What do you think?
Rate this book
The Analysis of Matter
The Analysis of Matter is one of the earliest and best philosophical studies of the new physics of relativity and quantum mechanics. Written at the time of major new developments in physics and just when quantum mechanics was being developed, Russell offers an analysis of the concepts and problems that are central to a philosophical understanding of physics, and argues for a revised concept of matter. The Analyis of Matter demonstrates the logical structure of the world and develops Russell's views on the philosophy of science out of the theories of such scientists as Einstein, Bohr and Heisenberg.
408 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1927
8 people are currently reading
311 people want to read
About the author
Bertrand Russell
1,257 books7,321 followersBertrand Arthur William Russell, 3rd Earl Russell, OM, FRS, was a Welsh philosopher, historian, logician, mathematician, advocate for social reform, pacifist, and prominent rationalist. Although he was usually regarded as English, as he spent the majority of his life in England, he was born in Wales, where he also died.
He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1950 "in recognition of his varied and significant writings in which he champions humanitarian ideals and freedom of thought."
He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1950 "in recognition of his varied and significant writings in which he champions humanitarian ideals and freedom of thought."
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
September 23, 2020
The Analysis of Matter (1927) is a companion to The Analysis of Mind (1921). In the latter, Bertrand Russell concluded that all the stuff of our mental life – our thoughts, feelings, etc. – are constructions out of sensations and images, the latter being impressions of earlier sensations operating on physical, bodily structures called memory. He reached this conclusion through the analysis of all the concepts used in the science of psychology. In the last chapter of the book, Russell offered his theory of neutral monism as an explanation of this conclusion and a means to bridge the gap between physics and physiology on the one hand (both material sciences) and psychology on the other hand. His grand claim was that both material and mental experiences are constructions out of neutral stuff: events in the physical world. This is, in effect, a replacement of Russell’s earlier naïve realism and a rejection of all forms of idealism (which claims matter is a mental construction).
Six years later, with The Analysis of Matter, Russell walks the same route but starts from the opposite side. Now he attempts an analysis of matter – the central concept in physics and physiology. Or rather, since Russell wrote the book in the heyday of the revolutions in general relativity and quantum mechanism, the central concept in physics was up to that point. This sounds like the book is, due to all subsequent scientific developments in physics, outdated, but this would be a mistake. One can easily substitute bundles of energy in fields for matter to keep Russell’s book itself highly relevant. This is because Russell attempts a philosophical analysis of the theories and concepts used in the science of physics.
In part I of the book, Russell treats classical mechanics, the (then) new physics of relativity, the different interpretations of quantum mechanics. The key point in part I is that physics has replaced our common sense view of world based on perceptions. The logical apparatus of physics – with concepts like time and space (both the ordering of processes in terms of systems of coordinates), light (bundles of energy whose intrinsic qualities are unknown) and matter (electrons and protons) – is, ultimately, an abstraction based on the common sense notion of ‘conservation’. Within this apparatus, matter functions as ‘that which is indestructible’.
In short: the world of modern physics consists of abstract entities which are described by mathematical formulae and general laws that are expressed in terms of differentials (or intervals – in general relativity). The physicist works with logical constructions that are not observable but the acceptance of which leads to coherent theories which are validated through observation and experiment. Physics is characterized by intrinsic uncertainty – not just in the quantum mechanical sense, but also in the sense that we can never be sure that the current entities in physics are the ultimate ones – are that there are ultimate elemental entities to begin with.
(Russell wrote his book in a time when electrons and protons were regarded as the constituents of matter, yet he remarks on multiple occasions that it is highly unlikely that these are the final steps – later on particle physics developed into a whole field of innumerable particles of all sorts of shapes and sizes. Even protons and neutrons are now constructions out of quarks, which – some claim – are themselves constructions out of strings. Anyway, the point is clear: Russell offers highly sophisticated analyses in a very nuanced way.)
In part II, Russell leaves the world of physics and aims his sharp mind at the question of perception. That is, physics, as a science, is ultimately built up from particular perceptions by particular scientists of particular experiences. No matter how abstract the logical apparatus of physics has become, it is only when particular data are inserted into the general formulae that physics makes sense. Also, physical constants – like the speed of light or the Planck constant – are the results of experiment and observations and are in no way logically derived from the formulae themselves. So, Russell inquires into perception as a source of knowledge in physics.
The key point in part II is the causal theory of perception. Russell offers this theory as an alternative for two problematic epistemological positions. Common sense claims knowledge of objects, while solipsism – through scepticism – claims there is no knowledge of the world, only of the self. The problem of common sense is that there really is no knowledge of objects (this was already problematic in Descartes, but became exuberant in Locke and culminated in Hume’s radical scepticism). The solipsist cannot be so easily refuted, or rather: he cannot be refuted at all. The solipsist position is coherent and insurmountable, yet it closes us off from any further investigation. (Also, as Russell wittily points out, no solipsist really lives like a solipsist, since that would mean certain death.)
Russell’s causal theory of perception circumvents the intellectual barrenness of the solipsist since it leaves room for the physical world of objects, while it overcomes the problems of common sense by deriving these objects – as logical inferences – from primordial sense-data, the stuff of experience. These sense-data are either collected into private spaces (perspectives) or collected in one place – or rather: centred around one point in three-dimensional space. Private space is part of psychology, while physical space is part of physics, and both are seen to be two interpretations of the same physical world. In physical space, we infer perceptions from points in space where there no observers from perceptions from points in space where there are actual observers. Laws of perspective and causal laws are the guiding principles here.
We observe a collection of perceptions around a centre in a shared space and we infer continuity between perceptions and correlated events in other parts of this shared space (on the basis of observation of motions). This is all rather technical jargon for saying we observe that our perception of, for example, light differs from what went on before the light had reached the eye. We infer the continuity of this light ray and infer a transformation of this light ray. This view of the world underlies the whole science of physics and its consequences are verified (on the whole) more than they are falsified. That is, it works to accept this theory but we can never be certain it is a correct view.
With this causal theory of perception Russell is able to dismantle philosophical problems that arise in physics. For example the problem of physical laws – Do they actually exist? According to Russell, the belief in physical laws is what constitutes physics, but the assumption that they exist in the physical world is an assumption which is irrelevant in most cases. For example, statistical laws are simply a description of the probabilities of certain distributions of certain physical objects or one of more of their qualities. It is unnecessary to somehow postulate the physical existence of this law it is enough to use it to calculate its predictions and observe its effects.
Another problem Russell deals with is the notion of substance. This is inferred from the supposed indestructibility of matter – matter is continuously changing form in physical processes, so there has to be something that remains the same. It is relic of our common sense view of the world, which is based on conservation. For physics, it is a logical construction that is totally irrelevant.
Russell ends part II with the conclusion that objects are series of events in a four dimensional manifold of spacetime. Matter, on this view, is nothing but groups of events that are connected through laws of dynamics and are described in terms of worldlines. The key point is, of course, that matter is a logical construction, which comes in handy in our physical theories, but which remains a logical construction – that is, a logical inference from sense-data. We will never be able to experience the logical constructions that physics makes use of, we have to accept them as long as they lead to the development of our physical theories – which are themselves verified through the use of sense-data.
So we see sense-data, or perception, playing a key role in physics. This, by the way, also holds for physiology. We are easily tricked into all kinds of muddled thinking when it comes, for example, to brains. We assume our brains to be physical structures, but this is a logical inference. We have no direct experience of sense-data which allows us to make this claim. A physiologist might look at our brain (preferably post mortem) but what he perceives is sense-data which was inaccessible to us and which has no connection whatsoever to his own brain. So our knowledge of brains is based on experiences of physical events and we are tricked into assuming we know we have a brain – the brain is a logical construct and the assumption we have a brain is a logical inference. There is no direct experience of us having a brain.
This view presumably leads to the destruction of the body-mind problem, since it postulates that both our mental experiences and our physical experiences are, in the end, nothing but constructions from neutral stuff (neutral regarding matter and mind, that is). This allows Russell the flexibility he needs to overcome all kinds of problems in body-mind dualism.
In part III, Russell combines the abstract theories of physics (part I) with the causal theory of perception (part II) into a metaphysic that solves a lot of existing philosophical problems – most notably the aforementioned mind-body problems.
The essential point is Russell’s view that physics is the “causal skeleton of the world” (p. 391). That is, physics is an abstract formalism that describes the structure of all stimuli of perceived and unperceived sense-data. The things which possess these structures – the physical objects, or put in another way: the terms in physical propositions – are themselves unknowable. We infer them since they allow us to reliably describe the physical structure of the world. This structure itself – the relations between the terms in physical propositions – is of the type of one-many relations, which says that all relations are complexes construed out of further complexes, etc.
When it comes to perceptions, we encounter a difficulty. In psychology we study things like thinking, feeling, willing, etc. and these perceptions are partly subjective, and in so far as they are subjective they are knowable. When it comes to cognition we remain in the domain of physics, when subjectivity enters the scene, we leave the domain of physics and enter the domain of pure psychology.
Again, since all physical objects are inferences from perceived structures – i.e. logical constructions – this goes for matter as well. We obtain physical knowledge through our own perception of sense-data, combine them with testimonies of perceptions of sense-data by others, and from both combined we derive causal relations which allow us to know the whole of real and possible perceptions around one centre. The collection of all these perceptions – real and possible – are what we call the physical object. We don’t know this object, only its (possible) appearances in physical space. This view of the physical world is perfectly in line with the substitution of space and time in classical physics for the four-dimensional manifold of spacetime, where causal lines describe the motions of bodies. (This was the biggest revolution of the time, forced on us by general relativity.)
The natural question that pops up in relation to this worldview is: If matter is a logical construction, out of what is it constructed? The answer is given by Russell’s causal theory of perception: physical events are the causes (stimuli) of our perceptions – we infer ‘objects’ as collections of these events following the laws of perspectives and causal laws. This, in effect, is a correspondence theory of truth: the structure of the physical events (stimuli) corresponds with the structure of our perceptions. The intermediary phases are unknowable, but the assumption of them leads to useful theories which are verified more than they are falsified. For example, seeing the Sun (object) shows us the origin of the stimulus (the place of the object in spacetime) as well as the result of the stimulus (our perception of the Sun) – we have no information about what happens between the Sun emitting a photon and the photon hitting our retina (resulting in our perception). Physical theory tells us about fields, bundles of energy, transitions, etc. – all of this is assumption, verified by experience.
And this is where The Analysis of Matter connects with The Analysis of Mind. Russell’s theory of neutral monism allows for the theories of physics, the theories of psychology and their partial overlap (when it comes to cognitive experience). Russell ends the book with stating that the subjectivity of the perceiver in an experience is as of yet inexplainable in scientific terms, but hints as quantum mechanics as a possible future solution, since brains are built, ultimately, out of quantum elements following statistical laws.
To sum up: according to Russell the spatiotemporal dynamical order of events (and thus general relativity) follows from our acceptance of the causal theory of perception. That is, we assume (1) that our perceptions of these events are caused; (2) that multiple perceivers perceive the same events from multiple perspectives (their private space); (3) and that collections of perceptions are grouped around centres in public space
.
For science to offer us knowledge, it is necessary to accept causality and induction as principles – that is, if we want to avoid solipsism. But since causality and induction are never certain, all our scientific knowledge can only be probable. In other words: all scientific propositions are possessed with a degree of certainty, since all of these propositions are by nature based on uncertain inferences. Phenomenalism – the view that the world is a totality of phenomena – claims to avoid using causality as a principle and thus to circumvent the problems of induction, but implicitly presuppose causality as a principle in relation to the communication of knowledge (i.e. speaking and listening).
----------------
Last paragraphs in comments.
Six years later, with The Analysis of Matter, Russell walks the same route but starts from the opposite side. Now he attempts an analysis of matter – the central concept in physics and physiology. Or rather, since Russell wrote the book in the heyday of the revolutions in general relativity and quantum mechanism, the central concept in physics was up to that point. This sounds like the book is, due to all subsequent scientific developments in physics, outdated, but this would be a mistake. One can easily substitute bundles of energy in fields for matter to keep Russell’s book itself highly relevant. This is because Russell attempts a philosophical analysis of the theories and concepts used in the science of physics.
In part I of the book, Russell treats classical mechanics, the (then) new physics of relativity, the different interpretations of quantum mechanics. The key point in part I is that physics has replaced our common sense view of world based on perceptions. The logical apparatus of physics – with concepts like time and space (both the ordering of processes in terms of systems of coordinates), light (bundles of energy whose intrinsic qualities are unknown) and matter (electrons and protons) – is, ultimately, an abstraction based on the common sense notion of ‘conservation’. Within this apparatus, matter functions as ‘that which is indestructible’.
In short: the world of modern physics consists of abstract entities which are described by mathematical formulae and general laws that are expressed in terms of differentials (or intervals – in general relativity). The physicist works with logical constructions that are not observable but the acceptance of which leads to coherent theories which are validated through observation and experiment. Physics is characterized by intrinsic uncertainty – not just in the quantum mechanical sense, but also in the sense that we can never be sure that the current entities in physics are the ultimate ones – are that there are ultimate elemental entities to begin with.
(Russell wrote his book in a time when electrons and protons were regarded as the constituents of matter, yet he remarks on multiple occasions that it is highly unlikely that these are the final steps – later on particle physics developed into a whole field of innumerable particles of all sorts of shapes and sizes. Even protons and neutrons are now constructions out of quarks, which – some claim – are themselves constructions out of strings. Anyway, the point is clear: Russell offers highly sophisticated analyses in a very nuanced way.)
In part II, Russell leaves the world of physics and aims his sharp mind at the question of perception. That is, physics, as a science, is ultimately built up from particular perceptions by particular scientists of particular experiences. No matter how abstract the logical apparatus of physics has become, it is only when particular data are inserted into the general formulae that physics makes sense. Also, physical constants – like the speed of light or the Planck constant – are the results of experiment and observations and are in no way logically derived from the formulae themselves. So, Russell inquires into perception as a source of knowledge in physics.
The key point in part II is the causal theory of perception. Russell offers this theory as an alternative for two problematic epistemological positions. Common sense claims knowledge of objects, while solipsism – through scepticism – claims there is no knowledge of the world, only of the self. The problem of common sense is that there really is no knowledge of objects (this was already problematic in Descartes, but became exuberant in Locke and culminated in Hume’s radical scepticism). The solipsist cannot be so easily refuted, or rather: he cannot be refuted at all. The solipsist position is coherent and insurmountable, yet it closes us off from any further investigation. (Also, as Russell wittily points out, no solipsist really lives like a solipsist, since that would mean certain death.)
Russell’s causal theory of perception circumvents the intellectual barrenness of the solipsist since it leaves room for the physical world of objects, while it overcomes the problems of common sense by deriving these objects – as logical inferences – from primordial sense-data, the stuff of experience. These sense-data are either collected into private spaces (perspectives) or collected in one place – or rather: centred around one point in three-dimensional space. Private space is part of psychology, while physical space is part of physics, and both are seen to be two interpretations of the same physical world. In physical space, we infer perceptions from points in space where there no observers from perceptions from points in space where there are actual observers. Laws of perspective and causal laws are the guiding principles here.
We observe a collection of perceptions around a centre in a shared space and we infer continuity between perceptions and correlated events in other parts of this shared space (on the basis of observation of motions). This is all rather technical jargon for saying we observe that our perception of, for example, light differs from what went on before the light had reached the eye. We infer the continuity of this light ray and infer a transformation of this light ray. This view of the world underlies the whole science of physics and its consequences are verified (on the whole) more than they are falsified. That is, it works to accept this theory but we can never be certain it is a correct view.
With this causal theory of perception Russell is able to dismantle philosophical problems that arise in physics. For example the problem of physical laws – Do they actually exist? According to Russell, the belief in physical laws is what constitutes physics, but the assumption that they exist in the physical world is an assumption which is irrelevant in most cases. For example, statistical laws are simply a description of the probabilities of certain distributions of certain physical objects or one of more of their qualities. It is unnecessary to somehow postulate the physical existence of this law it is enough to use it to calculate its predictions and observe its effects.
Another problem Russell deals with is the notion of substance. This is inferred from the supposed indestructibility of matter – matter is continuously changing form in physical processes, so there has to be something that remains the same. It is relic of our common sense view of the world, which is based on conservation. For physics, it is a logical construction that is totally irrelevant.
Russell ends part II with the conclusion that objects are series of events in a four dimensional manifold of spacetime. Matter, on this view, is nothing but groups of events that are connected through laws of dynamics and are described in terms of worldlines. The key point is, of course, that matter is a logical construction, which comes in handy in our physical theories, but which remains a logical construction – that is, a logical inference from sense-data. We will never be able to experience the logical constructions that physics makes use of, we have to accept them as long as they lead to the development of our physical theories – which are themselves verified through the use of sense-data.
So we see sense-data, or perception, playing a key role in physics. This, by the way, also holds for physiology. We are easily tricked into all kinds of muddled thinking when it comes, for example, to brains. We assume our brains to be physical structures, but this is a logical inference. We have no direct experience of sense-data which allows us to make this claim. A physiologist might look at our brain (preferably post mortem) but what he perceives is sense-data which was inaccessible to us and which has no connection whatsoever to his own brain. So our knowledge of brains is based on experiences of physical events and we are tricked into assuming we know we have a brain – the brain is a logical construct and the assumption we have a brain is a logical inference. There is no direct experience of us having a brain.
This view presumably leads to the destruction of the body-mind problem, since it postulates that both our mental experiences and our physical experiences are, in the end, nothing but constructions from neutral stuff (neutral regarding matter and mind, that is). This allows Russell the flexibility he needs to overcome all kinds of problems in body-mind dualism.
In part III, Russell combines the abstract theories of physics (part I) with the causal theory of perception (part II) into a metaphysic that solves a lot of existing philosophical problems – most notably the aforementioned mind-body problems.
The essential point is Russell’s view that physics is the “causal skeleton of the world” (p. 391). That is, physics is an abstract formalism that describes the structure of all stimuli of perceived and unperceived sense-data. The things which possess these structures – the physical objects, or put in another way: the terms in physical propositions – are themselves unknowable. We infer them since they allow us to reliably describe the physical structure of the world. This structure itself – the relations between the terms in physical propositions – is of the type of one-many relations, which says that all relations are complexes construed out of further complexes, etc.
When it comes to perceptions, we encounter a difficulty. In psychology we study things like thinking, feeling, willing, etc. and these perceptions are partly subjective, and in so far as they are subjective they are knowable. When it comes to cognition we remain in the domain of physics, when subjectivity enters the scene, we leave the domain of physics and enter the domain of pure psychology.
Again, since all physical objects are inferences from perceived structures – i.e. logical constructions – this goes for matter as well. We obtain physical knowledge through our own perception of sense-data, combine them with testimonies of perceptions of sense-data by others, and from both combined we derive causal relations which allow us to know the whole of real and possible perceptions around one centre. The collection of all these perceptions – real and possible – are what we call the physical object. We don’t know this object, only its (possible) appearances in physical space. This view of the physical world is perfectly in line with the substitution of space and time in classical physics for the four-dimensional manifold of spacetime, where causal lines describe the motions of bodies. (This was the biggest revolution of the time, forced on us by general relativity.)
The natural question that pops up in relation to this worldview is: If matter is a logical construction, out of what is it constructed? The answer is given by Russell’s causal theory of perception: physical events are the causes (stimuli) of our perceptions – we infer ‘objects’ as collections of these events following the laws of perspectives and causal laws. This, in effect, is a correspondence theory of truth: the structure of the physical events (stimuli) corresponds with the structure of our perceptions. The intermediary phases are unknowable, but the assumption of them leads to useful theories which are verified more than they are falsified. For example, seeing the Sun (object) shows us the origin of the stimulus (the place of the object in spacetime) as well as the result of the stimulus (our perception of the Sun) – we have no information about what happens between the Sun emitting a photon and the photon hitting our retina (resulting in our perception). Physical theory tells us about fields, bundles of energy, transitions, etc. – all of this is assumption, verified by experience.
And this is where The Analysis of Matter connects with The Analysis of Mind. Russell’s theory of neutral monism allows for the theories of physics, the theories of psychology and their partial overlap (when it comes to cognitive experience). Russell ends the book with stating that the subjectivity of the perceiver in an experience is as of yet inexplainable in scientific terms, but hints as quantum mechanics as a possible future solution, since brains are built, ultimately, out of quantum elements following statistical laws.
To sum up: according to Russell the spatiotemporal dynamical order of events (and thus general relativity) follows from our acceptance of the causal theory of perception. That is, we assume (1) that our perceptions of these events are caused; (2) that multiple perceivers perceive the same events from multiple perspectives (their private space); (3) and that collections of perceptions are grouped around centres in public space
.
For science to offer us knowledge, it is necessary to accept causality and induction as principles – that is, if we want to avoid solipsism. But since causality and induction are never certain, all our scientific knowledge can only be probable. In other words: all scientific propositions are possessed with a degree of certainty, since all of these propositions are by nature based on uncertain inferences. Phenomenalism – the view that the world is a totality of phenomena – claims to avoid using causality as a principle and thus to circumvent the problems of induction, but implicitly presuppose causality as a principle in relation to the communication of knowledge (i.e. speaking and listening).
----------------
Last paragraphs in comments.
December 9, 2025
Free download available at Project Gutenberg
I made the proofreading of this book for Free Literature and Project Gutenberg will publish it pretty soon.
I made the proofreading of this book for Free Literature and Project Gutenberg will publish it pretty soon.
June 7, 2024
A MAJOR WORK OF RUSSELL’S THAT IS OFTEN OVERLOOKED
Philosopher and mathematical logician Bertrand Russell wrote in the Preface of this 1927 book, “The attempt to discover the philosophical outcome of modern physics is one which, at the present moment, is beset with great difficulties… The subject of the relation of ‘matter’ to what exists, and generally of the interpretation of physics in terms of what exists is, however, not one of physics alone. Psychology, physiology, mathematical logic, and philosophy are all required, in addition to physics, for the adequate discussion of the them with which this volume deals… Since the purpose of the book is philosophical, it has been my endeavor to avoid physical and mathematical technicalities as far as possible.”
In the first chapter, he observes, “in relation to the interpretation of geometry we have already been brought into contact with a very different problem---namely, that of the application of physics to the empirical world. This is, of course, the vital problem: although physics can be pursued as pure mathematics, it is not as pure mathematics that physics is important… The laws of physics are believed to be at least approximately true, although they are not logically necessary; the evidence for them is empirical. All empirical evidence consists, in the last analysis, of perceptions; thus the world of physics must be, in some sense, continuous with the world of our perceptions, since it is the latter which supplies the evidence for the laws of physics.” (Pg. 6)
He continues, “We must therefore find an interpretation of physics which gives a due place to perceptions; if not, we have no right to appeal to the empirical evidence. This problem has two parts: to assimilate the physical world to the world of perceptions, and to assimilate the world of perceptions to the physical world. Physics must be interpreted in a way which tends towards idealism, and perception in a way which tends towards materialism. I believe that matter is less material, and mind less mental, than is commonly supposed… the present volume … will throughout assume the general validity of scientific method properly conducted.” (Pg. 7)
He suggests, “when physics is now considered… as a deductive system, we do well to adopt the Einsteinian interpretation: free particles move in geodesics, and the law of gravitation is a law as to how geodesics as shaped in the neighborhood of matter. This view… accords with the facts, and it puts the law of gravitation in a recognizable place among physical principles, instead of leaving it … an isolated and unrelated law. I propose, therefore, to continue to adopt Einstein’s view as to the best way of interpreting the principles of physics, without suggesting that no other way is logically possible.” (Pg. 80)
He says of Relativity Theory, “The theory is a combination of two diverse elements: on the one hand, new experimental data; on the other, a new logical method. It must be regarded as a happy accident that the two appeared together; if the right kind of theoretical genius had not happened to be forthcoming, we might have had to be content for a long time with patched-up hypotheses… As it is, the combination of experiment and theory has produced one of the supreme triumphs of human genius.” (Pg. 100)
He admits, “Hence IF modern physics invalidates perception as a source of knowledge about the external world, and yet depends upon perception, that is a valid argument against modern physics. I do not say that physics in fact has this defect, but I do say that considerable labor of interpretation is necessary in order to show that it can be absolved in this respect. And it is because of the abstractness of physics, as developed by mathematicians, that this labor is required.” (Pg. 139-140)
He notes, “Substance is a category which comes naturally to common sense, though without the attributes of indestructability added by the metaphysicians … I think one must conclude… that the attitude of common sense as to the indestructability of substance is vacillating; on the whole, the success of physics in providing immortal material unites represents a triumph of the philosopher over the plain man.” (Pg. 151) Later, he adds, “We cannot therefore argue from the practical success of common sense to its approximate theoretical accuracy, but only to a certain rough correspondence between its commoner inferences and those permitted by a correct theory. If physics has had to desert common sense, that is no reason for finding fault with physics.” (Pg. 155)
He laments, “It may be admitted that most of what has passed for philosophy would not have been very useful to the men of science; but that was chiefly because philosophy was no longer being created by men like Descartes and Leibniz, who were of supreme eminence in science as well. It may be hoped that this state of affairs is coming to an end.” (Pg. 160)
He proposes, “The existence of causal laws perhaps deserves to rank as a postulate, or may perhaps be proved probable, on the existing evidence, if induction is assumed… a postulate need not be supposed to hold universally. We shall assume that there are causal laws, and try to discover them; but if none are found in a given region, that merely means that science cannot conquer that region. There are at present important regions of this kind. We do not know why a radioactive atom disintegrates at one moment rather than another. We cannot be sure that these occurrences severally are governed by laws; but if they are not, science cannot deal with them individually, and is confined to statistical averages. Whether this will prove to be the case, we cannot yet say.” (Pg. 168)
He summarizes, “‘Matter,’ I shall contend, is known only as regards certain very abstract characteristics, which might quite well belong to a manifold of mental events, but might also belong to a different manifold… Our reason for not regarding ‘matter’ as actually being an arithmetical structure derived from the finite integers is the connection of ‘matter’ with perception…But this connection… tells us extremely little about the character of the unperceived events in the physical world. Unlike idealists and materialists, I do not believe that there is any other source of knowledge from which this meager result can be supplemented… I allow myself to speculate; but that is an exercise of imagination, not a process of demonstrative reasoning.” (Pg. 215)
He suggests, “Like other scientific postulates, the belief in general laws is rooted in the properties of nervous tissue—the same properties which make us believe in induction and enable us to learn from experience. This origin, of course, affords no warrant for the truth of the belief, but equally gives no reason against it. Indeed… it affords a slight presumption in favor of the view that a great many events are in accordance with general laws, since it shows that animals which act in a way which the truth of this belief would render rational can survive. I should not wish, however, to lay stress upon such an argument.” (Pg. 229)
He explains, “the physical object to be inferred from perception is a group of events, rather than a single ‘thing.’ Percepts are always events, and common sense is always rash when it refers them to ‘things’ with changing states. There is therefore every reason, from the standpoint of perception, to desire an interpretation of physics which dispenses with permanent substance. As we have seen that such an interpretation is possible, we shall henceforth adopt it.” (Pg. 247)
He acknowledges, “We can construct theories which fit the known facts, but we can never be sure that other theories would not fit them equally well. This is an essential limitation on scientific inference… no prudent man of science would maintain that such-and-such a theory is so firmly established that it will never call for modification… The fundamental reason for this uncertainty… is the fact that our relation S, which connects the physical object with the percept, is many-one and not one-one.” (Pg. 255-256)
He summarizes, “There is nothing in physics to prove that the physical world is radically different in character from the mental world. I do not myself believe that the philosophical arguments for the view that all reality must be mental are valid. But I also do not believe that any valid arguments against this view are to be derived from physics. The only legitimate attitude about the physical world seems to be complete agnosticism as regards all but its mathematical properties. However, something can be done in the way of constructing possible physical worlds which fulfill the equations of physics and yet resemble rather more closely the world of perception than does the world ordinarily presented in physics.” (Pg. 271)
He concludes, “on the basis of physics itself, there may be limits to physical determinism.. But if mind and brain are causally interconnected, very small cerebral differences must be correlated with noticeable mental differences. Thus we are perhaps forced to descend into the region of quantum transactions, and to desert the macroscopic level where statistical averages obtain… This, of course, is merely a speculative possibility; but it interposes a veto upon materialistic dogmatism… for the present… the philosopher must be content to await the progress of science.” (Pg. 393) He adds, “As regards the world in general, both physical and mental, everything that we know of its intrinsic character is derived from the mental side, and almost everything that we know of its causal laws is derived from the physical side. But from the standpoint of philosophy the distinction between physical and mental is superficial and unreal.” (Pg. 402)
This book is not always cited in modern surveys of Russell’s philosophy, but it is definitely “must reading” for anyone wanting to seriously study his philosophy.
Philosopher and mathematical logician Bertrand Russell wrote in the Preface of this 1927 book, “The attempt to discover the philosophical outcome of modern physics is one which, at the present moment, is beset with great difficulties… The subject of the relation of ‘matter’ to what exists, and generally of the interpretation of physics in terms of what exists is, however, not one of physics alone. Psychology, physiology, mathematical logic, and philosophy are all required, in addition to physics, for the adequate discussion of the them with which this volume deals… Since the purpose of the book is philosophical, it has been my endeavor to avoid physical and mathematical technicalities as far as possible.”
In the first chapter, he observes, “in relation to the interpretation of geometry we have already been brought into contact with a very different problem---namely, that of the application of physics to the empirical world. This is, of course, the vital problem: although physics can be pursued as pure mathematics, it is not as pure mathematics that physics is important… The laws of physics are believed to be at least approximately true, although they are not logically necessary; the evidence for them is empirical. All empirical evidence consists, in the last analysis, of perceptions; thus the world of physics must be, in some sense, continuous with the world of our perceptions, since it is the latter which supplies the evidence for the laws of physics.” (Pg. 6)
He continues, “We must therefore find an interpretation of physics which gives a due place to perceptions; if not, we have no right to appeal to the empirical evidence. This problem has two parts: to assimilate the physical world to the world of perceptions, and to assimilate the world of perceptions to the physical world. Physics must be interpreted in a way which tends towards idealism, and perception in a way which tends towards materialism. I believe that matter is less material, and mind less mental, than is commonly supposed… the present volume … will throughout assume the general validity of scientific method properly conducted.” (Pg. 7)
He suggests, “when physics is now considered… as a deductive system, we do well to adopt the Einsteinian interpretation: free particles move in geodesics, and the law of gravitation is a law as to how geodesics as shaped in the neighborhood of matter. This view… accords with the facts, and it puts the law of gravitation in a recognizable place among physical principles, instead of leaving it … an isolated and unrelated law. I propose, therefore, to continue to adopt Einstein’s view as to the best way of interpreting the principles of physics, without suggesting that no other way is logically possible.” (Pg. 80)
He says of Relativity Theory, “The theory is a combination of two diverse elements: on the one hand, new experimental data; on the other, a new logical method. It must be regarded as a happy accident that the two appeared together; if the right kind of theoretical genius had not happened to be forthcoming, we might have had to be content for a long time with patched-up hypotheses… As it is, the combination of experiment and theory has produced one of the supreme triumphs of human genius.” (Pg. 100)
He admits, “Hence IF modern physics invalidates perception as a source of knowledge about the external world, and yet depends upon perception, that is a valid argument against modern physics. I do not say that physics in fact has this defect, but I do say that considerable labor of interpretation is necessary in order to show that it can be absolved in this respect. And it is because of the abstractness of physics, as developed by mathematicians, that this labor is required.” (Pg. 139-140)
He notes, “Substance is a category which comes naturally to common sense, though without the attributes of indestructability added by the metaphysicians … I think one must conclude… that the attitude of common sense as to the indestructability of substance is vacillating; on the whole, the success of physics in providing immortal material unites represents a triumph of the philosopher over the plain man.” (Pg. 151) Later, he adds, “We cannot therefore argue from the practical success of common sense to its approximate theoretical accuracy, but only to a certain rough correspondence between its commoner inferences and those permitted by a correct theory. If physics has had to desert common sense, that is no reason for finding fault with physics.” (Pg. 155)
He laments, “It may be admitted that most of what has passed for philosophy would not have been very useful to the men of science; but that was chiefly because philosophy was no longer being created by men like Descartes and Leibniz, who were of supreme eminence in science as well. It may be hoped that this state of affairs is coming to an end.” (Pg. 160)
He proposes, “The existence of causal laws perhaps deserves to rank as a postulate, or may perhaps be proved probable, on the existing evidence, if induction is assumed… a postulate need not be supposed to hold universally. We shall assume that there are causal laws, and try to discover them; but if none are found in a given region, that merely means that science cannot conquer that region. There are at present important regions of this kind. We do not know why a radioactive atom disintegrates at one moment rather than another. We cannot be sure that these occurrences severally are governed by laws; but if they are not, science cannot deal with them individually, and is confined to statistical averages. Whether this will prove to be the case, we cannot yet say.” (Pg. 168)
He summarizes, “‘Matter,’ I shall contend, is known only as regards certain very abstract characteristics, which might quite well belong to a manifold of mental events, but might also belong to a different manifold… Our reason for not regarding ‘matter’ as actually being an arithmetical structure derived from the finite integers is the connection of ‘matter’ with perception…But this connection… tells us extremely little about the character of the unperceived events in the physical world. Unlike idealists and materialists, I do not believe that there is any other source of knowledge from which this meager result can be supplemented… I allow myself to speculate; but that is an exercise of imagination, not a process of demonstrative reasoning.” (Pg. 215)
He suggests, “Like other scientific postulates, the belief in general laws is rooted in the properties of nervous tissue—the same properties which make us believe in induction and enable us to learn from experience. This origin, of course, affords no warrant for the truth of the belief, but equally gives no reason against it. Indeed… it affords a slight presumption in favor of the view that a great many events are in accordance with general laws, since it shows that animals which act in a way which the truth of this belief would render rational can survive. I should not wish, however, to lay stress upon such an argument.” (Pg. 229)
He explains, “the physical object to be inferred from perception is a group of events, rather than a single ‘thing.’ Percepts are always events, and common sense is always rash when it refers them to ‘things’ with changing states. There is therefore every reason, from the standpoint of perception, to desire an interpretation of physics which dispenses with permanent substance. As we have seen that such an interpretation is possible, we shall henceforth adopt it.” (Pg. 247)
He acknowledges, “We can construct theories which fit the known facts, but we can never be sure that other theories would not fit them equally well. This is an essential limitation on scientific inference… no prudent man of science would maintain that such-and-such a theory is so firmly established that it will never call for modification… The fundamental reason for this uncertainty… is the fact that our relation S, which connects the physical object with the percept, is many-one and not one-one.” (Pg. 255-256)
He summarizes, “There is nothing in physics to prove that the physical world is radically different in character from the mental world. I do not myself believe that the philosophical arguments for the view that all reality must be mental are valid. But I also do not believe that any valid arguments against this view are to be derived from physics. The only legitimate attitude about the physical world seems to be complete agnosticism as regards all but its mathematical properties. However, something can be done in the way of constructing possible physical worlds which fulfill the equations of physics and yet resemble rather more closely the world of perception than does the world ordinarily presented in physics.” (Pg. 271)
He concludes, “on the basis of physics itself, there may be limits to physical determinism.. But if mind and brain are causally interconnected, very small cerebral differences must be correlated with noticeable mental differences. Thus we are perhaps forced to descend into the region of quantum transactions, and to desert the macroscopic level where statistical averages obtain… This, of course, is merely a speculative possibility; but it interposes a veto upon materialistic dogmatism… for the present… the philosopher must be content to await the progress of science.” (Pg. 393) He adds, “As regards the world in general, both physical and mental, everything that we know of its intrinsic character is derived from the mental side, and almost everything that we know of its causal laws is derived from the physical side. But from the standpoint of philosophy the distinction between physical and mental is superficial and unreal.” (Pg. 402)
This book is not always cited in modern surveys of Russell’s philosophy, but it is definitely “must reading” for anyone wanting to seriously study his philosophy.
November 11, 2011
4 1/2 stars. The whole of Part I is far too mathematical for my liking. Other than that, it was excellent. Of what I know of modern physics, it stands the test of time relatively well, too.
March 14, 2018
Amazing read.
July 24, 2019
Há alguns problemas com a teoria conquanto seus comentários a respeito da dicotomia entre realismo e idealismo são valiosos.
December 24, 2024
This book, although difficult, is worth reading if you’re interested in the history and philosophy of physics, metaphysics, or the philosophy of mind. It captures a remarkable moment in the history of science. General relativity is only twelve years old, and quantum mechanics is still in the process of being formulated. Russell has encountered Heisenberg’s version but not Schrodinger’s, so he knows about the uncertainty principle but not about wavefunctions. He knows about protons and electrons but not neutrons, which will not be discovered for another three years.
Russell sees immediately that the new physics holds profound implications for philosophy, and this book represents an early attempt at teasing out those implications. Part I is a lucid, semi-technical exposition of general relativity. It doesn’t shy away from mathematical detail but remains mostly accessible.
Part II develops a causal theory of perception. Percepts, Russell argues, are events internal to a perceiver (“in the head”), caused by radiations from real, external regions of spacetime. A key implication of the causal theory of perception, Russell argues, is that percepts carry information about the structure of the perceived events but not about their intrinsic quality. Since all knowledge of the external world is based on percepts, all such knowledge is ultimately knowledge of structure. This aligns with what we find when we look at successful physical theories: all the work is done by equations describing abstract, mathematical, structural properties such as wavelength, while intrinsic qualities of events (such as red, blue, hot, loud, etc.) drop out of the picture. The only intrinsic qualities with which we are acquainted are those of events internal to our brains.
It’s in Part III of the book that things get really interesting and weird, as Russell allows himself to speculate about the fundamental nature of reality, taking for granted general relativity, quantum mechanics and the causal theory of perception. Remember this is well before Schrodinger’s cat: the famous problems of interpreting the quantum world haven’t even been clearly stated yet.
Perhaps the most significant chapter is “Physics and Neutral Monism”, which outlines Russell’s neutral monism: the view that the “mental” and the “physical” are just different arrangements of the same basic stuff, namely events. A percept is an event in the brain linked by causal laws to other events in the brain, and is in this sense “mental”. But it is also linked by causal laws to other events outside the brain, and is in this sense “physical”. Percepts “fit into the same causal scheme as physical events, and are not known to have any intrinsic character that physical events cannot have” (p. 384).
Why is this "neutral monism" and not physicalism? Because we need to allow that we have knowledge by acquaintance of the intrinsic qualities of our percepts, and this knowledge lies outside of physics, which is concerned only with structure. Physics gives us the “causal skeleton” of the world, but not the intrinsic qualities that fill the skeleton. Russell gives an early version of the “Knowledge Argument” when defending this idea, writing: “It is obvious that a man who can see knows things which a blind man cannot know; but a blind man can know the whole of physics. Thus the knowledge which other men have and he has not is not part of physics” (p. 389).
Do events outside human brains also have intrinsic qualities? Russell suggests that external events may resemble mental events more than they resemble “traditional billiard-balls”. He doesn’t explicitly endorse panpsychism, instead professing agnosticism about the intrinsic quality of events outside human brains. We might have reason to posit such qualities, but we can never know what they are like. These speculations are the inspiration for the contemporary version of panpsychism (or “panprotopsychism”) known as “Russellian monism”.
Russell sees immediately that the new physics holds profound implications for philosophy, and this book represents an early attempt at teasing out those implications. Part I is a lucid, semi-technical exposition of general relativity. It doesn’t shy away from mathematical detail but remains mostly accessible.
Part II develops a causal theory of perception. Percepts, Russell argues, are events internal to a perceiver (“in the head”), caused by radiations from real, external regions of spacetime. A key implication of the causal theory of perception, Russell argues, is that percepts carry information about the structure of the perceived events but not about their intrinsic quality. Since all knowledge of the external world is based on percepts, all such knowledge is ultimately knowledge of structure. This aligns with what we find when we look at successful physical theories: all the work is done by equations describing abstract, mathematical, structural properties such as wavelength, while intrinsic qualities of events (such as red, blue, hot, loud, etc.) drop out of the picture. The only intrinsic qualities with which we are acquainted are those of events internal to our brains.
It’s in Part III of the book that things get really interesting and weird, as Russell allows himself to speculate about the fundamental nature of reality, taking for granted general relativity, quantum mechanics and the causal theory of perception. Remember this is well before Schrodinger’s cat: the famous problems of interpreting the quantum world haven’t even been clearly stated yet.
Perhaps the most significant chapter is “Physics and Neutral Monism”, which outlines Russell’s neutral monism: the view that the “mental” and the “physical” are just different arrangements of the same basic stuff, namely events. A percept is an event in the brain linked by causal laws to other events in the brain, and is in this sense “mental”. But it is also linked by causal laws to other events outside the brain, and is in this sense “physical”. Percepts “fit into the same causal scheme as physical events, and are not known to have any intrinsic character that physical events cannot have” (p. 384).
Why is this "neutral monism" and not physicalism? Because we need to allow that we have knowledge by acquaintance of the intrinsic qualities of our percepts, and this knowledge lies outside of physics, which is concerned only with structure. Physics gives us the “causal skeleton” of the world, but not the intrinsic qualities that fill the skeleton. Russell gives an early version of the “Knowledge Argument” when defending this idea, writing: “It is obvious that a man who can see knows things which a blind man cannot know; but a blind man can know the whole of physics. Thus the knowledge which other men have and he has not is not part of physics” (p. 389).
Do events outside human brains also have intrinsic qualities? Russell suggests that external events may resemble mental events more than they resemble “traditional billiard-balls”. He doesn’t explicitly endorse panpsychism, instead professing agnosticism about the intrinsic quality of events outside human brains. We might have reason to posit such qualities, but we can never know what they are like. These speculations are the inspiration for the contemporary version of panpsychism (or “panprotopsychism”) known as “Russellian monism”.
May 22, 2024
(Almost) everything we were taught about matter and physics is wrong :)
June 4, 2025
I confess I didn’t understand parts of it, but I really enjoyed the book and found it thought-provoking.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews