JFK's Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War

by Bruce Riedel

Bruce Riedel provides new perspective and insights over Kennedy’s forgotten crisis in the most dangerous days of the cold war.

The Cuban Missile Crisis defined the presidency of John F. Kennedy. But the same week the world stood transfixed by the possibility of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, Kennedy was also consumed by a war that has escaped history’s attention, yet still reverberates significantly today: the Sino-Indian conflict.

As well-armed and equipped troops from the People’s Republic of China surged into Indian-held territory in October 1962, Kennedy ordered an emergency airlift of supplies to the Indian army. At the same time, he engaged in diplomatic talks that kept the neighboring Pakistanis out of the fighting. The conflict came to an end with a unilateral Chinese cease-fire, relieving Kennedy of a decision to intervene militarily in support of India.

Bruce Riedel, a CIA and National Security Council veteran, provides the first full narrative of this crisis, which played out during the tense negotiations with Moscow over Cuba. He also includes another, nearly forgotten episode of US espionage during the war between India and China: covert US support of Tibetan opposition to Chinese occupation of Tibet. He details how the United States, beginning in 1957, trained and parachuted Tibetan guerrillas into Tibet to fight Chinese military forces. The covert operation to help precipitate the conflict but the United States did not end its support of it until relations between the United States and China were normalized in the 1970s.

Riedel tells this story of war, diplomacy, and covert action with authority and perspective. He draws on newly declassified letters between Kennedy and Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru along with the diaries and memoirs of key players and other sources make this the definitive account of JFK’s forgotten crisis. This is, Riedel writes, Kennedy’s finest hour as you have never read it before.

Genres: History, India, Politics, Nonfiction, China, American History, The United States Of America

177 pages, Hardcover

First published November 30, 2015

About the author

Bruce Riedel is a senior fellow and director of the Brookings Intelligence Project, part of the Brookings Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence. In addition, Riedel serves as a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy. He retired in 2006 after 30 years of service at the Central Intelligence Agency, including postings overseas. He was a senior advisor on South Asia and the Middle East to the last four presidents of the United States in the staff of the National Security Council at the White House. He was also deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Near East and South Asia at the Pentagon and a senior advisor at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels.

Riedel was a member of President Bill Clinton’s peace process team and negotiated at Camp David and other Arab-Israeli summits and he organized Clinton’s trip to India in 2000. In January 2009, President Barack Obama asked him to chair a review of American policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, the results of which the president announced in a speech on March 27, 2009.

In 2011, Riedel served as an expert advisor to the prosecution of al Qaeda terrorist Omar Farooq Abdulmutallab in Detroit. In December 2011, Prime Minister David Cameron asked him to brief the United Kingdom’s National Security Council in London on Pakistan.

Riedel is a graduate of Brown (B.A.), Harvard (M.A.), and the Royal College of Defense Studies in London. He has taught at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and Johns Hopkins University’s School for Advanced International Studies, and he has been a guest lecturer at Dartmouth, Harvard, Brown, and other universities. Riedel is a recipient of the Intelligence Medal of Merit and the Distinguished Intelligence Career Medal.

Reviews

[Stefania Dzhanamova · Rating 5 out of 5]

Contrary to what is generally known, in the fall of 1962 President John F. Kennedy faced not one but two international crises. In addition to Cuba, where the Soviet Union had been covertly deploying nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and bombers capable of targeting Washington and much of the south-eastern United States, there was another looming problem – China, which was planning to invade its neighbor India. 

According to Kennedy's speechwriter and close aide Ted Sorensen, the President wondered aloud which crisis would be more damaging in the long term. The Cuban Missile Crisis could lead to a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. The Chinese invasion could dismember India and force the United States to retaliate by bombing advancing Chinese forces. Kennedy was afraid that the India crisis would lead to an “all-out war between the two most populous nations on earth that might rival the confrontation in the Caribbean in long run implications.” He associated the Cuban Missile Crisis with China's attack on India and believed that together they would have grave long-term consequences. 

Mao's border conflict with India was propelled by two main concerns: its control of Tibet and India’s Forward Policy. 

According to the author, Tibet was the more pressing issue. In the late 1950s, Mao came to see India as the principal cause of the difficulties China encountered in conquering Tibet. Rather than blaming the Tibetan resistance on the Chinese occupation itself, he found it more convenient to blame Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and India. Mao believed Nehru wanted to keep Tibet a buffer between India and China, and on this exaggerated idea about Indian hostility Mao based his decision for war. Because he totally dominated Chinese decision-making, his views of Nehru, whether they were right or wrong, determined Chinese policy. Once he had publicly proclaimed Nehru to be the source of China’s difficulty in seizing control of Tibet and ending all resistance inside and outside Tibet, war was only a matter of time. Increasingly scathing India press reports about Chinese atrocities in Tibet and in the border clashes further strengthened Mao’s determination to teach Nehru a lesson.

Tensions with China mounted after the Dalai Lama fled into exile in India in 1959, and Nehru and his advisers devised what became known as the “Forward Policy” of sending Indian military forces into disputed territory with China. In the early 1960s, India began to create military outposts behind the Chinese troops in disputed land to cut off their supplies and force their return to China. Violent incidents became more and more common. Therefore, it was Nehru, not Mao, who implicitly declared war. 

The Chinese attack on India began in October 1962 and inflicted major casualties on the poorly equipped and badly led Indian army. It also resulted in Chinese occupation of 14,500 square miles of territory claimed by India in Kashmir. President John F. Kennedy found himself in what Bruce Riedel calls "a combustible international environment." One misstep would have been enough to put America at simultaneous wars with two superpowers. It was up to the President to find a way out.

He handled the Cuban Missile Crisis magnificently. He never lost his temper and remained all but imperturbable in the face of severe opposition from the Joint Chiefs, the ExComm, and Congressional leaders. When General Curtis Lemay declared that imposing a naval blockade instead of invading was "almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich," and the navy, army, and marine chiefs unanimously agreed that the only viable solution in Cuba was "the full gamut of military action by us," for instance, Kennedy insisted that a Soviet nuclear strike on American cities would result in 80–100 million casualties: “you’re talkin’ about the destruction of a country.” The point, he tried to persuade the hawks, “is to avoid, if we can, nuclear war by escalation. . . . We’ve got to have some degree of control." He successfully prevented a nuclear war that would have meant the death of hundreds of millions.

Interestingly, when dealing with the Sino-Indian crisis, John Kennedy did not resort to the ExComm. This facts shows how disillusioned he had become with his advisers' hawkish and doctrinaire thinking. He told Ambassador to India John Kenneth Galbraith “with much feeling and some anger of the recklessness of much of the professional advice he had received during the missile crisis, in particular the proposal to bomb the missile sites.” “The worst advice as always was from those who feared that to be sensible made them seem soft and unheroic," President Kennedy said. He felt that Galbraith and he made up the right team to tackle the war in India largely on their own.

The Chinese attack had inflicted damage so grave that despite his reluctance, Nehru was compelled to ask Kennedy for immediate American military aid to India, including an airlift of infantry weapons and light equipment for troops fighting on the border, and even American piloted transportation planes. He also had sent a formal request to Washington for a joint air defense, involving American air cover for Indian cities to free India’s air force for tactical raids against the Chinese. 

While everyone else in the administration was busy with Khrushchev and Cuba, John F. Kennedy quickly assured Nehru of American support and warned China against “forcing the hand of the President of the United States.” Hundreds of U.S. military advisers and air force personnel swarmed New Delhi. One Indian general, who was captured by the Chinese in the war, later wrote, that President Kennedy had assumed the role of "big brother" and true friend of India. The Chinese withdrew two days after his warning.

Connected to the story of President John F. Kennedy's forgotten crisis is another forgotten episode. Even before the war of 1962, the United States was engaged in an effort to shake Tibet at a time when Prime Minister Nehru was striving to avoid war with China. From 1957 to the early 1970s, the United States covertly supported the Tibetan people in their resistance to Chinese occupation. Tibetan youth were withdrawn via East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), sent first to Saipan and then to Colorado for training, and then parachuted by CIA aircraft back into Tibet. There they fought the People’s Liberation Army of China, the largest army in the world. Kennedy was deeply involved in the effort even though Ambassador Galbraith considered it a crazy undertaking. 

The forgotten crisis had grave long-term implications. Riedel argues that it initiated a continuing arms race in South Asia. In response to China’s invasion, India launched a military buildup that led several decades later to its developing nuclear weapons. For example, when India tested the bomb in 1999, it presented the 1962 invasion by China as justification for acquiring its own bomb. 

The Tibetan people’s struggle is still real, and Tibet remains a bone of contention between India and China. The Dalai Lama still lives in exile in India. India still maintains the Special Frontier Force, a large force of Tibetan exiles under the control of the Indian army, which was created after the 1962 war with the help of the CIA. 

President John F. Kennedy’s forgotten crisis is still influencing the world more than a half-century later.

JFK'S FORGOTTEN CRISIS is the first book to study John F. Kennedy's approach to the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and to the Tibetan project. Its narrative is concise, informative, and graspable, albeit rather dry. Bruce Riedel makes several attempts to embellish his story with more graphic descriptions, such as in the prologue in which he describes Nehru's dinner with the Kennedies in George Washington's mansion, Mount Vernon, but they are, unfortunately, not as fruitful as a picky reader like me might desire.

[Philip · Rating 4 out of 5]

Well, I am definitely smarter now.

Aside from reading the excellent The Battle of Rezang La last year (thanks Payal!), I previously knew next to nothing about the 1962 Sino-Indian War, except that ...I dunno, there had been one? As such, I of course I never realized that this short - if decisive and ultimately momentous - war occurred at EXACTLY the same time as the Cuban Missile Crisis; and so just as happened 21 years earlier, the United States was fighting - or in this case, looking at the very real possibility of fighting - two simultaneous if unrelated wars on opposite sides of the globe. Except THIS time, instead of Germany and Japan, it would have been nuclear-armed Russian and China.

And so this highly readable book gave me an excellent overview of this "forgotten crisis" in American history, (although it is certainly well-remembered in India). Among the many things I hadn't really thought about before is the fact that despite all the reading I've done on mid-20th Century Tibet, I had never thought about the role Tibet played in the greater India-China conflict, (or was it the role the India-China conflict played in the fate of Tibet?). But of course, that makes perfect sense - the entire "India-China border" is in fact exclusively the India-Tibet border, and so any confrontation between these two powers would obviously hinge on Tibet, at least geographically.

And make no mistake: this book - and the whole China-India rivalry (as well as the India-Pakistan and even Pakistan-Afghanistan ones) are ALL about geography. The McMahon Line, the Johnson Line, the Durand Line; the fates of Kashmir, Tibet, and "East Pakistan;" the inexplicable and totally undefendable Siliguri Corridor…I tell you people, we fail to teach (and learn the lessons of) geography at our peril.

Speaking of - it is just one of those nice pieces of synchronicity that I also happen to be reading Ken Jennings' (yes, that Ken Jennings) loving tribute to geography geeks everywhere, Maphead: Charting the Wide, Weird World of Geography Wonks, in which he emphasizes not just the importance but also the sheer joy of maps and geography - at least to we geo-nerds. But that one will get its own review later on…

P.S.: One minor kvetch; this book is only peripherally about the CIA and Tibet; in fact, Pakistan plays a bigger role in this story than either of those. However, I understand how including the words "CIA" and "Tibet" on any book cover ups its visibility; and so as it is already a semi-scholarly publication put out by the Brookings Institute, this worthy title probably needs all the marketing help it can get.

[Divakar · Rating 5 out of 5]

I’ve never read a book focusing exclusively on the Indo-China war ( though books on the Indo-China war spawned an industry for retired generals and has been politicians) though it did get its fair share of attention on a lot of books on India / Nehru that I have read. The general narrative is that China dinked us on our Hindi-Chini bhai bhai approach and very treacherously took parts of Eastern India / NEFA never to return it to us. Another popular (and at times senti and emotional) narrative is that the Chinese deceit left Nehru a broken man and ultimately he succumbed 2 years later.

JFK’s forgotten crisis is a misleading title for this book. There is more than the Indo-China war in this very well researched book. It is 50 years hence and whatever the laws for declassifying CIA / State Department files are – a lot of inside information is available for authors and researchers. Bruce Riedel is eminently qualified to write as an inside man in CIA for over close to 30 years specializing on Asia and also as a well-regarded author with multiple books on Asia / South Asia under his belt. With his firsthand knowledge and network due to his CIA background and also access to hitherto classified documents, he brings out this eminently readable book which is more like an unvarnished history of Indo-US relations in the early sixties.

The early 60s are best remembered by the Western world – first for the Bay of Pigs fiasco which was an embarrassment to the new US President but later the Cuban missile crisis which got us for the first time close to a nuclear war and apocalyptic visions of a world coming to an end. While this was occupying center stage, a still major worry for us was the Chinese attack on India which was largely ignored by the Western press which was obsessed with the events in Cuba. If Riedel is to be believed, India needs to be eternally grateful for the role of JFK (and also his Ambassador Kenneth Galbraith) and all the political cover and military support that USA provided to us (this is my inference and not what the author suggests). Why did China attack India in the first place and what was Mao’s motivation to do so is well covered? As per Riedel it was China’s way of telling us – ‘Don’t mess around with us in Tibet.’

The book goes chronologically from Eisenhower’s times to the current with a lot of emphasis on Kennedy’s role in staving off the laceration of Eastern India by China, the Tibetan issues, the role of Jackie Kennedy in bolstering Indo-US relationships and much more. The reconstruction of events which are 50 years old is remarkable.

Revelations that I never knew were the insurgent support that US provided to the Tibetans (with Pakistan’s help), the role of JFK in keeping Pakistan on a leash and ensure that they do not attack us on the Western front during the Indo-China which would have been a double whammy for us and the extent of military support that US extended to India during the India China war.

It seems like a missed opportunity that the relationship between the World’s two largest democracies which was so cordial in the late 50s and early 60s came to such a pass later during Nixon’s time – especially during the 1971 conflict.

Go read this book. Unlike books by Indian authors which are very often one sided about events that have hurt us / or we are emotionally charged– like the Indo-Pak wars, the Tibetan accession by China or the Chinese invasion – here is an author who writes with a clinical feel for the events and provides us an unbiased outside perspective based on facts.

Never read any of Bruce Riedel’s books before. Also never imagined that career spooks can write so well. Happy to have read this and will read more of Riedel in 2016.

[Randal White · Rating 4 out of 5]

We all know about the Cuban Missile Crisis and how President Kennedy faced down the Soviet Union to resolve the matter. I was very surprised to learn that at the same time, their was another, equally dangerous, situation developing between China and India. This is the story of the Chinese invasion of Indian-held territory, almost leading the world into a war between the two most populous countries on Earth. Riedel masterfully covers how JFK dealt with the crisis, averting what may have become World War Three. And of the U.S.'s support for Tibet against China. It's amazing to me how Kennedy could juggle two such crises at once. It leaves me with a feeling of almost awe in how talented he was. In a short, concise book, Riedel covers the crisis very well. I found this book to be very informative, well written, well documented, and fair. All in all, this is quite the impressive little book. Well worth reading!

[James Murphy · Rating 4 out of 5]

The hype surrounding this book, as well as one of its major themes, is that the Sino-Indian War beginning in October 1962 occurred at the same time as the Cuban Missile Crisis and that it had to be dealt with by John F. Kennedy at the same time he managed the dangerous and better-known crisis with the Soviet Union over their positioning nuclear-tipped misssiles in Cuba. I was aware of the war between China and India in the Himalayas, having read Neville Maxwell's excellent book on the subject, India's China War. I had not, however, connected the 2 events as simultaneous in time though hemispheres apart. Or had not considered the Sino-Indian War in the light of Riedel's main focus, the pressure on American diplomatic and presidential crisis management.

As interesting as the history is, and as serious as the crisis was, Kennedy was less pressured than we might imagine. There are 2 reasons for this: he had an excellent man in New Delhi in Ambassador to India John Kenneth Galbraith, and the war itself was in 2 phases, the 2d and most dangerous occurring after the Cuban threat was past. The president left the diplomacy and American responses to the October phase of the war to Galbraith. When the Chinese resumed their attacks in November Kennedy was able to give it his full attention.

This small book's valuable for that story alone but even more so for providing a history of American-Pakistani-Indian-Chinese relations from the 1950s to the present. Riedel explains more than how Kennedy's diplomatic responses and quick aid to India caused Mao to suspend the Chinese November attacks threatening to cut northeastern India away from Bengal. The full history of American diplomacy in the region is recounted, as well as the ongoing tensions between Pakistan and India, including their 1965 and 1971 wars, their development of nuclear capabilities, and the state of national competitions in the region today.

Two minor grumbles with the book. Riedel's prose is a little clunky. But his background includes 33 years with the CIA, and I allow him the possbility that there's no need for a fine prose style in the Agency. And the book's repetitious at times. But it's fascinating, I learned a lot, and I'm glad I read it.

[Michael Elkon · Rating 4 out of 5]

Quick, interesting read about a war that is hardly known in the West (myself included). Riedel tells a classic Cold War story that involves a host of different players and the US trying to balance its relations with all of them. We were allies with Pakistan because of military ties, specifically the use of a base that we could use to project power in the region, including to support the Tibetan rebels. We were considering allying with India as well based on shared democratic values, only our moves to improve that relationship necessarily would weaken relations with India. We didn't like China and were trying to provoke them in any way possible, with the end result being that JFK's moves to strengthen ties with India ended up pushing Pakistan and China closer together. (And naturally, amoral Richard Nixon would ally himself with both, strengthening relations with China to hurt the USSR and also with Pakistan, leading to the horrendous situation in Bangladesh.)

Riedel does a nice job of explaining how Nehru allowed domestic political considerations to push him into a bad situation with the Chinese. His electorate wanted a more muscular foreign policy, so he pushed on the border with China in a couple places, only he didn't have the military strength or logistics to support the position. China then took advantage by attacking along the border, pushing Indian forces back and threatening to sever eastern India from the rest of the country. China did not push its advantage, in part because it proved its point (Mao's demands were fairly reasonable; he wanted to gain in one area in return for ceding territory in another) and in part because JFK was mobilizing US forces and was about to provide air defense for India so that it could free its air force for operations against the Chinese.

John Kenneth Galbraith comes out of the book looking good, as he was on the side of India and correctly saw the dangers of supporting a guerrilla campaign in Tibet. Unlike many in the CIA, he saw the process of training Tibetans in Colorado and then dropping them into China as a useless gesture, as those soldiers would not be able to accomplish anything (correct) and would only serve to annoy the Chinese (also correct). The fact that the operations were based out of Pakistan and therefore have Pakistan leverage in its relations with the US was another reason why JKG was right.

And lastly, Nehru like filet mignon. For shame!

[Shubhang · Rating 2 out of 5]

There is no Soviet Union. While it does not exist today, in the midst of the cold war for the such a strategic player to be missing is amnesia. You could count the number of times the Soviet Union appears in the book and that is all that there is to it.

The book is predictably written from the perspective of the White House, especially JFK. In that respect the book holds true to its title. Also providing some new perspectives to the crisis of which less is know and even lesser written about, this book would probably make addendum to Neville Maxville's India's China War and Brooks-Henderson-Bhagat Report (like the GoI will ever release that). The Chinese have no public literature on that war and India still agonizes over the loss. The US had the Cuban Missile Crisis to deal with which left this war as a sideshow.

The book is well written and while repetitive at points is not encyclopediac, assuming the reader some foreshadow of knowledge of the crisis and the polymath of the subcontinent. The pace is good and it does not alienate the reader with the internal politics of the nations, pointing them out only when required. The maze of diplomacy is covered with ease.

The biggest letdown of the book was that while painting the White House 'white', it does not redden the Kremlin, it obviates it. While the war did change the stance of India from non-aligned and redefined our relationship with our Northern Neighbor, the absence of any role of Kremlin is not just odd but feels deliberate. One cannot believe that Nehru had no contact with Kremlin during the entire time or that Kremlin had no effect on unilateral ceasefire which is because of willingness of US and allies to defend India (when no public announcement was ever made). This is the biggest flaw of the book and while leaving the reader richer in some aspects the overall story is left void.

The cat and mouse game that Pakistan played to ensure it came on tops pitting US and China for its own benefit is deftly covered. Two things we understand about Pakistan is, that as a secondary player it is good to derive benefit for itself and two, it is never loyal.

Intriguing read but the voids are too large to ignore.

[Lucas · Rating 3 out of 5]

Through privileged level access to diplomatic records, The book sheds some light on the events that occurred during the sino-indian War in 1962

The complex relation between India, China, Pakistan, and the US has somehow been balanced with limited impact for three-quarters of a century now.

[Suraj Patil · Rating 5 out of 5]

JFK is known for solving the Cuban missile crisis which nearly started a war between the US and the Sovient Union, he was extremely cool while making negotiations and solving the crisis and as it turns out, we now have declassified documents which make us respect his decision making process even more. At the same time as the missile crisis, in another part of the world, there was a different crisis going on, also initiated by a communist dictatorship on the world's largest democracy, it was the Chinese invasion of India.

It was October 1962 and while the world was busy watching the Cuban missile crisis, the PLA attacked India near the border, within one month, the situation was so dire that it was possible that the PLA would capture Sikkim which wasn't a part of India back then, but an Indian protectorate. Had the Chinese army captured Sikkim, they would have cut off India from the North East states and it would be been devastating blow to India, as they would be been able to capture Bengal too.

It was because of a man called Galbraith (and the faith JFK put in him) that the Chinese surrendered. It was because of the delirious nature of the Indian PM who believed that China was his friend and that US/UK were his enemies, he was blinded by the long, ardous freedom struggle against Britain to see clearly that Chinese were no where near as his friends, but they were infact his enemies. It is sad that it was Nehru who kept telling successive US presidents to grant the UNSC seat to the communist govt, the seat which rightfully belonged to the govt in Exile in Taiwan.

Back then, India was not prepared for a war, partly because of the refusal of Nehru to take help from US/UK, whom he saw as aggressors and partly because the economy of India wasn't in that good a shape, because Nehru was of the socialist point of view (It wouldn't be until 1993 Rao govt that India would go on the correct path).

It all started with Mao suspecting that India was working with the US for secret missions over Tibet, when it was Pakistan which was working with the US (and they'd keep pressuring the US to take their sides because of the Peshawar base). It is ironic that after the war, India-US became closer than ever and India indeed helped US for Tibet missions.

Albeit China won the battle, but they lost the war, their intent behind starting the war and what actually happened was completely out of phase, for instance, had the war not happened, India-US ties would have been low, at their best, India would have never bothered with creating a nuclear weapon. The 1962 war shocked the country and the then PM Nehru so much that he had to ask help from US and UK (which they gave without any conditions at all), after the Cuban missile crisis, US/UK/Canada and the commonwealth army/air force was ready to come to India's rescue, but China unilaterally imposed a ceasefire, maybe because he saw that the US was very serious when they openly said that they were on India's side, not just in words, but also militarily, US Navy ships were near the Indian ocean and just a few days before the ceasefire, JFK would have sent US Air force jets to India.

[Supriyo Chaudhuri · Rating 5 out of 5]

This story about Sino-Indian War of 1962 has many strands running together, the geopolitics of South Asia within the global context of Cold War, Nehru's ideological commitment to anti-imperialism and apparent naivete in dealing with China, and indeed, the main focus of the book, Kennedy's leadership in the midst of twin crisis. This is a breezy read, full of great personalities, some known and celebrated, like Nehru and Kennedy, others less so, like BN Mullik, India's Intelligence Chief for many years. Ultimately, this book explains and illuminates the contours of the modern South Asia, and indeed, the Indo- US relationships.

[Hunter Marston · Rating 4 out of 5]

Riedel's account of this untold history is illuminating and expansive for the short book length. What is particularly interesting, and valuable, for the foreign policy wonk are the lessons of JFK's presidential leadership and decisionmaking for today's leaders. I appreciated the author's ability to convince the reader how formative the 1962 Sino-Indian War was for the modern contours and balance of power in Asia.

[Amit Tiwary · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is some what let down for me. There is far more better content available on the built up of 1962 Indo-Sino war. JFK's involvement in this war is not detailed may be due to the fact that no more information exists. Plus Pandit Nehru contacted so many other countries including Israel during the crisis and did get help from others. Russia also flexed it muscles on Pakistan and threatened to open fronts if Pakistan got involved in this particular war. So, there are omissions!

What is evident and is proved substantially that India would have benefited much more had JFK lived and completed his term(s). That was so unfortunate for America and India.

Still a good read if you just want to know about JFK's involvement and attitude towards South Asia.

[Nishant Agarwal · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very well researched book about the US and CIA's actions during the 62 war that shaped the current realities in South Asia.

[Sunil · Rating 5 out of 5]

Good shit

[Shantanu Patnaik · Rating 4 out of 5]

Some really unique insights into how US and JFK specifically helped India during the 1962 loss and prevented it from being even more humiliating

[Sudhakar Kadiyala · Rating 5 out of 5]

A reference to the book”JFK’S Forgotten Crisis Tibet,The CIA,And The Sino-Indian War”, in Indian Parliament by Honourable PM on dated 4th Feb 25 made me curious to pick and read the book.The book was written by Bruce Riedel a former CIA official and a Scholar.it’s indeed a tribute to John F Kennedy and his team for playing a crucial role in avoiding a global crisis during Indo-China war of 1962. It was the time when two major western powers were at loggerheads over “Cuba” and simultaneously at the same time two big Asian countries (India & China) were involved in a war.The Cuban crisis completely overshadowed the Indo-China war in which India was badly defeated.The fact that nearly 3968 Indian soldiers of POW were released as against zero POW of China (P141)reflects the China’s total domination and India’s devastating defeat.When Kennedy became the President of USA, he appointed John Kenneth Galbraith (A professor at Harvard)as the ambassador to India who is known to him since his Harvard days.They again came in touch with each other after WWII when they were involved working with Democratic Party and when Kennedy decided to run for presidency he took Galbraith’s advice on domestic and foreign issues.Both of them have the experience of visiting India earlier and coincidentally met Nehru for their respective works and interest.The visit to India and their meetings etc formed a part of briefings and better understanding(P45&46) between them.It was their closeness and understanding of India and its leadership together with their sincere efforts enabled them to stall the Indo-China war from further escalation which otherwise would have resulted in a global crisis.Due to ongoing Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy couldn’t spoke openly about its stakes in South Asia until late November,1962. It was his ambassador, whose statements and actions that has warmed Mao of American resolve to support India(P145).Later after the war and as per US-embassy public relations, it was found that, Indians approval of United States has jumped from 2.5 percent in October 1957 to 62 percent in December I.e. after the war of 1962(P154).Undoubtedly the period can be considered as the “Golden Period “and can be said that the war has improved the relations between the two countries following up with an aid and military support.Nonetheless the military support didn’t go well with Pakistan, who were always against any kind of support to India while linking Kashmir as condition for aid or talks.So a few incidents of initiations from US & UK’s after the war for a peaceful settlement on Kashmir as both feared Pakistan tilting towards China(P150) didn’t go well with both the countries.Though the talks started earnestly but India felt the sense of betrayal by Pakistan for its deal with China(P153-155).Besides, the cutoff of aid in 1965 followed by the election of Nixon as President who was Pro-Pakistan weakened the relations between the two countries.
A few notable lines from the book as regards to Kennedy,Pandit Nehru and India’s defeat with some interesting anecdotes are—
1)JFK strongly viewed India as supporting,” dignity and individual freedom “ as against,Red China which represents ruthless denial of human rights(P49).
2) Kennedy was regarded as “Big brother and a true friend of India”, by none other than one of the Indian General and Brigadier Dalvi(P3&144) and significantly after the above statement by the Brigadier,the Chinese withdrew unilaterally within two days.Dalvi later wrote in one of his books that the Chinese withdrawal was the direct result of President Kennedy’s decisive action.
3)Kennedy was also instrumental in stopping Pakistan to attack India during Indo-China war.His message to Ayub Khan and a similar message that followed from Prime Minister Macmillan made Pakistan not to take advantage of India’s vulnerability,else the results would have been much catastrophic(P138).
3))To support India win arms race against China he suggested NATO allies along with Japan an aid of $1 billion per year. He strongly considered that it was the duty of “free world” to help India outshine “Red China”.(P50).
4)In his historical speech of 1959,JFK said that ,”We want India to win” & as president he had greatly stepped up economic aid to India while firmly refusing to be blackmailed by Pakistan for compensation (General Ayub Khan’s demand to support Pakistan on Kashmir issue)(P-145).
6)In one of his last press conferences in 1963,JFK said that there is nothing that has occupied his attention more than India in the last nine months.
The following lines are as regards to Pandit Nehru and India’s defeat.
India was totally unprepared for the war and it failed to understand China’s intentions.The outbreak of Tibetan Revolt in early 1959 made China to act firmly against them while suspecting the role of India in the uprising of the revolutionaries (P58).The resistance forces of Tibet,who were fighting the mighty PLA were in fact trained at Colorado(with CIA’s assistance)) and later parachuted into Tibet via East Pakistan.
Instead of listening to his Generals on the scene during the war,Nehru listened to the top brass and left for a three day visit to Ceylon.
Inspite of Brigadier Dalvi’s caution of being poorly supplied and short of manpower, he was asked to enter into a battle to defend the country, resulting in loss of lives and land(P113),which every Indian grieve even today.
4)During top secret postmortem of the Indian defeat by the CIA in 1965 that was later declassified — Nehru instead of opposing a deal between a weak Tibet and a strong China, endorsed the deal,surprising the US diplomats(Rusk & Henderson) (P24).
He entered into a treaty concerning Tibet on five principle’s called “Panchsheel”, and that inspite of being cautioned by the intelligence chief Mullick,ceding Indian interests for vague promises and good behaviour from the Chinese.Thus as per the CIA’s report,the Chinese,who meant business played upon Nehru’s anti imperialistic attitude and sincere behaviour .(P25) resulting in a great loss to the country.
5)China strategically planned the war almost three years before, by laying the roads, etc which the Indian side failed to understand(another intelligence failure to understand the motive of an enemy).A fact as told by brigadier Dalvi after his release as a POW.
6)During his meeting with President Eisenhower (Ike) in 1956 Nehru pressed for a permanent seat to China with the right to veto power in UN Security Council which on hindsight today appears to be a big diplomatic blunder by India.
The following are a few interesting anecdotes to read..
1)The visit of senator Ted Kennedy in 1971 who was also a strong supporter of India like his brother and on an occasion when asked by the then opposition leader in parliament Atal Bihari Vajpayee, as when Ted is going to become the president of USA? Ted replied that ,”he liked this kind of question”. (P170).)(reflecting the support for Kennedy’s then).
2)Similarly the visit of Indira Gandhi to NEFA(North Eastern Frontier Authority)(P143) during the thick of fighting earned her the reputation of a remarkable courageous woman, and the glimpses of the same could be seen in 1971 of Indo-Pak war.
3)JBK visited many places in India like the Jaipur palace,Tajmahal,Udaipur,Varanasi etc and particularly her visit to a jewellery shop in Jaipur where the owner helped her to buy something for her husband which she was looking for,makes the reading interesting.At all places she had a warm welcome and her entire trip was also covered in TOI news paper then.
4) During the visit of the First Lady,Jacqueline Bouvier Kennedy(JBK),Nehru insisted her to stay in prime ministers guest house (it was the same suite often used by Edwina Mountbatten ),who also stayed at the same place during her frequent visits to India after Independence. Perhaps,Edwina and Nehru were at least close friends if not more but here “Jackie was getting Nehru’s complete attention”(P80) and he even had a picture of himself strolling with JBK displayed all by itself in the main entrance hall of his house(P78)(An interesting fact to know and read)
5)Nehru has the unusual habit of tapping his fingertips together and looking up at the ceiling, whenever he gets bored in a conversation(P48).Before becoming the President JFK once met Nehru when he visited India and requested an audience with prime minister Nehru through US embassy in New Delhi.It was recalled later by The First Lady (JBK)that within ten minutes of their meeting ,Nehru started tapping his fingertips reflecting his boredom.However according to another account Nehru has shown more interest in Pat Kennedy (JFK’s attractive 27 year old sister) than Jack or Bobby,during the meeting.(another interesting anecdote for reading and speculation).
Unfortunately the assassination of JFK slowly started taking a U-turn in Indo- US relations and were further deteriorated during the period of Nixon as president .He was a strong supporter of Pakistan and a firm critic of Nehru since the time ,he was VP under IKE’s presidency.He expressed the view that being neutral or non-aligned is immoral(P47),on Nehru’s non-aligned policy.Further the US stoppage of aid to India , the support to Pakistan during Nixon’s period etc made India to lean towards USSR which supported India unconditionally with out involving Kashmir issue.
Overall an extraordinary book based on interesting historical facts that goes with excellent narration.

[Nitin Thakur · Rating 5 out of 5]

A genuine piece of Historical Research and Analytical work. This is the first work of Bruce Riedel I read and I must say, it really took me back to the past. I was able to feel the stress, must have developed in the minds and hearts of leaders, may it be American or Indian, during the emergent years of so called Cold War. The simultaneous happening of the Indo-Sino war of 1962 and Cuban Crises shocked the leaders.

My main motive behind it was to look back the first confrontation between India and China, as History is the best source to learn after all. Many people believe, and so what I learnt since childhood, that China attacked us. Though, as an Indian Citizen one can't challenge the fact, but now I really believe it was either provocation or deterrence by Indian side. Provocation I call just to the fact of the " Ill prepared 'Forward Policy' by the former PM". I don't understand why PM Nehru was so reluctant to put China into a suspicion list and infant kept on appeasing China on the Tibetan issue. The factor I understand behind it could be the Past Imperialistic Dominance experience and PM Nehru was way to obsessed with criticising The West and did not took China seriously even after Intelligence Bureau's Chief B.N.Mullick's cautioning. After all, thats what experts are there to advice which in fact were refuted during the initial hours of 1959.

Furthermore, I really question the motive of putting Forward Policy in place when the army was not yet ready. The step behind the policy, to a great sense, seemed provocative to China. China very cautiously planned each and every stepped and I am sure they only pulled back after US, UK, Canada and Japan came for the Indian aid. China, in no sense would have stopped unilaterally, US wouldn't have jumped into the conflict.

On the part of Pakistan, it was a golden opportunity to gain the Kashmir. They are way to obsessed with it, as if they don't have any other thing to do in the world. I feel that it was the best time to negotiate Kashmir, but thanks to miscalculations by Ayub Khan which lost the prospects of even the talks. India was ready to accept LOC as International Boundary, which was logical without much hurting the National Pride. Ayub went way too ambitious and wanted to extend it further. Later he must have regretted the move, after 1965 war, as why would one negotiate after winning the war??
India is still generous and offers to still talk over the issue bilaterally.

For Americans, especially President Kennedy, was and is a Hero. He managed the issues so delicately, though he was lucky to have by his side the best man Mr.Galbraith, and saved the continent from a WW III.

A great thanks to the Author for bringing out detailed and analytical work.

[Rajeev · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book was recommended by the Hon’ble Prime Minister of India in a speech delivered on the floor of the Parliament in the first week of February 2025. He was winding up the debate in the budget session of the Lok Sabha. He was energetically responding to the opposition Congress Party, whose leader, Rahul Gandhi had raised several allegations against the Government accusing it of pusillanimous behaviour in their dealing with the Chinese. It was at this juncture that Narendra Modi mentioned Bruce Reidel's book and advised the Opposition to read it to get enlightened about how the revered leader Jawaharlal Nehru had dealt with the Chinese. I don’t think this book could have got a better promotion and I am sure that several Indians would have laid their hands on the book and read it. And let me tell you, I am profoundly thankful to the Prime Minister for recommending this book!!
I had not read any book on John F Kennedy before this one. I know that he is one President who is loved and revered by Americans even to this day. Of course, all the conjectures and conspiracy theories surrounding JFK’s assassination are still rife even after six decades of the incident. Bruce Reidel paints a largely positive picture of President Kennedy. Riedel’s long association with the CIA would have got him access to a lot of classified material which in turn would have helped him in no small measure in authoring this book.
The unique feature of this book is that it brings out the interplay of international relations between India, Pakistan, China and the United States. Each country tried to protect its interests and there was a lot of subterfuge involved, more so in the case of the China-Pakistan “iron friendship”. It is obvious that Nehru was a romantic and an idealist and he continued to pander to the Chinese even when it was obvious that they never had any soft corner for the Indian State. The Chinese thought that the Indians were creating impediments to their irredentist aspirations in Tibet. Bruce Reidel has brought out the double game played by the Pakistanis in this regard. Even as Field Marshal Ayub Khan was cosying up to the Chinese, he was allowing the Pakistani airspace and the airbases to be used by American U2 spy planes thereby facilitating clandestine surveillance on China and Russia by the US Air Force. Playing double games has always been the Pakistani way of conducting international relations and this continues even to this day.
The Cold War with the Eastern Bloc was the defining story of JFK’s presidency. The belligerent attitude of the erstwhile USSR in America’s backyard in Cuba which almost culminated in a third World War is the most remembered crisis of the JFK Presidency. However, the annexation of Tibet by China and the Chinese aggression on India are the other notable crises that occurred during the JFK presidency both of which had the potential to spiral out of control and culminate in a nuclear Armageddon.
JFK is much lauded for the way he handled the crisis in Cuba. Nikita Khrushchev of the USSR was at his belligerent best when he moved close to 10,000 troops to the US’ backyard in Cuba in 1962. The Bay of Pigs crisis, as it is known, is a well-documented incident in the annals of world geopolitics. Alarmingly, the Russians moved their nuclear-tipped missiles to Cuba virtually bringing the whole of the US under an imminent nuclear threat. It was through skilful negotiations, coercion and intimidation that the Americans managed to thwart the Russian aggression and made them withdraw from Cuba. Even though the crisis was defused, Cuba remained a troublesome sore on America’s flank for decades to come. Riedel quotes from authoritative sources how JFK was disillusioned with the American Intelligence community and his geopolitical advisers who led him astray with their wrong assessment of Russian resolve which almost precipitated a nuclear showdown.
The Chinese conundrum was a different ball game altogether. There were fair indications for a long time that China had expansionist ideas with their intentions focused on Tibet and the North East of India. The Indians under Nehru were guilty of not recognising the less-than-honourable intentions of the Chinese. Nehru wanted to project himself as a statesman par excellence but sadly he misread the cunning and guile of the Chinese supremo, Mao Tse Tung. India had to pay a heavy price for it. The Americans tried their level best to put brakes on the Chinese expansionist designs in Tibet. They offered covert support to Tibetan dissidents and requested the Indians to assist them in this endeavour. The Indian response was at best lethargic and half-hearted. It was only a matter of time before the Chinese would be forced to "teach India a lesson" and put Nehru in his place. India offered asylum to the Dalai Lama and this was the proverbial “straw” that broke the camel’s back.
The Chinese were particularly harsh on the Indians. They launched a full-scale frontal attack across the Thagla ridge in NEFA (present-day Arunachal Pradesh) on 20 October 1962. The Indian Army was woefully ill-equipped and unprepared to take on the ruthless might of the PLA. There was an abject failure of strategic leadership in the higher echelons of the Indian Army. The Nehru government was found to be woefully lacking in resolve and leadership and the course of the war was almost decided even as the first bullet was fired. It was the Indian Army that faced the brunt of the marauding PLA and this debacle against the Chinese is something that rankles the national conscience even to this day.
Nehru was taken aback by what he perceived as outright deception by his close Chinese friends. There was a brief lull in the fighting. Reasonably chastened by what he had experienced during the Cuban crisis, JFK consciously did not rely too much on the American intelligence community to deal with the India-China problem. Instead, he reposed his faith in his Ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith. Galbraith was someone who had an affinity to India and it seems that he tried his best to help out the Indians in their hour of crisis. Nehru appealed for Air Force assets from the Americans to counter the Chinese threat. The Chinese resumed their campaign by mid-November 1962 and they advanced along the plains of Assam up to Tezpur. At that juncture, Mao suddenly decided not to advance any further probably due to the impending involvement of the Americans in the conflict and because it was becoming too much for the PLA to maintain long lines of logistics for their invading forces.
Bruce Reidel has painted an embarrassing picture of Nehru. The Americans found him to be a difficult person to deal with. Nehru’s abiding interest in ladies was well-known and well-documented by several historians. His relationship with Lady Mountbatten and its effect on the course of Indian Independence has drawn the attention of commentators. Riedel has quoted extensively from reliable sources about Nehru’s condescending behaviour towards Jaqueline Kennedy, the American First Lady, during her visit to India.
It is not surprising that this book was recommended by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Nehru’s leadership was found wanting on more occasions than one. It is quite possible that whatever decisions arrived at during the crisis were in line with the geopolitical situation existing at that time. It is easy to criticise in hindsight. However, it is also important for the nation to appreciate and identify the mistakes we have committed in the past as we do not have the luxury to repeat them. JFK’s Forgotten Crisis is a highly recommended work – especially for those who like to delve into contemporary history and geopolitics.

[Arjun K · Rating 5 out of 5]

Best book that every one in India must read. In India everyone knows that we lost war with China in 1962. But we do not have much knowledge about 1962 war or any war after 1947 for that matter. Our history books in schools starts from BE till British empire that ended in 1947. I was always interested why we lost the war and influences that outside super powers that played a role in it. This author is obviously writing in perspective of an American but he is unbiased in praise and criticism as well.

Book is very informative and also gives a good picture on decision making process in USA, India and China. I am also amazed that how one man (US Presidents) can shape history. Kennedy wanted to have good relationship with India but successors wanted to have good relationship with Pakistan and China. Two countries that do not share any values with USA. Pakistan being an Islamic republic and China a communist country. Whereas India a democratic country that shares much of values on democratic system, Institution, Law and order international systems, Human right does not have a good relations with USA.

Pakistani who received a lot of support (Military as well as Humanitarian aid) supports terrorist organisations that has killed American citizens as well as its military personnels. India has been a victim of Islamic terrorists even before they targeted the Americans through embassy bombings in Lebanon and Africa and 9/11 and then in Afganisthan.

Again I reiterate anyone and everyone who are interested to know about history of 1962 war needs to buy this book.

[Arjun warrier · Rating 5 out of 5]

Written after considerable research and backed up with distinct references. As an Indian it is fascinating to have a different perspective as to how the geopolitical scenario in South Asia was influenced by the leaders of four great Nations. The consequences of decisions taken by then leaders in the prevailing situation has attributed to the present Asian power struggle. The authors writing is lucid and creates an impression that the world would have been far different if it wasn't for untimely demise of two exceptional leaders. It leaves the reader wondering as to whether the prevailing arms race between China, India and Pakistan would be prevalent if these leaders would have achieved their long term plan? The support from United States , UK and alligned nations was vital towards India's ability to stand on its a feet and that too after decades of being a victim of British imperialism. The book also highlights upon the bonhomie relations between United States and India in the early 1950s and 1960s. The book is not aligned to any country in particular and showcases the temperament and endurance achieved by John F Kennedy's leadership during one of the most testing times for the United States. His ability to coerce and negotiate deals which may have obviated the world from plunging into the Third World War.

[GrabAsia · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very interesting parallel to the contemporary situation of a missile crisis facing the US (N Korea now, Cuba then), and a simultaneous stand-off between India & China (resulting in war October 1962 and nearly that, today).
It shows how JFK learnt not too depend entirely on his military advisors (who said the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, planned before JFK took office in Jan 1961, should be launched, and it turned out to be a disaster). In the Cuban missile crisis game of chicken, Khrushchev blinked first and backed down.

The Tibetan crisis that resulted in the Indo-China war of late 1962, gave India a bloody nose from which Prime Minister Nehru never recovered, dying a broken man in 1964. Swathes of Indian territory was lost (Aksai Chin) and more at the mercy of China (North-Eastern India). The military situation hasn't changed much after 55 years, with Chinese forces and, more importantly, infrastructure, being stronger. The only difference is that Pakistan is much less of a military threat now than it was then. The other reason that President Xi of China probably didn't up the ante further in 2017 was the economic impact of an Indo-Chinese war, that would hurt too much.

A startling reminder of how history repeats itself.

[Peter · Rating 2 out of 5]

I thought the cover image and information sounded intriguing but I was turned off almost immediately by the prologue. The author's writing style is plodding and filled with irrelevant information (such as Mrs. Kennedy giving Dulles a copy of From Russia With Love). I also felt like some of the information was questionable. For example, Riedel mentions Kennedy settling in Camelot in his early days as president but I recall that his time as president was not referred to as Camelot until after his assassination. Also, the author refers to Jackie as JBK...I have never seen anyone refer to her this way but the author uses this abbreviation as if it is natural.

Admittedly, I did not get far in reading this book. The topic sounds interesting but maybe I need another author to write the book.

[Peter A. van Tilburg · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very well documented report on the Sion-Indian war and how the Kennedy administration responded to that while at the same time the Cuban missile conflict with the USSR was a huge crisis. The author has made a very good job in searching all available published information and reconstruct from that what happened. He succeeded to write a concise but very well understandable report which in addition is also easy to read. Although Chinese and USSR reports are not available he motivates why he thinks that Mao and the USSR acted the way they did.
The book gives a good view on how the political friend-enemy developed in the region and makes clear how until today the arms race keeps both Pakistan and India and China in its grip.
Also the assessment and lessons learned for a US commander in chief are good conclusions.

[Umang · Rating 5 out of 5]

What a great read! US's fear of the spead of communism led it to plan unrest in Tibet. Pakistan's fear of India led it to allow the use of its territory for US to run those covert operations in return of sophisticated weapons. India's fear of becoming a tool of the West resulted in its staying non-aligned and aloof from realities of the world. Chinese suspicion of US & India causing problems in Tibet and India's own missteps led to the 1962 war.

In the end we can say that when shit hit the fan for India - US stood up for India. This brief episode also started the slow pace of India and US coming close, something Mao was very paranoid about not letting happen.

[R Venkitachalam · Rating 4 out of 5]

Recently in the Lok Sabha, Narendra Modi made a book recommendation while moving the vote of thanks to the President, not to me, but to the Opposition leaders. He asked them to read this all-important book on foreign affairs “JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA and the Sino – Indian War” written by renowned foreign policy analyst, Bruce Reidel. I do not know if Rahul Gandhi followed the PM’s recommendation. I did. In my growing up years, much before I was trained to survive corporate politics, there were very few world leaders who commanded our attention and admiration – one was John F Kennedy, and the other was Jawaharlal Nehru. If one was inspirational, the other was aspirational. Suddenly the book became a must-read for me. Here is my review of the book.

A good author with exceptional leaders as subject matter, even without a recommendation from the PM I would have reached out for the book if I knew such a book existed. I am glad that I read the book; but not so much for how it was written. It helps one to understand the broad contours of foreign policy as it was applicable in those tumultuous days of Cuban missile crisis and the Indo-China war. There is nothing great to write home about the writing style of the author. The book falls between a wartime journal without the intricate details of an ongoing battle and not really a salacious one as you would find in fiction. No doubt the events brought back memories of those days Bay of Pigs, John Kenneth Galbraith, Ayub Khan, Jacqueline Kennedy, Mao Tse Tung, etc. etc., just to name a few. Now let us look at some of the contentious facets between India and China as written in the book:

“As tensions with China mounted after the Dalai Lama fled into exile in India in 1959, Nehru and his advisers gradually implemented what became known as the “Forward Policy” of sending Indian military forces forward into contested and disputed territory with China. India had been building up its intelligence presence along the border for more than a decade, but in the early 1960s it began to create military outposts behind the Chinese troops in the disputed land, so as to cut off their supplies and force their return to China. This action led some scholars, most notably the Australian journalist and author Neville Maxwell, to argue, “It was Nehru, not the Chinese, who declared war.”

"The Forward Policy was never formally reviewed and approved as such by the Indian government; rather it grew from a series of incremental decisions and events. It was also more of a statement of political resolve than a military strategy: The Indian army was never given the means to effectively implement it. Because India's major dispute with China was over territory in the Aksai Chin portion of Kashmir that India claimed and China controlled, it was there that the Forward Policy was most vigorously prosecuted and confrontations with the Chinese were the most volatile. The extremely harsh terrain in Aksai Chin made it a formidable challenge for Indian troops, and the logistics of supplying forward posts was extremely difficult. Later India implemented the Forward Policy in the northeastern region where India occupied the disputed territory claimed by China. Violent incidents became more and more common on both fronts”. For Nehru and Krishna Menon, the defense minister the Forward Policy was not a “military challenge to a far stronger power, but the necessary physical extension of a subtle diplomatic game”.

There are some anecdotal quotes that I found interesting. In one place Jacqueline Kennedy talks of Mrs Indira Gandhi. According to her the latter was “a truly bitter woman, a real prune – bitter, kind of pushy, horrible woman. It always looks like she’s been sucking on a lemon”. John Kenneth Galbraith, the then Ambassador of the US comes across as the real hero behind the throne (remember that tall and lanky gentleman? According to the book he was a key policy counsellor for not only the US President but also the Indian Prime Minister. Galbraith is there all over the place in the book and comes across as a top-class diplomat, a species that is almost extinct today.

Another important quote from the book: “the Soviet Union had failed India and so had the nonaligned world”. The latter part of the book describes the plight of the country’s then popular Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the humiliation that he had to suffer.

Here is another interesting (and also revealing) quote from the book: “Zulfikar Bhutto visited Washington in October 1963. The Pakistani foreign minister had deservedly earned a reputation in the United States as being pro-China and anti-America. In a bid to flatter the young Bhutto, Kennedy remarked that if Zulfi (Bhutto's nickname) were an American, he would be serving in JFK's cabinet. Zulfi responded that if he was really an American, he would be President and JFK would be in his cabinet. This response was the final irritant in Kennedy's relations with the Pakistani leadership”- Moral of the story: You don’t mess with people at the high table!
Finally, let me sign off with this quote from the book – the very last paragraph. “JFK proved to be the ultimate crisis manager in 1962. His deft handling of two global crises simultaneously involving the two great communist adversaries of the United States was a tour de force of policymaking at the highest level. America, India and the world were lucky to have JFK and Ken in 1962”.

I am glad I read the book. Thank you, Mr. Prime Minister, for your book recommendation. It took me to another time and another world.

Thank you.

[Pabitra Das · Rating 5 out of 5]

Brilliant

This is an excellent and not so highlighted analysis of the events. Nehru and JFK in a new light. I recommend this book to everyone interested in history. Nehru was a great Indian leader and human being. And like any other human being, he had faults. This book is really excellent in depicting this great man tearing apart and re-organizing himself in the middle of a great crisis. Very well researched, easy to follow and like a fictionally non fiction.

[George Hodgson · Rating 5 out of 5]

A bit fawning at times but a good account of a forgotten event in history. Had either the Sino-Indian or the Cuban Missile Crisis been handled differently by Kennedy it would have been catastrophic. This is how adults handle crises.

[Arnab Maity · Rating 5 out of 5]

Beautiful and thoroughly informative!

[Mobeen warraich · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent read, thoroughly enjoyable.

[Varunkumar · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book by a former American diplomat on India-China war of 1962 was referred by PM Modi in his parliamentary speech while discussing Chinese aggression. Rich with description of events as they unfolded day by day, the book provides insights into what is till date the biggest post-independence debacle India has ever faced.

Distracted by Cuban missile crisis that began on the same day of Chinese invasion, JFK left management of Indian crisis to his trusted foreign policy advisor and Ambassador to India, Kenneth Galbraith. Unlike his predecessors and his successors, JFK was unabashedly pro-India and his decision reflected it clearly. Had his life, not been curtailed by his assassination, India-US relations and the entire geopolitical situation globally would have been much different.

Book mentions two secret letters from Nehru to JFK which remained classified till 2010 on requests made by Indian government to US during war. They show the extent to which situation on the Indian side had deteriorated. Indian leadership had reached conclusion that entire eastern India was lost to China and Nehru frantically was requesting, among other things, 12 squadrons of the US airforce and 10000 soldiers to support Indian war effort stationed within India. To imagine this fact in juxtaposition of how we then ended up on the side of USSR and against the US, and to imagine all the lost opportunities that entailed, is a gut-wrenching endeavour.

Book is a recommended read for all history buffs, none less by the PM Modi himself.