What do you think?
Rate this book
Labour in power, 1945-1951
This is the only detailed and comprehensive account of the policies, programs, and personalities of the powerful and influential Attlee government. Based on a vast range of previously unpublished material, personal papers, and recently released public records, the book provides in-depth portraits of key figures of the period and compares Britain during these years with other European nations after 1945. In conclusion, Morgan assesses the legacy of this crucial administration for Britain, the western world, the new Commonwealth, and the Labour Party itself.
546 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1985
4 people are currently reading
49 people want to read
About the author
Kenneth O. Morgan
63 books13 followersKenneth O. Morgan, Research Professor, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, and Honorary Fellow, Queen's College, Oxford.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
October 27, 2025
Harold Wilson is that you? This of course is said in jest, but with a blind exultation of political consolidation over any form of ideological backbone remaining an underlying feature of the author's view throughout, I think there is something to be said to this comparison. That being said, I think even Wilson had less of an idolatry to the Labour party in general and in this government in particular. With my less than glowing introduction penned, I'd now like to take issue and dissect why this book failed to live up to my expectations.
My criticisms of this book were of no particular strength for the beginning of the book. The first chapter "The Long March to 1945" does a fine job at describing the origins of the Labour party which along with the Preface places a strong; but generally well defended; focus on the historical importance of this government both in its time and in the years since. "A Framework to Politics" continues in much the same manner, giving the final bit of context to the mechanisms and driving thoughts of the government.
Following this context driving section of generally high quality, four chapters starting with "Priorities and Policies" are put forth of quite variable quality. The first, on "Nationalization and Industry" does an ample job at describing the ideological thrust and drive of nationalization as a lasting legacy of the Attlee government, as well as its limitations when driven to its conclusion by leaders increasingly running out of mandate to fulfill. The following chapter "Welfare State" is likely the finest of the book with a deep drive to understand the drives of the Welfare State beyond egalitarian means to efficiency and the strong drive of ministers (especially Bevan) in creating the Welfare State and ensuring an informed socialism. Quite well done. Unfortunately, this is followed by what is in my opinion the worst chapter in the book, covering "The New Commonwealth."
The chapter starts benignly enough with a recap of the figures involved, and quick glance of general policies in a rather mixed, but notably active bag in several theaters. However, what most of the chapter devolves into is case studies on Palestine and India, supposedly as representative examples of the Commonwealth policy at their respective worst and best. Remarkably to my determination, this analysis fails at all its objectives. At once, the processes fail to be representative (largely different in scope than other commonwealth projects), different in conclusion (partition in both), or even to show the relative successes and failures of British Commonwealth policy, with the evidence presented therein showing responses that I would characterize; much to my surprise; as the best and worst (rather than worst and best) of Commonwealth policy. On Palestine, the situation covers a pressured (if insensitive) Bevin dealing with the intractable condition of a Holy Land flooded by Jewish refugees and breaking into complete anarchy as terrorists directly attract military rule. In spite of a tough situation, Bevin generally recognizes the long-game that could devolve in the region and takes appropriate steps both to defuse the active situation and create a non-sectarian state. Unfortunately, US loan pressure and Zionism, along with related defensive realities forces through a UN handover with what is recognized immediately as a miserable solution of devolution. Though terrible in outcome, the office stands at its best and firm in realistic solutions that fails to realized by externalities beyond even its scope. On India, solutions remain hard to come by, leading to stalemate from difficulties between the INC and Muslim League, though Britain has solid solutions. Instead of proceeding, Attlee takes the problem from Bevin, and with Mountbatten's assistance forces another rapid withdrawal, far ahead of any previously offered timeline with the ultimate partition of India as a result. While Morgan portrays this as fine diplomacy that prevents some hypothetical Palestine like scenario, this conveniently ignores the 20 million displaced, and 2 millions deaths involved in the hasty partition, which unlike is presented, fails to achieve long-term diplomatic warmth and engenders a new murky international situation that proceeds to the present day. Focused so strongly on the domestic response to the crises as measures of 'success', Morgan fully fails to recognize the actual impact or procedures of either situation.
Continuing with "Foreign Affairs and Defense" the book presents a nuanced look at foreign affairs in a remarkably active time period. With several conflicts and defense contributions, Morgan aptly notes the hawkish view often taken and its "painful controversy down to the present time." Notably solid references are made to US pressure and reliance build-up in the time period and strong economic pressures by raw material, balance of payments, and dollar/gold deficits that place remarkable strain that although poorly prepared for, are well dealt with, perhaps in great contrast to the following Labour government.
From here, a set of broadly chronological chapters follow, which create a new issue in the book of some disjointed overall structure. "The Mood of Post-War" is largely forgettable and may have been better placed prior to the "Priorities and Policies" section though provides some key insights into the electorate some may find useful. "The Crises of 1947" paints a much clearer picture with multiple issues that play a delicate balance in domestic and international in nature with a deep shock to the cabinet (particularly Dalton). Luckily, Morgan barely contains is pro-government glaze for this chapter giving an insightful look as to the government's failures and equally importantly, what was beyond its control. Overall, this chapter reflects well on the introspective ability of the government to deal with domestic crises.
"The Cripps Era" devolves into some occasional His-Story, depicting Cripps as a god-like figure of strong moral values, incessant drive and remarkable power. As Morrison was earlier propped up as such, this remains a little strange, but the influence of Cripps is at least well defended in the impact he ends up having though elevating him as someone who "held the government together" and "the most influential Chancellor ever" whereby all who followed were simple "less-able hands" seems excessive. Despite this, Cripps was certainly an able Chancellor with sound economic judgement as suggested.
The final two chapters "The Second Attlee Government" and "The Return from Jerusalem" paint the picture of a confident if battered administration rapidly falling under the weight of crisis an irreparable ideological divide. Morgan's biases again creep up throughout here as Attlee is given a bit of a spotlight to flounder in. On foreign affairs, Attlee plays a decent role in tempering Morrison's terrible judgements, but ultimately blame lies with him on the poorly though through promotion. Further, Morgan would have you believe that Britain played a decisive role in tempering the US's overly aggressive response in the Korean War, despite presenting evidence from the US that found Attlee's arguments and style as "not impressive." Finally, though absent by sickness, Attlee can directly be blamed for the collapse of unity and the cabinet, and bewildering choice of election date through his lack of earlier intervention and aloofness in political timing in both elections, though Morgan ignores this entirely. Remarkably, in spite of singing the praises of nearly every Labour minister in these chapters, Morgan ends the book on a solemn note as to Labour's failure in government to fix the institutional issues that allowed for strife to dominate the coming decades in the party.
Overall, there is little more I can say other than that this book has many contrasts. At times, a solid political history is presented; at others it devolves into a complete praise of the figures involved. Across several instances, the evidence speaks to me the opposite of the argued point. It is debatable if a thesis should even be presented at times, rather than more mundane conclusions. With this many words, I'm not sure I have presented a much better response than another reviewer that simply states the book borers on hagiography. In spite of its weakness in tone and response, the evidence within is ample and highly helpful to those wishing to learn about this time period. So it is that a well presented and gathered, if flawed work, earns my three stars.
PS. I wish a happy 91st year of life to the author, who I found is now a Lord.
My criticisms of this book were of no particular strength for the beginning of the book. The first chapter "The Long March to 1945" does a fine job at describing the origins of the Labour party which along with the Preface places a strong; but generally well defended; focus on the historical importance of this government both in its time and in the years since. "A Framework to Politics" continues in much the same manner, giving the final bit of context to the mechanisms and driving thoughts of the government.
Following this context driving section of generally high quality, four chapters starting with "Priorities and Policies" are put forth of quite variable quality. The first, on "Nationalization and Industry" does an ample job at describing the ideological thrust and drive of nationalization as a lasting legacy of the Attlee government, as well as its limitations when driven to its conclusion by leaders increasingly running out of mandate to fulfill. The following chapter "Welfare State" is likely the finest of the book with a deep drive to understand the drives of the Welfare State beyond egalitarian means to efficiency and the strong drive of ministers (especially Bevan) in creating the Welfare State and ensuring an informed socialism. Quite well done. Unfortunately, this is followed by what is in my opinion the worst chapter in the book, covering "The New Commonwealth."
The chapter starts benignly enough with a recap of the figures involved, and quick glance of general policies in a rather mixed, but notably active bag in several theaters. However, what most of the chapter devolves into is case studies on Palestine and India, supposedly as representative examples of the Commonwealth policy at their respective worst and best. Remarkably to my determination, this analysis fails at all its objectives. At once, the processes fail to be representative (largely different in scope than other commonwealth projects), different in conclusion (partition in both), or even to show the relative successes and failures of British Commonwealth policy, with the evidence presented therein showing responses that I would characterize; much to my surprise; as the best and worst (rather than worst and best) of Commonwealth policy. On Palestine, the situation covers a pressured (if insensitive) Bevin dealing with the intractable condition of a Holy Land flooded by Jewish refugees and breaking into complete anarchy as terrorists directly attract military rule. In spite of a tough situation, Bevin generally recognizes the long-game that could devolve in the region and takes appropriate steps both to defuse the active situation and create a non-sectarian state. Unfortunately, US loan pressure and Zionism, along with related defensive realities forces through a UN handover with what is recognized immediately as a miserable solution of devolution. Though terrible in outcome, the office stands at its best and firm in realistic solutions that fails to realized by externalities beyond even its scope. On India, solutions remain hard to come by, leading to stalemate from difficulties between the INC and Muslim League, though Britain has solid solutions. Instead of proceeding, Attlee takes the problem from Bevin, and with Mountbatten's assistance forces another rapid withdrawal, far ahead of any previously offered timeline with the ultimate partition of India as a result. While Morgan portrays this as fine diplomacy that prevents some hypothetical Palestine like scenario, this conveniently ignores the 20 million displaced, and 2 millions deaths involved in the hasty partition, which unlike is presented, fails to achieve long-term diplomatic warmth and engenders a new murky international situation that proceeds to the present day. Focused so strongly on the domestic response to the crises as measures of 'success', Morgan fully fails to recognize the actual impact or procedures of either situation.
Continuing with "Foreign Affairs and Defense" the book presents a nuanced look at foreign affairs in a remarkably active time period. With several conflicts and defense contributions, Morgan aptly notes the hawkish view often taken and its "painful controversy down to the present time." Notably solid references are made to US pressure and reliance build-up in the time period and strong economic pressures by raw material, balance of payments, and dollar/gold deficits that place remarkable strain that although poorly prepared for, are well dealt with, perhaps in great contrast to the following Labour government.
From here, a set of broadly chronological chapters follow, which create a new issue in the book of some disjointed overall structure. "The Mood of Post-War" is largely forgettable and may have been better placed prior to the "Priorities and Policies" section though provides some key insights into the electorate some may find useful. "The Crises of 1947" paints a much clearer picture with multiple issues that play a delicate balance in domestic and international in nature with a deep shock to the cabinet (particularly Dalton). Luckily, Morgan barely contains is pro-government glaze for this chapter giving an insightful look as to the government's failures and equally importantly, what was beyond its control. Overall, this chapter reflects well on the introspective ability of the government to deal with domestic crises.
"The Cripps Era" devolves into some occasional His-Story, depicting Cripps as a god-like figure of strong moral values, incessant drive and remarkable power. As Morrison was earlier propped up as such, this remains a little strange, but the influence of Cripps is at least well defended in the impact he ends up having though elevating him as someone who "held the government together" and "the most influential Chancellor ever" whereby all who followed were simple "less-able hands" seems excessive. Despite this, Cripps was certainly an able Chancellor with sound economic judgement as suggested.
The final two chapters "The Second Attlee Government" and "The Return from Jerusalem" paint the picture of a confident if battered administration rapidly falling under the weight of crisis an irreparable ideological divide. Morgan's biases again creep up throughout here as Attlee is given a bit of a spotlight to flounder in. On foreign affairs, Attlee plays a decent role in tempering Morrison's terrible judgements, but ultimately blame lies with him on the poorly though through promotion. Further, Morgan would have you believe that Britain played a decisive role in tempering the US's overly aggressive response in the Korean War, despite presenting evidence from the US that found Attlee's arguments and style as "not impressive." Finally, though absent by sickness, Attlee can directly be blamed for the collapse of unity and the cabinet, and bewildering choice of election date through his lack of earlier intervention and aloofness in political timing in both elections, though Morgan ignores this entirely. Remarkably, in spite of singing the praises of nearly every Labour minister in these chapters, Morgan ends the book on a solemn note as to Labour's failure in government to fix the institutional issues that allowed for strife to dominate the coming decades in the party.
Overall, there is little more I can say other than that this book has many contrasts. At times, a solid political history is presented; at others it devolves into a complete praise of the figures involved. Across several instances, the evidence speaks to me the opposite of the argued point. It is debatable if a thesis should even be presented at times, rather than more mundane conclusions. With this many words, I'm not sure I have presented a much better response than another reviewer that simply states the book borers on hagiography. In spite of its weakness in tone and response, the evidence within is ample and highly helpful to those wishing to learn about this time period. So it is that a well presented and gathered, if flawed work, earns my three stars.
PS. I wish a happy 91st year of life to the author, who I found is now a Lord.
February 8, 2023
Borders on hagiography
April 20, 2009
Read for British History graduate class. Way too much detail clouds the occasional interesting note (like the British views of the Korean War, for instance). Might be interesting only to the most detail-oriented British historian and didn't offer me the type of basic informaiton I needed to better understand the British Labour Party movement in the post-war period.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews