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El Maestro
=The Teacher
124 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 389
11 people are currently reading
187 people want to read
About the author
Augustine of Hippo
3,334 books2,021 followersEarly church father and philosopher Saint Augustine served from 396 as the bishop of Hippo in present-day Algeria and through such writings as the autobiographical
Confessions
in 397 and the voluminous
City of God
from 413 to 426 profoundly influenced Christianity, argued against Manichaeism and Donatism, and helped to establish the doctrine of original sin.
An Augustinian follows the principles and doctrines of Saint Augustine.
People also know Aurelius Augustinus in English of Regius (Annaba). From the Africa province of the Roman Empire, people generally consider this Latin theologian of the greatest thinkers of all times. He very developed the west. According to Jerome, a contemporary, Augustine renewed "the ancient Faith."
The Neo-Platonism of Plotinus afterward heavily weighed his years. After conversion and his baptism in 387, Augustine developed his own approach to theology and accommodated a variety of methods and different perspectives. He believed in the indispensable grace to human freedom and framed the concept of just war. When the Western Roman Empire started to disintegrate from the material earth, Augustine developed the concept of the distinct Catholic spirituality in a book of the same name. He thought the medieval worldview. Augustine closely identified with the community that worshiped the Trinity. The Catholics and the Anglican communion revere this preeminent doctor. Many Protestants, especially Calvinists, consider his due teaching on salvation and divine grace of the theology of the Reformation. The Eastern Orthodox also consider him. He carries the additional title of blessed. The Orthodox call him "Blessed Augustine" or "Saint Augustine the Blessed."
Santo Agostinho
An Augustinian follows the principles and doctrines of Saint Augustine.
People also know Aurelius Augustinus in English of Regius (Annaba). From the Africa province of the Roman Empire, people generally consider this Latin theologian of the greatest thinkers of all times. He very developed the west. According to Jerome, a contemporary, Augustine renewed "the ancient Faith."
The Neo-Platonism of Plotinus afterward heavily weighed his years. After conversion and his baptism in 387, Augustine developed his own approach to theology and accommodated a variety of methods and different perspectives. He believed in the indispensable grace to human freedom and framed the concept of just war. When the Western Roman Empire started to disintegrate from the material earth, Augustine developed the concept of the distinct Catholic spirituality in a book of the same name. He thought the medieval worldview. Augustine closely identified with the community that worshiped the Trinity. The Catholics and the Anglican communion revere this preeminent doctor. Many Protestants, especially Calvinists, consider his due teaching on salvation and divine grace of the theology of the Reformation. The Eastern Orthodox also consider him. He carries the additional title of blessed. The Orthodox call him "Blessed Augustine" or "Saint Augustine the Blessed."
Santo Agostinho
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January 21, 2021
O ČOM JE KNIHA?
Augustín v knihe vedie dialóg so svojím synom Adeodátom o rozprávaní, učení a napomínaní, o znakoch a slovách, označovanom a označujúcom, no jednoducho celkom šialenú lingvistickú rozpravu, ktorej výsledok môže vyznieť prekvapivo a prehnane teologicky. Slová nás ničomu nenaučia, maximálne nám môžu pripomínať, čo vo vnútri vieme. A je len jeden učiteľ, večná Pravda, Ježiš Kristus, ktorý je v nás a skrze ktorého poznávame pravdu. Augustín v dialógu k záveru však prichádza logickým sledom myšlienok, ktorý je filozofický, nie teologický.
Dá sa povedať, že de Magistro je rozdelená na dve časti. Úvodne vymedzenie a záverečné vyvodenie. Úvodné vymedzenie končí užitočným "zhrnutím vymedzeného" Adeodátom. Ľudia rozprávajú, aby učili alebo pripomínali (aj pri pýtaní sa). Slová nie sú nič iné, len znaky a nemôže byť znakom, čo nič neoznačuje. Znaky sú ukazované buď pomocou znakov, alebo pomocou znakov iných vecí, ktoré nie sú znakom, alebo bez pomoci znakov tie veci, ktoré môžeme urobiť po otázke. (Sedím a človek sa ma spýta, čo je to chodenie a ja začnem kráčať). Niektoré znaky nemôžu byť navzájom označené tými znakmi, ktoré samy označujú (spojka). Iné znaky môžu - znak označuje tiež slovo a slovo označuje tiež znak, lebo aj znak aj slovo sú dva znaky a dve slová (strácam sa). Slovo znak označuje všetko označujúce, slovo "slovo" nie je znakom všetkých znakov, len tých, ktoré "hovoríme, píšeme". Znak je teda viac než slovo. Všetky časti reči sú menami, lebo k ním môžeme pridať zámená a o všetkých je možné povedať, že pomenúvajú a ku každému keď pridáme sloveso, bude vytvárať samostatnú výpoveď. Slovo označuje "údere v uchu" a "meno" úder v mysli.
Tu končí, podľa mňa prvá časť a nasleduje akási aplikácia, začínajúca otázkou "je človek človek?". Augustín obsah druhej časti zhŕňa takto - otázkou je, či je možné niečomu učiť bez znakov, či sa má dávať prednosť znakom pred vecami (niektorým) a či poznanie vecí je lepšie než znaky. Augustín napríklad hovorí, že by sme vôbec nemohli debatovať, keby sa myseľ, počujúca slová, neobracala k tomu, čoho sú to znaky (čo označujú). Teda určite záverom nechce zatratiť zmysel slov a znakov. Následne však so synom riešia otázku "čo je dôležitejšie?" Znak? To, čo označuje? Poznanie znaku? Poznanie označovaného? Ak som to správne pochopil, "d" je správne, aj keď nie úplne. Rieši sa otázka, že čo je lepšie, "jesť aby sme žili, alebo žiť, aby sme jedli" alebo "rozprávať, aby sme učili, alebo učiť, aby sme rozprávali". Odpoveď je, dúfam, jasná.
Čím sa však Augustínov dialóg líši od Platónovských dialógov (aspoň tých, ktoré som čítal) je, že v na konci prvej a aj na konci druhej si na dlhšiu dobu zoberie slovo jeden z protagonistov (v prvej časti Adeodátus, v druhej Augustín) a prináša jednak zhrnutie, jednak vyvodenie záverov, jednak posun debaty ďalej a celé to vyzerá tak, akoby si Augustín v jednom momente povedal, že už ma nebaví viesť dialóg, lebo by sme tu boli do večera.
Záver teda znie, že ľudia môžu byť poučení bez znakov. Tu Augustín dochádza k skepse voči znakom. "Keď mi je daný znak a zastihne ma nevedomého, čoho je znakom, nemôže ma ničomu naučiť." Podľa neho sa skôr učíme znaku tým, že poznávame než tým, že by sme veci dávali znak. Keď niekto rozpráva, učíme sa skôr znaku, ktorý sme nepoznali a v znaku sú dve veci - zvuk a význam. Zvuk vnímame sluchom, význam tak, že uvidíme vec, ktorú znak označuje. Augustín hovorí, že "keď poznal som danú vec, nepoviem, že neuveril som vlastným znakom, ale vlastným očiam, znakom/slovám som práve že uveril, aby som dával pozor/aby som hľadel pohľadom, čo by som mal pozorovať a poznať". Znaky nám teda pomáhajú veci hľadať, no nie poznávať.
A zrejme má pravdu, keď hovorí, že slovami sa učíme len slovám, ba len zvuku a hluku slov. Nemôže byť však slovom, čo nie je znakom (to znamená označujúcim), lebo slovo "haskkm" nič neoznačuje, a teda nedáva žiadne poznanie. Zároveň môžeme počuť nové slovo (napr. bedeker) a neviem o tom, že je to slovo, pokým neviem, čo označuje/čo znamená (dovtedy je slovo haskkm a bedeker na rovnakej úrovni). Čiže poznanie slov dosahujeme poznaním vecí samotných, no počutím slov sa neučíme ani slovám samotným. Ak počujeme slovo a vieme, čo znamená, tak nám pripomína to, čo znamená, no neučí nás. Ak nevieme, čo znamená, ani nám nepripomína, no navádza nás k hľadaniu.
Miestami máte pocit, že vám roztrhne hlavu, keď čítate, že ..."čo chápem, tomu taktiež verím, ale nechápem všetkému, čomu verím. Všetko teda, čo chápem, viem, ale neviem všetko, čo verím. Napriek tomu som si vedomý, aké je užitočné veriť mnohému, čo neviem..." No i tak Augustín dokázal veľmi dobre vysvetliť, problém diskusie a vymedzenia pojmov, keď niekto povie, že "sú zvieratá zdatnejšie než človek". Jeden by si bol pomyslel, že to nie je pravda, veď človek dokáže prekonať akékoľvek zviera, no tu sa zdatnosťou myslí všeobecná schopnosť. Niekto však zdatnosťou môže myslieť silu, a v tom prípade jeho výrok je pravdivý. My však nemáme ako vedieť, pokým si nevymedzíme pojmy, ako to dotyčný myslí, a teda môžu vznikať konflikty a nedorozumenia. Čo z toho vyplýva? Jednoducho len slovám nepripisovať význam, ktorý im neprináleží.
A teda ako poznávame? Na všetky veci, ktoré chápeme, sa pýtame nie hovoriaceho, ktorý sa zvonku ozýva, ale Pravdy, vládnucej v našom vnútri nad samou mysľou, a aby sme sa jej pýtali, pomáhajú nám slová. Ten, koho sa pýtame (Ježiš Kristus), nás poučuje. A keď "učí" iný (vonkajší) učiteľ, žiaci sami vo svojom vnútri majú uvažovať, či hovorí pravdu a pýtať sa vnútornej Pravdy, či to, čo hovorí vonkajší učiteľ, je pravda. To je podľa Augustíne pravé učenie a poznávanie.
ČO SI O NEJ MYSLÍM?
Ide o jedno z prvých lingvisticky ladených diel, ktoré som čítal a i keď mi pomohlo konečne pochopiť problém "označujúceho" a "označovaného", stále nedokážem prekonať hlavybôľ, ktorý mi podobné úvahy spôsobujú. A možno je to aj dobré a dialogická forma celkom napomohla lepšiemu porozumeniu, ale stále si nemôžem pomôcť, lebo som sa strácal. A to kazilo dojem z čítania a poznávania. Každopádne, na úvod celkom dobré a prístupné jednoduchému človeku, akým som ja. Tak 3 a pol * a Augustína treba čítať, lebo je veľmi inteligentný a inšpirujúci svätý.
Augustín v knihe vedie dialóg so svojím synom Adeodátom o rozprávaní, učení a napomínaní, o znakoch a slovách, označovanom a označujúcom, no jednoducho celkom šialenú lingvistickú rozpravu, ktorej výsledok môže vyznieť prekvapivo a prehnane teologicky. Slová nás ničomu nenaučia, maximálne nám môžu pripomínať, čo vo vnútri vieme. A je len jeden učiteľ, večná Pravda, Ježiš Kristus, ktorý je v nás a skrze ktorého poznávame pravdu. Augustín v dialógu k záveru však prichádza logickým sledom myšlienok, ktorý je filozofický, nie teologický.
Dá sa povedať, že de Magistro je rozdelená na dve časti. Úvodne vymedzenie a záverečné vyvodenie. Úvodné vymedzenie končí užitočným "zhrnutím vymedzeného" Adeodátom. Ľudia rozprávajú, aby učili alebo pripomínali (aj pri pýtaní sa). Slová nie sú nič iné, len znaky a nemôže byť znakom, čo nič neoznačuje. Znaky sú ukazované buď pomocou znakov, alebo pomocou znakov iných vecí, ktoré nie sú znakom, alebo bez pomoci znakov tie veci, ktoré môžeme urobiť po otázke. (Sedím a človek sa ma spýta, čo je to chodenie a ja začnem kráčať). Niektoré znaky nemôžu byť navzájom označené tými znakmi, ktoré samy označujú (spojka). Iné znaky môžu - znak označuje tiež slovo a slovo označuje tiež znak, lebo aj znak aj slovo sú dva znaky a dve slová (strácam sa). Slovo znak označuje všetko označujúce, slovo "slovo" nie je znakom všetkých znakov, len tých, ktoré "hovoríme, píšeme". Znak je teda viac než slovo. Všetky časti reči sú menami, lebo k ním môžeme pridať zámená a o všetkých je možné povedať, že pomenúvajú a ku každému keď pridáme sloveso, bude vytvárať samostatnú výpoveď. Slovo označuje "údere v uchu" a "meno" úder v mysli.
Tu končí, podľa mňa prvá časť a nasleduje akási aplikácia, začínajúca otázkou "je človek človek?". Augustín obsah druhej časti zhŕňa takto - otázkou je, či je možné niečomu učiť bez znakov, či sa má dávať prednosť znakom pred vecami (niektorým) a či poznanie vecí je lepšie než znaky. Augustín napríklad hovorí, že by sme vôbec nemohli debatovať, keby sa myseľ, počujúca slová, neobracala k tomu, čoho sú to znaky (čo označujú). Teda určite záverom nechce zatratiť zmysel slov a znakov. Následne však so synom riešia otázku "čo je dôležitejšie?" Znak? To, čo označuje? Poznanie znaku? Poznanie označovaného? Ak som to správne pochopil, "d" je správne, aj keď nie úplne. Rieši sa otázka, že čo je lepšie, "jesť aby sme žili, alebo žiť, aby sme jedli" alebo "rozprávať, aby sme učili, alebo učiť, aby sme rozprávali". Odpoveď je, dúfam, jasná.
Čím sa však Augustínov dialóg líši od Platónovských dialógov (aspoň tých, ktoré som čítal) je, že v na konci prvej a aj na konci druhej si na dlhšiu dobu zoberie slovo jeden z protagonistov (v prvej časti Adeodátus, v druhej Augustín) a prináša jednak zhrnutie, jednak vyvodenie záverov, jednak posun debaty ďalej a celé to vyzerá tak, akoby si Augustín v jednom momente povedal, že už ma nebaví viesť dialóg, lebo by sme tu boli do večera.
Záver teda znie, že ľudia môžu byť poučení bez znakov. Tu Augustín dochádza k skepse voči znakom. "Keď mi je daný znak a zastihne ma nevedomého, čoho je znakom, nemôže ma ničomu naučiť." Podľa neho sa skôr učíme znaku tým, že poznávame než tým, že by sme veci dávali znak. Keď niekto rozpráva, učíme sa skôr znaku, ktorý sme nepoznali a v znaku sú dve veci - zvuk a význam. Zvuk vnímame sluchom, význam tak, že uvidíme vec, ktorú znak označuje. Augustín hovorí, že "keď poznal som danú vec, nepoviem, že neuveril som vlastným znakom, ale vlastným očiam, znakom/slovám som práve že uveril, aby som dával pozor/aby som hľadel pohľadom, čo by som mal pozorovať a poznať". Znaky nám teda pomáhajú veci hľadať, no nie poznávať.
A zrejme má pravdu, keď hovorí, že slovami sa učíme len slovám, ba len zvuku a hluku slov. Nemôže byť však slovom, čo nie je znakom (to znamená označujúcim), lebo slovo "haskkm" nič neoznačuje, a teda nedáva žiadne poznanie. Zároveň môžeme počuť nové slovo (napr. bedeker) a neviem o tom, že je to slovo, pokým neviem, čo označuje/čo znamená (dovtedy je slovo haskkm a bedeker na rovnakej úrovni). Čiže poznanie slov dosahujeme poznaním vecí samotných, no počutím slov sa neučíme ani slovám samotným. Ak počujeme slovo a vieme, čo znamená, tak nám pripomína to, čo znamená, no neučí nás. Ak nevieme, čo znamená, ani nám nepripomína, no navádza nás k hľadaniu.
Miestami máte pocit, že vám roztrhne hlavu, keď čítate, že ..."čo chápem, tomu taktiež verím, ale nechápem všetkému, čomu verím. Všetko teda, čo chápem, viem, ale neviem všetko, čo verím. Napriek tomu som si vedomý, aké je užitočné veriť mnohému, čo neviem..." No i tak Augustín dokázal veľmi dobre vysvetliť, problém diskusie a vymedzenia pojmov, keď niekto povie, že "sú zvieratá zdatnejšie než človek". Jeden by si bol pomyslel, že to nie je pravda, veď človek dokáže prekonať akékoľvek zviera, no tu sa zdatnosťou myslí všeobecná schopnosť. Niekto však zdatnosťou môže myslieť silu, a v tom prípade jeho výrok je pravdivý. My však nemáme ako vedieť, pokým si nevymedzíme pojmy, ako to dotyčný myslí, a teda môžu vznikať konflikty a nedorozumenia. Čo z toho vyplýva? Jednoducho len slovám nepripisovať význam, ktorý im neprináleží.
A teda ako poznávame? Na všetky veci, ktoré chápeme, sa pýtame nie hovoriaceho, ktorý sa zvonku ozýva, ale Pravdy, vládnucej v našom vnútri nad samou mysľou, a aby sme sa jej pýtali, pomáhajú nám slová. Ten, koho sa pýtame (Ježiš Kristus), nás poučuje. A keď "učí" iný (vonkajší) učiteľ, žiaci sami vo svojom vnútri majú uvažovať, či hovorí pravdu a pýtať sa vnútornej Pravdy, či to, čo hovorí vonkajší učiteľ, je pravda. To je podľa Augustíne pravé učenie a poznávanie.
ČO SI O NEJ MYSLÍM?
Ide o jedno z prvých lingvisticky ladených diel, ktoré som čítal a i keď mi pomohlo konečne pochopiť problém "označujúceho" a "označovaného", stále nedokážem prekonať hlavybôľ, ktorý mi podobné úvahy spôsobujú. A možno je to aj dobré a dialogická forma celkom napomohla lepšiemu porozumeniu, ale stále si nemôžem pomôcť, lebo som sa strácal. A to kazilo dojem z čítania a poznávania. Každopádne, na úvod celkom dobré a prístupné jednoduchému človeku, akým som ja. Tak 3 a pol * a Augustína treba čítať, lebo je veľmi inteligentný a inšpirujúci svätý.
July 20, 2020
MQ
- Quid est docere atque discere?
- Utrum, quid, quomodo verbis (sive quibuslibet signis) res discitur/discipulus docetur?
--- Paradoxon: 1) ut quis [magister] rem aliquem [discipulum] doceat signis utitur; 2) nisi discipulus iam noverit rem quam magister signo docet, ipsum non intelliget signum
- Quousque valent signa/verba, praesertim ad a) scientiam/notitiam b) beatam vitam
- Quomodo (quibusque modis) incipere scire possumus?
- Quid efficiunt signa?
OUTLINE
INTRO
- WHY do we speak (loquimur)? 1.1
--Either to teach (docere) or to remind (commemorare). Even speech acts, singing, and thinking by means of words fall under 'commemorare'.
- verba defined as signa 1.3
-- this definition is tested with line from Virgil: 'si nihil ex tanta superis placet urbe relinqui'
--it's found that there are some verba which must be explained verbis (idest signa signis)
-- this suggests two genera of things that need to be taught/shown (ostendere, monstrare, docere)
1) ea quae iam sunt signa
- these can only be taught by means of other signs
2) ea quae non sunt signa
- these can be taught a) without signs (by showing the thing itself, e.g. paries); b) with signs, including but not limited to verba; c) agendo: by acting out the thing if it is an action: but this only works AFTER the "learner" has asked "what is x action" [NB: quaerere is already epistemologically important]
- The rest of the dialogue will focus on how 1) and 2) are taught and learned (i.e. how they come to be known, and how their knowledge is imparted: epistemology is perhaps the main query)
I: QUOMODO SIGNA SIGNIS DISCUNTUR
This part is about signs which are also things themselves and consequently must be known through signs (significates which are themselves signs).
1. WHAT do we do when we speak? 4.7 (compare 1.1 above). We either
- verbis signamus verba
- verbis signamus alia signa (e.g. gesta, litteras)
verbis signamus aliquid aliud, quod signum non est (e.g. lapis)
2. VERBA defined as SIGNA ad auditum pertinentia (4.8) [NB: the perspective/discipline fr wh verba are of concern here]
- "verbum est quod cum aliquo significatu articulata voce profertur"
3. Difference bw SIGNUM AUDIBILE and SIGNIFICATUM AUDIBILE (4.8-9)
- significatum audibile is a signum rei visibilis (e.g. "Rome" is the name of a real, visible city)
- signum audibile is a signum signi (e.g. "name" where "the name of Rome is a sign of a sign of a visible city)
- all parts of speech are signa audibilia; they are all "nomina;" because they are names of parts of speech which are signs of things (4.9-6.18)
REVIEW of discussion thus far by Adeodatus (7.19-8.21)
II: QUOMODO SIGNIS DISCUNTUR NON SIGNA, SED ALIA SIGNIFICABILIA
This part is about how things which aren't signs are learned through signs. [NB: strong epistemological undertone: to what extent can things which are not themselves signs be known, either through themselves or through signs?]
1. Verba cannot be understood except via their signification
- Sophisms prove this: "homo, quid est" (two syllables, or a rationale mortale animal?); leo ex ore procedit
-- to understand whether "homo" is uttered in a use/mention sense, you must focus on the significance of the words (8.23)
-- Adeodatus's principle: take what is said in terms of what it is signifying
2. Problem to Adeodatus's principle: a primary sense in which we understand words, even when we KNOW what they are signifying (8.24)
- e.g. even if it has been established that "homo" is being mentioned (i.e. its significance is the two syllables ho + mo) we still recoil at the utterance "tu igitur homo non es"
-- Why? Bc of "Lex rationis mentibus nostris indita" [seems to be saying that there is a natural faculty for understanding language in the human mind]
3. Res, cognitio, doctrina > than verba and signa (9.27)
- except when the res is bad/foul (e.g. vitium, caenum): then the verbum/signum > res
- BUT the cognitio rei (even in the case of vitium, caenum) is still > verba/signa
III: QUAE NULLO ADHIBITO SIGNO MONSTRARI POSSINT?
1. There are certain actions which seem able to be taught or shown (docere, monstrare) per se: loqui, ambulare, sedere, iacere huius modi cetera (10.29)
- In reality, only loqui and docere per se illustrantur because for all other actions, you have to use signs to designate the beginning and ending of the action, or to point out the action
- But even loqui and docere are illustrated signis, because to speak or to teach is, by definition, to signify (10.30)
-ERGO: nihil doceri sine signis potest
2. Interlude on method (δ) and the virtue and protection of doubt: is Adeodatus really sure? (10.31)
- "ita incognita pro cognitis habere periculosum est"
3. Complete reversal of III.1, part A (10.32)
- example of auceps and someone who learns what it is to aucupari only by watching him with attention and intelligence
- proof that there are some things which sine signis doceri/monstrari/ostendi possunt
- god/nature also teach many things without signs, rebus ipsis visis
- ERGO: some things sine signis discuntur
4. Complete reversal of III.1, part B (10.33)
- is there anything that can be learnt signis?
- eg 1: "sarabarae": if I don't know the thing which is signified by the verbum, I can't learn the thing from the verbum
-- notitia comes from seeing the rem not hearing the verbum
-- notitia might be obtained from a sign with LIKENESS (eg painting), but not from a verbum
- eg 2: "caput"
-- meaning learnt by seeing the word connected to the res iam notissima
--"Ita magis signum re cognita quam signo dato ipsa res discitur."
- in signo duo
--sonus: percipitur non per signum sed sensum
-- significatio: percipitur non per signum sed re quae significatur aspecta
ERGO: nihil discitur signis
IV. QUOMODO DENIQUE DISCITUR? VERITAS IPSI MENTI INTUS PRAESIDENS
1. To percipere or scire both corporalia and intelligibilia, "consulimus veritatem intus menti praesidentem" (11.38)
- Verba perhaps "monent" ut consulamus veritatem
- Veritas is what truly "docet"
- Veritas = sapientia sempiterna = incommutabilis dei virtus = Christus
2. Knowledge of things through senses (12.39)
- We percipere sensibilia (sensu corporis) because
-- praesto sunt or:
-- CREDIMUS verbis alius alterius
--we have imagines memoriae impressae = documenta rerum antea sensarum
--- When we speak about sensibilia either
---- Auditor verbis nostris credit OR
---- Auditor recognoscit ex suis memoriis de eadem re
3. Knowledge of things through the mind (intelligibilia: 12.40)
- We percipere/scire intelligibilia by means of mens and ratio, which "consulit" veritatem interiorem
- When we speak about these things, we 'contuemur' them praesentia in illa interiore luce veritatis
A-- The hearer who 'cernit' these things which we have seen, and about which we speak, does not learn ex loquentium verbis
---She either already knows and sees in the same way OR
---"interrogata" respondere potest
----Even if she denies that she knows/can respond, she will be able to if asked about parts of the whole truth gradually: here an important function of verba in interrogando (δ)
--- eg 1: homo volans (will likely not be believed, and even if creditur non scitur)
--- eg 2: "sapientes stultis meliores" (this is known to be true already, not from our words)
--- eg 3: Epicurus narrating arguments for the immortality of the soul: even though he himself doesn't know they are true, a listener who does will be able to acknowledge the truth in his words
--- in none of these cases does the "discipula" learn from "verba"
B-- The hearer who can't cernere won't learn from the verba either
--- will either frustra verba audire OR
--- will believe only (credere) but not discere [>scire]
4. Verba also fail to reveal (indicere) animum loquentis (13.42)
A- mentientes ac fallentes verbis utuuntur ut animos occultent suos
B- sometimes people talk about things they don't know (scire)
-- e.g. reciting something absent mindedly
-- e.g. lapsus linguae
C- sometimes even when people speak what they know the verba fail to show what is in the animo
-- e.g. "beluae superant hominibus virtute"
--- I might mean virtus as in strength
--- The listener might take it as virtue as in moral goodness
---This problem would be solved by definitiones ! (but it's hard to find a good definitor; we'll talk about this someother time . . . )
D- Sometimes ambiguity comes from mishearing
5. Sometimes verba DO reveal the animus loquentis (13-14.45)
- Verba can tell us that someone "cogitat de his rebus quas verba significant" (iff: verba cum accepta fuerint audiut eius cui nota sunt)
- Do teachers then teach nothing but their own cogitata/cognita?
--A) magistri verbis rem explicant
--B) discipuli utrum cognita/cogitata magistrorum sint vera apud semetipsos considerant intuentes interiorem ullam veritatem: TUNC ILLI DISCUNT
--C) We are decieved into thinking we learn from teachers because there is not much time between tempus locutionis magistri et tempus cognitionis meae
CONCLUSION
- Alias consideranda tota utilitas verborum
- Main point: no magister in terra; unus in caelo; eum diligere et nosse = beata vita
- Dialogue itself a demonstration of the argument
AR
- are there knowables that are unsignifyable?
- epistemological gradation slippage between: this set: quaerere, docere, commemorare, significare, ostendere, monstrari; and this set: sentire, percipere, considerare, cogitare, scire, cognoscere, intellegere, credere, recognoscere, amare
- why does he spend so much energy refuting the idea that signa could be maioris momenti than significata?
- why is doubt a guard of tranquillity?
- is he advocating mitigated scepticisim (how does this dialogue interact with c. Acad.?
- what does A mean by saying that veritas/sapientia are universal, but are given to each person according to bona/mala voluntas (11.38)?
- is the illumination revelation? inspiration? reason native to human?
- where did A learn the use/mention distinctions he plays with?
- Quid est docere atque discere?
- Utrum, quid, quomodo verbis (sive quibuslibet signis) res discitur/discipulus docetur?
--- Paradoxon: 1) ut quis [magister] rem aliquem [discipulum] doceat signis utitur; 2) nisi discipulus iam noverit rem quam magister signo docet, ipsum non intelliget signum
- Quousque valent signa/verba, praesertim ad a) scientiam/notitiam b) beatam vitam
- Quomodo (quibusque modis) incipere scire possumus?
- Quid efficiunt signa?
OUTLINE
INTRO
- WHY do we speak (loquimur)? 1.1
--Either to teach (docere) or to remind (commemorare). Even speech acts, singing, and thinking by means of words fall under 'commemorare'.
- verba defined as signa 1.3
-- this definition is tested with line from Virgil: 'si nihil ex tanta superis placet urbe relinqui'
--it's found that there are some verba which must be explained verbis (idest signa signis)
-- this suggests two genera of things that need to be taught/shown (ostendere, monstrare, docere)
1) ea quae iam sunt signa
- these can only be taught by means of other signs
2) ea quae non sunt signa
- these can be taught a) without signs (by showing the thing itself, e.g. paries); b) with signs, including but not limited to verba; c) agendo: by acting out the thing if it is an action: but this only works AFTER the "learner" has asked "what is x action" [NB: quaerere is already epistemologically important]
- The rest of the dialogue will focus on how 1) and 2) are taught and learned (i.e. how they come to be known, and how their knowledge is imparted: epistemology is perhaps the main query)
I: QUOMODO SIGNA SIGNIS DISCUNTUR
This part is about signs which are also things themselves and consequently must be known through signs (significates which are themselves signs).
1. WHAT do we do when we speak? 4.7 (compare 1.1 above). We either
- verbis signamus verba
- verbis signamus alia signa (e.g. gesta, litteras)
verbis signamus aliquid aliud, quod signum non est (e.g. lapis)
2. VERBA defined as SIGNA ad auditum pertinentia (4.8) [NB: the perspective/discipline fr wh verba are of concern here]
- "verbum est quod cum aliquo significatu articulata voce profertur"
3. Difference bw SIGNUM AUDIBILE and SIGNIFICATUM AUDIBILE (4.8-9)
- significatum audibile is a signum rei visibilis (e.g. "Rome" is the name of a real, visible city)
- signum audibile is a signum signi (e.g. "name" where "the name of Rome is a sign of a sign of a visible city)
- all parts of speech are signa audibilia; they are all "nomina;" because they are names of parts of speech which are signs of things (4.9-6.18)
REVIEW of discussion thus far by Adeodatus (7.19-8.21)
II: QUOMODO SIGNIS DISCUNTUR NON SIGNA, SED ALIA SIGNIFICABILIA
This part is about how things which aren't signs are learned through signs. [NB: strong epistemological undertone: to what extent can things which are not themselves signs be known, either through themselves or through signs?]
1. Verba cannot be understood except via their signification
- Sophisms prove this: "homo, quid est" (two syllables, or a rationale mortale animal?); leo ex ore procedit
-- to understand whether "homo" is uttered in a use/mention sense, you must focus on the significance of the words (8.23)
-- Adeodatus's principle: take what is said in terms of what it is signifying
2. Problem to Adeodatus's principle: a primary sense in which we understand words, even when we KNOW what they are signifying (8.24)
- e.g. even if it has been established that "homo" is being mentioned (i.e. its significance is the two syllables ho + mo) we still recoil at the utterance "tu igitur homo non es"
-- Why? Bc of "Lex rationis mentibus nostris indita" [seems to be saying that there is a natural faculty for understanding language in the human mind]
3. Res, cognitio, doctrina > than verba and signa (9.27)
- except when the res is bad/foul (e.g. vitium, caenum): then the verbum/signum > res
- BUT the cognitio rei (even in the case of vitium, caenum) is still > verba/signa
III: QUAE NULLO ADHIBITO SIGNO MONSTRARI POSSINT?
1. There are certain actions which seem able to be taught or shown (docere, monstrare) per se: loqui, ambulare, sedere, iacere huius modi cetera (10.29)
- In reality, only loqui and docere per se illustrantur because for all other actions, you have to use signs to designate the beginning and ending of the action, or to point out the action
- But even loqui and docere are illustrated signis, because to speak or to teach is, by definition, to signify (10.30)
-ERGO: nihil doceri sine signis potest
2. Interlude on method (δ) and the virtue and protection of doubt: is Adeodatus really sure? (10.31)
- "ita incognita pro cognitis habere periculosum est"
3. Complete reversal of III.1, part A (10.32)
- example of auceps and someone who learns what it is to aucupari only by watching him with attention and intelligence
- proof that there are some things which sine signis doceri/monstrari/ostendi possunt
- god/nature also teach many things without signs, rebus ipsis visis
- ERGO: some things sine signis discuntur
4. Complete reversal of III.1, part B (10.33)
- is there anything that can be learnt signis?
- eg 1: "sarabarae": if I don't know the thing which is signified by the verbum, I can't learn the thing from the verbum
-- notitia comes from seeing the rem not hearing the verbum
-- notitia might be obtained from a sign with LIKENESS (eg painting), but not from a verbum
- eg 2: "caput"
-- meaning learnt by seeing the word connected to the res iam notissima
--"Ita magis signum re cognita quam signo dato ipsa res discitur."
- in signo duo
--sonus: percipitur non per signum sed sensum
-- significatio: percipitur non per signum sed re quae significatur aspecta
ERGO: nihil discitur signis
IV. QUOMODO DENIQUE DISCITUR? VERITAS IPSI MENTI INTUS PRAESIDENS
1. To percipere or scire both corporalia and intelligibilia, "consulimus veritatem intus menti praesidentem" (11.38)
- Verba perhaps "monent" ut consulamus veritatem
- Veritas is what truly "docet"
- Veritas = sapientia sempiterna = incommutabilis dei virtus = Christus
2. Knowledge of things through senses (12.39)
- We percipere sensibilia (sensu corporis) because
-- praesto sunt or:
-- CREDIMUS verbis alius alterius
--we have imagines memoriae impressae = documenta rerum antea sensarum
--- When we speak about sensibilia either
---- Auditor verbis nostris credit OR
---- Auditor recognoscit ex suis memoriis de eadem re
3. Knowledge of things through the mind (intelligibilia: 12.40)
- We percipere/scire intelligibilia by means of mens and ratio, which "consulit" veritatem interiorem
- When we speak about these things, we 'contuemur' them praesentia in illa interiore luce veritatis
A-- The hearer who 'cernit' these things which we have seen, and about which we speak, does not learn ex loquentium verbis
---She either already knows and sees in the same way OR
---"interrogata" respondere potest
----Even if she denies that she knows/can respond, she will be able to if asked about parts of the whole truth gradually: here an important function of verba in interrogando (δ)
--- eg 1: homo volans (will likely not be believed, and even if creditur non scitur)
--- eg 2: "sapientes stultis meliores" (this is known to be true already, not from our words)
--- eg 3: Epicurus narrating arguments for the immortality of the soul: even though he himself doesn't know they are true, a listener who does will be able to acknowledge the truth in his words
--- in none of these cases does the "discipula" learn from "verba"
B-- The hearer who can't cernere won't learn from the verba either
--- will either frustra verba audire OR
--- will believe only (credere) but not discere [>scire]
4. Verba also fail to reveal (indicere) animum loquentis (13.42)
A- mentientes ac fallentes verbis utuuntur ut animos occultent suos
B- sometimes people talk about things they don't know (scire)
-- e.g. reciting something absent mindedly
-- e.g. lapsus linguae
C- sometimes even when people speak what they know the verba fail to show what is in the animo
-- e.g. "beluae superant hominibus virtute"
--- I might mean virtus as in strength
--- The listener might take it as virtue as in moral goodness
---This problem would be solved by definitiones ! (but it's hard to find a good definitor; we'll talk about this someother time . . . )
D- Sometimes ambiguity comes from mishearing
5. Sometimes verba DO reveal the animus loquentis (13-14.45)
- Verba can tell us that someone "cogitat de his rebus quas verba significant" (iff: verba cum accepta fuerint audiut eius cui nota sunt)
- Do teachers then teach nothing but their own cogitata/cognita?
--A) magistri verbis rem explicant
--B) discipuli utrum cognita/cogitata magistrorum sint vera apud semetipsos considerant intuentes interiorem ullam veritatem: TUNC ILLI DISCUNT
--C) We are decieved into thinking we learn from teachers because there is not much time between tempus locutionis magistri et tempus cognitionis meae
CONCLUSION
- Alias consideranda tota utilitas verborum
- Main point: no magister in terra; unus in caelo; eum diligere et nosse = beata vita
- Dialogue itself a demonstration of the argument
AR
- are there knowables that are unsignifyable?
- epistemological gradation slippage between: this set: quaerere, docere, commemorare, significare, ostendere, monstrari; and this set: sentire, percipere, considerare, cogitare, scire, cognoscere, intellegere, credere, recognoscere, amare
- why does he spend so much energy refuting the idea that signa could be maioris momenti than significata?
- why is doubt a guard of tranquillity?
- is he advocating mitigated scepticisim (how does this dialogue interact with c. Acad.?
- what does A mean by saying that veritas/sapientia are universal, but are given to each person according to bona/mala voluntas (11.38)?
- is the illumination revelation? inspiration? reason native to human?
- where did A learn the use/mention distinctions he plays with?
March 13, 2017
A great early interaction between Augustine and his 16 year old son Adeodatus.
September 10, 2022
Probably the thing that’s got me closest to making me a Christian/Neoplatonist
Read
August 28, 2023achei que ia ser um pouco mais legal, mas gostei! quando eu tiver aula do livro volto aqui pra falar melhor :)
January 3, 2012
De magistro a fost compusa intre anii 388-389, dupa convertirea lui Augustin la crestinism, si are forma unui dialog cu fiul sau Adeodat, pe atunci in virsta de 16 ani (si care a murit la 17 ani, dupa ce facuse dovada unei remarcabile precocitati). Lucrarea incheie seria dialogurilor filosofice "Contra Academicos libri tres", "De vita beata", "De quantitate animae", "De libero arbitrio".
Structurata in cincisprezece capitole si doua parti (prima un dialog si a doua o expunere continua), opera are ca tema descoperirea invatatorului si rolul limbii in procesul de cunoastere, argumentind teza ca verba non docent (vorbele nu te invata). Intr-adevar, dupa ce se discuta despre virtutea si rostul cuvintelor, se arata ca nu prin ele capata omul cunoasterea, ci prin adevarul cel vesnic, luminind dinauntru.
Omul arata intelesul cuvintelor numai prin cuvinte, in timp ce Cristos este invatatorul launtric. Caci: "De-atita doar s-au dovedit in stare cuvintele - spre a le da ceva mai multa insemnatate - sa ne atraga atentia pentru a cerceta lucrurile, iar nu sa ni le dea la iveala pentru ca sa le cunoastem." (p. 109)
Structurata in cincisprezece capitole si doua parti (prima un dialog si a doua o expunere continua), opera are ca tema descoperirea invatatorului si rolul limbii in procesul de cunoastere, argumentind teza ca verba non docent (vorbele nu te invata). Intr-adevar, dupa ce se discuta despre virtutea si rostul cuvintelor, se arata ca nu prin ele capata omul cunoasterea, ci prin adevarul cel vesnic, luminind dinauntru.
Omul arata intelesul cuvintelor numai prin cuvinte, in timp ce Cristos este invatatorul launtric. Caci: "De-atita doar s-au dovedit in stare cuvintele - spre a le da ceva mai multa insemnatate - sa ne atraga atentia pentru a cerceta lucrurile, iar nu sa ni le dea la iveala pentru ca sa le cunoastem." (p. 109)
June 21, 2015
El trabajo de traducción, introducción y comentario de Eduardo Sinnott es, sin duda, de una calidad superlativa.
Es indispensable al aborar este tipo de obras clásicas encontrar un tabajo de calidad para poder aprender lo que el original señalara para ser aprendido.
Sin dudas lo recomiendo.
Es indispensable al aborar este tipo de obras clásicas encontrar un tabajo de calidad para poder aprender lo que el original señalara para ser aprendido.
Sin dudas lo recomiendo.
Read
March 27, 2024The Teacher is a short philosophical dialogue of St Augustine from soon after his conversion, based off a real conversation with his teenage son, Adeodatus, who would die within a few years of this dialogue.
Vernon Bourke describes the topic of the discussion (Augustine's Quest for Wisdom p128-9): "Does a student really learn anything from his teacher? This is the question faced by Augustine as his son. It is a difficult one. Signs are the instruments used by every human teacher. Words are the usual type of teaching sign, though others, such as gestures and things, may be used. Do verbal signs convey truth to the mind of the student, truth which he did not know before?" As can be seen, in discussing the question of learning Augustine develops his theory of semiotics, which he will later also broach in the better known 'Teaching Christianity'. This is challenging thought.
However, Augustine's conclusion will be that signs ultimately do not teach us but only prompt us to learn. There is only one true Teacher and that is Jesus Christ, who illuminates the mind: "Regarding each of the things we understand, however, we don't consult a speaker who makes sounds outside us, but the Truth that presides within over the mind itself, though perhaps words prompt us to consult Him. What is more, He Who is consulted He Who is said to dwell in the inner man (Eph 3:16-17) does teach: Christ– that is, the unchangeable power and everlasting wisdom of God, which every rational soul does consult". As such, this short dialogue is an important text in developing Augustine's theory of knowledge through Divine Illumination.
Vernon Bourke describes the topic of the discussion (Augustine's Quest for Wisdom p128-9): "Does a student really learn anything from his teacher? This is the question faced by Augustine as his son. It is a difficult one. Signs are the instruments used by every human teacher. Words are the usual type of teaching sign, though others, such as gestures and things, may be used. Do verbal signs convey truth to the mind of the student, truth which he did not know before?" As can be seen, in discussing the question of learning Augustine develops his theory of semiotics, which he will later also broach in the better known 'Teaching Christianity'. This is challenging thought.
However, Augustine's conclusion will be that signs ultimately do not teach us but only prompt us to learn. There is only one true Teacher and that is Jesus Christ, who illuminates the mind: "Regarding each of the things we understand, however, we don't consult a speaker who makes sounds outside us, but the Truth that presides within over the mind itself, though perhaps words prompt us to consult Him. What is more, He Who is consulted He Who is said to dwell in the inner man (Eph 3:16-17) does teach: Christ– that is, the unchangeable power and everlasting wisdom of God, which every rational soul does consult". As such, this short dialogue is an important text in developing Augustine's theory of knowledge through Divine Illumination.
September 8, 2022
«Si se nos pregunta sobre lo sensible, respondemos lo que sentimos si lo tenemos presente; como si se nos pregunta, al estar mirando la luna nueva, cómo es y dónde está. El que pregunta, si no la ve, cree a las palabras, y con frecuencia no cree; más de ningún modo aprende si no es viendo lo que se dice; en lo cual aprende no por las palabras que sonaron, sino por las cosas y los sentidos. Pues las mismas palabras que sonaron para el que no veía suenan para el que ve.
Mas cuando se nos pregunta, no de lo que sentimos presente, sino de aquello que alguna vez hemos sentido, expresamos no ya las cosas mismas, sino las imágenes impresas por ellas y grabadas en la memoria; en verdad no sé cómo a esto lo llamamos verdadero, puesto que vemos ser falso; a no ser porque narramos que lo hemos visto y sentido, no ya que lo vemos y sentimos. Así llevamos esas imágenes en lo interior de la memoria como testimonio de las cosas sentidas, y contemplando con recta intención esas imágenes con nuestra mente, no mentimos cuando hablamos; antes bien, nos sirven de testimonio. El que escucha, si las sintió y presenció, mis palabras no le enseñan nada, sino que él reconoce la verdad por las imágenes que lleva consigo mismo; pero si no las ha sentido, ¿quién no verá que él, más que aprender, da fe a las palabras?».
DEL MAESTRO de Agustín de Hipona
Mas cuando se nos pregunta, no de lo que sentimos presente, sino de aquello que alguna vez hemos sentido, expresamos no ya las cosas mismas, sino las imágenes impresas por ellas y grabadas en la memoria; en verdad no sé cómo a esto lo llamamos verdadero, puesto que vemos ser falso; a no ser porque narramos que lo hemos visto y sentido, no ya que lo vemos y sentimos. Así llevamos esas imágenes en lo interior de la memoria como testimonio de las cosas sentidas, y contemplando con recta intención esas imágenes con nuestra mente, no mentimos cuando hablamos; antes bien, nos sirven de testimonio. El que escucha, si las sintió y presenció, mis palabras no le enseñan nada, sino que él reconoce la verdad por las imágenes que lleva consigo mismo; pero si no las ha sentido, ¿quién no verá que él, más que aprender, da fe a las palabras?».
DEL MAESTRO de Agustín de Hipona
May 11, 2020
De Magistro traz o diálogo entre Agostinho e Adeodato, seu filho, sobre o magistério. Agostinho parte do pressuposto que ensinar é recordar do conhecimento inato dado por Deus. As palavras são os signos utilizados para representar ou significar o objeto. Mas há coisas que podem ser representadas pelo ato, não necessariamente por signos. Ex: andar, beber, comer. Os signos, por sua vez, servem para significar algo, inclusive a si mesmos. Na busca da verdade, porém, é preciso que a razão aceite uma autoridade que lhe é externa para alcançar o significado. Ora, nós cremos antes de compreender, de forma que conhecemos e cremos nas coisas em si antes de conhecer seus signos, a forma que lhes representa.
Para a devida apreensão da verdade das coisas é preciso que uma autoridade externa à razão a legitime em seu significado. O papel da palavra é apontar para a coisa significada por meio do signo, contudo nós aprendemos o significado da coisa ao conhecê-la em si mesma. Como conhecemos as coisas em si? Por meio da experiência e da razão que nos lembram do conhecimento que já dispomos internamente, dado e ratificado por Deus que é a autoridade externa legitimadora da verdade. Então, o que é aprender: é ser exposto à informação e descobrir interiormente que ela é verdadeira.
Para a devida apreensão da verdade das coisas é preciso que uma autoridade externa à razão a legitime em seu significado. O papel da palavra é apontar para a coisa significada por meio do signo, contudo nós aprendemos o significado da coisa ao conhecê-la em si mesma. Como conhecemos as coisas em si? Por meio da experiência e da razão que nos lembram do conhecimento que já dispomos internamente, dado e ratificado por Deus que é a autoridade externa legitimadora da verdade. Então, o que é aprender: é ser exposto à informação e descobrir interiormente que ela é verdadeira.
September 14, 2018
Un libro fantastico. Oltre all'introduzione accuratamente scritta, il testo è stato per me una grossa fonte di ispirazione. Ammiro come Agostino accompagni con questo suo discorso e metodo di scrittura, il lettore in tutto il suo susseguirsi di pensieri per arrivare alla esposizione della sua tesi. I capitoli più ricchi e interessanti sono stati decisamente gli ultimi. Una conclusione magistrale con pensieri sul maestro Interiore; la guida che si esprime mediante il nostro intuito per portare alla luce ciò che realmente possiamo dire di Sapere.
Ma come poter, tramite parole, rendere cosa significhi il messaggio contenuto in questa meravigliosa Opera? Come dice Agostino, le parole o segni presuppongono la conoscenza delle cose.
Ma come poter, tramite parole, rendere cosa significhi il messaggio contenuto in questa meravigliosa Opera? Come dice Agostino, le parole o segni presuppongono la conoscenza delle cose.
January 28, 2019
Une discussion entre Augustin et son fils sur le langage, le rôle des mots comme signes de ce qu’ils désignent et des limites de ceux ci. Des remarques profondes sur ce que veut dire enseigner.
Augustin voit Christ comme le maître intérieur qui nous enseigne, témoignant par la raison en nous de la véracité ou fausseté d’une affirmation quand on l’entend. Ce n’est donc pas l’affirmation qui enseigne mais ce maître. Le mot « tête » ne nous apprend pas ce qu’il désigne à moins qu’on l’associe à ce qui est désigné, c’est à dire en montrant une tête. La connaissance de la chose doit précéder celle du signe pour que le mot devienne signe.
Augustin voit Christ comme le maître intérieur qui nous enseigne, témoignant par la raison en nous de la véracité ou fausseté d’une affirmation quand on l’entend. Ce n’est donc pas l’affirmation qui enseigne mais ce maître. Le mot « tête » ne nous apprend pas ce qu’il désigne à moins qu’on l’associe à ce qui est désigné, c’est à dire en montrant une tête. La connaissance de la chose doit précéder celle du signe pour que le mot devienne signe.
June 17, 2019
Magnífico! O conteúdo, apesar de estar ligado a teoria da iluminação, é um exercício mental fabuloso. Adeodato, provavelmente com seus 15 ou 16 anos, mantém um nível altíssimo de conversação com o seu pai. Em certa parte do livro, Santo Agostinho diz ao filho que, além de introduzir o ponto chave onde queria chegar, toda a conversa inicial servia como um exercício de agudeza mental. E ele tinha razão.
Ora pro nobis, Santo Agostinho!
Ora pro nobis, Santo Agostinho!
December 11, 2019
Very hairy, sure helps to know a lot about grammar, very inspiring (Especially, it seems, to most philosophers of language, who have stolen a great deal from this text).
September 29, 2025
In a word, language has never been the problem, has it?
July 2, 2021
Agostino d'Ippona è uno dei personaggi che più hanno segnato la storia della filosofia, oltre che della religione: ha scritto numerose opere tra le quali questo piccolo testo che si occupa di pedagogia. Il "De magistro" è un dialogo tra Agostino e suo figlio Adeodato. Partendo dal concetto dell'insegnamento, Agostino ci porta a riflettere sulle idee, sulle parole che utilizziamo per rappresentarle e sul significato (e il valore) dell'insegnamento. La riflessione è su base filosofica per cui richiede una certa attenzione per superare l'apparente difficoltà nella lettura. Una volta superato l'ostacolo, però, si apre una riflessione che è di una sconvolgente attualità, che ci mostra come l'educazione e il linguaggio, spesso troppo sottovalutati, persino bistrattati, debbano riacquistare la centralità del discorso educativo. Agostino, nella sua prospettiva di fede, ci dice che tutto può essere riassunto in Gesù; ciò non toglie che anche nella società laica il valore del linguaggio e dell'insegnamento siano da riscoprire. Un classico!
December 8, 2021
Une leçon touchante avec un pédagogue mais qui fait un peut tourner la tête en rond, l'aspect de dialogue avec son fils rend le livre touchant, un peu intime.
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