I was never interested in banking and finance in general. But a review on this book in the internet made me curious.
It's surprisingly short and concise (apparently the authors earn enough not to pour too much water to books which they write). At the same time a bare minimum of repetitions is available, just enough to refresh in a reader's memory something important written before. So, for me, not much skilled in banking but used to reading technical or science books, the book was very comfortable to read.
The authors express their main idea right off the bat: these days banking is overcomplicated, dangerous and... obsolete. And it can and should be canceled. But immediately after this statement they admit that they don't offer a plan for how to do this, how to facilitate a transition.
First, they start with an explanation for such readers as myself what the banking is and how banks work, what it means that 'banks create money' and what basically the main purpose of the banking is. Borrowers need big lumps of money for long periods. Whereas lenders prefer to lend small sums and for short periods. And banks create a bridge between these two poles. It's their historical function. But banking comes with a cost. After financial crisis in the beginning of XX century when an outflow of depositors made many banks collapsed, notions of ‘a deposit insurance’ and ‘a lender of last resort’ were invented. At the same moment first regulations intended to limit taste for risk among bankers were introduced. And this helped and stabilized the banking for a few decades.
Until information technologies came to the scene. These technologies made easier the task of moving bank’s actives from a bank’s balance to balances of child companies. This allowed banks to move their actives from their own balances and to walk around regulation requirements to restrict volumes of their actives in relation to their own capitals. This was achieved with invention of ABS (asset-backed security) which is a financial instrument aggregating many loans given by a bank to various clients. So, using the language of math it’s a first derivative of a loan. But then a second derivative was invented (CDO), which would aggregate a few ABS, which aggregate a set of loans (in the house that Jack built...). Then a third derivative (CDO2), and so on. But what is true in math appeared the same true in finance: the higher order of derivative you have the less you can say about initial function/assets. But these papers were sold by banks to each other or were used as a security or pledge for another loan, thus spreading around and creating a chain of dependencies on the same initial asset or set of assets (loans).
And then the crisis of 2007-2008 happened. It was enough for a large group of mortgage borrowers to fail in order to cause a domino effect when dependent actives appeared to be of no value. In this situation an American government had to go further and to introduce measures even wider than ones introduced a century ago. To stop a collapse of the entire financial system they had to announce guarantees for those derivatives, effectively paying to their holders.
But what happened next? More elaborated and complicated regulations followed. They made banks to have dedicated departments which only task was to reconcile the bank's activity with these regulations. But it didn't remove the source of the problem. The same tricks are still possible and allowed, just became more complicated. And big banks are almost completely protected against insolvency because they are systemically important. Which effectively opens for them all doors and allows any risk. Also, such guarantees work in fact as public subsidies creating unequal conditions for big and smaller banks. Another problem, more conceptual, is that systematic suppression of risk creates eventually even higher risk. The bubble is growing bigger and bigger.
Then the authors suggest making a step back and revising what the main purpose of the banking was and if we still need banks for that purpose. And out of a sudden it seems that the same function can be carried out now differently. The same information technologies can fill the old gap between lenders and borrowers. There are online platforms which allow direct investments or loans. A credit history of a company or a person can be checked automatically these days. And also, the owners of these platforms provide check and consultancy services without offering banking services, which means without serving deposits and without giving loans. The problem of liquidity of assets and immediate access to money (like with purchases payed by a debit card) is solved with trading bots which can sell a person's share in some loan online just in milliseconds. And there are many other nuances which I'm not going to mention here but which, in the authors words, allow using absolutely the same 'interface' as the traditional banking uses but which is implemented absolutely different.
So, then what to do with banks? The authors underline that existing regulations attempt mostly to restrict risky operations. Those regulations try to define which operation is risky and in which situations and they just get stuck in a swamp of multidimensional, multivariable system with many 'ifs’'. Whereas they, authors, suggest looking to the root of the banking: to the old good balance sheet with assets and liabilities. And they offer to introduce just a single rule, a 'system solvency rule': the value of the organization’s real assets should be higher than or equal to the volume of the organization’s liabilities in the worst financial condition. Here real assets are all non-financial assets like equipment, hardware, patents, etc. And the worst financial condition roughly speaking happens when an organization has to pay out all debts. This rule is applicable for all types of organizations. It doesn't create any problem for the real sector of economy, for companies creating goods and services: in most cases they comply to this rule. But the rule effectively forbids financing loans with loans (in case of traditional banks, with money borrowed from clients, i.e. from deposits). Thus, it forbids banking. Because it requires securing loans only with own capital. But it does not kill lending per se. It just allows direct lending, without mediators. Like earlier mentioned online platforms for direct lending/investments.
Then the book shows a brave new world without banking. It focuses much on how it will impact the public monetary policies. And here I was a bit stuck. It was like to discover for myself the physics of atom: how a state operate with money on a level of their cost, that in order to have stable prices the state makes us to pay for using money and at the same time pays us (injects money to the economy).
Like I said in the beginning, the book doesn't share any hint on how to implement such retreat from banking in real life. Yes, it's obvious that it's a very difficult task. For example, what to do with billions of existing loans and deposits? They can't be canceled overnight since no bank has enough capital to return money to all depositors, and no borrower is able to repay a loan at any arbitrary time before a final date. So either banks should stop borrowing/lending but still continue to work until the last cent will be paid (but it's like to stop fueling an engine, it will just stop working) or some super bank (apparently a public bank) should buy all loans and deposits and to take care of a soft landing of the banking system. But this also looks like an immense weight for a state. Another problem is people: employees, a giant army of financiers, lawyers, IT, software engineers, etc. Not to mention a huge cloud of related businesses around. It's a big sector of economy.
While reading I was thinking that gradual retreat from banking must happen naturally as soon as loan/trading platforms will prove to be easy to use, more profitable, less risky, and not to be a subject to chain reactions on financial markets. Clients will vote with money. But the authors claim that the opposite is happening now: such platforms launch banking services in parallel to the initial role of a ‘stateless protocol’ of communication between lenders and borrowers.
But although the scale of this problem is very clear even for such an inexperienced reader as myself, it should be not only clear to the authors of the book, but they definitely must have some vision how such a transition from banking to no-banking could be facilitated, however crazy that vision would be. It sounds like utopia anyway, so why not to unleash all the most daring fantasies?
Otherwise it’s a very good book. Very specific, concise, and with things called with their real names.