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The Schlieffen Plan
Using a copy of the Schlieffen Plan unearthed in 1953, Ritter examines the man and his plan for the German campaign to France through Belgium in 1914.
- GenresHistory
195 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1958
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About the author
Gerhard Ritter
82 books4 followersGerhard Ritter nacque in Turingia,nel 1888.Professore universitario a partire dal 1924,durante gli ultimi anni della seconda guerra mondiale entrò in contatto con i gruppi di opposizione al regime,e fu imprigionato dalla Gestapo.Ripreso l'insegnamento universitario,morì a Friburgo il 1 luglio 1967.
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Displaying 1 of 1 review
September 26, 2025
High quality book, probably best as a text for a master’s degree level of study. While the topic is obvious a great historical document/focus area, the author’s expertise is obvious throughout the text. A must read for the military historian. Key excerpts below.
- But Schlieffen failed to take due account of a great difference between the conditions of Napoleonic times and his own - the advent of the railway. While his troops would have to March on their own feet around the circumference of the circle, the French would be able to switch troops by rail across the cord of the circle. P6. PJK: In other words, discussion of interior/exterior lines.
- There was an annual general staff ride through the eastern frontier districts just as in the West. And during the winter, war games allowed the constant invention of new military situations and the testing of new solutions. P33. PJK: amazing staff discipline to professionalize strategic planning. Time and resource intensive, but critical for future success.
- As the memoranda of April 1892 already indicates, Schlieffen’s main aim was to fight the decisive battle in the West “as quickly as possible”, so as to be free, after total victory, to defeat Russia. P38.
- One can see how he doubted the feasibility of a lengthy defense in prepared positions and how much he preferred to take the offensive. “To win, we must endeavor to be the stronger of the two at the point of impact. Our only hope of this lies in making our own choice of operations, not and waiting passively for whatever the enemy chooses for us.” P38.
- Clearly the success of a great enterprise depended on the speed and surprise of the German advance through Belgium. The enormous pressure of time is indefensible feature of the whole Schlieffen plan. P57.
- The great Schlieffen Plan was never a sound formula for victory. It was a daring, indeed an over-daring, gamble whose success depended on many luck accidents. A formula for victory needs a surplus of reasonable chances of success if it is to inspire confidence- a surplus which tends quickly to be used up by “frictions” in the day-to-day conduct of war. P66. PJK: So much truth in these sentences. I love that victory needs a surplus of chances of success. Frictions are also a reality in any military mission, training or combat.
------------ Quote from the actual document ---------------
- France must be regarded as a great fortress. Of the outer enceinte the sector Belfort-Verdun is almost impregnable…. P144. PJK: assessment of enemy strongpoints, and thus where not to attack.
- But Schlieffen failed to take due account of a great difference between the conditions of Napoleonic times and his own - the advent of the railway. While his troops would have to March on their own feet around the circumference of the circle, the French would be able to switch troops by rail across the cord of the circle. P6. PJK: In other words, discussion of interior/exterior lines.
- There was an annual general staff ride through the eastern frontier districts just as in the West. And during the winter, war games allowed the constant invention of new military situations and the testing of new solutions. P33. PJK: amazing staff discipline to professionalize strategic planning. Time and resource intensive, but critical for future success.
- As the memoranda of April 1892 already indicates, Schlieffen’s main aim was to fight the decisive battle in the West “as quickly as possible”, so as to be free, after total victory, to defeat Russia. P38.
- One can see how he doubted the feasibility of a lengthy defense in prepared positions and how much he preferred to take the offensive. “To win, we must endeavor to be the stronger of the two at the point of impact. Our only hope of this lies in making our own choice of operations, not and waiting passively for whatever the enemy chooses for us.” P38.
- Clearly the success of a great enterprise depended on the speed and surprise of the German advance through Belgium. The enormous pressure of time is indefensible feature of the whole Schlieffen plan. P57.
- The great Schlieffen Plan was never a sound formula for victory. It was a daring, indeed an over-daring, gamble whose success depended on many luck accidents. A formula for victory needs a surplus of reasonable chances of success if it is to inspire confidence- a surplus which tends quickly to be used up by “frictions” in the day-to-day conduct of war. P66. PJK: So much truth in these sentences. I love that victory needs a surplus of chances of success. Frictions are also a reality in any military mission, training or combat.
------------ Quote from the actual document ---------------
- France must be regarded as a great fortress. Of the outer enceinte the sector Belfort-Verdun is almost impregnable…. P144. PJK: assessment of enemy strongpoints, and thus where not to attack.
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