In this elegant critique, Amartya Sen argues that welfare economics can be enriched by paying more explicit attention to ethics, and that modern ethical studies can also benefit from a closer contact with economies. He argues further that even predictive and descriptive economics can be helped by making more room for welfare-economic considerations in the explanation of behaviour.
Amartya Kumar Sen is an Indian economist who was awarded the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for his contributions to welfare economics and social choice theory, and for his interest in the problems of society’s poorest members.
Sen was best known for his work on the causes of famine, which led to the development of practical solutions for preventing or limiting the effects of real or perceived shortages of food. He is currently the Thomas W. Lamont University Professor and Professor of Economics and Philosophy at Harvard University. He is also a senior fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows and a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, where he previously served as Master from the years 1998 to 2004. He is the first Asian and the first Indian academic to head an Oxbridge college.
Amartya Sen's books have been translated into more than thirty languages. He is a trustee of Economists for Peace and Security. In 2006, Time magazine listed him under "60 years of Asian Heroes" and in 2010 included him in their "100 most influential persons in the world".
The book is quite concise but there are some stuff they bring up that are quite questionable. For example, they say a flaw in economics is that self interested ppl care abt interests not their own, but isnt that already adopting other ppls interests into your own interest in decision making? They did touch upon some ethic frameworks i did like because i didnt know much about them like welfarism and wtv which i would definitely read up on afterwards but the stuff i did understand from economics and game theory im like: “ehhhh really tho. Whats your point man. I dont agree with what i think u are getting at bro.” So i kinda disagree with this book but they dumped a lot of cool ethic theories so i give it a three star.
Recommended by EJMR as I looked for good philosophy readings.
Sen in this essay criticizes the implicit assumptions grounding the First Welfare Theorem and other assumptions of welfare economics. Sen argues that ethics and economics have gotten too disconnected to the detriment of both. Economics had its start in two traditions: an Aristotelian stew in which concepts which we would today call ethics, politics, and economics were all mixed up and one in which economics is viewed as separate and instrumental. After the first generation of modern economists such as Adam Smith and John Stewart Mill, for whom morality was central, the engineering approach has been emphasized.
Sen examines the assumptions economics makes about human behavior. A core assumption of the vast majority of economics is that people behave rationally. Sen breaks rationality down into two sub-concepts: consistency (or rationalizability) and self-interest maximization. He later breaks self-interest maximization into sub-concepts as well.
A rationality is the system of rules by which an agent decides on an action given their preferences, beliefs, and options. It may also include rules restricting the types of preferences allowed and how beliefs are formed. Economic models assume many subtly different versions of rationality in different contexts. But the standard bare-bones version entails that an agent have complete and transitive preferences. Complete preferences means being able to make a choice between any two options that might conceivably be presented. Transitive preferences mean that if an agent prefers A to B, and B to C, he prefers A to C. While a person with intransitive preferences is conceivable, he might find it very difficult to go shopping because he’d cyclically replace stuff in his shopping cart with other preferred stuff. A neat thing about rational preferences is that they can be represented as mathematical ‘utility functions’. An individual doesn’t need to be conscious of their utility function: to be ‘consistently rational’ they just need to act as though they were consciously maximizing it. Further, for a person to be consistent, their preferences don’t necessarily have to have any connection to their good or pleasure or anything. If a suicide bomber or a drug addict acts sensibly in pursuit of their goals, they might be acting consistently, but you might not think they are acting in their self-interest.
The other definition of rationality economists work with is self-interest maximization. Why do economists want to assume that the utility function people maximize represents their well-being? First, factually, self-interest seems to be at least a powerful motivation. More fundamentally, if we want to be liberals and not automatically assume that the good for everyone is the same, then we need some other access to what individuals’ goods’ are. It makes sense to assume that individuals have better access to what their own flourishing entails than any outsider. Letting individuals tell us what their good is through their revealed preferences allows economists to dodge hard utilitarian problems of higher versus lower pleasures and the like. We don’t have to decide what the good life entails: the consumer gets to. Sen argues that self-interest maximization, while certainly compatible with rationality, is not required by it.
Sen then moves from positive economics to normative economics. Sen argues welfare economics is grounded in a version of utilitarianism. Sen divides classic utilitarianism into three parts: a) Welfarism – A state’s goodness is completely described by its utility information b) Sum Ranking – The best state is the one that has the highest total utility c) Consequentialism – A choice should be judged based on its forseeable consequences
Sen thinks economics’ strength is its embrace of consequentialism, as any moral theory must employ at least some consequential reasoning. For example, even if rights are intrinsically valuable, we still need to be consequentialists to deal with situations where different rights come into conflict.
As for sum-ranking, in PEL’s utilitarianism episode, one of the huge problems that arose was inter-personal comparisons of utility. Utilitarianism sounds great until you are actually faced with practical problems of weighing the relative merits of saving one man’s life versus the inconveniencing ten thousand people. Utility monsters also lead to paradoxes. And Arrow’s Impossiblity theorem tells us that there is no voting system that can sensibly decide between a set of pareto efficient options. Engineering economics dodges these hard problems by dropping the sum-ranking criteria. Economists only feel on solid ground normatively when advocating for pareto efficiency. But Sen thinks the pareto criteria is too conservative. Extremely unequal societies can still be pareto efficiency, so long as the richest guy has some value from his hoard at the margin.
Sen also critiques welfarism. The move economists want to make is to say that people act to maximize their self-interest. By designing policies to get people more of their revealed preferences, economists hope to make them and society better off. Due to his analysis of rationality, Sen thinks extrapolating interests from actions is problematic. His analysis also suggests that there are at least two different things we should care about: getting people more of what they want and getting people more of what’s good for them. If these two things don’t line up perfectly, then a one dimensional measure of the good is inadequate. Sen is attracted to the idea of other intrinsic values as well. So Sen rejects moral monism. A ranking of social outcomes which squeezes heterogeneous considerations into a unidimensional scale may be desirable, but it is not necessary.
In the years since Sen’s lecture, much progress has been made in economics, led by behavioral economists and decision theorists, in understanding a wider range of behavior. Many economists today shy away from using the loaded term ‘rational’ for any set of behavioral assumptions. However, versions of utilitarianism remain the dominant paradigm for understanding welfare.
অর্থনীতির সাথে নৈতিকতার সম্পর্ক কেনো জরুরি বা জ্ঞানের এই দুই শাখার আন্তঃসম্পর্ক কীভাবে গণ-অর্থনীতির মৌলিক চরিত্র তৈরি করতে পারে; তারই সবিশেষ ও সবিস্তারিত আলোচনা উঠে এসেছে অর্থনীতিবিদ অমর্ত্য সেনের এ বইটিতে। মূলত ১৯৮৬ সালে ক্যালিফোর্নিয়া বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়ে অধ্যাপক অমর্ত্য সেন যে বক্তৃতাগুলো দিয়েছিলেন (যেগুলো রয়্যার লেকচার সিরিজ নামেই পরিচিতি), তারই সম্পাদিত ও সংকলিত রূপ হচ্ছে আলোচ্য বইটি। তিনটি মৌলিক আলোচনার এক অভূতপূর্ব সম্মিলনের সাথে কুড়ি পাতার সুতীক্ষ্ম সমালোচনা বইটিকে সুখপাঠ্য করে তুলেছে। Economic Behaviour and Moral Sentiments, Economic Judgements and Moral Philosophy এবং Freedom and Consequences এ তিনটি অধ্যায়ে অর্থনীতির সাথে নৈতিকতার মেলবন্ধন কেনো এবং কোন প্রেক্ষাপটে জরুরি, তা বর্ণনা করেছেন। বর্তমানে আধুনিক অর্থনীতিশাস্ত্রে এ দূরত্ব যে ক্রমেই বাড়ছে, সে সম্পর্কেও তিনি স্পষ্ট মতামত রেখেছেন। অর্থনীতির ‘ethics’ related approach এবং ‘engineering’ related approach এ দুটো বিষয় নিয়েই সুগভীর আলোচনা সেরে তিনি সপ্রমাণ উপস্থাপন করেছেন যে, বর্তমান অর্থনীতিশাস্ত্রে ‘ইতিবাচক বিশ্লেষণ’- এর নামে ‘engineering’ related approach কেই প্রাধান্য দেওয়া হচ্ছে, যার কারণে গণ-অর্থনীতির চরিত্র গড়ে উঠছে না (প্রথম অধ্যায়)।
সন্দেহ নেই, তাঁর আলোচনার বিষয়গুলো অত্যন্ত জটিল; কিন্তু অধ্যাপক সেনের লেখনীতে যে স্বভাবসিদ্ধ সৌকর্য থাকে, তা প্রতিটি আলোচনাকে প্রাণবন্ত করে তুলেছে। বোধ করি, বক্তৃতাগুলো থেকে সম্পাদনার ক্ষেত্রে এই লেখনীশৈলীকেই মুখ্য হয়ে উঠেছে।
Sen's clear and concise book is adapted from his 1986 university lectures. They offer a critique of some of the utilitarian, rationalistic and egoistic assumptions underlying welfare economics. I especially enjoyed his analytical distinctions in the realm of welfare and utility. Sen's insights, in lecture form, are stripped of excessive (although obviously useful) math, but not of their fire power.
Inter alia (tra l'altro) per nulla facile, ma cogliendone anche un 10% è comunque illuminante
Pag 8 E' difficile credere che le persone reali (di cui si ritiene debba interessarsi l'economia) non si pongano la domanda socratica "come bisogna vivere" chè è il motivo centrale dell'etica (secondo Bernard Williams) Pag 9 L'economia ha 2 origini una legata all'etica a Aristotele e alla sua Etica Nicomadea Pag 10 Per Aristotele non c'è possibilità di dissociare lo studio dell'economia dall'etica e dalla filosofia politica. La moderna economia del benessere si fa ad Aristotele "il bene umano è desiderabile se riguarda una sola persona ma è divino se riguarda un popolo e una città" Pag 11 Approccio ingegneristico i fini sono dati l'obiettivo è trovare i mezzi adeguati. Il comportamento umano è visto come basato su motivazioni semplici. L'approccio ingegneristico arriva appunto da un ingegnere Leon Walras. Ma anche prima da Sir William Petty. L'approccio ingegneristico arriva addirittura da Arthasatra di Leontilya. Il trattato si compone di 4 parti 1) Metafisica 2)ciò che giusto ciò che è sbagliato 3) scienza del governo 4) scienza della richezza. Pag 14 L'economia moderna si è impoverita anche perchè si è distanziata dall'etica Pag 15 Nonostante la teoria formale dell'equilibrio generale sia astratta e vede gli esseri umani semplificati ha reso più semplice la composizione delle interrelazioni sociali . La teoria generale fa capire che le carestie centrano poco con la disponibilità di cibo e hanno invece cause antecedenti Pag 19 La razionalità può non bastare alcune volte ci sono più cose razionalmente ammissibili (il comportamento razionale è specificato in termini ristretti) identifica il comportamento razionale con quello effettivo. Pag 20 Due metodi predominanti di vedere la razionalità 1) Coerenza Interna cioè ordinare massimizzare finanziariamente le preferenze Richter (1971) Razionalizzabilità. Non tutti gli ordinamenti completi sono numericamente rappresentabili Debreu. Comportarsi costantemente in modo opposto per ottenere beni è coerenza interna, ma non razionalità e quindi condizione necessaria che vi sia almeno una "razionalità di corrispondenza" tra scelte e obiettivi. Pag 22 La coerenza interna comunque definita non è sufficiente per la razionalità Pag 23 2)la Massimizzazione dell'interesse personale come Razionalità. Max interesse personale è sicuramente non irrazzionale, ma non regge l'ipotesi che una qualsiasi scelta non orientata al Max interesse personale sia irrazionale. Se la razionalità significa solo massimizzare l'interesse personale significa negare all'etica qualsiasi ruolo nella presa delle decisioni Pag 24 L'uomo economico che persegue i propri interessi ci dà la migliore approssimazione possibile del comportamento umano nell'economia? Pag 25 George Stigler ha introdotto senza dimostrare l'homo economicus. Pag 26 Nessuno studio interessante è stato fatto sulle motivazioni (Freakeconomics? no? . Il giappone che spesso viene citato a favore dell'homo economicus è proprio l'esatto contrario in quando si fonda su senso del dovere e lealtà. Pag 27 In Giappone basso tasso di litigi basso numero di avvocati comportamento basato su regole. Richard Dore ha fatto studi comparativi su diversi sistemi di valori predominanti "la ricetta confuciana per il successo industriale" (Invece Taleb non crede nelle differenze di paese se ho ben capito) Pag 28 L'interesse personale ha un ruolo importante, ma non è il solo motore. Pag 29 La commistione di comportamento egoista e altruista è una delle caratteristiche fondamentali della fedeltà ad un gruppo . Le due principali definizioni utilizzate in economia sono 1°) Efficienza Tecnica cioè maggiore output a parità di input 2°) Ottimalità paretiana nessuno può stare meglio se non facendo stare peggio qualcun altro. PAg 31 Nella teoria dei sentimenti morali di Adam Smith Prudenza = "ragione e comprensione" unita a "dominio di se". La prudenza è quindi diversa dall'interesse personale come invece sostiene l'interpretazione di Stigler. La prudenza per Adam Smith è la virtù più utile a una persona. Pag 31-32 la "posizione Smithiana" mistifica il pensiero di Adam Smith. Pag 32-33 Smith bacchetta Epicuro perchè tende (come molti filosofi) a banalizzare i problemi riducendoli a poche variabili causali. Pag 33 Edgeworth utilitarista dice che il calcolo economico del proprio interesse invece che della valutazione etica è importante per i contratti e per la guerra (quindi non per tutto l'operato economico) Pag 36-37 Interpretazione secondo Sen del pensiero di Adam Smith sulla carestia. Pag 42-43 L'economia del benessere tradizionalmente valuta il beneficio della società con criterio utilitaristico cioè la somma totale dell'utilità generata. In ottica etica questa visione è molto ristretta. Lionel Robbins ha bollato come normativi o etici i confronti interpersonali di utilità I filosofi positivisti hanno forse sbagliato considerando prive di significato tutte le posizioni etiche, ma non hanno affatto suggerito che tutte le proposizioni prive di significato fossero etiche . Vale in assenza di esternalità e in assenza di economie di scala. E' molto elegante spiega la natura reciprocamente vantaggiosa del commercio. Nell'economia del benessere però il ruolo di questa conclusione è limitato perchè l'ottimalità paretiana è un risultato modesto dal punto di vista sociale. Pag 48 Per abbbinare giudizi distributivi all'ottimalità paretiana si ricorre al criterio di equità che esige che nessuno invidi il paniere di beni di cui dispone un'altro. La non esistenza dell'invidia in un momento non è sinonimo di distribuzione equa delle risorse. Pag 49 di recente il teorema fondamentale dell'economia del benessere è stato esteso ai beni pubblici (cioè quei beni il cui consumo non riduce quello di un'altro) anche questa teoria ha problemi sulle informazioni necessarie per le descrizioni pubbliche relative alla scelta dell'adeguata distribuzione iniziale. Pag 50 Se redistribuzioni radicali di proprietà non sono possibili, i movimenti nella direzione dell'ottimo paretiano richiede dei meccanismi misti non presi in considerazione dal teorema fondamentale. PAg 51 L'enorme importanza dell'ottimalità paretiana nell'economia del benessere è strettamente collegata all'utilitarismo. Se si considera l'utilità personale come l'unica cosa di valore intrinseco è allora naturale utilizzare il criterio di ottimo paretiano. Pag 52-53? Pag 54 La persona può essere vista in termini di facoltà di agire, capacità di dare forma a obiettivi, impegni e valori e possiamo anche vedere la persona in termini di benessere. Questa dicotomia si perde in un modello basato solo sull'interesse personale nel quale le facoltà si finalizzano solo nel benessere. Pag 57 Il benessere e la facoltà di agire anche se fossero dipendenti reciprocamente resta il fatto che sono due variabili non c'è una funzione semplice di trasformazione. Una lotta per l'indipendenza del paese. Quando si raggiunge l'obiettivo si è felici, ma la felicità è solo una conseguenza. Pag 58 Quindi l'approccio monadico basato unicamente sul calcolo dell'utilità da informazioni molto limitate. Pag 59 Giudicare il benessere unicamente sulla felicità o appagamento dei desideri ha il problema che la misura è distorta sia per le attese future sia rispetto ciò che si è ricevuto. Se uno ha fatto una vita con molte privazioni può trovare la felicità in piccole cose. Chi ha ricevuto poco non ha il coraggio di desiderare molto. Pag 60 Chi sostiene che l'utilità è l'unica fonte del valore fa coincidere l'utilità con il benessere. Pag 61 Forse il modo migliore per rappresentare il vantaggio non sta nel considerare solo i risultati raggiunti, ma anche attraverso la libertà che ha una persona. Pag 62 Se utilità coincide con il vantaggio consegue che efficienza coincide con ottimo paretiano. Quando il concetto di vantaggio viene cambiato altrettanto si modifica il concetto di efficienza. L'etico Utilitarista Jeremy Bentham rifiuta le etiche morali basate sui diritti. Marx nella sua filosofia morale incorpora l'Etica della libertà di Brenkert. Pag 64 Non considerare l'importanza intrinseca dei diritti deriva dalla mancanza d'interesse da parte dell'economia del benessere per l'etica. La teoria economica dominante ha rifiutato anche le tesi di utilitarismo più raffinato. Nonostante qualche rara protesta come quella di John Hicks. Pag 66 L'economia predittiva basa la sua robustezza circa il comportamento umano attraverso la Massimizzazione dell'interesse personale. Pag 67 Nella tradizione dominante economica predittiva (ingegneristica) influenza l'economia del benessere. Pag 76 Bisogna considerare il benessere quando si valuta l'equità distributiva bisogna valutare la facoltà di agire quando si considera le svariate cose che una persona vorebbe vedersi compiere. Pag 77 Essere felici è molto importante ma non è il solo risultato che conta per una persona Rawls 1971. Pag 83 Si può rimuovere l'ipotesi di ordinamento completo e valutare se una combinazione di oggetti è superiore ad un'altra (trade-off) Isacc Levi ha studiato le scelte difficili. Pag 84 Esiste un terzo approccio che di fronte ai conflitti di principi può ammettere sia la superiorità di un'alternativa sul altra sia l'opposto. Il dilemma di Agamennone (G.A. Privitera. G. Basta Donzelli. A. Masaracchia. R. Pretagostini. F. Montanari. Storia della letteratura greca. A cura di Giovanni D'Anna Nell'Agamennone, prima tragedia dell'unica trilogia del teatro greco pervenutaci integra, con Coefore ed Eumenidi (458), uno dei nodi drammatici è costituito dall'angoscioso dilemma di Agamennone di fronte all'alternativa di sacrificare la figlia Ifigenia, perché possa partire la spedizione dei Greci contro Troia, o di risparmiarla e di rinunziare quindi alla spedizione di cui egli è capo supremo. Ancora un sovrano costretto ad una scelta, che sarà comunque fonte di mali, tra due condizionamenti entrambi potenti e ineludibili. Se però al sovrano guerriero si impone come necessaria la scelta dell'impresa bellica in cui generazioni di Greci avevano ravvisato i valori più alti della loro identità culturale, è tuttavia una tale scelta parimenti rimessa in questione in nome di una cultura che (se ne fa portavoce il Coro) condanna gli orrori della guerra e del sacrificio umano che l'ha propiziata. E una ferma condanna di ogni eccesso (di fama, di ricchezza, di passioni) percorre il dramma e ne costituisce la trama profonda. A ciò fa riscontro il fatto che da una parte la spedizione greca è giudicata come una punizione, giusta e conforme ai voleri di Zeus, della colpa di Paride, ma dall'altra è condannata e ritenuta meritevole della punizione divina. In questa antinomia si coglie il travaglio del poeta ateniese nel rileggere il patrimonio mitico tradizionale alla luce di quella norma etica (e politica) di moderazione, di sophrosyne, che apparteneva all'ideologia della polis: moderazione ed equilibrio contro eccesso e trasgressione. ) non può essere risolto introducendo un'ordinamento delle preferenze. Pag 85 Per le esigenze dei governi ci vuole un ordinamento completo bisogna Agire. Pag 86 L'asino di Buridano no sa scegliere quale sacco d'avena è superiore all'altro e muore di fame. Le decisioni pubbliche razionali devono venire a patti con scelte parzialmente giustificate. Pag 88 Il modello di ordinamento ponderato completo può essere irrealistico e decisamente ingannevole ai fini di descrizione e predizione del comportamento oltre ad essere forse ingannevole nell'etica normativa. Pag 88-89 Esistono dilemmi anche profondi che influenzano l'economia si veda lo sciopero dei minatori inglesi del 1984-1985 Pag 92 Robert Nozick crea una struttura morale basata sui diritti Sen ha dimostrato che per essere efficace deve internalizzare valutazioni esterne il modo migliore per procedere è incorporare il valore del rispetto dei diritti e il disvalore delle violazioni. Pag 93-94 Se il rispetto delle regole ha un valore intrinseco viene meno il welferismo dove l'unico elemento che ha valore è l'interesse personale. Pag 94 l'approccio ingegneristico è utile per valutare le conseguenze di un atto a prescindere che si sposi o meno l'etica del conseguenzialismo. Etica del conseguenzialismo richiede che le valutazioni sulla giustezza delle azioni sia giudicata interessante sulla bontà delle conseguenze. PAg 95 L'analisi consequenziale può essere necessaria, ma non sufficiente. Pag 97 Se il ragionamento conseguenziale è impiegato senza le limitazioni del welferismo l'approccio conseguenziale può fornire una struttura flessibile e robusta per la riflessione ai fini prescrittivi su questioni quali i diritti e la libertà (ingegneria utile all'etica) Pag 99 Nella letteratura economica abituale la persona è vista nell'atto di massimizzare la propria funzione di utilità, la quale dipende solo dai suoi consumi e determina tutte le scelte. Questa complessa struttura di "comportamento mosso dall'interesse personale " ha tre caratteristiche distinte e sostanzialmente indipendenti: 1) Benessere personale egoistico: il benessere di una persona dipende solo dai suoi consumi (e in particolare non comporta nessuna antipatia o simpatia verso gli altri) 2) Obiettivi di benessere personale: l'obiettivo di una persona è massimizzazione del proprio benessere o in presenza di incertezza del valore atteso ponderato su basi probabilistiche di tale benessere (ciò che non comporta l'assegnazione di un'importanza diretta al benessere degli altri) 3) Scelte basate su obiettivi personali: ciascun atto di scelta delle persone è guidato immediatamente dal perseguimento del proprio interesse (non c'è interdipendenza). Pag 100 Il benessere personale si basa su un fondamento più ampio che il consumo personale Pag 101 se ognuno persegue come obiettivo il proprio interesse personale si può cadere in soluzioni non ottime dal punto di vista sociale vedi il dilemma del prigioniero. Nel dilemma del prigioniero ogni individuo ha una strategia strettamente dominante. Pag 102 Una strategia di Non-cooperazione può avvenire anche quando i partecipanti sono troppo morali. Pag 105 il comportamento è in ultima analisi una questione anche sociale si crea un senso di identità del NOI. Il riconoscimento dell'interdipendenza può suggerire di seguire regole diverse. Pag 108 Adam Smith aveva parlato di regole di condotta per correggere l'eccessivo amore per i propri interessi. Pag 110 L'allontanarsi dall'interesse personale non va visto come esternalità ma integrato nel modello riformulando il modello corrente.
“On Ethics and Economics” is a lecture given by Dr. Amartya Sen at the University of California, Berkeley in the year 1986. The basic idea that has been put forth in this book is that the splitting of ethics and economics into two distant different variables has resulted in the impoverishment of modern neoclassical economic theory to a great extent. Dr. Sen had persuasively argued that the potential contribution that these two fields can make to each other would be of great help in tackling problems of interdependence in complex ethical problems even when economics is not involved and, on the other hand, economics can be made more productive by paying more attention to the ethical considerations which play a vital role in human judgment and behavior.
In the first chapter, “Economic Behaviour and Moral Sentiments”, Sen presents us with the origins of economics and the two different approaches towards economics namely ‘ethics’ and ‘engineering’ approaches. While the neoclassical economic theories are solely prioritizing the engineering approach, emphasizing more on self-interest maximization as an equivalent to human rationality, Sen says, “It may not be all absurd to claim that maximization of self-interest is irrational but to argue that anything other than maximizing of self-interest must be irrational seems altogether extra-ordinary. Universal selfishness as a requirement of rationality is patently absurd.”
This engineering approach followed by modern economists avoids ethical considerations and moral values leading towards widening the gap between ethics and economics. Dr. Sen cites Japan as an example to refute the argument that self-interested actions would lead to efficient outcomes and shows that the systematic departures from self-interested behavior in the direction of moral values that include duty, loyalty, and goodwill have played a substantial part in the industrial success of Japan. Thus, Dr. Sen asserts that it is not self-interest alone, but a plurality of motivations that drives the actions or behavior of human beings.
In the second chapter, “Economic Judgments and Moral Philosophy”, Dr. Sen had argued that the present-day theory of welfare economics is narrowed by the ideas of Pareto optimality and economic efficiency, utility and welfare, and utility-maximization. Dr. Sen believes this blatant oversimplification fails to consider the ‘agency’ aspect of human beings which reflects the broader welfare of mankind. He criticizes this approach since it fails to assess the ‘social progress’ while regarding only the optimal distribution or utility as the sole purpose of welfare.
This perspective of utilitarianism suffers from the major drawback when the well-being of a person defined in terms of utility is judged exclusively on the basis of the metric of happiness or desire-fulfillment. Sen argues that this approach distorts the extent of deprivation. In his words, “The metric of happiness may, therefore, distort the extent of deprivation, in a specific and biased way. The hopeless beggar, the landless labor, the dominated housewife, the over-exhausted coolie may all take pleasures in small mercies, and manage to suppress intense suffering for the necessity of continuing survival.” Dr. Sen condemns this economic theory of utilitarianism which ignores the ‘agency aspect’ of human beings where interpersonal utility differs between each individual. In the third and last lecture on “Freedom and Consequences”, Dr. Sen further criticizes the shortcomings of the utilitarian view which fails to acknowledge the distinction between the ‘well-being aspect’ and ‘agency aspect’. Dr. Sen had also further stressed the aspect of ‘freedom’ which bears critical importance in one’s achievements, which is also overlooked from a utilitarian point of view. Dr. Sen concludes his lecture by prescribing the consequential approach (to decide if an action is good or bad based on its outcome) as an answer to a number of ethical conflicts arising in the field of economics and welfare.
In a nutshell, this is a very technical book, especially if one had not read a fair bit of ethics and moral philosophy before. The writing is too complex and incomprehensible.
A short, dense, and frankly, humbling read. Not well-versed or trained in economics, I stumbled and bumped my way through the reading, but am happy I did. Sen provides an in-depth argument as to why mainstream Western economics fails to adequately calculate and quantify human behaviour. The notion of “maximizing self-interest” at the heart of the Western presumption of human behaviour leads to an orientation of predictive and descriptive economics that obscures the more layered and diverse reality of human reasoning. Sen argues that an incorporation of social instrumentalism and welfare economics into mainstream economic considerations would better address the human and collective elements of difficult economic calculations.
The thought stimulated in me as a result of this reading was a deeper insight into how Capitalism operates on and through an ethical scheme. The pursuit of profit is benefitted from the largest and most demanding consumer market as possible. When consumer markets are seen through the lens of the collective, individual consumers themselves are often aggregated to create consumer collectives (communities) and advance community goals. For example, a consumer collective may experience the need for public transportation and subsequently satisfy said need with the collective purchase of a public transportation system, shared and used by all members of the collective. Such consumer behaviour, however, is not conducive to maximizing profit because it consolidates large groups of potential individual and redundant consumers into singular collective consumers. (Think of the difference between 100 people each buying a book, versus 100 people jointly purchasing a single book which is shared amongst themselves. 100 individual consumers turn into 1 collective consumer.)
When consumers are individualized, their needs become redundant. Instead of selling a single railway system to a community of consumers for collective needs, the individualized consumer sees their individual need for transportation satisfied by an individualized response. For example, instead of collectively purchasing and implementing a public transportation system, a group of individualized consumers may instead each prioritize a car to advance their self-interest, thus creating an oversaturated market-demand based on redundant satisfaction of collective needs.
Therefore, despite there being a collective need, in a profit-oriented economy, individualization is promoted to turn collective needs into individual needs. No wonder Capitalism has proliferated in individualistic cultures. No wonder the US, despite having only a fraction of the global population, remains the most disproportionately over-consuming market. Profit breeds individualism, which breeds profit, and so on. Capitalism is an ethical model for collective behaviour, and works best when communities are dismantled in favour of exalting individual self-interest on behalf of the consumer. Capitalism is the death of community.
Based on three lectures given at Berkeley in 1986, this short book first argues for the reintroduction of ethics into the field of economics. Economics as a discipline has wandered into theoretical abstractions and mathematical models divorced from the daily lives of real people. Sen, not only a Nobel Prize winning economist (1998) but also a first rate moral philosopher, points out the beginnings of the economics as a discipline emerged from the moral philosophies of Hume, Adam Smith, the French physiocrats, and others in the 17th and 18th centuries. Sen then criticizes the reliance on utilitarianism as the template for judging economic results, showing how this often leads to unfortunate outcomes. Sen is a consequentialist in the sense that outcomes should increase human flourishing. But relying on utility, the greatest happiness for the greatest number, as the measurement of economic success too often leads to outcomes that oppress too many people and reward too few. He also isn't sympathetic to right-based theories such as those of Rawls and Nozick. Ultimately, the way to expand human flourishing is to concentrate on whether or not economic outcomes promote the welfare of people. This is not utilitarian in approach because human welfare includes not only the wealth of individuals, but also their access to health, education, friendship, and other benefits less easily measurable than income and wealth. Human freedom depends as much on the more ephemeral qualities of human life as on the more concrete financial aspects.
This has been my Amartya Sen year, and On Ethics and Economics turned out to be an excellent addition to my reading list. The book consists of a series of three lectures in which Sen argues that the neglect of ethics by economists has left the field wanting in three respects. First, by excluding ethics from economics, economists have tended to focus on "engineering" problems while ignoring both their own history and the history of human behavior; second, this exclusion impoverishes economic explanations of human behavior, reducing all motivations to self interest; finally, the exclusion creates an over-reliance on utilitarian consequentialism that ignores interdependencies and reduces freedoms and rights to utilities. Sen forcefully argues that these deficiencies in economics can be addressed when taking into account ethical imperatives surrounding freedom and a robust notion of rights that reflects communal decision. While acknowledging, the need for certain types of abstractions, the reduction of human behavior to self-interest, Sen argues, ignores a whole field of cooperative behaviors and human actions that economists cannot explain without dismissing legitimate bases of human action. As an alternative, Sen argues, economics (and ethics) would gain by looking at ethics as foundational to human motivations and functioning.
Interesting rumination on methodology in economics by Sen. Sen introduces the book by giving an overview of conceptions of rationality in economics - that of either choice consistency (ordinal preferences to use a technical term) and self-interest maximization. Economists, and Sen recognizes this, have since departed from the strong forms of rationality etched out by theorists such as Edgeworth’s theories of economic behavior with consequentialist assumptions. Sen believes that such an approach has impoverished both ethics and economics as a scientific discipline as individuals may not reliably maximize an objective function or may have inconsistency in choices. Therefore, the predictive value of economics may be reduced. In my view, this proceeded more by assertion than argument and wasn’t quite convinced. The book has 30 pages of references and didn’t reference Becker’s quite persuasive discussion of the implications, in my view, in this regard (http://www.elautomataeconomico.com.ar...).
Sen this discusses whether certain norms should be viewed as having inherent value or merely instrumental value. Sen’s discussion is a reheated discussion of critiques of utilitarianism and consequentialism.
Overall, an interesting book, but not that memorable in my view
Sen develops some very interesting ideas in this short book. First, humans are deeply ethical creatures and the standard economic assumption of the equation of self-interested behaviour with rationality is misleading. It also cannot be attributed to Smith himself, as it often is. Rationality cannot be a matter of internal consistency of choice, hence economists equate it with maximization of self-interest; a misleading paradigm.
Second, welfare economics has been separated pretty sharply from what Sen terms 'engineering' -- a quantitative, pragmatic approach to analysing economy. Pareto optimality, the assumption that a social state is optimal if and only if no one's utility can be raised without reducing the utility of someone else, is core to welfare economics. This criterion, however, overlooks the possibility of extreme inequality. Sen distinguishes well-being from agency, noting that both should be considered as distinct criteria despite being interdependent. The deontological tradition of tracing economic reasoning to rights has historically been overlooked in favour of purely utilitarian thinking.
Third, we come to the view that there are four distinct categories of relevant information regarding a person: well-being achievement, well-being freedom, agency achievement and agency freedom. This diversity of criteria is often overlooked in mainstream economics. Having explored the importance of ethics in economic reasoning, Sen concludes that dialogue between ethics and economics will be important and fruitful for both fields.
Amartya Sen is an Indian economist and philosopher, who since 1972 has taught and worked in the United Kingdom and the United States.
This short book is based on a series of lectures that Sen delivered in April 1986. There are some historical references, but it’s largely based on academic perspectives of modern economics, welfare economics, and ethics.
I found his discussion of the issues to be quite dry and highly theoretical. The arguments for greater incorporation of ethics into economics (and for economics to take greater account of welfare issues) are highly persuasive – they certainly precede much of the progress towards ESG/sustainability/purpose/value in subsequent decades.
Sen argues against a narrow focus on self-interest being the primary driver for economic decisions by individuals (including some insights on Adam Smith, which support Sen’s assertion)…
The academic debates seem arcane from a 2023 perspective. I wouldn’t recommend this book, unless this area is really your thing.
Interesting development of the concept of welfare economics and how it should include ethics and predictive economics in order to better grasp the realities of life. At points clearly explained, at others slightly ambiguous and difficult to follow. The author could have summed it up in far less paged than he used for this book, which made the reading a bit too long and slow paced. Still, an interesting and insightful book.
I would like to give at least 3 stars as Sen's lecture is the clearest and most thorough version of certain ideas, which one can so frequently find elsewhere (i.e. mostly in the leftist critique of mainstream economics). But I cannot help it: Sen did not persuade me about anything important. His notion of homo economicus is a strawman and while his argument is normally supported by rich references, the important claims lack the small numbers by them. This undermines his main thesis a great deal.
2,5 Mi aspettavo un testo di divulgazione, con riferimenti più concreti a situazioni attuali; ho trovato invece un testo molto teorico e per le mie capacità e conoscenze difficile da comprendere.
Peccato, mi dispiace non essere riuscita a estrarre dalle analisi di Sen tutti gli insegnamenti che può trasmettere.
A primer on the intricate relationship between Modern Economics and Ethics. In the book Sen argues that welfare economics can be substantially enriched by paying more attention to ethics, and the study of ethics can also benefit from a closer contact with economics.
I wasn't too sure, what to make of this work. There are a range of issues, here that I need to try to understand here. These are obviously, the lighter fare; since it excludes much of the mathematics from his serious output.
Il libro porta avanti tesi sacrosante: peccato pera traduzione che rende più ostica argomenti che in lingua risultano molto più semplici. Non capisco se sia un errore della traduzione o, piuttosto, dell'"economichese" in lingua italiana.
Thought-provoking and really put into words what's been rattling around in my head on the topic. The reference section is a bounty of information on those who have contributed to this subject as well.
Sen is quite convincing in his views. I do see the relevance of ethics in economics. Self serving behaviour would only take you as far. Difficult, but if it is incorporated, it will lead to more wholesome and well rounded studies, illustrating actual human behaviour better.
While the book raises more problems with utilitarian welfare economics than it solves, it is a perfect example of sheer academic wit and a supremely logical mind.
A good set of essays on the importance of ethics and economics, as well as Sen's classic critique of utilitarianism and well-being measurements in economics
Ilmu ekonomi termasuk ilmu yang berusia cukup tua. Aristoteles, seorang filsuf Yunani Kuno, mendefinisikan ilmu ekonomi sebagai ilmu tentang pengaturan rumah tangga (oikonomia, dari oikos dan nomos). Akan tetapi sejarah perkembangan manusia hingga memasuki milenium ketiga ini masih banyak diselimuti oleh berbagai fakta kegagalan ilmu ekonomi terutama dalam mengatasi kemiskinan, kelaparan, ketertindasan, kesenjangan, dan sebagainya. Melalui buku ini, Amartya Sen, peraih Nobel Ekonomi tahun 1998, melakukan kritik epistemologis terhadap ilmu ekonomi modern yang gagal menjawab tantangan kemanusiaan. Kritik dan gagasan utama Sen dalam buku ini tercermin dalam judul asli buku ini, yakni On Ethics and Economics. Dalam buku ini Sen mengatakan bahwa selama ini ilmu ekonomi cenderung lebih berorientasi pada perkembangan pasar dan bisnis tingkat dunia saja tanpa memperhatikan proses-proses pembangunan ekonomi yang menurut kenyataannya telah merampas hak-hak asasi manusia. Untuk mengakhiri kebuntuan tersebut sudah semestinya ilmu ekonomi melakukan tegur sapa dan dialog dengan bidang ilmu lain yang cukup penting, yakni etika. Asumsi dasarnya amat sederhana: kegiatan ekonomi pada dasarnya adalah suatu kegiatan manusiawi biasa yang karena itu semestinya juga memperhatikan segi-segi etis. Dengan memberi perhatian yang lebih besar secara eksplisit terhadap pertimbangan-pertimbangan etis inilah ilmu ekonomi nantinya dapat lebih bersifat efektif mengatasi persoalan-persoalan ekonomi masyarakat yang sebenarnya. Kritik epistemologis Sen dimulai dengan suatu penyadaran sejarah bahwa sejak semula sudah lama ditegaskan keterkaitan ilmu ekonomi dengan bidang ilmu lainnya, seperti etika dan ilmu politik. Aristoteles misalnya dalam buku Nicomachean Ethics mengaitkan subjek ilmu ekonomi dengan tujuan-tujuan manusia. Dengan demikian, telaah ekonomi seharusnya juga mengikutkan pembahasan mengenai berbagai penilaian dan peningkatan tujuan yang bersifat lebih mendasar itu, yang dapat ditemukan dalam bidang etika pada level individu dan politik pada level struktur sosial. Sen juga mengkritik pandangan ilmu ekonomi modern yang mengatakan bahwa dalam perilaku ekonomi sepenuhnya bersifat rasional. Rasional di sini bisa berarti sebagai konsistensi internal terhadap pilihan, atau mengidentifikasikan rasionalitas dengan maksimalisasi kepentingan diri. Sen secara tegas menolak kedua anggapan ini terutama karena dengan adanya asumsi perilaku rasional dalam aktivitas ekonomi, maka pendekatan etis diam-diam hendak dibuang jauh-jauh. Lagipula, menurut Sen, yang disebut dengan konsistensi yang murni itu sebenarnya amat bergantung kepada serangkaian penafsiran (subjektif) terhadap beberapa pilihan, dan bahwa kepentingan diri itu tidak serta-merta dapat mengantarkan kepada efisiensi atau efektifitas ekonomis. Dalam soal kepentingan diri ini pula Sen memberikan penafsiran terhadap pemikiran Adam Smith dalam buku The Wealth of Nation yang oleh beberapa kalangan dianggap sebagai penolakan Smith terhadap pendekatan etis dalam ilmu ekonomi. Menurut Sen, ketika Adam Smith menulis: “Kita mendapatkan manfaat, bukan karena rasa kemanusiaan mereka melainkan karena kecintaan mereka pada diri sendiri, dan jangan pernah berbicara dengan mereka tentang kebutuhan-kebutuhan kita sendiri melainkan keuntungan-keuntungan mereka”, dia sebenarnya sedang membahas tentang pola pembagian kerja ekonomi dan bagaimana transaksi-transaksi normal berlangsung di pasar sehingga dapat memberikan manfaat bagi semua pihak. Lebih jauh lagi Sen memperjelas bahwa pertimbangan etika dalam ilmu ekonomi tidak hanya dapat memberikan maksimalisasi kesejahteraan pribadi saja, melainkan juga dapat mendorong timbulnya tanggapan-tanggapan yang membuat kesejahteraan pribadi mendapat landasan lebih luas daripada konsumsi sendiri. Namun perlu dicatat bahwa pendekatan etis juga memerlukan penilaian-penilaian yang bersifat konsekuensial terhadap aktivitas ekonomi, sehingga dapat menjangkau bidang kehidupan yang lebih luas. Pemikiran-pemikiran Sen dalam buku ini menarik dikaji dan didiskusikan bersama ketika ilmu ekonomi kehilangan keberpihakannya terhadap nilai humanisme dan cenderung elitis karena berparadigma positivistik. Melalui pemikiran Sen ini, ilmu ekonomi diajak kembali kepada komitmen awalnya untuk menebar harapan bagi semua orang untuk dapat hidup lebih baik dan layak dan tidak terjebak pada ambisi dan kerakusan.
Tulisan ini dimuat di Majalah Gamma, 27 Juni 2001.