This book is a readable, if dry, account of how the CIA worked circa the late 1980s, which is far more exciting when read between the lines. Kessler is (was?) one of the preeminent intelligence journalists in Washington D.C., with a string of books about the FBI, spies in Moscow, and the Reagan White House. In 1990, Kessler approached the CIA public relations office about writing a book, and got a favorable response: hours of interviews with key officers, including then Director William H. Webster, large amounts of access to the buildings, and relative freedom to write whatever he wanted within the constraints of national security.
The picture he paints is one of dedicated professionals, hard at work within a sometimes opaque bureaucratic structure. Where the CIA has erred, it has done so because the world is inherently uncertain, or because their worst excesses were ordered by the White House. The idea of rogue agents and operations is part of the bad old days before the Church Committee. The new CIA, as reorganized by Director Webster, is an efficient team player, supplying fair intelligence to the President, in line with American values. Sure, the CIA operates everywhere except for the "Five Eyes" nations, but it's mostly precautionary, and a way to get sources in place to prevent surprise. The four Directorates are somewhat insular, but all good in their own way. Operations talks to foreigners and recruits them to be agents. Intelligence analyzes everything coming in, and synthesizes it down to intelligence assessments for the White House. Science & Technology runs spy satellites and a real life "Q-branch." Administration makes sure that everybody gets paid on time, and secures the agency overall. Webster gets a glowing report: former judge, FBI director, bringing the CIA into the modern era by reversing the politicized decisions made under Casey, the previous CIA director who was a Reagan campaigner staffer, and providing much needed support to the public relations office and the office of general counsel.
Reading between the lines, I got the sense that Kessler was brought on to help rehabilitate the CIA after the Iran-Contra affair, and justify its relevance after the fall of the Soviet Union. He wound up getting a little seduced by the agency, so the epilogue, which was written after the Aldrich Ames case broke, runs directly counter to the rest of the book. CIA compartmentalization is a joke. The security people are entirely incompetent. Deep philosophical cracks in the mission of the CIA need to be filled before it can be the intelligence agency America deserves.
My final verdict is that this book is a picture of a kind of business as usual that no longer exists. The post-9/11 CIA, an agency of drone strikes and extraordinary renditions, is very different from the gentlemen analysts and Operations great gamers Kessler writes about. There are a few illuminating anecdotes here, but far too little about the contemporary crisis of Iran-Contra. Kessler knows his stuff, but this book has not aged well.