Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy

by Raja Ram Dravid

A comprehensive and critical study, focussing on controversy between the Nyaya Vaisesika and Mimamsa realists, and the Buddhist nominalists. goes int The author gives a critical and comprehensive study of the fundamental problem of universals in Indian Philosophy. The centre of the study is the controversy between the Nyaya-Vaisesika and the Mimamsa realists on the one hand and the Buddhist nominalists on the other. The author discusses not only the epistemological and metaphysical approach to the problem of universals but also the semantic approach made by the various systems of Indian Philosophy. In this context the view of the Grammarions with special reference to Bhartrhari has been discussed in some detail. A brief but critical analysis of some of the main trends of thought on universals in Western Philosophy--beginning from Pluto to the contemporary philosophers--has also been given. Besides his scholarly and eminently readable treatment of fundamental problem of universals, the author has attempted to give his own solution of the problem. It is based on the recurrent identities and similarities which are the principles of grouping and which form the foundation of our thought and speech. o epistemology and metaphysicals, and relatings the discussion to western concepts and thinkers. a major work, good reviews. orig. pub. 1972.

Genres: Philosophy

393 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2001

Reviews

[A. B. · Rating 5 out of 5]

A wonderfully erudite book. Dravid traces the history of the problem of universals through all the major schools of Indian thought, as well as devotes three brief but well-researched chapters on the universal in Western thought. This is my first introduction to thinking about universals as a philosophical problem.

Having reviewed all the major positions, I think I would come to a midway position, whereby the resemblance theory, as consonant with some kind of nominalism is true of most general terms. However, I think it is necessary to postulate some actually existent universals that exist in the particular, although never independently from it. These universals qualify the particulars they inhere in (my sympathy for Nyāya shows through here); and I postulate that these could include general concepts like similarity, identity, existence, and being. While I am sympathetic to the existence of such universals, I am not yet certain what exactly would populate this category. I remain hopeful of finding out.