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American Military Studies
Storming the City: U.S. Military Performance in Urban Warfare from World War II to Vietnam
In an increasingly urbanized world, urban terrain has become a greater factor in military operations. Simultaneously, advances in military technology have given military forces sharply increased capabilities. The conflict comes from how urban terrain can negate or degrade many of those increased capabilities. What happens when advanced weapons are used in a close-range urban fight with an abundance of cover?
Storming the City explores these issues by analyzing the performance of the US Army and US Marine Corps in urban combat in four major urban battles of the mid-twentieth century (Aachen 1944, Manila 1945, Seoul 1950, and Hue 1968). Alec Wahlman assesses each battle using a similar framework of capability categories, and separate chapters address urban warfare in American military thought.
In the four battles, across a wide range of conditions, American forces were ultimately successful in capturing each city because of two factors: transferable competence and battlefield adaptation. The preparations US forces made for warfare writ large proved generally applicable to urban warfare. Battlefield adaptation, a strong suit of American forces, filled in where those overall preparations for combat needed fine tuning. From World War II to Vietnam, however, there was a gradual reduction in tactical performance in the four battles.
Storming the City explores these issues by analyzing the performance of the US Army and US Marine Corps in urban combat in four major urban battles of the mid-twentieth century (Aachen 1944, Manila 1945, Seoul 1950, and Hue 1968). Alec Wahlman assesses each battle using a similar framework of capability categories, and separate chapters address urban warfare in American military thought.
In the four battles, across a wide range of conditions, American forces were ultimately successful in capturing each city because of two factors: transferable competence and battlefield adaptation. The preparations US forces made for warfare writ large proved generally applicable to urban warfare. Battlefield adaptation, a strong suit of American forces, filled in where those overall preparations for combat needed fine tuning. From World War II to Vietnam, however, there was a gradual reduction in tactical performance in the four battles.
400 pages, Hardcover
First published September 15, 2015
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
May 27, 2022
In his book, Alec Wahlman, an analyst specializing in irregular and urban warfare, studies the effectiveness of American forces in urban terrain in the mid-20th century. He bases his arguments on four major battles: Aachen, Manila, Seoul, and Hue. According to him, the American Army and the Marine Corps were ill-prepared for urban warfare – their field manuals did not teach them how to capture a city, and the focus on house-to-house fighting in their training was minimal. Nevertheless, they performed well in all four.
Wahlman argues that the key to the Americans' success lay in their ability to practice what he calls "transferrable competence" and "battlefield adaptation". As he explains, the former included the ability to coordinate infantry, armor, artillery, engineer, and air support effectively, draw upon previous combat experience, and employ heavy firepower. His logic in this case was rather lost on me, for I think that everything of the aforementioned is important for every battle in every terrain. Battlefield adaptation meant, quite literally, the ability of commanders to adapt their tactics to the terrain and circumstances on time. This, again, seems to me to be vital for warfare in general, not only for urban warfare. As the author elaborates, the most significant difference between urban and field combat was the limited visibility in the city, to which it was important to adapt. For instance, despite being untrained for an urban fight, the Marines in Hue adapted quickly to overcome poor weather, political constraints, and a determined enemy. They also worked closely with the ARVN forces, which were badly shaken in the initial assault and slower to recover. The Marines quickly realized that the North Vietnamese could not destroy their heavy armor with their B-40 rockets, so they and the South Vietnamese closed in and subjected the North Vietnamese to heavy fire until the enemy retreated.
Wahlman also points out that the American performance in the four battles debunks two myths regarding urban warfare: that the attacking force needs an advantage in power of three to one and that the infantry is most suitable for urban warfare. In reality, in Manila the Americans had only a three-to-two advantage, and in Aachen the Germans outnumbered them threefold, but still lost. Furthermore, advanced technology such as tanks greatly facilitated and improved the performance of the Americans. For instance, in Aachen, the Americans overcame the Germans' superiority in manpower by fielding a large number of tanks and by using massed artillery and aerial firepower – the infantry alone could not have done this.
The author makes a prediction about future urban conflicts based on his evaluation of the American tactics from Aachen to Hue. Although the American Army won all four battles, its tactical performance steadily became worse. As Wahlman observes, the American commanders in Hue seems to have learned nothing from the previous urban engagements, for they did not attempt to isolate the city. Thus, the North Vietnamese Army forces fighting inside the city continued to receive equipment and men at night. According to Wahlman, urban operations would become a necessity in the future because to defeat an enemy, his major urban centers must be seized as they increasingly represent the power and wealth of a nation. Cities not only seat the ruling government, but also hold the industrial base, transportation network, and the hub of the country’s economic and cultural centers.
He argues that future battles for cities will be fraught with the same perils that made armies of the past avoid them. For instance, narrow streets are ideal ambush sites, where the risk of high casualties is great. To make matters worse, the enemy has more opportunities to blend with the civilians. Heavy firepower is often counter-productive as the resulting rubble makes fighting positions even more insecure. Collateral damage will kill or wound civilians, causing media to spread pictures and tales of their suffering all over the world. Logistics and medical evacuation are difficult. Furthermore, as the four battles analyzed in this book demonstrate, the tactical knowledge, without which everything inevitably goes south, has not improved.
STORMING THE CITY is before everything else a study for professionals. Wahlman writes in heavy academic language, with terms that are surely familiar to defense analysts, but will send the lay reader skimming through Wikipedia articles about different tank models or armored vehicles. This book is rather weak on maps. Otherwise, this is an informative and well-argumented work. I highly recommend it to those who are interested in urban warfare.
Wahlman argues that the key to the Americans' success lay in their ability to practice what he calls "transferrable competence" and "battlefield adaptation". As he explains, the former included the ability to coordinate infantry, armor, artillery, engineer, and air support effectively, draw upon previous combat experience, and employ heavy firepower. His logic in this case was rather lost on me, for I think that everything of the aforementioned is important for every battle in every terrain. Battlefield adaptation meant, quite literally, the ability of commanders to adapt their tactics to the terrain and circumstances on time. This, again, seems to me to be vital for warfare in general, not only for urban warfare. As the author elaborates, the most significant difference between urban and field combat was the limited visibility in the city, to which it was important to adapt. For instance, despite being untrained for an urban fight, the Marines in Hue adapted quickly to overcome poor weather, political constraints, and a determined enemy. They also worked closely with the ARVN forces, which were badly shaken in the initial assault and slower to recover. The Marines quickly realized that the North Vietnamese could not destroy their heavy armor with their B-40 rockets, so they and the South Vietnamese closed in and subjected the North Vietnamese to heavy fire until the enemy retreated.
Wahlman also points out that the American performance in the four battles debunks two myths regarding urban warfare: that the attacking force needs an advantage in power of three to one and that the infantry is most suitable for urban warfare. In reality, in Manila the Americans had only a three-to-two advantage, and in Aachen the Germans outnumbered them threefold, but still lost. Furthermore, advanced technology such as tanks greatly facilitated and improved the performance of the Americans. For instance, in Aachen, the Americans overcame the Germans' superiority in manpower by fielding a large number of tanks and by using massed artillery and aerial firepower – the infantry alone could not have done this.
The author makes a prediction about future urban conflicts based on his evaluation of the American tactics from Aachen to Hue. Although the American Army won all four battles, its tactical performance steadily became worse. As Wahlman observes, the American commanders in Hue seems to have learned nothing from the previous urban engagements, for they did not attempt to isolate the city. Thus, the North Vietnamese Army forces fighting inside the city continued to receive equipment and men at night. According to Wahlman, urban operations would become a necessity in the future because to defeat an enemy, his major urban centers must be seized as they increasingly represent the power and wealth of a nation. Cities not only seat the ruling government, but also hold the industrial base, transportation network, and the hub of the country’s economic and cultural centers.
He argues that future battles for cities will be fraught with the same perils that made armies of the past avoid them. For instance, narrow streets are ideal ambush sites, where the risk of high casualties is great. To make matters worse, the enemy has more opportunities to blend with the civilians. Heavy firepower is often counter-productive as the resulting rubble makes fighting positions even more insecure. Collateral damage will kill or wound civilians, causing media to spread pictures and tales of their suffering all over the world. Logistics and medical evacuation are difficult. Furthermore, as the four battles analyzed in this book demonstrate, the tactical knowledge, without which everything inevitably goes south, has not improved.
STORMING THE CITY is before everything else a study for professionals. Wahlman writes in heavy academic language, with terms that are surely familiar to defense analysts, but will send the lay reader skimming through Wikipedia articles about different tank models or armored vehicles. This book is rather weak on maps. Otherwise, this is an informative and well-argumented work. I highly recommend it to those who are interested in urban warfare.
April 11, 2021
Good overview and lessons learned on 20th Century urban operations - Aachen, Manilla, Seoul, and Hue. Compares and contrasts various aspects of each operation with a conclusion that sums up considerations for fighting in cities.
October 22, 2023
Disappointing. Just read the conclusions and save yourself the time reading the entire book. We win in urban warfare due to our adaptation at the lowest levels and the use of fire support that is sufficiently supplied. Also, could you isolate the city (Souel, Hue)?
September 16, 2024
Not a very entertaining read, but lessons are important. Looks at four battles from WWII to the Vietnam War: Aachen, Manila, Seoul and Hue, to make the argument that transferability of competence and rapid adaptation at the tactical level are keys to success in urban combat.
February 22, 2016
An unexpectedly readable, interesting, and well-written examination of exactly what the subtitle imports. Four chapters present case studies of emblematic battles: Aachen (1944), Manila (1945), Seoul (1950), and Hue (1968). Wahlman’s goal is to provide neither definitive accounts nor operational/political contexts for these conflicts; this work is simply an evaluation of the tactical performance of American forces. And each study admirably addresses these contexts retaining an analytical core of “command, control and communications, intelligence and reconnaissance, firepower and survivability, mobility and counter-mobility, logistics, and dealing with the population.” The battles range over a variety of terrains and conditions, and the book examines how “transferable competence” and “battlefield adaptation” were key in capturing each city—and how the ability of the military to accomplish this has degraded over time. The writing is excellent, economical, tactical, and, amazingly, readably technical. VERDICT For readers not even remotely interested in urban warfare, topical mechanized military coverage, or histories of World War II and/or Korea—you could be surprised by this. Just like that fantastic article from (fill in the blank: Atlantic Monthly, Guns & Ammo, Bass Weekly) about (fill in the blank: brain surgery, inventor Thomas Blanchard, snap spinners), you probably respond to good writing, and boy, it’s here. Readers with interests in these areas will certainly enjoy this; the rest of us could really take a lesson in why this is important for today and the future of our military efforts. I’m always urging readers to stray beyond their usual comfort zones; this is a case in point.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews