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The Liddell Hart Memoirs Vol I
Basil Liddell Hart is regarded as one of the greatest military thinker of the last century.
In this extraordinary autobiography, he tells the story of his intellectual development.
Prophetically, in the light of the years that followed, the draft of the official Infantry Training manual of 1921 was criticized in some military quarters as being too revolutionary, too sweeping, too different from established ideas and methods.
Equally prophetic was that the younger and progressive elements in the British Army welcomed it as one of the most exciting, instructive and thought-provoking documents ever to come out as an official publication. Its author, a twenty-four year old Regular officer, a survivor of the Big Push on the Somme in July 1916, was Basil Liddell Hart.
This first volume of his memoirs takes the reader to 1937. For Captain Liddell Hart these years were packed with incident. From infantry tactics his dynamic, questing mind led him to study the whole field of military affairs and defence strategy.
Invalided to the half-pay list of the Army in 1924, he became military correspondent of first the Morning Post, then the Daily Telegraph and finally The Times, as well as military editor of the Encyclopædia Britannica. In a brilliant stream of articles, books, lectures he led that small group of enthusiasts who between the two world wars sought to lift the British Services from reactionary mediocrity to the state of powerful modern efficiency which they believed, all too correctly, to be essential for the future peace of the world.
Liddell Hart’s name is synonymous with the Blitzkrieg concept of armoured warfare — indeed its most successful exponents say that he originated it — and in this book he details in full his struggle against ignorance and apathy to provide his country with an effective armoured force. But that is only one aspect of the book. His personal collection of papers and documents covering this period, and his correspondence and records of conversations with such figures as Churchill, Lawrence, Lloyd George, and the leading statesmen, soldiers and politicians of the last fifty years, is acknowledged to be one of the finest in the world.
From these and from the uninhibited richness of his private notes and diaries, he has produced this unique contribution to history, as provocative and perhaps as controversial as anything he has written in his distinguished career.
In the summer of 1938, believing that Britain was grossly unprepared for an imminent war and that he could help far more from the public platform than through the private ear, Liddell Hart gave up his advisory role.
“The greatest military thinker of the 20th Century whose ideas have revolutionised the art of war” — GENERAL CHASSIN
“Nearly all German tank strategy was based on Liddell Hart’s teachings” — GENERAL VON MELLENTHIN
“The theoretical originator of mechanised warfare. I was one of his disciples” — GENERAL GUDERIAN
“No expert on military affairs has better earned the right to respectful attention than Liddell Hart” — PRESIDENT KENNEDY
“He still remains the foremost exponent of military matters in this country” — F.M. SIR CLAUDE AUCHINLECK
“Britain’s greatest military historian of our times” — F.M. VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN
Captain B.H. Liddell Hart (1895-1970) was an historian who made military history and theory interesting and understandable to the general reader. He was military writer for several London newspapers, as well as Military Editor of the ‘Encyclopaedia Britannica’. He was knighted in 1966.
Endeavour Press is the UK's leading independent digital publisher.
In this extraordinary autobiography, he tells the story of his intellectual development.
Prophetically, in the light of the years that followed, the draft of the official Infantry Training manual of 1921 was criticized in some military quarters as being too revolutionary, too sweeping, too different from established ideas and methods.
Equally prophetic was that the younger and progressive elements in the British Army welcomed it as one of the most exciting, instructive and thought-provoking documents ever to come out as an official publication. Its author, a twenty-four year old Regular officer, a survivor of the Big Push on the Somme in July 1916, was Basil Liddell Hart.
This first volume of his memoirs takes the reader to 1937. For Captain Liddell Hart these years were packed with incident. From infantry tactics his dynamic, questing mind led him to study the whole field of military affairs and defence strategy.
Invalided to the half-pay list of the Army in 1924, he became military correspondent of first the Morning Post, then the Daily Telegraph and finally The Times, as well as military editor of the Encyclopædia Britannica. In a brilliant stream of articles, books, lectures he led that small group of enthusiasts who between the two world wars sought to lift the British Services from reactionary mediocrity to the state of powerful modern efficiency which they believed, all too correctly, to be essential for the future peace of the world.
Liddell Hart’s name is synonymous with the Blitzkrieg concept of armoured warfare — indeed its most successful exponents say that he originated it — and in this book he details in full his struggle against ignorance and apathy to provide his country with an effective armoured force. But that is only one aspect of the book. His personal collection of papers and documents covering this period, and his correspondence and records of conversations with such figures as Churchill, Lawrence, Lloyd George, and the leading statesmen, soldiers and politicians of the last fifty years, is acknowledged to be one of the finest in the world.
From these and from the uninhibited richness of his private notes and diaries, he has produced this unique contribution to history, as provocative and perhaps as controversial as anything he has written in his distinguished career.
In the summer of 1938, believing that Britain was grossly unprepared for an imminent war and that he could help far more from the public platform than through the private ear, Liddell Hart gave up his advisory role.
“The greatest military thinker of the 20th Century whose ideas have revolutionised the art of war” — GENERAL CHASSIN
“Nearly all German tank strategy was based on Liddell Hart’s teachings” — GENERAL VON MELLENTHIN
“The theoretical originator of mechanised warfare. I was one of his disciples” — GENERAL GUDERIAN
“No expert on military affairs has better earned the right to respectful attention than Liddell Hart” — PRESIDENT KENNEDY
“He still remains the foremost exponent of military matters in this country” — F.M. SIR CLAUDE AUCHINLECK
“Britain’s greatest military historian of our times” — F.M. VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN
Captain B.H. Liddell Hart (1895-1970) was an historian who made military history and theory interesting and understandable to the general reader. He was military writer for several London newspapers, as well as Military Editor of the ‘Encyclopaedia Britannica’. He was knighted in 1966.
Endeavour Press is the UK's leading independent digital publisher.
496 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1965
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About the author
B.H. Liddell Hart
223 books299 followersBritish military authority Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart early advocated tank and air warfare.
Usually known as captain before his knighthood, this English soldier and historian led theorists.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B._H._L...
Usually known as captain before his knighthood, this English soldier and historian led theorists.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B._H._L...
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Displaying 1 of 1 review
March 5, 2022
I am going to withhold my thoughts on these memoirs of Liddell Hardt until I have read the second volume. Suffice to make notes for the moment. But how prescient his thinking was! Some of the claims could be put down to hindsight, but so much is on record, if he painted a rosier picture than was in fact the case, one can forgive him.
The memoirs are a little self-serving and self-aggrandising. He claims to have put up the first critique of the Napoleonic concept of total war. But he was a genius and one with largely good intentions. He was concerned to humanise war, lofty goal following WWI. Sees the tank and airpower as means to bring swift effective conclusions and he wanted to stop the annihilation of enemy’s army being seen as goal of war. Hence argues for chemical weapons too, as means of defeating enemy’s will to fight (sees potential of chemical weapons to not necessarily kill, but incapacitate). Hence advocates tear gas being used against ringleaders of General Strike in 1926.
Book a real hot potato. Doesn’t hold punches. Lots of anecdotal stuff which is gold dust. Such as Lloyd George views on Haig.
Not that enlightened – he describes someone as a “very clever little Jew”.
Airpower claims very prescient, foresees problem of Mediterranean interference of shipping. But the problem of this advocacy is if the enemy gets same solution. Then the problem of land war merely displaced into different arena. The battleship begets the submarine, which begets the destroyer.
This philosophy – of destroying enemy’s willingness to fight had disastrous consequences in WWII with airpower used against civilian populations. He condemns this at places in the narrative. Largely he wants military success with the least loss of life.
Big chapter on disarmament. This appears to contradict as his disarmament plan would outlaw precisely those tanks prescribed such a purpose in his strong advocacy of the expanding torrent strategy of tank warfare.
Foresees the eclipse of the battleship and the ascendency of the air warfare. Terribly critical throughout of military leadership, particularly – and he devotes about half the book to this bugbear – the strength of the advocacy of the cavalry within the British Army. He is also strongly critical of tank corps being attached to the infantry, thus giving them a support role rather than the powerful offensive role that Hitler successfully used them for in Blitzkrieg.
Very little about his personal life. A lot of the stuff in the book is dynamite and I guess he felt maligned by the military establishment. Why they didn’t listen to him more is embarrassing, shocking, sad and woefully predictable.
The memoirs are a little self-serving and self-aggrandising. He claims to have put up the first critique of the Napoleonic concept of total war. But he was a genius and one with largely good intentions. He was concerned to humanise war, lofty goal following WWI. Sees the tank and airpower as means to bring swift effective conclusions and he wanted to stop the annihilation of enemy’s army being seen as goal of war. Hence argues for chemical weapons too, as means of defeating enemy’s will to fight (sees potential of chemical weapons to not necessarily kill, but incapacitate). Hence advocates tear gas being used against ringleaders of General Strike in 1926.
Book a real hot potato. Doesn’t hold punches. Lots of anecdotal stuff which is gold dust. Such as Lloyd George views on Haig.
Not that enlightened – he describes someone as a “very clever little Jew”.
Airpower claims very prescient, foresees problem of Mediterranean interference of shipping. But the problem of this advocacy is if the enemy gets same solution. Then the problem of land war merely displaced into different arena. The battleship begets the submarine, which begets the destroyer.
This philosophy – of destroying enemy’s willingness to fight had disastrous consequences in WWII with airpower used against civilian populations. He condemns this at places in the narrative. Largely he wants military success with the least loss of life.
Big chapter on disarmament. This appears to contradict as his disarmament plan would outlaw precisely those tanks prescribed such a purpose in his strong advocacy of the expanding torrent strategy of tank warfare.
Foresees the eclipse of the battleship and the ascendency of the air warfare. Terribly critical throughout of military leadership, particularly – and he devotes about half the book to this bugbear – the strength of the advocacy of the cavalry within the British Army. He is also strongly critical of tank corps being attached to the infantry, thus giving them a support role rather than the powerful offensive role that Hitler successfully used them for in Blitzkrieg.
Very little about his personal life. A lot of the stuff in the book is dynamite and I guess he felt maligned by the military establishment. Why they didn’t listen to him more is embarrassing, shocking, sad and woefully predictable.
Displaying 1 of 1 review