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De Gaulle #3
Шарль дэ Голь
Біяграфічная кніга “Шарль дэ Голь” знаёміць чытача з лёсам адной з найцікавейшых постацяў сусветнай палітыкі ХХ ст. Аўтар паведамляе шмат цікавых дэталяў з жыцця гэтага вельмі неадназначнага дзеяча, які ператварыў Францыю ў адну з краінаў-пераможцаў у Другой сусветнай вайне, дзейнічаючы пры гэтым насуперак не толькі афіцыйнай уладзе, але і большасці насельніцтва краіны, якое на рэферэндуме выказалася за падпісанне з Гітлерам “замірэння”, а па сутнасці — капітуляцыі.
328 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1965
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104 people want to read
About the author
Jean Lacouture
160 books12 followersJean Lacouture is a journalist, historian and author. He is particularly famous for his biographies.y
Jean Lacouture began his career in journalism in 1950 in "Combat" as diplomatic redactor. He joined Le Monde in 1951. In 1953, he worked in Cairo for France Soir, before returning to Le Monde as director for the overseas services, and grand reporter (the highest title in French journalism) until 1975.
Politically engaged on the Left, Lacouture supported decolonisation, and Mitterrand from 1981. He worked for the Nouvel Observateur, and L'Histoire. He is interviewed in the 1968 documentary film about the Vietnam War entitled "In the Year of the Pig".
Lacouture was also director for publication at Seuil, one of the main French publishers, from 1961 to 1982, and professor at the IEP of Paris between 1969 and 1972.
He is mainly known to the public because of his biographies, including the lives of Ho Chi Minh, Nasser, Léon Blum, De Gaulle, François Mauriac, Pierre Mendès-France, Mitterrand, Montesquieu, Montaigne, Malraux, Germaine Tillion, Champollion, Rivière, Stendhal and Kennedy.
A dedicated music lover, Lacouture is also president of a society of devotees of Georges Bizet.
Jean Lacouture began his career in journalism in 1950 in "Combat" as diplomatic redactor. He joined Le Monde in 1951. In 1953, he worked in Cairo for France Soir, before returning to Le Monde as director for the overseas services, and grand reporter (the highest title in French journalism) until 1975.
Politically engaged on the Left, Lacouture supported decolonisation, and Mitterrand from 1981. He worked for the Nouvel Observateur, and L'Histoire. He is interviewed in the 1968 documentary film about the Vietnam War entitled "In the Year of the Pig".
Lacouture was also director for publication at Seuil, one of the main French publishers, from 1961 to 1982, and professor at the IEP of Paris between 1969 and 1972.
He is mainly known to the public because of his biographies, including the lives of Ho Chi Minh, Nasser, Léon Blum, De Gaulle, François Mauriac, Pierre Mendès-France, Mitterrand, Montesquieu, Montaigne, Malraux, Germaine Tillion, Champollion, Rivière, Stendhal and Kennedy.
A dedicated music lover, Lacouture is also president of a society of devotees of Georges Bizet.
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
October 18, 2013
The first book ended with DeGaulle beginning the process of liberating France from the Nazis, and even worse, their collaborators. As I mentioned, DeGaulle's major victory wasn't saving France from the Nazis, although he and the Free French helped heroically, but in saving France's soul.
Having saved the France he knew and loved, DeGaulle, having never formally held office, was quickly shown the door after a brief time as interim-head of state. He was in good company, of course, Roosevelt having died, Churchill quickly deposed as Prime Minister. It was his own choosing insofar as he stepped down under the assumption that the government was doomed. And he was right, but it took longer for him to be proven right. DeGaulle, the symbol, seemed to not be needed at the time, and political party forces, which he disdained, had no need for him.
Yet he was younger than them both, and in better health. And his country lay in ruins, both physically, socially and politically. He tried to guide it, but was caught up in forces beyond himself. It took a dozen years for the Fourth Republic to crumble beneath the weight of incompetent political management and incoherent vision, and of course the ongoing problems in Algeria, ironically, the home of the Free French for some time, which took the opportunity to demand, some violently, their freedom.
DeGaulle, who had been planning it for years, saw his opportunity and, his country, on the verge of civil war, remade the republic as he saw it, the "Idea of France" he formed the Free French for in the first place. Fiercely independent, fiercely nationalistic, but fiercely Republican and Democratic. He joked when asked when he first took over, "Do you think I'd want to start a career as a dictator at 68?" but such a move would not be unusual for someone in such a situation. He had the power. But to him, his power was only useful if people would believe in him anyway.
But DeGaulle was great because he was a rare figure who wanted to use his personal power to achieve good ends, not as and end its self. He did not share the humility of, say, Ronald Reagan, who saw himself as merely the messenger of good ideas. But his audience was different. The French rarely lacked for ego, nor disliked it. Putting ego to good use was more important. He saw himself as the embodiment of France yet again, coming back to rescue it during its darkest hour, and he used that embodiment to preserve that which needed to be preserved and to evolve what needed to be evolved. And when, over a decade later, after losing a referendum on a relatively meaningless issue, he decided that without the power his "symbol" once conferred upon him, he had no need to hold office anymore, France having evolved beyond needing him personally, he resigned.
It is not to say DeGaulle did't believe in himself as a great man, or at least a great "symbol" of France. His greatest fear the last year and a half of his life was that he would die before he finished writing his memoirs (he finished much, but not all). And he was convinced that even though France had grown tired of him, his legend would grow in his absence.
And of that, he was of course totally right. DeGaulle was usually right about his analysis. DeGaulle may have chosen wrong ends and wrong means. While explaining his reasoning, he was ultimately wrong on NATO (he almost admitted this himself, staying in the alliance, although not the military structure, as one of his last acts), wrong in how he confronted his political opponents in the last years, and probably chose the wrong person for various jobs along the way that exacerbated his problems. But he rarely misunderstood the game or the stakes. For example, he was right that the British would ultimately act more in accordance with America than its European allies. He may have been wrong concerning the implications, I think you could make a strong case that a closer, less "independent" alliance with the UK and America would have been in the best interests of France. But that is a values question, ultimately. DeGaulle understood the situation and acted accordingly to his values, the values of a strong, independent, mysterious France. And his people love him for it to this day.
Lacoutrue's book explains not just the how, but makes intelligent and thoughtful explanations as to why without being a DeGaulle partisan, although his overall admiration of the man is clear. History will endlessly debate the many things DeGaulle did, from his withdrawal from Algeria to his problematic re-election that he almost certainly should have won by a larger margin. Lacouture does an excellent job of describing the situations and persons involved and giving an overall view from which to understand them. DeGaulle embodied France, in different ways, twice in his life, once during World War 2, and once during his Presidency. The first was more daring and spectacular, the second perhaps more difficult and confusing and less spectacular.
Yet DeGaulle predicted that without him, France would slide into mediocrity. In a sense, he was right. It would be hard to argue France has grown in terms of political or cultural influence in the past 40 years. Yet perhaps the ultimate compliment you can give to DeGualle was that he was only partly right on this question. The "idea" of France he created out of sheer will to wash the stain of collaboration off of France, lasted long past his death. Over 30 years later, US Senator John McCain criticized French President Jacques Chirac (a former member of DeGaulle's team) for meddling in America's foreign policy as "An old lady tryng to dine out on her looks not realizing she doesn't have the face for it any more." In a sense, he was right. France was trying to exert its influence beyond what it really aught to be able to do given its relative economic, military and even cultural influence. In other words, it was following in DeGaulle's footsteps, asserting a rank it didn't have, because it believed in its self.
If DeGaulle were alive today, I'd think he'd consider that a rather extravagant complement to his legacy.
Having saved the France he knew and loved, DeGaulle, having never formally held office, was quickly shown the door after a brief time as interim-head of state. He was in good company, of course, Roosevelt having died, Churchill quickly deposed as Prime Minister. It was his own choosing insofar as he stepped down under the assumption that the government was doomed. And he was right, but it took longer for him to be proven right. DeGaulle, the symbol, seemed to not be needed at the time, and political party forces, which he disdained, had no need for him.
Yet he was younger than them both, and in better health. And his country lay in ruins, both physically, socially and politically. He tried to guide it, but was caught up in forces beyond himself. It took a dozen years for the Fourth Republic to crumble beneath the weight of incompetent political management and incoherent vision, and of course the ongoing problems in Algeria, ironically, the home of the Free French for some time, which took the opportunity to demand, some violently, their freedom.
DeGaulle, who had been planning it for years, saw his opportunity and, his country, on the verge of civil war, remade the republic as he saw it, the "Idea of France" he formed the Free French for in the first place. Fiercely independent, fiercely nationalistic, but fiercely Republican and Democratic. He joked when asked when he first took over, "Do you think I'd want to start a career as a dictator at 68?" but such a move would not be unusual for someone in such a situation. He had the power. But to him, his power was only useful if people would believe in him anyway.
But DeGaulle was great because he was a rare figure who wanted to use his personal power to achieve good ends, not as and end its self. He did not share the humility of, say, Ronald Reagan, who saw himself as merely the messenger of good ideas. But his audience was different. The French rarely lacked for ego, nor disliked it. Putting ego to good use was more important. He saw himself as the embodiment of France yet again, coming back to rescue it during its darkest hour, and he used that embodiment to preserve that which needed to be preserved and to evolve what needed to be evolved. And when, over a decade later, after losing a referendum on a relatively meaningless issue, he decided that without the power his "symbol" once conferred upon him, he had no need to hold office anymore, France having evolved beyond needing him personally, he resigned.
It is not to say DeGaulle did't believe in himself as a great man, or at least a great "symbol" of France. His greatest fear the last year and a half of his life was that he would die before he finished writing his memoirs (he finished much, but not all). And he was convinced that even though France had grown tired of him, his legend would grow in his absence.
And of that, he was of course totally right. DeGaulle was usually right about his analysis. DeGaulle may have chosen wrong ends and wrong means. While explaining his reasoning, he was ultimately wrong on NATO (he almost admitted this himself, staying in the alliance, although not the military structure, as one of his last acts), wrong in how he confronted his political opponents in the last years, and probably chose the wrong person for various jobs along the way that exacerbated his problems. But he rarely misunderstood the game or the stakes. For example, he was right that the British would ultimately act more in accordance with America than its European allies. He may have been wrong concerning the implications, I think you could make a strong case that a closer, less "independent" alliance with the UK and America would have been in the best interests of France. But that is a values question, ultimately. DeGaulle understood the situation and acted accordingly to his values, the values of a strong, independent, mysterious France. And his people love him for it to this day.
Lacoutrue's book explains not just the how, but makes intelligent and thoughtful explanations as to why without being a DeGaulle partisan, although his overall admiration of the man is clear. History will endlessly debate the many things DeGaulle did, from his withdrawal from Algeria to his problematic re-election that he almost certainly should have won by a larger margin. Lacouture does an excellent job of describing the situations and persons involved and giving an overall view from which to understand them. DeGaulle embodied France, in different ways, twice in his life, once during World War 2, and once during his Presidency. The first was more daring and spectacular, the second perhaps more difficult and confusing and less spectacular.
Yet DeGaulle predicted that without him, France would slide into mediocrity. In a sense, he was right. It would be hard to argue France has grown in terms of political or cultural influence in the past 40 years. Yet perhaps the ultimate compliment you can give to DeGualle was that he was only partly right on this question. The "idea" of France he created out of sheer will to wash the stain of collaboration off of France, lasted long past his death. Over 30 years later, US Senator John McCain criticized French President Jacques Chirac (a former member of DeGaulle's team) for meddling in America's foreign policy as "An old lady tryng to dine out on her looks not realizing she doesn't have the face for it any more." In a sense, he was right. France was trying to exert its influence beyond what it really aught to be able to do given its relative economic, military and even cultural influence. In other words, it was following in DeGaulle's footsteps, asserting a rank it didn't have, because it believed in its self.
If DeGaulle were alive today, I'd think he'd consider that a rather extravagant complement to his legacy.
Read
March 24, 2021Not to be confused with the three-volume biography the same author later wrote, this is more in the style of a biographical essay. Seemingly written not so much to inform as to comment on commonly known events.
Quick - too quick - overview of de Gaulle's formative years. Breathless pace: we are in World War II before page 70.
The author's opinions and conclusions are probably sound, but he does not lead the reader to them, instead, he states them in the style of an editorial sketch. But excellent for quotes and observations about le grand Charles.
A good read.
Quick - too quick - overview of de Gaulle's formative years. Breathless pace: we are in World War II before page 70.
The author's opinions and conclusions are probably sound, but he does not lead the reader to them, instead, he states them in the style of an editorial sketch. But excellent for quotes and observations about le grand Charles.
A good read.
April 20, 2019
Very interesting Volume II. From p.211 — “The philosophy inspiring Charles de Gaulle’s diplomatic words and actions is simple and strong: all human activity is ordered around the nation, which in turn is shaped by history and geography, armed by the State, held together by common interests, animated by culture and led by a hero.” Amazingly similar to philosophy of President Trump...
February 1, 2016
A very good book covering DeGaulle's post war era, his handling of Algeria and relationships with both the East and the West. Well written.
February 4, 2016
Not quite as good as part one. Hard to figure out the players in the
Algerian independence movement and the pieds noir.
Algerian independence movement and the pieds noir.
March 7, 2022
In discussion with a former Vice President, De Gaulle was said to define a statesmen as ‘a man capable of taking risks’ and, by this measure, he could be counted as a strong one. Most striking to me was the inflection that occurred between the General de Gaulle (as described in the first tome), founder of the ‘Fighting French' in WWII, and the President de Gaulle, cognizant of the need for an independent Algeria. While in war, he fought to maintain his country’s territorial integrity. When returning to office, he embraced the inevitability of the French departments making up Algeria becoming independent. He risked his presidency on a referendum for Algerian self-determination in the face of rebellious paramilitary officers of the OAS who (like General de Gaulle had 20 years prior) viewed themselves as fighting for the larger interests of France. This would lead to his near assassination by the OAS in 1962.
Although, this is not the work for which the author won the Prix Goncourt, and editing was lacking for the English translation (why I can't give it 5 stars), ‘The Ruler’ gives a strong sense, topic-by-topic, of the critical aspects of de Gaulle’s political life. He was shown not to be a model democrat — indeed, he assumed power almost via military coup in 1958 (the efforts of which he was aware and very likely ‘lent a hand’). Yet in office, he proposed the referendum ushering in the direct election of the President (something not even the U.S. can yet claim) and previously had left power voluntarily in 1946. Readers get an abiding view of a man with a sense for what would best position France to play a leading role in the world, even at the cost of alienating the powerful in the East and West. His judgment (against European integration, the longevity of NATO, importance of Quebec self-determination) was not faultless, but in many areas (seeking French nuclear independence, refusing concessions to the Soviets on Berlin, and opposing U.S. entanglement in Vietnam) he was a foresighted leader. It is no surprise that he is often cited in French polls as their greatest historical figure.
Although, this is not the work for which the author won the Prix Goncourt, and editing was lacking for the English translation (why I can't give it 5 stars), ‘The Ruler’ gives a strong sense, topic-by-topic, of the critical aspects of de Gaulle’s political life. He was shown not to be a model democrat — indeed, he assumed power almost via military coup in 1958 (the efforts of which he was aware and very likely ‘lent a hand’). Yet in office, he proposed the referendum ushering in the direct election of the President (something not even the U.S. can yet claim) and previously had left power voluntarily in 1946. Readers get an abiding view of a man with a sense for what would best position France to play a leading role in the world, even at the cost of alienating the powerful in the East and West. His judgment (against European integration, the longevity of NATO, importance of Quebec self-determination) was not faultless, but in many areas (seeking French nuclear independence, refusing concessions to the Soviets on Berlin, and opposing U.S. entanglement in Vietnam) he was a foresighted leader. It is no surprise that he is often cited in French polls as their greatest historical figure.
October 1, 2024
Magistral travail de biographe. Mais pas que... Bien écrit et discrètement évaluateur. L'impression demeure, comme à la lecture du livre de Peyrefitte, que c'est une époque de géants, et que l'actuelle, après un lent déclin du personnel politique, n'est plus faite que de lilliputiens. Mais le de Gaulle Président de la République y apparaît moins impérial que dans le livre, magistral aussi, de Peyrefitte. Certes il y a ces gestes magnifiques, comme le discours de Phnom-Penh, en faveur du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux mêmes, mais dit Lacouture à propos du Vietnam, "que signifie une intervention qui ne se fonde ni sur le poids des armes ni même sur une procédure diplomatique engageant la responsabilité de son auteur". Et il y a ses chimères, comme son idée, à la toute fin, de vouloir régler le malaise ouvert en 68, par la "Participation" (à ce mot, Pompidou en privé frappait sa tempe de son index) ou son obstination à voir dans les Québécois des Français en Amérique, eux qui se voient comme des Américains parlant français. Et il y a surtout la fin de la guerre d'Algérie. On comprend qu'à partir de 1960-61, il veuille en finir vite : la décolonisation est un processus inévitable, toute l'armée française est immobilisée dans cette impasse et il sait que son propre temps est compté ("je suis revenu dix ans trop tard" répète-t-il) pour réaliser les projets qu'il a à coeur. On peut comprendre donc qu'il y ait quelque chose de bâclé dans les accords d'Evian. Mais ce qui, à mes yeux, jette un discrédit définitif sur le personnage, c'est la manière dont une fois les accords signés, il se lave les mains de ce qui se passe en Algérie. Et notamment il ne fait rien pour empêcher le massacre des harkis. Rien ne peut justifier cette indifférence.
Alors, adieu de Gaulle.
Mais bravo Lacouture !
Alors, adieu de Gaulle.
Mais bravo Lacouture !
May 8, 2021
This starts from the moment when De Gaulle walks triumphantly down the Champs d'Elysees into Paris at the head of a procession of french people, soldiers and generals showing the world and more importantly their allies that the Liberation was by the french for the french republic. The fact that Allied supremo Eisenhower was authorised to allow this parade when the reality was more that the conquering army was General Patton's III US Army Corps means that the political realities for De Gaulle and Roosevelt were more salient feature. De Gaulle was tall, imposing, a towering figure, who insisted that France mist come first in all his calculations. He refused to allow the Americans to dominate La Patrie; and there were moments in his career when the relations with Churchill and Roosevelt was stretched to breaking-point. However De Gaulle emerged with his Gaullist Party in charge; he became instrumental in founding the 4th Republic, but then declined to get involved in the grubby daily dealings of party politics resigned his post. He was later required as the great gentleman-politician of France to return again to save the country. During the Algerian Crisis De Gaulle was on the side of the left and socialists who wanted to sever the Metropolitan connection with the Arab republics, returning to France the European nature of France. To many this was a reversal of fortune for an outward-looking proud, nationalist sentiment who were more than just economic determinism. They could not envisage abandoning the hope for generations of French prosperity. Yet De Gaulle was the most cunning and wily politician of them all, who outmanoeuvred all his opponents to bring the conflict to an end, and at the same time gather the intelligence community into agreeing to withdraw his troops. The achievement guaranteed the end of a tradition that stretched back at least to Napoleon that France would always fight her own battles. The new consensus in 1958 gave rise to the Fifth Republic and a plethora of parties; De Gaulle was always even in old age waiting in the wings of his country should need to call on him again. He never shrank from the task, and was the most patriotic of all the politicians; his natural conservatism however was centrist and not reactionary. He knew the realities of time marching on and was always prepared to step aside for the greater good. He was not much of a party man, often moody, solitary and inclined to be reflective, but was not anti-social and the older he grew the more human he seemed to the French people. De Gaulle mellowed with age but always retained that measure of dignity that made him a great statesman.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
July 4, 2014
The second volume of the English translation, I wish I had read this prior to living inEurope.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews