Terrorism and violent non-state actors have emerged in the last several decades as a primary global threat to peace and stability. It is a far reaching and immersive cross-disciplinary subject that thousands of our nation’s best minds dedicate themselves to tracking and understanding; Glenn Beck is not one of those minds.
In his new book It IS About Islam: Exposing the Truth About ISIS, Al Qaeda, Iran, and the Caliphate, Beck attempts to analyze Islamism and compel the reader to trace his monolithic understanding of it back to Islamic history and what he deems to be core Islamic concepts. In essence, it is a book about how Islam is fundamentally a religion that naturally yields and encouraged groups like ISIS. The book is divided into four parts: an introduction, a brief account of what Beck believes to be relevant Islamic history, a section on the “thirteen lies” of Islam, and a conclusion on what Beck sees as the way forward.
The layout and flow of the book isn’t bad, but unfortunately the content is consistently poor and underdeveloped. Reading through his work, I often found his “facts” to be cherry picked, often given without context, and subjected to high levels of reductionism. Beck routinely falls victim in his writing of the problem of “too much from too little” which occurs when large conclusions are derived from singular, narrow or otherwise unrepresentative sources and is a form of deception that is often the fault of the analyst and the lack of caution and standards that they set for themselves.
One of the first issues I had with Beck’s book was his definition of one of his key terms: Islamism. Beck himself states that “terminology is critical” and I wholeheartedly agree, so when I saw him fail to make clear distinctions between different types and groups of Islamists, and indeed making efforts to instead link them all together so that we might treat them all the same (while only reluctantly admitting minor differences) I was rather troubled. Beck makes little differentiation between organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood, and Al Qaeda, and even fewer between groups like Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and ISIS, and completely fails to mention more liberal or even apolitical Islamists.
This is a problem, because there is wide diversity among Islamists and many may see one another as enemies more so than allies with a common cause as Beck would depict them. To quote Princeton’s Readings in Islamist Thought compiled by Roxanne Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman: “Islamist thought is a complex system of representation that articulates and defines a range of identities, categories, and norms; organizes human experience into narratives that assemble past, present, and future into a compelling interpretive frame; and specifies the range and meaning of acceptable and desirable practices.” In other words: Islamism is an open playing field with ideological gambits that run the spectrum from liberal to conservative, from political to apolitical, from violent to completely pacifistic, from Salafists to modernists, and everywhere in between.
Indeed, Islamism is a modern effort to look at religious foundations and attempt to re-evaluate them for present day use usually in some sort of political or comprehensive manner under some form of sharia law (however such law is interpreted). In this sense, Islamism is a more modern phenomenon that represents a sort of rebellion by some against the traditional schools of formal Islamic jurisprudential thought. As Charles Kurzman writes in his book: Missing Martyrs: Why There are so Few Muslim Terrorists “laypeople have generated a profusion of do-it-yourself theology and jurisprudence. Any college grad in a cave can claim to speak for Islam.”
As technology has opened up communication networks, religious texts have become more and more easily accessible. Theological discussion is thus, no longer the purview of only the classically and formally educated (though it never was completely exclusionary). This opened up religious interpretation to the everyman, and indeed most big name Islamists including major personalities such as Hassan al Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and even Osama bin Laden (all of whom Beck references) all lack formal scholarly religious education, and were largely poorly versed in traditional Islamic usul al fiqh (formal legal and theological methodology). Instead, such actors usually claimed to be holders of new revealed messages from God or brought forth new, often politicized interpretations of Islam.
In other words, as Beck progresses in his book promoting a singular understanding of Islamists (and indeed a conservative violent one at that) and as he suggests, that said Islamists practice a distinctly medieval version of Islam (a popular refrain in general) here he is flat out wrong, and fails to recognize a bulk of the world’s Islamists when depending on so shallow of a definition. In fact, Salafism (a significant grouping within both Jihadi and Islamist fields), by its nature jettisons much of what would normally count as its history and civilization.
Contrary to Beck’s assertions that the Jihadi agenda is “right on track” Jihadis have long been highly disappointed at the poor turnout among Muslims and at the low level of support they have received. “We are most amazed that the community of Islam is still asleep and heedless while its children are being wiped out and killed everywhere and its land is being diminished every day, God help us.” Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Saudi Arabia noted. Major revolutionaries including bin Laden, and Zawahiri have engaged in the same lament, with Abu Musab al-Suri noting that it was “regrettable” that so few Muslims, only “one in a million,” have committed themselves to jihad.
The oft quoted revolutionary Sayyid Qutb (who Beck uses to try to link the Muslim Brotherhood to Al Qaeda and other modern terrorist groups) went even further in his analysis and stated flat out: “the Muslim community has been extinct for centuries.” Beck of course quoted the same book that this sentiment appeared in, but for some reason didn’t feel the need to recognize the fact that Qutb openly asserted that his viewpoint was wholly unpopular within not only Islam, but his own Muslim Brotherhood social circles. Indeed, While Beck pushes his readers to link splinter movement such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, he conveniently leaves out the fact that the Brotherhood’s supreme guide at the time, Hassan al-Hudaybi wrote his own book at the same time as Milestones was published entitled: Preachers not Judges, which categorically rejected the kind of violence that Qutb supporters would utilize in their formation of Egypt’s early jihadi groups and which would go on to inspire Al Qaeda. Why Beck decided to ignore Hudaybi’s work, despite his role as the supreme guide and despite the books popularity, and instead focus only on Qutb is something of a curious mystery.
Numerous other examples of seeming intellectual dishonesty or simple mistakes surfaced while reading Beck’s book. He tends to lump all Shias together and to then equates Shia beliefs with the revolutionary government of Iran. As Vali Nasr notes though in his book: The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future; Such an oversimplification of Shi’ism is not particularly useful in terms of analysis or even in terms of a basic understanding of how 12er Shi’ism traditionally functions. Nasr instead showcases the fact that revolutionary and even political Shi’ism is historically new and very uncommon. Indeed political Islam is not popular within Usuli Shiism at all where apolitical theology tends to rule the day. Most 12er Shias, he contends, look elsewhere for spiritual guidance and tend to see Ayatollah Khamenei as a state and political authority rather than a truly religious spiritual leader (Beck on the other hand incorrectly identifies Khamenei as the most dominant and popular spiritual guide for Shias). Instead, such religious guidance tends to focus around a cadre of other Ayatollahs usually based out of Qom and Najaf. In fact, one of the most popular spiritual guides of 12er Shi’ism (Ali al-Sistani – who has a larger religious following than Khamenei), as I write this, is supporting protests in southern Iraq against the Shia Iraqi government which Beck asserts is a puppet state of Iran.
The notion that Shias are a force that the Grand Ayatollah of Iran can order around or who owe their religious loyalty to the Iranian state completely ignores how Usuli Shi’ism traditionally works, and completely ignores the strong tradition within Usuli Shi’ism where ayatollahs, by religious custom / law hold significantly differing views from one another in order to promote diversity and debate. Unity of message within 12er Shi’ism is a rare thing. Beck’s inability to notice such wide diversity within a major Islamic community is telling as to his inexperience in, and unfamiliarity with, the subject matter that he is attempting to write on.
Another issue that I had with Beck’s work was his depiction of ISIS. He uses its apparent popularity to showcase how strongly the group’s message rings with Muslims. Yet as David Kilcullen, Former Chief Strategist in the Office of the Coordinator for Counter-terrorism at the U.S. State Department, and previous senior counter-insurgency adviser to General David Petraeus notes in his recent work Blood Year: Terror and the Islamic State; many ISIS recruits aren’t well versed in the Islamic faith or are even largely secular remnants of the Iraqi military. Indeed he details, contrary to Beck’s purely religious ideological depiction of ISIS, how ISIS was buttressed by fighting support from factions that don’t share its core ideology, but share a common goal in opposition to Iraq’s Shia dominated central government.
A big concern that I further had with Beck’s book, and one I frequently run into is his treatment of the Quran and the hadith as reference material. To his credit, Beck makes the uncommonly admitted note that hadiths are all judged based on their independent weakness or strength, but despite recognizing this, cites hadith as if they were all the same and makes absolutely no distinction between hadith collections as if Shias would be inclined to follow largely Sunni hadiths. Similarly, while he makes the crucial note that the Quran, unlike the Bible is written in the first person and thus must be read differently than third person narratives, he proceeds to treat Quran as a self-evident third person narrative in his citations without any care for the crucial historical context under which the revelations were revealed. Far from supporting Beck’s interpretations of scripture, Islamic theologians would cringe at his severely poor methodology. Indeed he often treats many of his personal interpretations of scripture and other texts as universal, when they, in reality, represent minority viewpoints or aren’t even used at all by most Islamists, let alone most Muslims. At other times Beck routinely take specific works and then attempts to paint them as having universal application.
A good example of the above latter was his use of Reliance of the Traveler as a single source to cover all of Islam when discussing his understanding of the concept of Takiyah. Apparently unbeknownst to him, he wasn’t citing a work widely used by Islamists, or even by most Muslims, but rather a text which focuses on discussions within the formal Shafi’I school of Islamic jurisprudence: a school that ISIS not only rejects as valid, but against which it is in open rebellion. Likewise, most Salafis, through their desire to look to Islam’s roots, and who reject most medieval Islamic literature, would similarly reject the Reliance of the Traveler given its roots in the 14th century. It is simply too modern for such Salafis.
His historical overview is highly stilted and dishonestly parsed to support his main theme: he tries to link Islam with Nazism during WWII while ignoring the hundreds of thousands of Muslims who fought for the allies; he links the Armenian Genocide to Islam without mentioning that it occurred under the auspices of the more secular Young Turk movement; He brings up the execution of the males of the Banu Qurayza as an example (his only example) of Muhammad’s “massacres,” but completely fails to mention that it wasn’t ordered by Muhammad, but by a third party arbitrator judging not under Islamic law, but under Judaic law (as detailed by Karen Armstrong’s Muhammad: A Biography of the Prophet).
Another major point of contention and poor analysis was Beck’s attempt to point to the Arab Spring a proof that Muslims want to overturn liberal democratic forms of political representation with Islamism. To do this, Beck focuses primarily on Egypt, and the fact that after Mubarak was ousted, an Islamist party (the Freedom and Justice Party) was able to capture the presidency and a significant portion of the parliament. Beck makes sloppy assumptions here, claiming that because an Islamist party was voted into power then it meant that people voted for them specifically because they were Islamist. He offers no supporting evidence for this theory, and unfortunately for him (but fortunately for us) the professional analytical world is saturated with research precisely on this topic.
Caryle Murphy a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, points out in her book Passion for Islam: Shaping the Modern Middle East: The Egyptian Experience that if Islamist parties were swept into power based on their Islamist ideals then support for Islamist parties should remain durable in the face continuing economic hardship; this is not what we have seen happen though as is clearly evidenced by the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi quickly lost popular support during their rule ushering in widespread protests and an eventual popular coup. If it were really all about Islam as Beck suggests, then we would have expected to have seen continued strong support from the bulk of the Brotherhood’s supporters even during the constitutional crisis and continued periods of political and economic instability. There are numerous other structural, social, and organizational causal variables, but few have to do with leaning purely on religious ideological attitudes.
Beck continues with his stilted dialogue by painting a picture of the Muslim Brotherhood being allies of Al Qaeda when in fact, the opposite is true. Al Qaeda has remained publicly critical of the Muslim Brotherhood and has directly blamed it for its inability to better radicalize Islamic populations and call them to the task of Jihad. Al Qaeda is fundamentally against participation in political elections and secular governments that the Muslim Brotherhood engages in and groups like ISIS and Boko Haram go as far as to label them unbelievers for such activities. Marc Lynch, director of the Institute for Middle East Studies, notes in his paper, Jihadis and the Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) that: “In a series of tapes and writings, Zawahiri savaged Hamas and the Egyptian MB for their participation in elections and public life. Al‐Baghdadi and Abu Hamza identified the MB as the driving force behind the setbacks of the jihad in Iraq, pointing not only to the Iraqi Islamic Party (an MB affiliate), but also to a wide range of other Sunni Islamist adversaries lumped together under the MB label.”
In fact, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current head of Al Qaeda himself published a work specifically denouncing the Muslim Brotherhood that he titled Bitter Harvest that clearly elucidates major doctrinal divides. Likewise, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (and its regional affiliates) have been similarly highly critical of groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS with Lynch noting: “the group has consistently condemned virtually every al‐Qa’ida attack in the Muslim world, from Morocco and Algeria to Indonesia and India, as well as Abu Mus’ab al‐Zarqawi’s attacks on civilians and on the Shi’a in Iraq” Such a division between these groups is perhaps even larger than the Sino-Soviet split was during the Cold War, and yet Beck cannot see it because he is too focused on his version of the Red Scare.
Beck continues his book recounting how successful terrorists have been in executing their “grand plan” and the phases therein; once again, the reality is the exact opposite. He points to the Arab Spring as the “uprising” that Al Qaeda had been hoping for, but it was anything but. Al Qaeda had no interest in a liberal uprising against governments, or movement towards political discourse and engagement by opposition parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood, nor were they interested in opposition messages articulated via primarily economic and social grievances. Egypt is not an example of how Al Qaeda and ISIS are winning, it is an example of how their influence failed to drive discourse in Egypt.
Zawahiri stated himself: “There is no solution except through jihad, all other solutions are futile. Rather, other solutions would only worsen the state of dilapidation and submissiveness in which we live; [purported solutions that exclude jihad] are equivalent to treating cancer with aspirin.” Thus the notion that they would see the elections in Tunisia for example as a success as Beck would have us believe; instead indicates a fundamental lack of basic knowledge and understanding of these actors.
Of particular note is his rather disgusting assertion that the fact that Sunnis and Shias are apparently killing each other is a “silver lining;” a grossly inhumane take on the murder of tens of thousands of civilians and relatively innocent individuals who are the primary casualties among such conflicts. It is also ignorant the fact that such fighting is good for ISIS and that ISIS indeed depends on it in order to promote their agenda and regional propaganda message of being the “protector of Sunnis.” Beck’s silver lining is nothing more than an utter disaster for peace and stability, anti-terrorism campaigns in general, and the eradication of ISIS as an entity specifically.
Overall, my largest criticism of Beck’s work is not his lack of knowledge, it is not his reductionist, or low academic and analytical standards and methodologies; but rather his central thesis that the Quran specifically supports terrorism and mass violence, and that this is the most accurate method of practicing Islam thus supporting his notion that ISIS is indeed greatly Islamic. Never mind his complete lack of analysis of the four main schools of Sunni Jurisprudence and the fact that they all disagree with him, or how a majority of Muslims decide to practice their faith. The problem with this flat uncompromising stance is that it empowers ISIS and its ilk, and showcases it as the only true expression of Islam. Beck utilizes the same takfiri sentiment that ISIS does, and would deny the validity of how over one billion people chose to define their personal faith and relationship with their God. I find that highly arrogant and indeed highly ignorant, and it offers us absolutely no tactical advantage, but rather alienates possible allies while empowering our most bitter foes. He claims he hopes for an Islamic reformation, but he would make groups like ISIS the sole drivers of authentic religious discourse. Toward the end of his book he makes the comment: “We need to see peoples and groups for what they really are, not what we want them to be.” I couldn’t agree more, I just wish he would take his own advice.