great book about panzer tactics. Bought this long ago in Singapore and read this in a hotel room in there.

[Carol Storm · Rating 5 out of 5]

Brilliant memoir of some of World War II's greatest battles written by the one German general who was never intimidated by Adolph Hitler.

One of the things that surprised me when I read this book was that General Guderian had a very dry sense of humor. When he talks about Goering "devoting himself to fine dining with visible results."

The only complaint I have about this book is that it ends with the German surrender in 1945. Reading on Wikipedia I see that General Guderian was imprisoned by the Allies for three years, but was never found guilty of any war crimes. His son (a combat veteran of World War II) later became the commanding general of the new West German Army. Heinz Guderian lived on until 1954.

I wish the general had written a sequel to this classic memoir. I would have been fascinated to hear his impressions of the English and American soldiers he met while he was a prisoner, and what kind of advice he might have given his son on basically rebuilding the German army from nothing. I also would have liked to hear his impressions of Germany and how the people responded to defeat. Incidentally, if you've ever read THE WINDS OF WAR or WAR AND REMEMBRANCE by Herman Wouk, it's easy to see that the fictional Armin Von Roon and his fictional book WORLD EMPIRE LOST were both largely inspired by Heinz Guderian and his book PANZER LEADER.

But the original is still the greatest!

[Olethros · Rating 3 out of 5]

-Por lo subjetivo, genera más preguntas de las respuestas que ofrece.-

Género. Biografía.

Lo que nos cuenta. Memorias del Generaloberst Heinz Guderian, centradas en su participación en la Segunda Guerra Mundial e íntimamente relacionadas con el arma blindada y sus desencuentros con los líderes alemanes.

¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:

http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...

[Yann · Rating 3 out of 5]

Le 28 mars 1945, à 14h, le cercle ordinaire, accru du général Busse, se rassembla dans l'étroit abri de la Chancellerie. Hitler apparut. Busse fut convié à parler. Au bout de quelques phrases, Hitler interrompit le général et lui reprocha les négligences mêmes que je croyais avoir infirmées la veille. Après deux ou trois phrases, la colère me prit. Je pris sur moi de couper Hitler et de le renvoyer à mes rapports oraux et écriture du 27 mars.
- Permettez-moi de vous interrompre, dis-je. Hier, je vous ai exposé en détail, oralement et par écrit, que le général Busse n'est pas responsable de l'insuccès de l'attaque de Küstrin. La 9ème armée a consacré à l'opération les munitions qui lui étaient allouées. La troupe a fait son devoir. Les pertes plus élevées que la normale le prouvent. Je vous prie donc de ne pas faire de reproche au général Busse.
- Que tout le monde quitte la salle, sauf le maréchal et le général, fit Hitler.
L'important auditoire une fois sorti de l'antichambre, Hitler dit brièvement:
- Colonel-Général Guderian, votre santé réclame une convalescence de six semaines!
Je levai la main droite.
- Je prends congé, dis-je en allant vers la porte.
Comme j'avais la main sur la poignée, Hitler me rappella:
- Restez, s'il vous plaît, jusqu'à la fin de la conférence.
Je revins à ma place sans mot dire. Les assistants furent rappelés dans la salle et le rapport continua comme si de rien n'était. Hitler s'abstient en tout cas de toute autre sortie contre Busse. Deux ou trois fois on demanda brièvement mon avis, enfin tout cela prit fin après des heures interminables. Les assistants quittèrent le bunker. Il retint Keitel, Jodl, Burgdorf et moi.
- Je vous en prie, dit-il, souciez-vous de votre santé. Dans six semaines, la situation sera très critique. J'aurai un besoin urgent de vous. Où voulez-vous aller ?
Keitel me conseilla de me rendre à Bas-Liebenstein. C'était un endroit très joli. Je répondis que les Américains y étaient déjà.
- Bon, alors à Bad-Sachsa, dans le Harz, déclara le compatissant maréchal.
Le remerciant de son amabilité, je fis observer que je choisirai mon séjour moi-même, en cherchant un lieu que l'ennemi n'occuperait pas dans les 48h. Encore une fois, je levai la main droite, en compagnie de Keitel, je quittai pour toujours le bunker du Führer.

[Steven Peterson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Heinz Guderian's "Panzer Leader" provides an inside story of the development of the German armored forces before World War II and the operation of those forces during that war. Guderian was one of the major figures helping to develop the Panzer doctrine of quick striking and deep thrusting armored attacks. And the book portrays the resistance from more traditional army leaders in the German military.

The Introduction (by Kenneth Macksey) observes that (page vii): "'Panzer Leader' is about one man's endeavor, at a moment of institutional change, to defend his country by the modernization of its army." An obvious question is what do talented military leaders do when serving political leaders who are not worthy of their loyalty? In the "Foreword," B. H. Liddell Hart casually notes that (page 13): "'Their's not to reason why, theirs but to do and die. No nation that maintains fighting services can afford to revoke that rule of experience. Where soldiers begin to question the rightness of the cause for which they are fighting, armies soon collapse." And perhaps Hart unwittingly makes a point. When should a military recoil from the madness of a leader like Hitler? Hart may be far too forgiving of soldiers fighting for wicked causes. Still, a difficult issue.

The book itself traces, briefly, Guderian's early life. It then considers his role in the development of German armor and the consequent doctrines of warfare based on the use of armor. He discusses the German movements against Austria and the Sudetenland and then the invasion of Poland.

The role of armor was most dramatically seen with the German attack on the Western front. The Panzer divisions sliced deep into the allied defenses, creating havoc. Only Hitler's foolish calling off the army at Dunkirk allowed the English to rescue substantial elements of its ground forces.

Guderian's tale of the preparation for and carrying out of the attack on Russia is detailed (and dry). Much detail is provided (and see Manstein's book on the same subject, "Lost Victories"). Perhaps most telling is his tale of the slashing retreat as German forces found themselves vastly outnumbered by Russian forces and subject to the awful weather of Russia. Guderian explains the mad strategy of Hitler of refusing to let the German forces find better sites to defend their positions. For his criticisms of Hitler (pretty courageous of Guderian), he was relieved--only to come back later as, of all things, Chief of the German General Staff.

At the end, he ventures a few observations on leading personalities of the Third Reich and concludes with some very brief comments. It would have been interesting to get deeper reflections from his perspective on the nature of the war, the role of the army vis-à-vis a despotic government, his own sense of the role that he played. The final part of the book is a series of Appendices that are useful (memos of critical events, for example).

This is a book, like Manstein's, that is useful for providing graphic detail of the military struggles of the Second World War. And both reveal little perspective by the two fighting generals of their role in the misery created by the Third Reich.

[Stephanie · Rating 5 out of 5]

I finally found time to finish this, although I have gone back to reread various sections that are of especial interest. What I wrote below remains true; however, I am struck by the relationships among senior military and civilian leadership and insight this provides into the period. I'm also struck by Guderian's candor regarding his obvious political divergence from the nazi political viewpoint despite his continued service.

I am also entertained by his comments on Churchhill. A very different perspective on a figure I much admire.



.....

I'm only about a quarter of the way through here and am enjoying this immensely. I can't think why I have missed reading this for so long.

Guderian's writing is frank and conversational, a real pleasure to read. His awareness of other writers contemporary to his subject, and his habit of commentary on their views, provides a great contrast to more familiar narratives from the Allied perspective.

I find myself deeply admiring this man and his efforts to advocate for his nation's military betterment. How similar the path for any military person who has the vision to propose a necessary technical and tactical evolution of their force against the conventional wisdom of their fellows. I am minded of accounts of Dolittle.

Perhaps the most entertaining portions of the narrative are his descriptions of his interactions with his superiors and of the politics within a military organization. So familiar and yet so far from the view civilians have of the operation within a chain of command.

I contrast his accounts of the invasion of France with accounts by American armored units in the invasion of Iraq (Cobra II) and find an amazing resonance.


I very much recommend this book.

[R.M.F. Brown · Rating 5 out of 5]

Battlefield and politics should never mix, and nowhere is that clearer than in Panzer leader. Charting the developments of Germany's Panzer forces during the 1920s & 1930s, Panzer Leader provides valuable insights into the challenges Guderian faced within his own service branch from vested interests, and the political interference that dogged him at every turn.

As others have pointed out, Guderian takes credit for the works of others, and any serious student of world war two would do well to cross reference this work with the writings of Von Manstein and other established academic texts.

On the question of ethics and morals, Guderian does little to explain why he served such a barbaric regime, using the shield of duty and the Prussian mindset to explain away his committed service.

His ignorance concerning the treatment of Jews in occupied Russia, and the notorius commissar order, is remarkable, given what we know about the co-operation of the Germany army in aiding the death squads operating behind the lines, but as somebody once said, hindsight is a wonderful thing.

In saying that, the above should not detract from what is a valuable piece of both military and political history. The folly of Hitler's insistence in micro-managing the German army is laid bare, and is in stark contrast to the shrewdness of Stalin, who was more content to detach himself from the military decision making (at least until victory was assured.) All in all, a great book for any student of military history.

[carl theaker · Rating 3 out of 5]

What better lessons than from the master himself? A bit on the dry side, but an invaluable perspective. Like all auto-biographies you must compare and contrast with third party points of view.

My copy is the Ballanatine Book abridged version measuring in at a mere 400 pages.

[Jacob · Rating 5 out of 5]

I've read through most of the book and am nearing it's end, but I can't seem to get past the part where the author is constantly at odds with his leader, Hitler. I guess the frustration of Guderian, expressed throughout the book, just builds up to the point where it becomes hard to move forward.
Don't get me wrong, this book is awesome so far, it's just that the tragic incompetence of those at the top of the command structure is saddening.

I'd also have to agree with another reviewer: this book needs better maps. I actually bought an atlas of WW2 (not so good, by Collins-Harper I think; I need something more detailed), but that didn't help much.
Heck, to go further with that idea, I would willingly pay for an animated representation of the movement as described in the book, particularly those that were under Guderian's direct command (Poland, France and the early parts of the Ostfront).

The pace of the writing is much faster than his other work, 'Achtung - Panzer!', which is more about his concept on armoured and future warfare, anyway. Still, the narrative could get bogged down when a paragraph after paragraph describes the movement or location of certain formations (e.g. stretching from a line 'location a' - 'location b' - 'location c' ...something like that). I guess that could have been remedied by better maps...

[Vanessa M. · Rating 4 out of 5]

I selected this book to read as part of a reading challenge (to read a history book by a writer with a different background from my own). This is my first WWII history book that I've read by a German officer. It was interesting to read from Guderian's perspective and to read where he placed the blame in the high command for the failures that occurred. I understand that to gain a fuller understanding I need to read more widely but I found it fascinating how so much, according to him, was other people's fault.

[Steve · Rating 1 out of 5]

The self-serving autobiographical account of Nazi Germany's tank expert. As numerous scholars have noted, Guderian takes credit for the ideas and accomplishments of others, while masking his own involvement in Nazi Germany's atrocities and poor strategic decisions.

[Pieter · Rating 5 out of 5]

Well-written memoirs of one of the most famous and talented panzer generals ever existed, Mr Heinz Guderian. Being active during the Anschluss and the wars in Poland, France and Soviet-Union, he describes in detail the ‘blitz’ progress of the German Army. But next to that, he also discusses technical features of the tank armies (armour plates, speed, guns,…). Both Guderian and Manstein (cf ‘Lost Victories) wondered why France did not attack Germany while it got involved in Poland. Truly a missed opportunity. The same holds for the panzers and troops halting at Dunkirk letting the British army slip away. Not the first and not the last blunder and proof of overconfidence of Field Marshall Göring. Guderian is also on the same level with Manstein that Moscow should have been Hitler’s focus not Ukraine or Stalingrad. In the latter case, Paulus should have been allowed to retreat according to the author. In a later stage, Guderian was promoted Inspector-General of the Armoured Troops. He saw no use of Operation Valkyrie as there was no true alternative, but seemed nevertheless one of the few generals able and daring to challenge and even oppose Hitler.

[Fernando · Rating 4 out of 5]

Increíblemente prolijo en detalles. Se hace más llevadero a partir de 1943.

[Matej Pavkovček · Rating 5 out of 5]

Vzdy som si chcel precitat svedectvo niekoho, kto bojoval na druhej strane v 2.sv. vojne na strane Nemecka. Toto bola neskutocne dobra volba. Heinz Guderian je vojnovy genius. Ako jeden z prvych videl obrovske moznosti v motorizovanej armade (rozumej tanky, vozidla, transportery apod.) Tato kniha je jeho biografiou s vacsim zaostrenim na 2.sv.vojnu. Je otcom myslienky a prevedenia blietzkriegu, co malo za nasledok ze do 8 mesiacov od zacatia vojny, Nemecko stihlo obsadit pol Europy. Tento muz zazil oba fronty, vychodny aj zapadny a o to viac jeho svedectvo dava uceleny obraz o jednotlivych taktikach a strategii wehrmachtu. Ceresnickou na torte uz je len to, ze postupom vojny, siel vyssie a vyssie v armadnom rebricku a nakoniec uz ako general armady mal pristup a chodil na jednania kde boli priamo ucastni aj najvysii predstavitelia NSDAP vratane Adolfa Hitlera. Tento pan mal niekolko zivych rozhovorov s Hitlerom a bol ocitym svedkom vela stretnuti najvyssich predstavitelov nacistickeho Nemecka. Kniha splnila vsetky ocakavania a bol pre mna neskutocny zazitok, vnimat a citat prvy krat z prvej ruky aj o tej opacnej strane. Doteraz som vzdy cital a pozeral videa len opacnej, vitaznej strany. Jedinu vec, co by som vytkol, miestami mi autor/Guderian pride, ze sa opisuje prilis v dobrom svetle a zlahcuje,resp. vyzdvihuje seba a svoje zasluhy viac ako bola realita. Ale to je len moj dojem.

[R.]

Not at all what I was hoping for or expecting. I made it a little less than half the way through this book and had to give it up. It was just too dry for me. Too heavy on detail and not heavy enough on the things that make military history exciting for me.

If you want to know the "how" of the way that Guderian fought and led, then this is for you. If you want to know more about the "why" don't pick this up. Go for one of the other WW2 books.

Discussing beans and bullets and whatnot is something that I do for a living as a logistics officer, it's not something that I want to do in my off time and certainly not something that I want to do for fun. To be honest, I wouldn't even recommend this book for professional development reasons because it's sooooooo dry. It also focuses almost exclusively on a tiny aspect of the war-fighting itself and very little on placing events in the larger political and military context in which they really become important and interesting. Reading an account of a battle told exclusively from the commander's perspective, without any supporting detail, without any first hand knowledge, and without a clear view of the decisions on the other side is like reading every other paragraph in a well written military history book in my opinion.

[Charlie · Rating 4 out of 5]

I grabbed this book out of a group of my Dad's books. I was surprised that the author was the architect of Germany's armored warfare capability during WW2 (think 'Blitzkrieg'). He learned lessons from WW1 and applied innovations even while Germany was banned from owning tanks (workaround: develop techniques with wooden mockups). As he described his activities (day by day) during the war in France, I found myself wanting to hear more about the battle. Then, I realized (Duh!) that the title was "Panzer Leader", not Panzer Battles. His descriptions of meetings with Hitler were fascinating. Here was a dedicated General fighting for his country, but being overruled by a tyrant who thought he was a brilliant leader. This mirrors the story of our General Patton. Guderian and the other generals were shocked by Hitler's decision to attach Russia. It was interesting to see the devolvement of Hitler through the book from an energetic ideolog to a stooped, trembling, raving tyrant. A sidelight to the story are the snippets here and there where Guderian defends himself from post-war accusations by other German officers. He even uses transcripts from Nuremburg to clear his reputation. Although he as imprisoned for a few years, he was not charged with war crimes.

[Michael · Rating 4 out of 5]

Well written autobiography of General Heinz Guderian, particularly from the development of the Panzer tank forces prior to WWII, their use in Poland, France and Russia, and the subsequent defeat of those forces at the end of the war. This book traces Guderian's rise from commanding a wireless station at the outbreak of WWI to Chief of the Army General Staff at the conclusion of WWII. A fair and insightful look at the disconnect between the life and actions of one that is entrusted to fight the war, and those that direct how the war will be fought.

[Rob Markley · Rating 5 out of 5]

I've re-read this after 30 odd years. It certainly remains a hugely significant book. Guderian is the consummate professional soldier in the Prussian tradition. In the final section discussing the famous German General Staff he expounds somewhat on what all that means, albeit it is then a summary of the attitudes and actions which have already come through in his narrative. To be a professional soldier is to be master of one's craft, innovative and organised, but also to be nationalistic, loyal and apolitical. Hence despite overwhelming conviction that Hitler was leading Germany to destruction, Guderian cannot sanction assassination nor coup d'etat, although from his point of view, it was exactly the skills he possessed that were needed to end the nightmare. (In all this from the soldier's point of view the Roosevelt doctrine of unconditional surrender comes across as a huge mistake, which prevents the army from ending the war once the situation became hopeless)

Also although he was evidently unaware of the full extent of terrible home and foreign atrocities that were being perpetrated behind the fighting soldier's front, Guderian does not shy away from such, nor plead total ignorance, rather documents his attempts to mitigate such matters within his sphere of influence. However as a soldier he sees his responsibility simply to fight for his country, thus despite distaste and a strong convictions as to honour and traditional Christian morality, his resolve is to serve Germany despite Nazism. One interesting theme to explore would be to discuss the tipping point where ethical and moral conviction is enough for a u-turn; after all few things are fully black or white, and in murky grey when is enough, enough to chose another evil against the existing evil?

Part of the value of this great work is the insight into World War II Germany and its leaders. Guderian is able to explore the character of Hitler and his inner circle from a unique, close proximity. Unfortunately practically all post war literature simply demonises Hitler and the Nazi's all the while explaining their rise as due to the chaos of interwar Germany. Guderian presents a much more nuanced view in which we see the aspirations of a people, the celebration of Hitler's triumphs such as the popular reaction of Anschluss and then the evolution of totalitarianism. A key part of this is forgotten second part of National Socialism - Nazi's were true socialists with the centralised control of every aspect of life, the role of the party in subsuming all power unto itself and the hatred of all that is good - most including faith. In fact faith such as it is devolves universally upon total subservience to a single individual. In all of this we see Hitler not as a right wing dictator at all, but as true comrade to Lenin, Stalin or Mao - oh the irony!

All the above vert most valuable and insightful, but this is of course primarily a military memoir. Although Guderian is one of, if not the key engineer (after the architects Fuller and Liddell Hart who he acknowledges) of blitzkrieg - that is total mobility, tank spear headed, combined arms warfare (probably in that order) the book does not address things at a tactical level at all. Perhaps that aspect was addressed in his pre war 'Achtung Panzer'? Nevertheless it would have been interesting to see how Guderian addressed the superiority of the Russian T34 in the field and to explore more his reasoning against self propelled guns v tanks and the various attributes/weaknesses of the different German tanks. After all he was Inspector-General of Armoured troops at a critical stage!

What this book addresses is the level of grand tactics and lower strategy. We see Guderian's own handling of armoured forces at divisional and above level, across Poland, France and Russia. What comes through is the breakthrough by Panzer forces followed by exploitation of following infantry in echelon behind. This is not Patton charging into empty blue yonder, nor Napoleonic unpredictable strokes; but rather grand tactics of carefully shielded flanks, encirclement and bursting through enemy communications with the object of elimination. At a strategy level the object is purely to pursue means by which these grand tactics had the best chance of success.

As Churchill points out, Germany could never defeat Britain with USA also in the war, but what misery would the world have been spared if Guderian's best grand tactics and strategy could have been combined with a true Grand Strategic vision to destroy the great evil of Soviet communism along the way?! Guderian would certainly hint that such was possible, nevertheless evil is its own downfall and Nazi Germany as it existed was incapable of this.

There are some issues with the book. The sketch maps in this particular edition were sometimes too small and chaotic to be much use. The index is merely of names and thus many interesting topics are hard to reference again. Guderian is straight forward in his narrative when Germany is on attack, but his chronology unaccountably jumps back and forwards all over the place as collapse on the Eastern Front occurs. The maps are also unaccountably usually missing for this part of the history when he was Chief of Army General Staff actually responsible for the Eastern front, thus with the ultimate top down view, although shorn of all power to implement actual strategy due to the machinations of Hitler's failing regime.

[Joe Ervin · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very good autobiography by Heinz Guderian. The character sketches of Hitler and his cabinet were very informative, though it was interesting to see the efforts Guderian makes to distance both the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS from the atrocities of the Holocaust, instead laying the blame on Party functionaries and rogue units. Certainly not an impartial observer but he does provide another perspective and does so in a clear, well-written and interesting way.

[Glen · Rating 5 out of 5]

I enjoyed reading this book ... I had to "keep at it" a bit ... It provided interesting insights into the German advance into Russia ... I personally though the author was trying in many respects to justify himself and his actions during and fate the campaign ... Certainly he seems to distance himself from anything questionable by falling into the old escape of "following orders" ...

[Patrick · Rating 4 out of 5]

a rather nice book on the military carreer of one of the "inventors" of tank warfare.
here again, I think it is still used at some military academies

[Mark Lisac · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book offers enough close-up glimpses of the Second World War at the highest levels to rate four stars, but it's dragged down somewhat by a nearly endless blizzard of place names and divisional and corps numbers. Guderian recreates several campaigns while apparently studying maps that the reader doesn't have.
Still, the recitation of lines taken or defended does reinforce one major point in the section on the invasion of Russia in 1941. Cities, rail centres and road junctions are taken one after another. Tens or hundreds of thousands of Russians are captured along with hundreds of guns in engagement after engagement. And still there is more space ahead and more Russians, eventually with T34 tanks that outclass anything the Germans have at the time.
Others have pointed out a handful of areas in which Guderian was or may have been self-serving in this memoir. It seems indisputable, though, that he was both a brilliant military leader and one of the few army officers (or any kind of personality) with the nerve and capacity to stand up to Hitler. He did so on numerous occasions, too.
Plenty to learn here, although sometimes in skimpy detail: the origins of the German armoured force and the blitzkrieg tactics; the resistance of many senior officers to the new methods; the crucial role of speed and communication; the intense focus on training exercises to discover what would work; the comparative shortage of tanks and other motorized equipment during the Germans' successes early in the war; Hitler's often unsuccessful meddling not only with operational plans but with equipment production plans; the endless internal arguments and chaotic structure of the military command (which parallels the chaotic structure of government that Hitler established by running overlapping civil service and Nazi party establishments); the continuing equivocal moral position of individuals like Guderian, who eventually but briefly concedes horrrors (without actually referring to millions of Jews being murdered) but still would like to have won the war and thinks he could have managed at least a tie if allowed to have his way. On the last point, he may have some justification. It seems clear that if he had not been ordered to stop in May 1940 he would have led his panzer troops to Dunkirk and stood a good chance of getting there before the British army; without the evacuation of more than 300,000 of its soldiers, England may conceivably have been pushed into accepting an armistice. The episode was arguably the turning point of the war. It's also possible that Churchill would still have held out, but would the threat from England have dissipated enough that a faster and more powerful invasion of Russia could have occurred, or a more complete push into the Mediterranean?
A final interesting chapter on Guderian's assessment of major personalities on the German side includes a lightning-bolt comment on Hitler's lack of any real friend: "His path through the world was a solitary one, and he followed it alone, with only his gigantic plans for company."
Did Guderian really not know about the concentration camps? One has strong doubts; he certainly heard of atrocities against Russian civilians. On the other hand, he says he never saw Eva Braun despite many meetings with Hitler and learned of the pair's liaison only while in prison after the war.
A sharp editor might have asked for more details. Guderian mentions, for example, that he talked with Rommel about what Rommel had learned in armoured combat, but he does not pass on what those lessons were. The translation in the Ballantine abridged edition reads smoothly.

[Velstadt · Rating 5 out of 5]

The most interesting bits in German war memories are the parts about Hitler. The recollections of the various encounters between Hitler and his generals help one in approaching a compelling character portrait of Hitler, as opposed to naive reductionism about "evil" and other boogey-terms and with a wave of the hand dismissing the man as a miscreant of no further interest.

Guderian's memoirs highlight the rather erratic nature of Hitlers energetic intellect and imagination, which in many cases was directly to the detriment of the German war effort. Also, Guderian is in line with Erich von Mansteins recollections when he underlines Hitlers lack of experience in high command from a psychological perspective. When Hitler subscribed to the waging of war in a competely new way, with modernized up to date methods, he did not do so solely due to his military genius, but in a significant extent out of his dislike towards the conservative and aristocratic elements of the old Prussian high army staff who would have preferred familiar and "tested" methods of operation. And when these new methods reaped unimaginable success, Hitler always betrayed his inexperience in matters of high command: when the opportunity presented itself for a (chance of) decisive victory, he suddenly became timid despite the staggering early successes in each campaign, as if growing superstitious about his fortunes, doubtful that the German forces could ride the wave of fortune over so many consecutive obstacles in such a rapid movement. This resulted in the halting of forward forces, in vacillation, dithering and hesitation just when the window was open for a decisive strike to annihilate the last resistance of the enemy.

It is a tragic read from the perspective of the German war effort against the Soviets. Hitlers fumbling and mistakes become more and more painful the longer the war continues. The Germans certainly would have had multiple chances of at the very least forcing the Soviets into a draw, if Hitler did not sabotage the war effort with his micromanagement, which, however tactically apt, was so painfully lacking in operational let alone strategic merits apart from political and economic factors.

Many people today owe their independence and peaceful lives to the heroic effort of Wehrmacht on the Eastern front. They forced the Soviets to concentrate all their war effort against the German juggernaut that fought so valiantly and heroically against the largest and possibly the best equipped army in the world. It is a tragedy that the honor of this fighting force is forever sullied by their simple attachment to the Nazi German state. The paramilitary wings of the armed forces responsible for the atrocities were never under the actual jurisdiction of the army, and were governed by party politics and politicians. The belief that Germans collectively deserve the blame for the war is a case of dumbfounding hypocrisy. By that logic, every member citizen of the EU collectively deserve the blame for American warcrimes in middle-east and North Africa by the simple extension of EU backing up their NATO allys war efforts. The German countryside recruit fighting against a savage opponent who had no scruples disregarding all international laws and honorable conduct of warfare cannot have been a worse man that those fighting in other western armies, or for example in the Finnish army.

[Michael · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is the memoir of the foremost practitioner of “Blitzkrieg,” a general who understood the concept of mobile warfare and its implications far better than others from an early time and established the standards for the use of tanks in the battlefield. From a military historian’s point of view, such a source is of immense value and interest, and the book provides detailed maps and records of his orders, along with his recollections of his decisions and the reasons for his military actions. No doubt his battles are still studied in military academies around the word today.

However, from almost any other point of view, this book is boring at best, and misleading or problematic at worst. Much of it is dedicated to establishing the “Myth of the Clean Wehrmacht” and Guderian makes such questionable assertions as he never even saw the notorious Commissar Order or others about conduct on the Eastern Front that contributed to mass murder and other atrocities. Indeed, while he is very critical of Himmler, he extends his exoneration to the Waffen SS and even the Allgemeine SS in places, suggesting that only the SD were responsible for “actions” against Jews and partisans. He also suggests that the partisans brought retribution upon themselves for abandoning the Geneva Convention and fighting against Nazi rule without wearing uniforms. He holds Hitler responsible for the lost war, and rarely admits that any of his military colleagues besmirched their honor, although he does argue forcefully that he was restricted from the best course of action due to their incapacity for understanding mobile warfare. On a grand political scale, he blames the allies for much unnecessary suffering due to the insistence on “unconditional surrender” and sees this as responsible for the loss of East Germany (his homeland) and the rest of Eastern Europe to Warsaw Pact and Soviet control.

In short, this is a book of its times, and has to be read critically, in light of other knowledge today. Non-military specialists will find its technical details to be slow going and the appendices (which include Guderian’s daily orders throughout the campaign in France) completely incomprehensible. Some odd translation choices add to the density of the text, including the ever-contentious decision to translate SS ranks (“Reichsführer SS” becomes “National Leader of the SS” here) and other specialized terms familiar to the historian of the period. One other thing that bothered me, although this was surely an editor’s decision rather than the translator’s, was insistence upon not splitting infinitives, which resulted in some awkward writing and forced me frequently to re-read a sentence two or three times to figure out what was wrong with it (see what I did there?).

Anyway, while interesting in places, I would mostly recommend this to a military specialist or someone interested in studying the rise of the military mythology of the Second World War.

[Bertie Brady · Rating 3 out of 5]

Panzer leader is Heinz Guderian's first-hand account of WW2 and especially the functioning of the German leadership.

Heinz Guderian served in a number of roles during WW2, such as general, inspector of armoured vehicles and chief of the general staff. Serving in these roles brought him close to the Wehrmacht and Nazi leadership. Guderian was involved in the creation of Blitzkrieg, which he used with devastating effects in France and Operation Barbarossa. He gives in-depth accounts of his conversations with Adolf Hitler and how his tumultuous relationship with him evolved throughout the war. I found his accounts of the invasions of France and the USSR, although more personal due to him actively serving on the ground to be on the whole quite dry, with Guderian mostly writing about troop movements and attacks in little depth and personal feeling. His maps, which accompany these sections, are almost incomprehensible, at least to the average reader. I found the most interesting chapters towards the end of the book as Germany was collapsing and the Nazi leadership was desperately clinging on to any hope of a stalemate and eventual peace treaty. His second to last chapter about the leading figures of the Third Reich was also intriguing, detailing his opinions on Hitler and how he was able to secure power. He also discusses prominent members of the government such as Goering (who he does not portray favourably), Himmler, Speer, and Goebbels. His account of these men is given more credibility due to having worked closely with them before and during WW2.

Guderian's writing style is understandably quite rigid and unimaginative, but this is acceptable given his lack of experience in writing and the book being translated from German.

One major issue I have with the book is Guderian's lack of transparency. He never accepts any blame for any wrongdoing either he or his troops may have committed and instead glosses over them with an almost unfathomable degree of purported ignorance. I got the impression that Guderian is an unreliable narrator who picks and chooses what he chooses to include in his book depending on how it would make him appear. In particular he details extensive conversations with Hitler and other German leaders with suspicious amounts of detail. giving long paragraphs of entire conversations which almost certainly could not have been remembered verbatim and which always make it seem like he is a wise, sensible and morally upright individual and his opponent to be a coward or raving lunatic. It seems Guderian far too often uses this book to settle the score with any of his enemies in the government or army, something I find especially troubling given the fact many of the people he slanders by the time of the book's release are either dead or imprisoned and thus unable to defend themselves.

I also took issue with his claim of being almost singlehandedly the creator of Blitzkrieg when, without a doubt, many other military theorists were fundamental in its development. Regardless, Guderian was certainly instrumental in the use of Blitzkrieg during the invasion of France and overall appears to be quite a capable military leader, as evidenced by the large degree of respect he possessed among the Wehrmacht and allied leaders.

Despite the lack of accountability and issues with accuracy, I found Panzer leaders to be a rare look into the personalities of Nazi Germany and the experiences of the army during the French campaign and war against the USSR. I think he achieved the goal he stated he wanted for the book in his conclusion, which was to honour his dead soldiers; I definitely have a renewed respect for the difficulties the average German soldier had to endure during the long war on the Eastern Front.

[Legate of Suvla · Rating 5 out of 5]

Piyade sınıfından gelmesine rağmen Tankların operatif potansiyelini von Manstein ile beraber herkesten daha iyi değerlendirmiş, tarihin akışını üstü örtülü değiştiren sıradışı bir adamın sıradışı otobiyografisi. Bir generalin böbürlenmesi değilde ilkeleri olan onurlu bir adamın hayatından bir kesiti izliyorsunuz. Bu tarz adam böyledir. Askerliği, karşındakini öldürme basitliğine indirgemekten ziyade bir sanat olarak gören nitelikleri vardır. Rommel, von Manstein gibi hatta bu listeye Atatürk’ü bile katabilirz.
Kitabın en fazla detaylandırıldığı Barbarossa harekatı, ve sonra Ruslar karşısında gerilemenin bir anlatılışı vardır ki, adamı bunaltan şu yaz sıcaklarında okurken ciddi ciddi g.tünüz dondurur (-55 derece nedir amk). "Bu adamın yerinde ben olsaydım ne yapardım?" sorusunun cevabı kitabın yazarıyla da aynı olunca bu adama olan saygınızda bir kat artıyor. Basil Liddell Hart 'ın Hitler'in Generalleri Konuşuyor 'dan önce bu kitabı okursanız, sağlam bir altyapıyı da kurmuş oluyorsunuz. Ayrıca hiç böyle bir iddiası olmamasına rağmen Hitler gibi bir adamı da 1. ağızdan dinlemektesiniz. Özellikle Der Untergang gibi kültleşmiş bir filmdeki Hitler portresiyle bu kitapta çizilen portrenin aynı olduğunu farketmemek elde değil. Bir noktaya kadar zaferden zafere mimarlık yapan bir generalin, bir noktadan sonra freni patlamış kamyon gibi yıkıma giden bir ülkenin insanlarını kurtarmak için çırpınışlarını görerek bu insana karşı içten içe bir merhamet duygusu beslemeye başlıyorsunuz.
Kitabın eksi yönleri de yok değil, kullanılan kağıt kalitesi standart kitap sayfalarının bir tık altında. Kitabın tercüme kısmına gelecek olursak da çeviri olması nedeniyle cümle düşüklükleri fazla miktarda var. Bazen kim kime ne demiş? Ya da neyi kastetmis anlayamıyorsunuz. Diğer bir olumsuz kisim ise yazarın sürekli "A'dan B'ye gittim orduları C'ye çektim, D'de tutunduk, E'de savası az kalsın kaybediyorduk" şeklinde açıklamaları bir süreden sonra bayıyor, ayrıca harekatı açıklama yönünde konmuş olan operatif haritalar ise yetersiz kalmış. Tüm bunlara rağmen akıcı ve samimi dilliyle mevcut eksileri kendi lehine çevirmesini bilen bir eser. II. Dünya Savaşı’nda belli bir noktaya gelindikten sonra okunması gerek bir kitaptır, hatta bu adamın ismini ilk defa duyuyorsanız daha pişmemişsiniz demektir. :D

[Sergio Carral · Rating 4 out of 5]

Autobiografía de su papel como alto mando durante su conflicto del Coronel General Heinz Guderian, uno de los genios teóricos de la Blitzkrieg, escrita durante su encarcelamiento por los aliados. Además de su Autobiografía Guderian da "su visión" sobre el papel y las acciones del reich en el conflicto.

Admiro la figura de Guderian y su genialidad militar, pero se nota que en aprovecha esta autobiografía para lavar su imagen, distanciándose del núcleo del régimen nacionalsocialista y resaltando sus logros. Este intento de blanqueo no fue exclusivo de él; muchos oficiales de la Wehrmacht, e incluso jerarcas del régimen (sí, hablo de Albert Speer), lograron construir con éxito una narrativa en la que parecían ajenos a los excesos y atrocidades del Tercer Reich.

Hay que decir que, aunque Guderian nunca fue un nacionalsocialista (como buena parte del alto mando de la Wehrmacht), sí se benefició de la política militarista y expansionista del pintor austriaco. De hecho, se podría decir que Hitler fue el mayor impulsor de su carrera. Siendo justos, creo que Guderian realmente despreciaba a Hitler (tuvieron bastantes enfrentamientos en las fases finales del conflicto), pero tampoco es que se opusiera al régimen.

Dejando de lado la política, la parte puramente militar de la biografía me pareció muy interesante. Los análisis estratégicos de Guderian y sus anécdotas (sobre todo las de las últimas etapas del conflicto) son geniales. En especial, las interacciones con Hitler son oro puro, me parecieron súper interesantes.

En resumen, es una obra muy buena que da una perspectiva en primera persona del conflicto, contada por uno de sus protagonistas. Lectura obligatoria para cualquier aficionado de la Segunda Guerra Mundial.

[Hayrettin · Rating 2 out of 5]

Kitap başta o kadar vaat ediciydi ki, bir süreliğine de olsa ilk defa bir kitap için "must read" shelf'i açtığım doğrudur. Lakin 100'lü sayfalara gelirken sönümleniyor ve son 1/3'lük kısıma kadar bürokrasi/kağıt işleri dairesine bağlıyor. Son 1/3'lük kısımda da genellikle dış kaynaklara cevaplar kabilinden kendi bakış açısını çok zayıf bir şekilde dile getirmesi mevcut denilebilir.

Yazarken bu kadar muhafazakar bir üslup seçen bireyin, muharebe sahasındaki cevherlerine dair ne yazık ki pek bir görüntü mevcut değil kitapta. Halbuki Rommel'e dair okurken o yenilikçilik vb. -belki çoğunlukla doğru zamanda doğru yerde olmasının da katkısıyla- insanın dikkatini çekiyor. Çok ufak bazı detayları dışında, Guderian'ın bu eserini özellikle teknik açıdan yetersiz bulduğumu belirtmem gerekir.

Sonuç olarak, ipini koparmış sürü psikolojisine "MEAN Value Theorem"i uygulanması sonucu ortaya çıkan topoğrafyaya doğmuş ve sipariş üstüne yazıldığı izlenimi veren bir eser.

Bedava yaşıyoruz, dostlar bedava.

Hava bedava, bulut bedava.

World of Tanks'te taktik bedava, sosyal medyada göbels bedava...


Dünya'nın kroniği bitmez..

[Ross · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is written almost in 3 parts. Early life and before the war, the war until Guderian's first dismissal, and the collapse. The first and 3rd parts are very enlightening and shows how inefficient and dogmatic the high command of the German Army was in the 1930s. Guderian was also at times close to and person non grata with Hitler with detailed accounts of these experiences. The last part of the book elaborates well on these concepts and details how desperate the situation was after Stalingrad through the winter of 1945 and is sobbering the read. The middle of this book while also giving insight also goes line-by-line about the tactics and maneuvers of Army Group Center. It gets a little bland, but is still worth reading and has many callouts by Guderian highlighting exemplary men he served aside. Guderian and the men under him were hardened and brave men that should be remembered as good men fighting for their country. Even the last sentence of the book iterates that these men Guderian was in charge of shall not go into oblivion, but should be remembered.