Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary at War, 1914-1918

by Alexander Watson

For the empires of Germany and Austria-Hungary the Great War - which had begun with such high hopes for a fast, dramatic outcome - rapidly degenerated as invasions of both France and Serbia ended in catastrophe. For four years the fighting now turned into a siege on a quite monstrous scale. Europe became the focus of fighting of a kind previously unimagined. Despite local successes - and an apparent triumph in Russia - Germany and Austria-Hungary were never able to break out of the the Allies' ring of steel.

In Alexander Watson's compelling new history of the Great War, all the major events of the war are seen from the perspective of Berlin and Vienna. It is fundamentally a history of ordinary people. In 1914 both empires were flooded by genuine mass enthusiasm and their troubled elites were at one with most of the population. But the course of the war put this under impossible strain, with a fatal rupture between an ever more extreme and unrealistic leadership and an exhausted and embittered people. In the end they failed and were overwhelmed by defeat and revolution.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, World War I, Germany, War, European History, Military History

788 pages, Paperback

First published August 1, 2014

About the author

Alexander Watson is Professor of History at Goldsmiths, University of London.

I'm a historian interested in the conflicts and catastrophes in Europe during the 20th century. I've written three books, all on the century's 'seminal catastrophe' - the First World War. My books have all won major prizes, have been widely reviewed and are unusual in focussing on the side for far too long simplistically perceived as the war's 'baddies' - the Germans and Austro-Hungarians.

My book 'Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary at War, 1914-1918' (Penguin and Basic Books, 2014) is an epic narrative of the First World War written - for the first time - from the perspectives of the Central Powers and their peoples. The Wall Street Journal called it 'truly indispensable ... a history as much of the emotions that hardship and war produced as of politics or diplomacy'. The Sunday Times named it 'The History of Book of the Year' for 2014. 'Ring of Steel' won the Wolfson History Prize, the Guggenheim-Lehrman Prize in Military History, the US Society for Military History's 'Distinguished Book Award' and the British Army's 'Military Book of the Year Award'.

'The Fortress: The Siege of Przemyśl and the Making of Europe's Bloodlands' (Allen Lane, 2019 and Basic Books, 2020) is my most recent book.
It tells the moving story of the First World War's longest siege - a dramatic campaign that opened the horrors which would ravage twentieth-century East-Central Europe. 'The Fortress' won the US Society for Military History's 'Distinguished Book Award' and was a finalist for the Gilder Lehrman Prize in Military History and the British Army Military Book of the Year Award. It was a BBC History Magazine 2019 and Financial Times 2020 'Book of the Year'. The Times praised the book as 'a masterpiece ... It deserves to become a classic of military history.'

My first book, 'Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914-1918' (Cambridge University Press, 2008) explored how armies and soldiers on both psychologically endured and kept on fighting through four years of horror on the Western Front. The book won the Institute of Contemporary History and Wiener Library's Fraenkel Prize.

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 5 out of 5]

If you’ve run across any of my other reviews of World War I-related books, you will know that I have spent approximately the last three-and-a-half years trying to learn everything I can about the Great War. I can pinpoint the date because this was a conscious decision I made when I learned that my wife with pregnant with our first kid. I thought to myself, “Self, you’re about to lose a bunch of your free time. You better choose one thing – besides wine – as a hobby, and go with it.” I chose WWI for a couple reasons. One, the centenary was coming up (now, of course, we’re in the midst of it); and two, I didn't know anything about it. (Also, I had been told that World War I pairs well with Yellow Tail chardonnay).

Things I knew about WWI three-and-a-half years ago: (1) It started because one guy shot another guy in Sarajevo; (2) Snoopy shot down the Red Baron, thereby assuring Allied supremacy of the blue yonder; and (3) The Americans won it, because AMERICA! (You’re welcome as always, Europe).

It’s taken awhile, and a lot of books, a lot of wine, a lot of money spent on books and wine, and a lot of time reading those books and drinking that wine, but I’ve just started to grasp how that Sarajevo assassination precipitated a world crisis, and a bit about how that crisis played out.

As we all know, a little bit of knowledge – and that’s what I have, a little bit of knowledge – is a dangerous thing. It has me putting on airs. I now have strong opinions on things that I never knew existed only a short while ago. It has given me a bit of a contrarian streak. And in that spirit, I purchased Alexander Watson’s Ring of Steel.

This small-child-of-a book (566 pages of text, another hundred plus pages of notes - this book is nothing if not well-cited) not only tells the story of the First World War from the perspective of Germany and Austria-Hungary, but it dares to take an apologist’s stand. At every point where Germany and Austria-Hungary are to blame, Watson offers up a defense. (Well, at just about every point. There is no one on earth who can logically defend Austria-Hungary’s bungled diplomacy following Franz Ferdinand’s assassination. It was just so bad. This is one of the strong – and obvious! – opinions I have formed).

Ring of Steel starts where every WWI book is legally obligated to begin, with the July Crisis. Austria-Hungary attempted to use the death of its unloved heir as a pretext for going to war with Serbia, which had been fomenting a dangerous pan-Serbian nationalism that threatened the integrity of the Habsburg Empire. But instead of just going to war, Austria-Hungary tripped over its untied shoelaces and fell flat on its face. Germany, needing to prop up its main ally, gave Austria the infamous “blank check,” a historical moment that feels more like one frat boy accepting a dare from another frat boy than it resembles dead-serious international diplomacy. In any event, Austria-Hungary proceeded with extreme, self-defeating slowness, assured of Germany’s support, while Germany’s bellicose, bipolar Kaiser tried to shove all the toothpaste back into the tube. The end result – obviously! – was Germany invading France via Belgium.

After the July Crisis, Ring of Steel moves onto the war itself. But it does this in a unique way. It does not present a chronology of battles, battlefields, and overmatched generals. It is not interested in the positioning of Army A vis-à-vis Army B. Instead, Ring of Steel tackles the war using a topical, thematic approach. The chapters present a series of discussions, rather than a series of sequential events.

The chapter on the opening stages of the war, for instance, does not present the usual narrative. It does not move methodically from the siege of Liege to the Battles of the Frontier to the climactic conflict on the Marne. Instead, it devotes a great deal of time to examining claims of German atrocities. Contemporary Allied propaganda depicted the Germans as Huns bent on rape, murder, and the bayoneting of infants. Directly after the war, many of these claims were debunked, and thus, German brutality came to be seen as mostly myth. Recently, there has been a pushback against this position, with certain historians – I’m thinking of Max Hastings, here – treating the Imperial German Army as proto-Nazis engaged in a dry run of World War II war crimes. Watson pushes back against the pushback, in a (somewhat, but not entirely) successful effort to re-contextualize alleged atrocities.

Similarly, in the chapter on the war on the Eastern Front, Watson steers clear of recapitulating the mistakes and movements that led to the crushing defeat of the Russians at the Battle of Tannenberg. Instead, Watson focuses on the invasion of Prussia by Russian troops. I thought this was a neat inversion of the typical WWI narrative, which focuses on the victimization of Russian and French civilians. Here, you see things from the point of view of a German civilian, just as innocent and shabbily treated as their Allied counterparts. (Later sections of the book detail the plight of German civilians as a result of the Allied blockade – a blockade that considered food to be “contraband”).

One of the most interesting chapters takes on the notion of German plans for Europe following victory against the Allies. As Watson writes, Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg’s war aims program:

[S]tated boldly that ‘the general aim of the war’ was ‘security…for all imaginable time.’ This disarmingly simple aim was to be the basis of German policy throughout hostilities. While it was defensive in conception, the intention to achieve everlasting security was extraordinarily ambitious. When combined with a world view that regarded security as a zero-sum game to be won through domination not cooperation, it soon slid into aggression. To secure Germany ‘for all imaginable time’ could not, even in Bethmann’s mind and certainly not for the more hawkish elites around him, mean merely a return to the unstable status quo of the last peacetime years. Instead it required permanent control of invasion routes and the subjection of dangerous neighbors: ‘France must be so weakened as to make her revival as a great power impossible for all time. Russia must be thrust as far as possible from Germany’s eastern frontier and her domination over the non-Russian vassal peoples broken.’

Watson notes, rightly, that German war aims were not the cause of the war. That is, Germany did not go to war in 1914 to secure these goals. Rather, they developed quickly as the war progressed. It is also worth noting that while Germany’s goals seem, on paper, to be the working paper of a DC Comics supervillain, they are exactly what the Allies did to Germany, once they won the war. What the Germans planned, the Allies did, with only an arguable difference in magnitude. (Redrawing of national frontiers? Check. Creation of demilitarized buffer zones? Check. People forced from their homes, or forced to get a new passport? Check. Reduction to a non-great power? Checkmate).

In all my reviews of WWI books, I make reference to the fact that I’m on a literary journey. It’s my way of leaving bread crumbs for those who are also interested in this mammoth subject, and want some ideas about where to start, or where to go next. To that end, I should note that this is second or third level reading. It operates under the assumption that you have some structural framework in your mind that outlines the broad parameters of the war. Watson does not take any time to catch you up to speed. He writes as though you already know the general history of WWI, and proceeds to give you the German/Austria-Hungarian version of it.

This is a dense book. Watson imparts of a lot of information. Fortunately, Watson is a decent writer. For the most part, he clearly expresses his thoughts and ideas, and he never bogs down in subjects that are objectively uninteresting (I’m thinking of the chapter in Hew Strachan’s book To Arms that is devoted to financing the war, and spends more time on bond yields than I’m comfortable with). He's a PhD, but I never felt like he was trying to keep me at arm's length as a reader. Every once in awhile, Watson will write one of those quintessentially British sentences that go on for a paragraph, are dreadfully passive, and are studded with clauses. But for the most part, I have no strong comments about the style, which means that it imparted information without either frustrating me, or causing my heart so soar at the poetry of its prose. I think the highest accolade I can give is that a book with such complex arguments and nuance was such a breeze to get through.

A book like this – with such a clear point of view – can’t help but go too far. Does Watson oversell the Germans and Austro-Hungarians? Sure. This would be a problem if it was the only book on World War I that existed. It’s not, though, and so it is an excellent way to balance the scales. The Triple Alliance was not comprised solely of saints, martyrs, and lovers of small animals. But neither was it the second coming of a barbarian horde. It was a collection of people – and Watson gives them their due as people.

[Anthony · Rating 5 out of 5]

Trapped

Ring of Steel by Alexander Watson is an excellent look into all aspects of The German Empire and Austria-Hungary during the First World War. From politics, objectives, tactics to actions and personalities a full account of why the war started, how was thought and why the Central Powers lost is laid bare.

Watson is English, but the narration is not biased, it’s fair in my opinion. Of course on one of history’s most important events there are differing opinions and others may not agree on this. My one complaint however, is that it is probably too short. For such a colossal subject Ring of Steel is only 566 pages of text.

I was though, impressed with the topics and themes Watson covers. From how the war actually started; with the Habsburg Monarchy issuing its 14 point demands to the Kingdom of Serbia in order to provoke war; to how it ended with the entire focus on German aggression and the need to hold self determination in Central and Eastern Europe. There much myth busting afoot. There is also great analysis. For example, why did General Erich von Falkenhayen plan to ‘bleed the French white’ at Verdun, how it nearly worked, but why it failed. The greatest catastrophe for the German’s in unrestricted submarine warfare and how Austria-Hungry became a sidekick to Germany.

Explanation of the controversial and near on illegal British blockade which formed part of the ‘Ring of Steel’ is explained and is interesting. As today history and attention falls on Germany and Kaiser Wilhelm II. Such is life, history is told by those who win. However, we are coming away from the this one sided approach. Germans did violate international law, invading Belgium and devastating occupied areas of resources and men, such as at Ober-Ost. But this was no more or less than other actions, other states took at the time.

Ultimately the Central Powers lost through exhaustion. Being cut off from the outside world and making disastrous decisions, such as the Zimmerman Telegram, the sinking of the Lusitania or the last grasp attempts of the naval command to death charge against the Royal Navy which triggered the revolution. The encirclement ultimately starved the civilian population and limited essential military supplies to the front. In some ways it’s amazing they held out for so long! What amazes me more is Germany, a strong, confident and new county gave up everything for the dying Habsburg Monarchy. It is clear that no one expected a long and devastating war like no other.

The war is absolutely the tipping point in world history, todays world is a direct result of the war. WWI and WWII are essentially part of one long 30 year conflict. Creating a weakened, fractured and lost modern Europe. Wilson’s 14 points were completely misguided and wrong, from a president who did not understand the Central Powers. Is he as much to blame for WWII as the politicians who took the world to war in 1914? Maybe, maybe not.

Ring of Steel is essential reading in the history of Europe and the Great War. I was completely hooked and could not put it down until it was finished. As I have said above, it should be longer. More focus could be given to the battles, conditions on the front line and what when on in the palaces, at general HQ or in the homes of ordinary citizens. However, this is not make or break for this excellent work.

[Cold War Conversations Podcast · Rating 4 out of 5]

I thought this would be a slog at 800+ pages, but found it a surprisingly readable and a thought provoking book.

Ring of Steel tells the story of World War 1 from the "other side of the hill" and claims to be the first modern history from this viewpoint.

Being a World War 2 devotee this book really opened my eyes to the German/Austro Hungarian viewpoint and decision making in World War 1. It really is a fascinating read telling the story of how Germany and Austria-Hungary initially mobilised the support of their populations to but as military losses mounted, and Allied blockades caused hunger and hardship on the homefront, doubts set in.

Whilst politics are key to understanding the German/Austro-Hungarian position social and economic effects of the war are covered extensively too.

Some nuggets from the book that I hadn't necessarily realised:

Russia mobilised before Germany, sparking German fears of invasion from the East that unified support across all political divides of the German and most of the Austro-Hungarian populace.

The general belief in Germany and Austro-Hungary that the war was purely a defensive reaction contrary to the Allies view of Germany/Austro-Hungary as the aggressor.

How complex the Austro Hungarian Empire was with its collection of separate nationalities and eleven spoken languages creating no ethnic, language, or national unity as in Germany.
There’s many more, but I’d recommend buying the book for those.

Whilst a lot of books are currently being produced from the Allies point of view Alexander Watson has filled a vacant space in our knowledge of the German and Austro-Hungarian viewpoint. Highly recommended.

[Kuszma · Rating 5 out of 5]

Elégtétel, amikor az ember brutális leárazáson vesz valamit, és az öt csillagnak bizonyul. Persze, valahol szomorú, hogy efféle könyvek raktáron maradnak, mert nem kapkodja el őket a nép, és végül egy „Akció!” matricával a hasukon találják magukat valami könyvesbolti piramison (ami a szociális otthon megfelelője könyvéknél), de hát most mit csináljunk, ilyen az élet, és ha így alakult, ne hagyjuk ki az alkalmat. Watson vaskos monográfiája az első világháborút tárgyalja, de nem általános megközelítésben, hanem a központi hatalmak két kulcsállamára, Németországra és az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchiára fókuszálva*. Újszerűségét az adja, hogy e két birodalom fő problémáját állítja középpontba: a bezártságot. Ők ketten ugyanis Közép-Európát birtokolták, ami ugye szép régió, de vállban szűk kicsit, keletről az oroszok bökdösnek a könyökükkel, nyugatról a franciák, a tengeren lépten-nyomon az ángliusok lépnek a lábujjunkra, hogy az olyan kavicsokról a cipőnkben már ne is beszéljünk, mint az apró szerb állam vagy Románia. Ez egyfajta klausztrofób érzést okozott az érintett társadalmakban, hogy a politikai elitről már ne is beszéljünk, ráadásul egy elhúzódó világháború esetén várható nehézségek kiindulópontja. Nyersanyag- és élelmiszerhiányt ígér, ami abból fakad, hogy mi sem könnyebb, mint elzárni ezen országokat a világkereskedelemtől, mert mezőgazdaságuk és iparuk teljesítőképessége ugyan imponáló, ám azért nem végtelen. Ez, az éhínség és a gazdasági összeomlás veszedelme a hurok, ami végig ott volt a németek és az osztrákok nyakán, bár több-kevesebb sikerrel próbálták kihúzni a fejüket belőle.

(Közbevetőleg jegyzem meg, mert később nehéz lenne beilleszteni: a kötet egyik legnagyobb erénye, hogy láthatóvá teszi a lényegi különbségeket, amelyek a Habsburgok és Vilmos Németországa között feszültek. Itt nem csak arról van szó, hogy utóbbiak sokkal potensebb iparral és hadsereggel rendelkeztek, és hadvezetésük is klasszisokkal tehetségesebbnek bizonyult, mint az osztrákoké**. Ennél fontosabb, hogy Németország többé-kevésbé egységes nemzetállam volt, aki megdöbbentő hatásfokkal volt képes mozgósítani saját népességét, és kiaknázni erőforrásait – gyakorlatilag egészen 1918-ig. A Monarchia ezzel szemben ómódi birodalmi berendezkedés volt, Isten tudja, mennyi népcsoporttal, nyelvvel és kultúrával, akiket csak a császár személye - és nem elhanyagolható mértékben a katolikus vallás - kötött össze. Bár a háború kezdetén sikerült meglepően jól mozgósítani ezeket a széttartó célokkal rendelkező közösségeket, de lehetett sejteni, ez nem fog mindig ilyen flottul menni***. Ferenc József házi birodalma egész egyszerűen túl sok energiaveszteséggel működött, sosem volt képes elég erőt koncentrálni, mert az elszökött a rosszul összefabrikált intézmények résein, a nemzetiségek közötti konfliktusokban, no meg a fogalmatlan hadvezetőség kezén. Nem túlzás tehát azt állítani, hogy 1.) az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia voltaképpen már 1915-re elveszítette a háborút, fennmaradását jórészt annak köszönhette, hogy a németektől rendre vérátömlesztést kapott, ám ezzel csatlós szerepbe lavírozta magát 2.) mindez pedig világosan illusztrálja a nemzetállamok erejét az idejétmúlt birodalmi szerveződésekkel szemben, amelyek a tömegháborúk világában egyszerűen már képtelenek voltak tartósan olyan teljesítményt nyújtani, amit az új követelmények megkívántak. Nem is csoda, hogy amikor az egésznek vége lett, úgy hullott szét az egész, mint egy kártyavár.)

A bekerítettséggel kapcsolatos problémákra a tengelyhatalmak sokszínű válaszokat adtak. Ott volt például a propaganda, amely sokáig fennmaradó negatív klisékkel ajándékozta meg a régiót. A németek azt is felismerték, hogy ha a jövő háborúiban is helyt akarnak állni, akkor létre kell hozniuk egy éléskamrát – és erre a keleti búzaföldek, Ukrajna és a Baltikum fekete talaja tökéletesen alkalmasnak tűnt. Gondolták, elég megfelelő számú német telepest odapaterolni, ők majd felvirágoztatják a barbár végeket, szütyőjükben a vetőmaggal meg a Goethe-összessel****. Megszületett tehát az élettér-elmélet, ami aztán a Mein Kampfban támadt fel újra, még agresszívabban. Ludendorff, a német hadigépezet szíve és esze egy pillanatig sem habozott, az elfoglalt területeket a lehető legjobban kiszipolyozta. Igaz, mindezt nem tette olyan brutálisan, mint később a Harmadik Birodalom, de azért megmutatta nekik az utat, amin el kell indulni. Mindezeken túl a németeknek volt még egy csodafegyverük arra, hogyan lehetne kitörni a kontinentális ketrecből: a tengeralattjárók. Bevetésük azonban – Watson szerint – kapitális hibának bizonyult. Mert igaz ugyan, hogy a totális tengeralattjáró-háborúval mély sebet ejtettek az antanton, de korántsem akkorát, hogy az elvérezzen. Cserébe viszont magukra húzták az USA haderejét és korlátlan ipari kapacitását – ráadásul pont egy olyan pillanatban, amikor az oroszok kiléptek a konfliktusból, és úgy festett, a központi hatalmaknak a többéves kimerítő birkózás után sanszuk van a győzelemre. A teutonok nyilván úgy vélték, hogy Amerika messze van, és mire összeszedi magát, addigra késő lesz a franciáknak és az angoloknak. De tévedtek. Úgyhogy hiába gyürkőztek neki 1918-ban, hogy döntő csapást mérjenek az ellenre, ekkorra már annyira ki voltak merülve, ellenfelük pedig olyan fölényben volt az emberek számát tekintve éppúgy, mint felszerelésben, hogy reális esélyük nemigen volt a sikerre. Offenzívájuk összeomlása pedig egyben azt is jelentette, hogy minden erejüket elherdálták, a várható ellencsapások elhárítására pedig egyszerűen nem maradt kapacitásuk*****.

Pazar elemző kötet, ami mellesleg megteremti a kontinuitást az első és a második világháború között. Persze ez a kontinuitás nem újdonság: sokan vizsgálták már a mérgező békét, ami nem megoldotta, hanem konzerválta a nemzetek közötti feszültségeket. Ugyanakkor Watson rámutat még egyre-másra. Például itt van az a régió, amit Snyder „véres övezetnek” nevez: ez a Baltikumtól a Balkánig terjedő sáv, benne Belorusszal és Ukrajnával. Ezen a területen ugyanis már az első világháborúban kialakult a gyakorlat, hogy a felek megkíséreltek etnikai homogenitást létrehozni – és bizony ez a folyamat az első világháborúban kezdődött******. Ennek nyilván a zsidó kisebbség volt a legnagyobb vesztese, akik rendre két tűz közé szorultak. De a többiekre is rájárt a rúd: a Monarchia hadserege a rutén civileket vegzálta, a németek meg a baltiakat igyekeztek másodlagos állampolgári szerepbe kényszeríteni. Szóval a minták kialakultak. Amikor pedig vége lett a háborúnak, az áldozatok revansot vettek*******, az agresszió körhintája pedig nem szokott leállni. Mert ezek az újabb áldozatok (ha tehették egyáltalán), rákontráztak az erőszakra********, és így tovább, és így tovább. És nem akadt senki, aki a tetteseket elszámoltatta volna. Ez pedig, nyugodtan kijelenthetjük, tökéletes táptalajt teremtett ahhoz, amit a régió a második világháborúban elszenvedett.

* Törökországról és pláne Bulgáriáról e könyvben nem sok szó esik, ami mondjuk érthető. Watsont nem a periféria érdekli, hanem a központi hatalmak súlypontja, ami nyilván nem Anatóliában, hanem valahol Poroszföldön vagy a Ruhr-vidéken keresendő.
** Persze ezzel nem mondtunk sokat. Az osztrák hadsereg „agya” ugyanis az a Conrad volt, aki minden idők egyik legalkalmatlanabb vezérkari főnöke. Valószínűleg egy kimiskárolt félszemű kandúrmacska is okosabb döntéseket hozott volna, mint ő. Tragikus, hogy egy efféle nímand döntött milliók életéről.
*** Természetesen a legnagyobb tüske a Birodalom talpában – ezt Watson nem győzi eleget hangsúlyozni – a magyarok voltak, akik a háború folyamán gyakran olyan hatást keltettek, mintha nem is az osztrákok mellett, hanem inkább ellenük harcolnának. A fő problémát az élelmiszerszállítások kérdése jelentette, amit a Tisza vezette kabinet folyamatosan próbált elszabotálni, esetenként kifejezetten az éhezés szélére taszítva Bécset. Másfelől Tiszáék nagy lendülettel vétóztak meg minden olyan törekvést, ami a Monarchia föderalista átszervezésével, vagy a demokratikus jogok kiterjesztésével volt kapcsolatos, ezzel pedig bizony közvetve sokat tett azért, hogy a birodalmon belül a feszültségek végül robbanásig fokozódjanak.
**** Mindig fázom, amikor a katonák próbálnak meg „kultúrát” vinni valahova. Annak olyan gumibot és bikacsök szaga van. Lásd SZFE és Szarka ezredes esetét.
***** Bár a háború után Ludendorff első számú hirdetője volt az ún. „tőrdöfés-elméletnek” (vagyis hogy a küzdelmet nem a hadsereg veszítette el, hanem a hátország, a civilek), de ez csak önmentegetés volt, a felelősség ocsmány áthárítása. Az igazság az, hogy 1918 őszére a nyugati fronton a németeknek már csak 300.000 hadra fogható emberük maradt, miközben az amerikaiak éppen készültek partra tenni vagy kétmillió bakát. És ez a 300.000 is már alig várta, hogy megadhassa magát.
****** Tegyük hozzá: az etnikumok ellen folytatott háborút nem a központi hatalmak művelték legbrutálisabban, hanem a cári orosz hadsereg, ami mindenhová vitte magával antiszemitizmusát, és olyan pogromokat rittyentett a galíciai zsidó kisebbség ellen, hogy még.
******* Kivéve a zsidók. Ők ritkán vághattak vissza,főképp azért, mert mindenki őket akarta először elgyepálni, és a hátuk mögött nem állt egy nagyhatalom sem, aki eredményesen meg tudta volna védeni őket.
******** Nyilván nem véletlen, hogy azok között a németek közül akik a békekötés után mindenüket (házukat, vagyonukat) elveszítették, mert menekülniük kellett mondjuk Lengyelországból vagy az új Csehszlovák államból, hatszor annyi tömeggyilkos került ki a második világháború során, mint a népesség egyéb részeiből.

[Ray · Rating 4 out of 5]

I thoroughly enjoyed this book, even though the subject material was a little dry. I particularly enjoyed the use of diary entries and letters from home/the front which the author used to illustrate his points with a human touch.

It explores the societal effects of the war on the populations of the main Central Powers - Germany and Austro-Hungary. It shows how initial enthusiasm turned to disappointment and dejection as the war dragged on and the loss of men and materiel mounted. This was not helped by the dastardly English blockarding ports so that the civilians on the Home Front were slowly starved.

The loss of support amongst the civilians at home set up a feedback loop when the wave of troops released from the Eastern front in early 2018 failed to provide the knockout blow to France and England as had been anticipated. In the end the German army was barely holding on, and Austria collapsed from within as its constituent nations voted with their feet.

Stupidly the victorious Entente imposed a swinging peace, leading to resentment and rancour, which all but guaranteed a re-match. This duly occured in 1939 as a populist orator exploited the myth that the undefeated armies at the front were betrayed by treasonous civilians, the stab in the back - dolchstoßlegende - to lead an aggrieved nation back to war. Not that it worked out any better for the Germans.

Well worth a read.

[Charles · Rating 3 out of 5]

Social, political, military, and diplomatic history of Imperial Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire Central powers during the Great War of 1914-1918.


Early war Landsers of the Imperial German Army. Note the Pickelhaube helmets discontinuted in 1916.

My dead tree, format, soft back was a door-stopper of 832-pages which included footnotes, bibliography and an index. It had a UK 2014 copyright.

Alexander Watson is a British historian and author of military and political history. He is the author of three (3) non-fiction books on WWI. This was the second book I’ve read by the author. The first being, The Fortress: The Siege of Przemyśl and the Making of Europe's Bloodlands (my review).

Firstly, this is an advanced/intermediate-level text on WWI. It would be very helpful for a reader to have a firm background in early-20th Century Military and Diplomatic history and WWI to fully appreciate this book. In particular, the period in eastern and central Europe should be well understood. In addition, I recommend having a period atlas on-hand to reference the much-changed place names throughout.

TL;DR Synopsis

Watson’s narrative follows a traditional chronological account, skipping about with individual chapters on significant historical: social, political, military, and diplomatic events for the four-year duration of the war. Note this book severely restricts itself to events within Germany and Austria-Hungary. The other Central Powers, and Entente powers are only discussed to the extent they affected events in Germany and Austria-Hungary, in which the former receives more consideration than the later. The majority of the narrative is the struggle of these two powers, and their eventual complete exhaustion against the greater material and population resources of the Entente. While the war was militarily lost by the Central powers on the Western Front, the effect of the war on their populations, the post-war collapse of empires, and the formation of the new, imperfect states of central and eastern Europe were well-covered.

The Review

Reading this book was like chewing on a log. Its long. Frankly, it was not the military and diplomatic history I anticipated. It’s very dense, and introduced me to societal areas of the conflict I was unfamiliar with. I also found the content to be also somewhat uneven. Significant wartime events found in other histories of the conflict were missing, although others previously unknown were uncovered. The writing was very much in the new style of the history from below. That is, demoting Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and his able staff-officer Erich Ludendorff at The Battle of Tannenberg to examine the state-of-mind of serving landsers (soldiers) in the trenches and their hausfrauen (housewives) now in single parent households waiting in breadlines. However, in order, the author’s historical focus was:

1. Social
2. Political
3. Military
4. Diplomatic

Generally, the sequence was chronological hinging on well-known key events in the conflict. For example, the political and diplomatic mishap in the Balkans that triggered the war, the Mobilization Race, the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, the Unlimited U-Boat War, and the Collapse of Tsarist Russia, etc.. Interleaved amongst these were chapters pausing the action, to discuss the early 20th century, eastern European politics of ethnicity, others discussed cultural and social questions in the multi-ethnic Austria-Hungary. (Ethnicity and territory are a perennial Eastern/Central European issue) Many chapters described the Materialschlacht (massive use of weapons and munitions) on both Central power’s military and the populace's need to manufacture them. Anecdotes from newspapers, diaries and memoirs were used to provide context. In the end, the populace (soldiers and civilians) were starved-out by the British blockade, and the German army was eventually buried beneath the weight of the Entente's production capability and surfeit of manpower. The evolving relationship between Germany and Austria-Hungary during the course of the war was well covered. The book’s narrative also delves into the description for the Hapsburg dynasty’s military and political failures which crippled the war in the east, and burdened the militarily stronger Imperial Germany.

The effect of reading this book is that of a good, albeit uneven lecture course for a student with the right background.

Watson is a good writer. The narrative was clear and factual. It was also written in British English. The book was professionally edited. I found no mistakes in the text. I noted that this book was not as slyly amusing as the author’s later book The Fortress: The Siege of Przemyśl and the Making of Europe's Bloodlands . However, the general tenor of the book was measured and generally academic.

Use of maps was OK. Maps were located in the front of the book. I prefer maps to be interleaved with the narrative. There they provide immediate context. I also would have liked the territorial maps to have separated chronologically, rather than having one regional map with “tide water” lines for territorial extents. Use of tables and charts was scant. A picture is worth a thousand words.. The photographs provided were good.

The narrative was largely Imperial German and Austro-Hungarian Hapsburg-centric. Hapsburg related prose was in minority to the German. Most of the contextual anecdotes were either German or Austro-Germanic too. The Hapsburg narrative was mostly Austrian, followed by Hungarian, Polish, Czech, Ruthenian (modern Ukrainian) and Jewish. I suspect this was due to the availability of German and Austrian-Hungarian Germanic archives vs. those of the post-war successor states?

I felt it was a problem with the book, that Germany and Austria-Hungary were the only two, albeit the more important of the Central Powers in the narrative. It made the book feel very uneven. There was almost no discussion of the Ottoman Empire, and only a very small bit on Bulgaria. For example, I don’t recall any mention of the Ottomans entering the war on the side of the Central Powers in 1914 or the German diplomatic effort to do so. The Entente defeat at the Battle of Gallipoli is unmentioned, despite its affect on German and Austro-Hungarian morale.

Through the social history, I received sense of what life was like for the population inside The Ring of Steel. Note there was little or no mention of British, French or Russian and much later American besiegers and occupiers. The cherry-picked anecdotes for life within the besieged territories of: soldiers, storekeepers, bourgeois gentleman and madams, and housewives over time showed the: initial enthusiasm, mid-term stoicism and eventual despair experienced by Germans and Austrians over the course of the war. For example, the rise in the cost of food, the eventual rationing and the element of starvation were particularly well done. However, a key point of the narrative was the divisive effect of the British blockade amongst the multi-ethnic (and implicitly multi-religion) eastern and central European populations of the Imperial German, Austro-Hungarian and Tsarist Russian Empires. These ill-at-ease societies fractured along ethnic lines under the stress of the war. The Hapsburg and Russian civilian/military interaction in captured, and re-captured territories were called-out as the precursor to the dehumanization of ethnic populations in the Nazi and Communist eras and more recently in the Balkans.

The political history was well done. The German politics of the war were familiar. However, there have been a lot books written on them. Most folks picking up this book, will already be familiar with them. Of supreme interest, was I received a lot of missing insight into Austria-Hungary. The organizational problems of the Austria-Hungarian Empire were large. The shambolic, dual-state nature of the Empire could not operate in crisis. Count István Tisza de Borosjenő et Szeged the Hungarian prime minister, politicked to put Magyar interests ahead of the Empire’s. (Austrian PMs hewed more closely to the Empire's interests.) As a result the Hungarian Magyars were amongst the last in the Empire to starve, to the detriment of the Empire as a whole. The army in almost all respects was likewise hamstrung by the politics of the dual monarchy. In particular, funding and ethnic divisions severely degraded its effectiveness. In addition, the Austro-Hungarian war leader, Fieldmarshal Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf was a liability. None of his campaigns during the war were successful. That he hung-on, in a command position, until the end of the war was an striking example of the military/political bureaucracy's malfunction. This book is worth reading just for the explanation of Austro-Hungarian politics.

The military history was mixed. In places it was brilliant. In others it was absent. For example, there was an amazing analysis of the German Verdun offensive and a pretty good one of the Battle of the Somme. However, there was no description of the Battle of Tannenberg, the conquest of Romania, Battles of the Masurian Lakes, or Operation Faustschlag, except in the political context. In general the eastern front, the Italian front, and the Macedonian front, received short-shrift military history-wise. Although, in the east the Brusilov offensive was well covered.

Of interest was the militarization of the already authoritarian German and Austro-Hungarian societies as they attempted a full, but inefficient mobilization of all their resources. This did not end well. In addition, the military plundering of captured territories for food, materials, and manpower for their homelands as the war progressed was well covered.

Another omission was, other than the U-Boat campaigns, the naval war was ill covered. In particular, the British/German naval competition contributed to the cause of the war. Actions in the North Sea and adjacent to the British Isles were mentioned, although not The Battle of Jutland. However, Austro-Hungary had a naval presence in the Adriatic. Engagements were fought with the Italians. Submarines were active in the Mediterranean threatening East of Suez. Forcing the Bosporus during the Battle of Gallipoli was a major Entente naval surface engagement. Finally, the Baltic became a 'German Lake', with the bottling-up of the Tsarist fleet, allowing for unobstructed commerce along its shores.

Still there was much that could be learned from this book.

For example, I found that until the conquest of Romania and its Ploesti oil-reserves, the Central Power’s oil came from Austro-Hungarian Galicia. Galicia was also the Austro-Hungarian bread basket agricultural region. Galicia was lost early in the war to the Russians. It was also the scene of heavy fighting early in the war. The oil fields were recovered relatively unmolested (unlike Galicia’s agricultural assets) in the unmentioned 1915 Gorlice–Tarnów offensive. Galician oil exclusively fueled the early U-boat campaigns and wartime petroleum needs.

Finally, the diplomatic history was good. It’s possible, the military history contribution suffered for a better diplomatic history? All diplomatic high points like The Zimmerman Telegram and American Neutrality were adequately covered. In particular, the diplomacy of the British Blockade, Territory Annexations as War Goals, and the Treaty of Brest Litovsk were well done. I would have liked there to have been more discussion of the bargaining between the Entente and the Central Powers over Italy’s defection to the Entente.

This was a thick book, in which a lot of research was invested. Political foolishness by the weak Austro-Hungarians drew them and the Germans into a conflict with a more populous power block with larger economies. The Central Power’s need for a quickly resolved war failed. Over the course of four years of constant military pressure and blockade, the material advantages and larger manpower pools of the growing Entente Powers out-produced, starved-out, and attrited the Central Powers. This was despite the Central Powers almost completely mobilizing their populations and substantial victories on the Eastern Front. Deprivations faced by the German soldiers on the Western Front, and their families at home over the long term caused the German western bulwark to crumble. (The war was lost on the Western Front.) The dependent Austro-Hungarians with their ethnically fragmented population was swept along with Germany’s surrender. Watson also makes the point that WWI was the ignition point for central and eastern European, toxic ethnic strife that hasn’t ended even today. The imperfect, ethnically-oriented successor states of Austro-Hungarian and Tsarist Russian territories (like The Ukraine) are still problems today.

I wanted this book to contain more military history, of which the author does a good job. However, this would be a worthy read for an interested and prepared student of WWI. Germany and the western front of WWI traditionally get the most popular attention. This book’s most important contribution was in describing the war in eastern and central Europe not just in military terms. WWI in eastern and central Europe was not a sideshow for millions of folks (properly volks). This book was a good adjunct to a study of WWI for a part of the world that is under represented in the literature.

Readers may want to read The Eastern Front 1914-1917 by Norman Stone (my review) before reading this.

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ring Of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I, by Alexander Watson, is just as it sounds. A gigantic tome of information on the life and times of the Central Powers (excluding Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire) as they fought in World War I. Germany and Austria-Hungary are often maligned as the evil empires that started WWI I much of the Anglo-Saxon world, and as both powers lost the war, history continues to be written, mostly, by the victors. Watson takes the opposite approach, looking at the Central Powers perceptions of the war and its beginnings. To be sure, the Austro-Hungarian and German governments did wish a war to commence, especially against the alarmingly powerful Tsarist Russia. Germany also had a bit of a grudge against France, which had been ongoing for more than a century. Austria-Hungary had a beef with Serbia as well.

So, when the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, was assassinated by a terrorist group with either tacit or explicit support from the Serbian government, and the Russians began to mobilize a bit to much for their liking, the German and Austrian high command thought it a good opportunity to act. France and Russia themselves seemed to want a war, as each coveted territory held by Germany or Austria-Hungary. Britain became involved, as the narrative goes, after the implementation of the Schliffen plan, a German offensive through neutral Belgium that would circumvent the massive fortifications on the German-France border. However, Britain seemed poised to attack Germany at any time as well, calling on their age-old policy of divide and conquer in Europe, to keep any one nation from getting to big.

This book follows these issues from the German and Austrian perspective. Serbia had a long history of antagonism toward Austria (and vice versa) and France had been looking for white hot revenge on Germany for the latters victories in 1871 and 1898. Russia had racially motivated claims on Austrian Galicia. Britain wanted to contain German power on the continent and expand its colonial holdings at both Germany and the Ottomans expanse. Clearly, the evil empire theory can be expanded to include all combatants.

Watson also examines the viewpoint of the German and Austro-Hungarian people at this time. The food shortages that hit the Central Powers due to mismanagement, hostile blockade, and poor yields was devastating for most people. War fervour, loyalty and national hegemony are examined. This period also saw the rise of racially motivated cleansings perpetrated by the central powers (and a few of the Entente members as well) targeting those deemed disloyal. Predictably, Jews, Polish, Ruthenian and Czech subjects of both Empires were targeted with deportation, and sometimes martial violence, often unfairly. Watson notes that Jewish volunteers in both Empires came out in droves at the beginning of the conflict, and racial minorities in the Hapsburg domains often came out to try and curry favour for greater autonomy. This autonomy was suspect to the ruling German and Hungarian landed-gentry, and was often met with outright hostility later in the war.

The soldiers on the front-line and the war are also examined in detail. German soldiers faced the same hardships as those they fought, with terrifying artillery bombardments, suicidal charges into machine gun fire, and trench life dominating. Psychological strain and physical harm befell them everyday, and many fought bravely in a conflict that was deemed to be defensive by the citizens of the Central Powers. The war aims of the Central Powers are also examined. They originally started off as small, with Austria wishing to teach Serbia a lesson, and possibly set up a puppet government or even directly annex the state. German war aims were much more modest off the bat, however. Germany originally wanted France to destroy her border fortresses, and possibly set up a puppet state in Belgium. They also wanted to "move Russia as far away from our borders as possible" which was ambiguous enough, but probably entailed freeing the Baltic states and possibly creating a sovereign state of Russian controlled Congress Poland. However, as the war expanded, their war aims grew. Security became the watchword, and Germany wanted to dismember both France and Russia to ensure "security for all time."

Watson takes a look at all of these things using an unbiased lens and tone. He does not fall for the history of the victors, but looks at the Central Powers for what they were: European states that had their own aspirations, insecurities and social, racial and class issues. This can be said of all powers at the time, including Entente Russia (who collapsed in 1917 due to class strife) France (with its multi-ethnic colonial Empires and class issues) and Britain (ditto with France). Watson's take on this is refreshing.

The book itself is an interesting social history of the Central Powers during WWI. It is a side of the conflict that is rarely scene, and the deep examination of German and especially, Austro-Hungarian society is fascinating as it is rare in modern history books. A small criticism would be the lack of economic information on the Empires at this time. Although Watson examines the crop yields of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and comments briefly on the inflation experienced during the war, he does not go into detail on the economic background of these issues. Although some would find that dry, it would have tied the whole book together neatly, and would have helped to offer a background on some of the monetary issues faced by the Central Powers. Alas, another book maybe.

All in all, a great read and a refreshing take on WWI that is often unheard of in Western historical literature. Worth a read for WWI buffs and those interested in Germany and Eastern Europe.

[Sotiris Karaiskos · Rating 5 out of 5]

Most books about the First World War are in one thing clear: Germany and Austro-Hungarians were the bad guys and their opponents were the good ones. This is why we often see things from the side of these good people, often overlooking what happened on the other side. This lack is trying to supplement this book and I think it does in an impressive and historically correct way. It does not, of course, take their place, nor the writer try to overlook their responsibility for the start of the war and the very great crimes they have done during the war, what it does is to show us their own perspective, the suffering of their peoples, but also the crimes of their opponents who shaped their thoughts to a certain extent. He does this by presenting us a comprehensive chronicle of the participation of these two countries in the first World War, the causes that made them engage in this armed conflict, until the causes of their final defeat. After reading, I can say that I feel that I have a more complete picture of the First World War, so that is a book that I recommend to those who are interested in this issue.

[Steven Peterson · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an outstanding work. It speaks of Germany and Austria Hungary as surrounded by a "ring of steel" in World War I--Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, (later) the United States, and some smaller countries. They were outnumbered.

This story is told from the perspective of Germany and Austria-Hungary. It is the story of government and the people. It is less of a military history. If you wish a detailed description of the masterful defeat of Russian forces at Tannenberg, you won't get it. There are only four pages out of a volume of 566 pages that even mention this battle. Of course, there are other volumes that focus on the battles and campaigns in great detail (e.g., Collision of Empires: The War on the Eastern Front in 1914), and one can refer to them for that aspect of the war.

The volume provides considerable information on how warfare affected the people back home. Over time, with the British blockade of sea lanes, which Germany depended upon for food and other key goods, there was a slow strangulation of Germany. Austria-Hungary? Some of its bread basket was occupied by Russian forces for a time, creating great hardship at home. Indeed, there is much discussion in this book of the interrelation of military issues and what was occurring in the two home countries. There is also considerable discussion of the political consequences in both Germany and Austria-Hungary from the war.

We learn a great deal about major figures--in Germany, from Hindenburg and Ludendorff and the Kaiser and Western generals to key political leaders. The same with key players from Austria-Hungary. One immediate lesson: military leaders in the German military were much more able than their colleagues from Austria-Hungary.

This is a terrific book. Sometimes, reading becomes a bit tedious from the massively detailed discussion of various elements of the conflict. But persevering is very much well worth the effort.

[Ryan · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book does a good job synthesizing recent WWI scholarship while also making its own unique contributions. The in-depth discussion of Austria-Hungary is especially interesting. Much of the material about Germany will be familiar to those who have read up on the subject, but Watson restores some much needed sanity to the historiography by taking a comparative approach. Germany’s “unique” aggression and barbarity has been a theme in discussions of the war since 1914, and this theme was re-purposed after 1945 to create the Sonderweg. Historians like Fritz Fischer believed that “Hitler was no accident” because the groundwork for German imperialism and aggression was present in 1914. Hence, there was continuity in history with Wilhelmine Germany being a sort of proto-Third reich. Recent works about Germany’s atrocities in Belgium, Southwest Africa, and its administration in the Baltic states have all emphasized this supposed continuity.

Watson does not apologize for or downplay German atrocities during the war. He does, however, compare them with Germany’s peers. Austria-Hungary, Russia and the Ottomans all come off worse in this comparison, and the British and the French don’t fare well either. In Watson’s view, the responsibility for the 800,000 civilians who died in Central Europe from malnutrition is split between the British, who deliberately blockaded food deliveries, and the Central powers for mismanaging their war economies. To my knowledge, this famine caused the highest number of civilian deaths during the conflict.

The discussion of the treaties that ended the wars is also very engaging. Watson suggests that Brest-Litovsk should not be characterized in such negative terms as it sometimes is, because the Germans were actually releasing many nationalities (Lithuanians, Finns, Latvians, Estonians, Poles) from the Tzarist empire and granting them more autonomy. It created an Eastern Europe that looked more like contemporary times than it did during Romanov or Soviet hegemony. The treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain, and Trianon also come in for some criticism (Trianon was especially harsh). The Allies’ desire to create post-war security by dismantling Austria-Hungary and downsizing Germany were not all that different from Bethmann Hollweg’s annexationist war aims meant to achieve “security for all time”. When discussing Eastern Europe in particular, Watson seems very skeptical that self-determination, at least as practiced by the victors, was ever a good idea, since in the long run it fostered more irredentist violence and authoritarianism. This perspective is a thoughtful way to connect the WWI era to Timothy Snyder’s concept of “the bloodlands”.

[Martin, I stand with ISRAEL · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book told of WWI from the German perspective. Interesting, that the book points to Russians as bad guys. I almost felt sorry for the people the Russians had demoralized during the early part of the war.

One thing prevalent is the on going anti-Semitism the Germans displayed during the war.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent and comprehensive history of the Austrian and German war effort during the First World War. One of Watson’s main arguments is that the history of these nations from 1914-1918 played a major role in Europe’s later catastrophe in the 1930s and 1940s. “The great material and emotional investment,” of Germany and Austria-Hungary, he writes, “ensured that defeat, when it came, would have a catastrophic impact on their societies.” Germany’s defeat was to a large degree psychological.

Watson describes all of the ill-formulated decisions made by the governments in Berlin and Vienna, governments that, Watson argues, knew little about their society’s suitability for total war, or lack thereof. For example, the crisis atmosphere in Vienna before the war was to some degree justified by problems related to its ethnic diversity, but most of these ethnic groups simply wanted more autonomy, rather than full independence, and were willing to compromise, one of many distinctions that Vienna failed to appreciate. At the same time, the disconnect between German diplomacy and military strategy was one of the causes for the war’s outbreak, and one of the causes for America’s entry into the war.

Watson does a great job showing these two powers at war, from their initial victories to their eventual defeat. He describes the ebb and flow of the Central Powers’ fortunes and the impact it had on the civilian population. His depiction of Germany,a powerful, modern nation-state, and Austria-Hungary, a backward multi-ethnic melting pot held together by flimsy compromises was very interesting. He also explores many related issues that other histories tend to overlook, like how the people of both nations reacted to inept leadership, and how the war prompted invasions and forced migrations that led to considerable ethnic tensions later. The Central Powers’ administration of the territory they conquered is also given good treatment.

Watson shows how both powers were surrounded on all sides by hostile nations with superior forces and stronger economies, and how this influenced their decision to try for a quick victory in the west before bringing overwhelming strength to bear on the east. But, of course, 1914 turned out to be disappointment, and they were stuck with a costly eastern front and the eventual intervention of the US (forced by German ham-handedness into a war it wanted to avoid), which blocked any hopes of any kind of victory on the western front. They were able to keep fighting for so long more or less because they simply had no choice, and because they were successful in stirring up their populations against the enemy, although this was easier done in Germany than in Austria-Hungary.

A great history of these nations’ war efforts. Much of the book’s perspective deals with the Central Powers’ military and population, meaning we get little regarding their intellectuals, or the German politics of the war; still, Watson does an admirable job explaining this from Austria-Hungary’s perspective, since that side of the issue is so much more complicated.

[Andrew Loach · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the best accounts of WWI I’ve read.
Alexander Watson offers a gripping deep dive into the war exclusively from the perspectives of Germany and Austria-Hungary. By shifting the focus to the so-called “losers,” Ring of Steel adds essential context to the events that led up to—and followed—the war’s end in 1918.

Watson’s portrayal of Germany reveals the impossible predicament the country was placed in, while the mismanagement within Austria-Hungary is baffling to witness. Altogether, the book paints WWI as a tragedy that could—and should—have been avoided. To make matters worse, the decisions made during and after the war seem designed to exacerbate tensions rather than resolve them.

I’d highly recommend this to anyone interested in understanding the war through the lens of those on the Central Powers side, especially the German psyche. Watson delivers a frustratingly enlightening look into how things unfolded the way they did. He’s also a brilliant writer—this 600-page work never feels dry or overwhelming. It’s immersive, insightful, and masterfully crafted.

4.6/5 – Hats off.

[Chrisorc · Rating 5 out of 5]

GOAT

[Bfisher · Rating 5 out of 5]

There isn't much popular history available which provides an internal view of the Central Powers during WW1, so this book is a worthwhile read on that basis. This is a survey history, so it necessarily covers a great deal of ground at a high level. However, the prose is readable, and Watson provides enough details to keep it interesting, for example, a sentence about a Steiff playset of a French POW transport.

It's greatest value lies in its description of how the multi-ethnic communities of pre-war Central Europe became, over the course of 1914-1918, a preview of the bloodlands of WW2, and of how the slave labour economy of the WW2 Third Reich was rehearsed in 1914-1918. They did not spring ex nihilo from the mind of Adolf Hitler. It may in some ways explain why Ludendorff found Hitler's ideas congenial enough to join him in the failed beer-hall putsch of 1923, and why Hindenburg accepted Hitler as the Chancellor of Germany in 1933. In that regard, there is a lamentably short discussion of how the German army developed skills in propaganda and indoctrination in the latter stage of WW1. Hitler was a great beneficiary of this in his transition from army indoctrination cadre to Bavarian politics in 1919.

We are still seeing aftershocks of this today in the Eastern Ukraine.

[Thomas · Rating 3 out of 5]

I received this ARC free from the publisher through Net Galley.com. I give this book 3 stars. Two major defects: Promised maps are not there(Maps in Table of Contents says"to come") and about 1/2 of charts/tables do not load properly. Strengths: The author has done an impressive amount of research--120pp of footnotes, 60+pp bibliography--many of the sources are in the original German. The book reads well, w. the major focus on the home front,i.e, how the 2 governments harnessed the population to support the war. I posted this so the publisher could fix the defects and make it a 4 star book. My Kindle edition does not give page numbers, but the table of contents shows it to be 800pp, including footnotes, etc.
In an interesting comment in the Epilogue, the author mentions that a high proportion of those who lost their homes/farms at the end of WWI participated in Holocaust crimes. The bibliography is excellent. A final puzzling note--the index is missing.

I have not received a corrected version of this ebook(7 months after above review) and therefore recommend that it should only be purchased in a print version.

[Liam Ostermann · Rating 5 out of 5]

(I have altered the following review to remove grammatical errors and infelicities of style and phrasing - June 2024).

It is probably hard for younger readers to imagine how completely the historiography of WWI was, for those in the English speaking world, was mired in the mud of Flanders fields until almost the end of the 20th century. When Norman Stone published his 'Eastern Front' in 1975 the only other English language account of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian fronts was the farago of verbiage that Churchill concealed his memoirs as in his multi-volumed 'World Crisis'. As for Italy? It was 2008 before Mark Thomson's wonderful 'White War' would tell English readers of the hideous hell that laid the groundwork for the rise of Mussolini and 2016 before Ryan Gingeras in his 'Fall of the Sultanate' gave voice to Turkey's war as anything but painterly backdrop to Churchill's idiotic Gallipoli adventure (if any reader is a passionate admirer of Winston Churchill then I must warn you that I do not share your admiration) or the the legends of Lawrence of Arabia. Alexander Watson now joins the group of historians (and I have only mentioned a fraction of them) who in this brilliant history forces us to look at WWI from the perspective of Germany and Austria-Hungary and to a lesser extent the Ottoman empire and Bulgaria. The fact that Bulgaria will probably elicit both raised eyebrows and '?!' suggest just how greatly this book is needed. Why do you think there are 162,000 UK soldiers who died of dysentery buried in and around Salonika?

If you have read nothing or very little on WWI then you will have great difficulties with this book not because it is written in dull or leaden academic prose, it is immensely and addictively readable), but because it presupposes a basic familiarity with the diverse and complex causes and pre existing treaty blocks of the European powers, great and small, in 1914. Even then it is not knowledge the reader needs but a willingness to tackle subjects of total unfamiliarity and to realise that for most of the participants in WWI, on both sides, what went on in in NE France and Belgium was of staggering irrelevance.

Professor Watson is very good at providing insight into the insouciance of the pre WWI elites of Germany and who strutted about in those glorious medalled get ups and wonderful plumed headgear to the fact that it would take nearly two months before the army of Austria-Hungary was mobilised because so many of its troops were off on harvest leave. The popinjays running Austria-Hungary were equally splendidly dressed and ignorant. Although the only allies each other had (neither trusted their 'ally' Italy) the Austrians prepared for war on the basis they would invade Serbia first and then turn on Russia while Germany prepared for war on the assumption they could send all their men against France because the Austrians would be busy holding down the Russians. It beggars belief that in all the elaborate war games they invited each other to, the Potsdam and Hofburg balls and the hunting parties at Rominten and Konopiste none of the royal men or their elaborate military staffs ever bothered to try and synchronize their war plans. But they didn't and it makes you wonder what all their security services were doing, or failing to do, when such basic information remained unknown.

Watson is also very good at putting the German 'atrocities' in Belgium in perspective (but more of that anon) but is less good on Austria-Hungary's actions in Serbia (though he has rectified this some what in his 2019 work on the siege of Przemysl) were aside from many other actions there was a vast number of indiscriminate execution of civilians.

The whole question of 'atrocities' by the Germans in Belgium in WWI is a classic example of unintended consequences of good intentions. The Hague peace conferences of 1898 and 1907 had devised various 'rules' of war and attempted to clearly delineate between soldiers and civilians with the intention of making civilians safer by restricting combatants to uniformed soldiers. The result was to outlaw 'francs tireurs', non military persons, i.e. those not in uniform, taking action against regular, i.e. uniformed enemy soldiers. The German army was very keen on the outlawing of francs tireurs but one of the foundation myths of the German nation was of the civilians who rose up against and helped defeat Napoleon. All national armies thought it was a good idea to outlaw francs tireurs but all nations expected that their civilians would also actively resist an invading army. For any 'people' to simply accept invasion was tantamount to accepting defeat, proving a people to be 'unmanly', effeminate, decadent, etc. Because no one wanted to address the essential dishonesty behind the banning of francs tireur actions. By formally placing civilians outside the rules of combat the Hague conventions made them more vulnerable because any civilian who resisted the demands of an invading army was acting 'illegally' and could thus 'legally' be treated as a hostile enemy but one without any of the protections that a soldier had.

My own point of view on atrocities is that of Sven Lindqvist in his passionate cri de coeur against European barbarity 'Exterminate all the Brutes'. The violence that Europeans had exercised in colonial wars finally came home to roost in 1914. I know of only one author (John Horne 'German Atrocities 1914') who even bothers to remark on the enormous effrontery and hypocrisy of Belgium claiming that Germans cut off the hands of Belgium children. The story was a lie but it successfully buried the reality that the only people who had regularly chopped off the hands of children (and adults) were Belgians in the Congo.

But back to 'Ring of Steel' this is a first rate history by a historian who has mastered his sources (please see my footnote *1 below) and writes tremendously well. So much of the history of the 20th century post WWI and so much of the history and politics of that nebulous area 'Eastern Europe' today is rooted in WWI and its consequences. The sooner we abandon the mythical centrality of the Flanders front and realise that it, rather than everywhere else, was the sideshow the more likely we are to begin to understand the current politics of so many European countries..

*1 I am a great lover of footnotes and references because they are the referential testimonies to the reliability of an author and, if dishonest will ultimately provide the evidence. If anyone doubts their importance I recommend reading Richard Evan's fascinating account of how David Irving was destroyed by his own references and footnotes in 'Telling Lies About Hitler'.

[Tom · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a really good book, but at the same time I didn't enjoy reading it. It wasn't dry, but it didn't exactly inspire me. Honestly, I have a hard time getting through WWI books. I've abandoned more than I've finished. WWII books I devour, WWI tends to be like: "well I've got to read this now." I did not even enjoy The Guns of August. I'd even highly recommend this book to someone who wants to read a good WWI book (but not a first WWI book, for this assumes some familiarity with the terrain).
... anyway, I'm glad I'm finished with it. I learned some stuff, that's what counts. Now I'm going back to WWII.

[Shoti · Rating 5 out of 5]

History is written by the victors. This is why I found the idea of ​​writing about World War I from the point of view of the losers, Germany and Austria-Hungary, fascinating by its uniqueness. Ring of Steel is one of the best history books I have ever read. Watson's eloquent writing and his intellectually satisfying analysis of causality are all the more captivating thanks to his attention to defusing certain long-standing historical myths.

[KB · Rating 4 out of 5]

I was really looking forward to reading this book and it did not disappoint. It's also, I think, quite an accessible history of the First World War from Germany and Austria-Hungary's perspective.

The book impressed me immediately. I feel like whenever you read any histories about the start of the war, you're always told about ethnic tensions and problems within Austria-Hungary, but it never goes much deeper than a surface-level, very general overview, and then all of a sudden the Archduke has been assassinated. Watson goes much further than this and repeatedly looks at the Empire's various ethnicities throughout the book.

I was expecting this to be much more battle-heavy than it is. The actual fighting is definitely not the focus of the book. This means that much more time can be devoted to other topics (interesting or, perhaps, slightly less interesting), which is great, but I was a little disappointed, I'll admit. I'm somebody who loves reading about combat and was sort of looking forward to getting a more detailed account from the other side with great first-hand accounts thrown in. Unfortunately this wasn't really the case. To be sure, the major battles are in there and Watson does cover them in an engaging way, but it tends to be quite brief.

We spend a lot of time on the home front and there's even a chapter devoted to the war at sea, particularly focusing on unrestricted submarine warfare. There's also lots of politics. And over the course of the book, it provides a very interesting examination at the two armies. I found that it didn't matter what Watson was writing about, he made it very easy to understand. It doesn't mean it was all interesting, but that's personal preference, really.

Being from the German and Austro-Hungarian perspective does not mean Watson continually lauds the two empires with praise and digs as hard as he can to pull up incidents to damn the Allies. Not at all. He spends a great deal of criticizing Germany and Austria-Hungary for the many ways they poorly managed the war at home, at the front and politically. For example, he calls the unrestricted U-boat campaign "the worst decision of the war" and asks, "how could Germany's leaders have been so extraordinarily stupid?" And even when German and Austro-Hungarian citizens were starving during the British naval blockade (which I loved that he included), Watson makes it clear that this partly was because neither country managed their food supply well.

This is a great history examining the war from the other side. Even though it's been a century, the way we look at the First World War seems to still be quite biased and we need accounts such as this to help balance this view. I think we've (mostly) moved away from the thought that the Germans and Austro-Hungarians were barbarous Huns raping, pillaging and committing war crimes throughout Europe, or that the Germans were essentially Nazis just in a different decade. However, misconceptions still exist and these can't always be corrected in works that largely focus on the Western armies.

Does this book attempt to do a complete 180 from what we know and cast the two empires in a different, positive light? Absolutely not. Does it perhaps provide convenient examples and maybe stretch or stress them to fit with what the author wants to show? At times, yes. However, it does is offer a more balanced look, recognizing the wrongs they committed while challenging some misconceptions, and providing good coverage of the two empire's war experiences for both their citizens and armies. While not perfect, Ring of Steel is nonetheless a great read and, in my opinion, a very welcome addition to the study of the First World War.

[Gumble's Yard - Golden Reviewer · Rating 4 out of 5]

Engrossing account of the First World War examining the war exclusively from the viewpoints of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians and also examining the war holistically, looking particularly at its impact on society as well as the trends and forces set in motion which would lead to the horrors of the Second World War.

A key theme of the book is that for both societies the war was by necessity a total people's war - relying for its success on a mobilisation of all parts of society bottom up as well as top down and with the home front as crucial as the front line. This was achieved more effectively in Germany (especially after the olive branch offered to and accepted by the Social Democrats at the war's outset) than in the Dual Empire where the split nature of the Empire (Watson portrays a negative picture of the Hungarians in particular) and the need to appeal to local and nascent national sympathiser meant that even when it was successful such appeals sowed the very seeds of the Empire's destruction. In Germany the consensus held for some time but finally unravelled into a class and left/right driven civil war.

Particularly interesting areas where Watson focuses and which are often omitted in traditional Allied focused accounts of the war include: the traumas of the Russian invasion of the East of Germany which in turn convinced most of the populace that the War was one of national and personal survival; the effects of the English economic blockade first in the economic hardships it produced, second in installing a view of England as the main and most hated enemy, thirdly in fracturing society as different groups (largely national and ethnic but also people against government in Austro-Hungary, but in Germany Prussia versus Barvaria, cities versus rural areas, the armed forces versus the home front, and even inter-service and inter-rank in the army and everywhere Gentiles versus Jews) accused each other of hoarding, profiteering or preferential treatment; the Germans use of economic plundering, deportations and forced labour in occupied areas and their realisation that the new all out war made the maintenance of buffer zones a post war necessity thus meaning even a defensive war naturally lead to aggressive war aims, something which in turn lead to the breakdown of social cohesion as the people realised that the army was fighting for outright victory rather than a negotiated peace; the disastrous decision to move to unrestricted submarine warfare; the effect of the Russian revolution, disastrous in Austro-Hungaria exacerbated due to the governments inept handling of the peace terms with Russia which set in force nationalism which quickly broke up the Empire and more complex in Germany - encouraging agitation at home, but also freeing up the Eastern armies for a final all out push in the West (one Watson argues could have succeeded if the Germans had concentrated in Amiens, a choke point for English supplies) which once it failed combined with the increasing tensions in the army's ranks to lead to rapid collapse.

Logically written, each chapter (each of which are presented effectively chronologically but also themed) starts with a context and ends with a summing up (often skilfully contrasting the German and Austro-Hungarian situation) and a logical segue way into the next chapter. Sometimes too detailed and with an over-emphasis on statistical tables, but excess detail is clearly signposted and easy to skip. A real area of strength of the book is how it usefully focuses in sometimes on individuals or individual towns to illustrate a more general point.

[Emmanuel Gustin · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is, as histories of wars go, a somewhat unusual book. It focuses on the Central Powers of World War I, Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, telling the story from the side of the losers. It is not a military history, in the sense that it devotes relatively few of its 566 pages (not including notes and bibliography) to fighting and battles, although it does some. Instead, this is mostly a political history, a social history, and economic history: The history of people's and states under the enormous strain of the Great War.

Most accounts of the Great War focus on the Western Front, and perhaps Gallipoli in addition. This book gives ample space to Eastern Front, Central Europe, and the fate of the Habsburg empire, in the failing struggle to keep German-speaking Austrians, Magyars, Ruthenes, Poles, Slovenes, Croats, Jews, Italians, and numerous other ethnic groups together in the state in which they used to live, as Watson quotes one of their politicians, in well-tempered discontent. The war ripped apart the unstable edifice, creating tensions that are still with us today. It is an almost unknown history, obscure and forgotten at least by Western Europe, but important.

Alexander Watson is sympathetic to the people but unsparing in his criticism of the political and military leadership, which was often short-sighted and at odds with the aspirations and ideals of the people they ruled. The Great War ended with the defeat on the battlefield of the armies of the Central Powers, but with that defeat also the last support holding up the contested legitimacy of the regimes fell away. If Watson is sharply critical about the mismanagement of the German leadership, he is scathing about the startling incompetence of the Austrians and Hungarians, who embraced the war in the hope that it would unify their country, but then proceeded to take steps that could only antagonise national groups and worsen tensions. Some of them were literally willing to let members of other ethnic groups starve, to protect their own economic interests.

As an analysis of the course the Great War took, why it was fought and why it ended as it did, this makes a powerful impression.

[Martin Samuels · Rating 4 out of 5]

Histories of the First World War tend to fall into three categories: personal accounts, battle or campaign studies, and strategic narratives from the Entente perspective. In this extraordinary book, Alexander Watson has single-handedly opened a new category: a strategic narrative from the Central Powers perspective.

Ranging far and wide, drawing upon the accounts of leading politicians and individual soldiers and civilians, Watson paints a picture of the experience and course of the war from a viewpoint that is surprisingly unknown, even to those who have long studied the period. In so doing, not only does he give a vivid sense of how these tumultuous events were felt on the losing side, he also brings out a number of key events, such as the fear of the population in the face of the Russian invasion of East Prussia in 1914, the disasters and suffering resulting from the loss of Galicia by Austria-Hungary, and the impact of the food shortages brought about by the British naval blockade. But what comes out most strongly is the stunning incompetence of many of the Central Powers leaders. The way in which Conrad deployed the Austro-Hungarian Army so badly in August 1914 that he almost guaranteed its route, the manner in which he then proceeded to destroy the united support for the war and the Dual Monarchy that had characterised the empire in 1914, the open hostility between the Austrian and Hungarian halves of the empire, the fact that the much-vaunted Hindenburg Programme probably led to a reduction in German military production, and the way in which the German Navy persuaded the Kaiser to order the start of unrestricted submarine warfare, thereby bringing America into the war, based on completely erroneous analysis of data. That the Central Powers came so very near to securing victory despite these enormous errors perhaps serves to underline the extent to which the German operational military capability far exceeded that of any other power.

It is easy to see why this book won the Guggenheim-Lehrman Prize in Military History. Despite its considerable length and academic rigour in referencing, it remains highly readable and gripping. Very highly recommended.

[Bob H · Rating 4 out of 5]

It's more than a military history: this book tells us much about the economic and social events of the war, and from the standpoint of the two empires' peoples. We also see the decisions, often mistaken, by their leaders: the Austro-Hungarian policy of reprisal and atrocity (far more extensive than the Germans', we find); the German decision to open U-boat warfare against neutral shipping, bringing in the US on the enemy side; the missteps in peace negotiations in Russia and elsewhere. A century on, it's a detailed, readable, worthwhile and sometimes revelatory look at this calamity, from a side of the war that has been sometimes neglected, sometimes misrepresented. Strong recommendation for those interested in the period.

[Elan Garfias · Rating 5 out of 5]

How do you not real a book with a title this cool? Watson's tome explores the ins and outs of the Great War from the Central Powers' perspective, paying due attention to both the war and home fronts. The chronology is roughly divided by the evolving compositions of the German High Command (OHL), which grew more and more extremist with the course of the conflict. I really appreciated his sketch of Austria-Hungary in 1914, which is much crazier than I imagined. Hungary was genuinely powerful, with its own government, and even its own mini-empire composed of various South Slavs and some Italians thrown in for good measure. While the dualist political structure gave the Austrians a new lease on life in 1867, it proved fatal in wartime, compromising both combat effectiveness and food supply. As early as the beginning of the war, Austrian and Hungarian offensives were throwing militia units (Landwehr and Honved, respectively) at the front lines...so yeah imagine getting beat by Serbia lmao. In the main body of the joint army, different nationalities were often hopelessly mixed together, leading to quadrilingual units and all the confusion that entails, though this did produce a great job market for aspiring polyglot officers. While Hungary stuck it out until the end, Hungarian war aims often worked at cross purposes to those of Vienna. The status of new territorial acquisitions further complicated the delicate balance between nationalities. For example, should Poland (already split three ways) be united into a new satellite state or split between Austria and Hungary. Should the South Slavs be added as a third kingdom within the union or become integrated with Hungary? Could restive Czechs maybe allowed greater autonomy as their own kingdom, paving the way for Austria-Hungary-Czechoslovakia? Austria certainly could have devolved more power to its Crownland nationalities, though Hungary was loathe to dilute its power within the union. Time and time again, the Germans were forced to divert their forces to clean up their ally's mess, from Galicia to Serbia.

For their part, while the Germans performed incredibly while under attack from all sides, the economic war proved unwinnable. Hunger came in fits and starts, as the Reich faced shortages once cut off from imports by a devastating British blockade (the eponymous Ring of Steel). This ultimately crippling vulnerability drove German war aims to be self-sufficient and carve out a proper sphere of influence in its hinterlands. Occupying to various degrees of harshness Belgium, Northern France, Poland, and the Baltic (Ober Ost), the initially modest territorial goals of German planners morphed into a war for survival. Though not genocidal, Watson notes how the ground for the later Nazi occupation of Eastern Europe were laid here, particularly in Falkenhayn's ruthless exploitation of the Ober Ost.

Though the population for the most part dutifully answered the summons to war (with the notable exception of the Berliner socialists), Watson largely dispels the notion of a hawkishly nationalist population. This was mostly limited to the middle class and students. His coverage of the SPD's reaction to war is highly illuminating, as otherwise antiwar or passive workers and deputies allowed themselves to support the war only once threatened with the direct presence of a Russian invasion. Yet once this threat abated with the spectacular German victory at Tannenberg, SPD deputies began breaking ranks and voting against further military spending.

As hunger set in in Germany (and actual starvation in Austria), High Command made successively further demands on both manpower and industrial capacity, placing their faith in novel strategies that ranged from the futile (U-boats) to the outright detrimental (ausblotsschlacht--think Verdun). With genuine ideological pressure coming from both Russian Bolshevism and Wilsonian national democracy, both empires proved too late to offer concessions and collapsed, war plans having placed far too high a cost for either country to bear.

While Watson can't be accused of being pro-Central powers, he is sympathetic to the human story behind them, as told by the soldiers, widows, children, etc who got caught up in such an insane mess. Both Germany and Austria-Hungary (or at least their governments) wanted a war, just not the one they got. Seeking to finally resolve the Balkan Powder Keg and secure their economic and military futures, they schemed for a regional war (i.e. trying to keep Russia from getting involved) and got a world one. They openly acknowledged just how low their chances of success were in such a scenario, yet the alternative of doing nothing proved even more unpalatable. I'm reminded of the Eugene Rogan's wonderful book The Fall of the Ottomans, which describes the similar, if even more dire, decision-making process in Istanbul: either we risk it all now with a low chance of victory, or we sit on our hands a 100% chance of defeat.

[T. Fowler · Rating 5 out of 5]

I agree with the Daily Telegram’s review that describes Ring of Steel as “Outstanding.” Alexander Watson leads the reader through all the significant political and socio-economic events in Germany and Austria-Hungary during the First World War, revealing a picture that I found fascinating. He shows that support for the war was not universal and it deteriorated as the war dragged on, particularly as the populations began to suffer from famine. What struck me most was the description of the brutal treatment of civilians by the German and Austro-Hungarian armies as they conquered territory in Belgium, Galicia and the Baltic states – forcible evacuations, pillage, rape and murder of all minority racial groups but always against Jews living in these areas. These atrocities were all possible, Watson shows, because the military were able to maintain their control over the direction of the war despite the realization that the Central Powers could not win after their failure to defeat France in 1914. The most amazing example of the military’s control was how Ludendorff created a personal fiefdom, called Ober Ost, over the Baltic states where he had absolute authority. Well-researched and well-written, Watson clearly explains the complex events that led to the war in 1914, as well as the breakdown of society in Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1918. My view of the First World War was entirely changed after reading this book.

[Javier Sastre · Rating 5 out of 5]

Monumental obra sobre los acontecimientos que rodearon la participación de Alemania y del Imperio Austrohúngaro en la Primera Guerra Mundial. Realmente interesante si te atrae el tema pero me temo que un tocho excesivo si no es el caso.
La recopilación de hechos y datos es exhaustiva en toda la extensión geográfica de estas Potencias Centrales que ocupaban la práctica totalidad de Europa Central, y a todos los niveles: político, militar, social y económico.
No se exactamente por qué, pero desde hace mucho tiempo me interesa la formación del estado alemán y, sobre todo, el desmembramiento y desaparición tan rápido y definitivo del Imperio Austrohúngaro al finalizar la Primera Guerra Mundial.
Creo que me ha llamado la atencion la vertiginosa debacle de una sociedad que llegó a estar tan desarrollada y que continuó proporcionando durante buena parte del siglo XX figuras de primer orden en los campos de las ciencias puras, la filosofía, la psicología, la economía o la literatura.
Lo más chocante es que fuera el propio Imperio Austrohúngaro el principal causante del estallido del conflicto a nivel mundial tras el asesinato del archiduque Francisco Fernando en Sarajevo en junio de 1914. Pensando que su declaración de guerra a Serbia no implicaría la intervención de otras potencias como Rusia, Francia o Inglaterra, y en caso de que así fuera se podría conseguir una victoria rápida sobre estas con el apoyo de Alemania.
Evidentemente no fue así y los conflictos étnicos y nacionales (polacos, checos, rutenos-ucranianos, yugoslavos) que ya preexistían solo se acentuaron dramáticamente cuando la guerra se tornó desfavorable y el bloqueo marítimo hizo padecer severamente a todas las poblaciones del imperio.
La humillación y peaje excesivo que se hizo pagar al finalizar la guerra a estas potencias, sobre todo a Alemania, que fue el territorio que quedó más íntegro, fueron claramente caldo de cultivo para el nazismo y la Segunda Guerra Mundial que se daria en apenas dos décadas.

[Stuart Fleet · Rating 4 out of 5]

I am a latecomer to this acclaimed German and Austria-Hungary centric account of the catastrophe that was the first world war. As you would expect, Ring of Steel includes a thorough analysis of all the key military campaigns, however I found the book particularly illuminating when our attention is drawn to the anxieties and hardships experienced by the citizens away from the front. Watson spells out clearly how political instability, fear, racism, mass deportation/migration, administrative incompetence, and creeping starvation back home all play an important role in the decision making processes that maintained this senseless conflict over such a long period of time. (Unusually, he even takes time to highlight the influence that “love" had on the rhetoric of war.) The traumas experienced through these years by ordinary people living in the patchwork of nations that makes up Central Europe undoubtedly laid a terrible foundation for the further horrors to come throughout Europe (and the wider world) later in the century. Ring of Steel is an original, extremely well researched and accessible presentation of a highly complex subject. In my opinion it deserves all the awards it achieved.

[Charlie]

This needed to talk more about the Hapsburg war goals (or lack thereof) but regardless an interesting take on the Central Powers. Demystifies some of the tropes that surround the First World War that crop up in books like the Guns of August (still good by the way, but Tuchman takes a very “Germany was evil and solely responsible for war” approach which is debatable at best, false at worst), whereas this looks at things more objectively and has no issue speaking on ally atrocities that were often more gruesome and deadly than that of Germany or the Hapsburgs (who by the way are not excused here in any sense).

Obviously no First World War book is complete without talking about the lineages to its sequel, but this is unique in speaking specifically about precursor institutions and practices during the war to things like General Plan Ost, the Holocaust and racial theories. While these things were certainly not as “refined” or developed as they came to be during the Second World War, the time spent discussing them and drawing the connections between these facets of both wars is one of the best parts of the book.

Anyway probably time for an Austria Victoria 3 run.

[Peter Fox · Rating 5 out of 5]

At just shy of 800 pages, if you include endnotes, etc, this is a substantial book. I daresay the hardback could be weighed, rather than have the pages counted. It's also a very readable book. It took me a good 12 days to read it, but I did move house in that time, so it's not a book that will take you months of work to get through.

This book looks at Germany and Austria-Hungary's experience of the First World War. This in itself is refreshing. It's nice to read something on this topic that isn't centred on England. Whilst The Somme does feature, it isn't the mainstay of the book and that's a welcome change.

Instead, the domestic fronts of both empires is where the action is. The various battles, advances and retreats all feature, but mostly to provide context to what was occurring at home. Watson really brings out the central importance of the deteriorating domestic situation, making a strong argument that this helped push both empires into the abyss.