Treatise on Happiness

by Thomas Aquinas, John A. Oesterle (Translator)

The Treatise on Happiness and the accompanying Treatise on Human Acts comprise the first twenty-one questions of I-II of the Summa Theologiae. From his careful consideration of what true happiness is, to his comprehensive discussion of how it can be attained, St. Thomas Aquinas offers a challenging and classic statement of the goals of human life, both ultimate and proximate. This translation presents in accurate, consistent, contemporary English the great Christian thinker's enduring contributions on the subject of man's happiness.

Genres: Philosophy, Theology, Nonfiction, Religion

224 pages, Paperback

First published January 31, 1991

About the author

Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, a Dominican friar and theologian of Italy and the most influential thinker of the medieval period, combined doctrine of Aristotle and elements of Neoplatonism, a system that Plotinus and his successors developed and based on that of Plato, within a context of Christian thought; his works include the Summa contra gentiles (1259-1264) and the Summa theologiae or theologica (1266-1273).

Saint Albertus Magnus taught Saint Thomas Aquinas.

People ably note this priest, sometimes styled of Aquin or Aquino, as a scholastic. The Roman Catholic tradition honors him as a "doctor of the Church."

Aquinas lived at a critical juncture of western culture when the arrival of the Aristotelian corpus in Latin translation reopened the question of the relation between faith and reason, calling into question the modus vivendi that obtained for centuries. This crisis flared just as people founded universities. Thomas after early studies at Montecassino moved to the University of Naples, where he met members of the new Dominican order. At Naples too, Thomas first extended contact with the new learning. He joined the Dominican order and then went north to study with Albertus Magnus, author of a paraphrase of the Aristotelian corpus. Thomas completed his studies at the University of Paris, formed out the monastic schools on the left bank and the cathedral school at Notre Dame. In two stints as a regent master, Thomas defended the mendicant orders and of greater historical importance countered both the interpretations of Averroës of Aristotle and the Franciscan tendency to reject Greek philosophy. The result, a new modus vivendi between faith and philosophy, survived until the rise of the new physics. The Catholic Church over the centuries regularly and consistently reaffirmed the central importance of work of Thomas for understanding its teachings concerning the Christian revelation, and his close textual commentaries on Aristotle represent a cultural resource, now receiving increased recognition.

Reviews

[Kenneth · Rating 5 out of 5]

Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologica addresses the question of human happiness in the Treatise on Human Happiness. Parts of the definitions he provides or systematic explanations contained therein can perhaps appear at first to be counter-intuitive when seen through the worldly fashion of “common” sense. For instance, Aquinas is uncompromising on the notion of perfect happiness necessitating the Last End of human existence, namely, God. God, for Aquinas, is an uncreated perfection that cannot be fully possessed short of the perfection of the human person in Heaven. Therefore, Aquinas reasons that no created good can satisfy the desire for ultimate fulfillment. Only the perfect Creator can grace the human creature with the perfect happiness that Aquinas en-visions in the Summa (I-II, q. 5. a. 3).

Aquinas reasons, by examining the nature of the world in which he lives, that the perfection of human happiness is not in this life. By way of deduction he concludes that perfect happiness can therefore only potentially lie in the hereafter, that is, dependent on the just desserts of Heaven or Hell or Purgatory. For Aquinas, suffering or the inherent imperfections of human nature (sin) as well as the natural imperfections of lesser created “goods” will be replaced with the ultimate satisfaction of “the Good” itself through, with or in, God in Heaven. Aquinas concludes in the Treatise on Human Happiness that the perfection of human fulfillment is the uncreated God who is not or cannot be satisfactorily had in earthly existence (I-II, q. 5 a. 1).

Aquinas spells out in the Treatise his position with regard to the various rival goods of life. He hierarchically orders created goods from the least fulfilling goods to those that in this life begin to approximate the eternal perfection of human happiness in Heaven. Goods that Aquinas lists in the Treatise on Human Happiness include the following: wealth, honors, fame or glory, power, bodily goods (health), pleasure (carnal), goods of the soul (virtue), or created goods in general (immanent human flourishing). Each is dealt with in turn, then relegated to the realm of imperfect goods by way of identifying faults that leave the good ultimately imperfectly satisfying for the human person (I-II, q. 2 a. 1-8). Aquinas deduces with what is essentially a “process of elimination” that perfect happiness is nothing other than God. There is no perfect happiness with God here, so perfect happiness is in Heaven.

Tension arises in Aquinas' account with regard to the prominence of the Last End of human happiness being placed in an altogether different category from immanent human flourishing. A prudent question with regard to Aquinas' position on human happiness is whether he is right to finalize imperfect happiness relative to his overriding concern with absolute fulfillment that is not here, but with God in an essentially different mode of existence in Heaven. God in Heaven is the sole means by which the human person is made perfectly fulfilled. However, that Heaven is “perfect” happiness via the uncreated “Good” that is God means that Aquinas' vision of the afterlife is contingent on the uncreated grace of God being inaccessible to the finite human person in this world in the same manner that Aquinas imagines happiness in Heaven to be perfect (I-II, q. 3. a. 1).

Labeling imperfect the happiness of immanent human flourishing, or the excellence of virtue, or the enjoyment of created goods, is contingent on whether Aquinas is right about the essence of Heaven's qualitative distinction from the known world with regard to happiness. What Aquinas calls imperfect goods can be aspects of the perfect Good when the perfect Good is present in this life in the same way here that it is in Heaven via the uncreated grace that Aquinas believes distinguishes Heaven. Aquinas is often interpreted to understand created goods of imperfect earthly happiness in terms of created graces that perfect the imperfections of human nature (I-II q. 112 a. 1). For Aquinas, human nature exists apart from the grace that God creates, while the grace that God creates is not God Himself in essence (which is reserved for the perfection of Heaven) but rather another mode of participation in the created world that remains fundamentally imperfect without the Final End.

Division into perfect or imperfect happiness in Aquinas is highly speculative. There is admittedly no intrinsic error with speculative philosophy, especially regarding the Scholastic project. Nevertheless, tension does arise when a fundamental part of Aquinas' Treatise on Happiness is contestable or problematic. For example, Aquinas holds that final or perfect happiness is “nothing else” than the vision of the divine essence (I-II q. 3. a. 8). That perfect happiness is rare albeit possible in this life is denied by Aquinas based on the conclusion that human nature cannot see or have the divine essence. The divine essence is the uncreated grace that for Aquinas is God's perfection unencumbered by the imperfections of the finite creation.

One can test Aquinas' position by the same means of deduction by which the conclusion that perfect happiness is only in Heaven is reached. In other words, using Aquinas' own criteria of judgment, the ideal of perfection being possible in this life can be examined when the field of happiness is narrowed to essential imperfections that Aquinas believes cannot be surpassed without first altering the world into another realm that permits perfect human happiness. The list of imperfect goods is worth summarizing to demonstrate the point.

First, Aquinas discounts wealth for being an instrumental means to other ends. Hoarding money is essentially dissatisfying when considered apart from usage (I-II q. 2. a. 1). Moreover, Aquinas eliminates honors, fame or glory, for being contingent on the opinions of others in much the same way. Favor from others is relatively desirable but cannot fulfill the person in the ultimate manner that Aquinas means (I-II q. 2. a. 2-3). Likewise, power is rejected for having no intrinsic perfection beyond the uses toward which the power is used. Similar to money, power is satisfying or dis-satisfying relative to what you do with power or the honor you receive from having power (I-II q. 2 a. 4). Health (bodily good) is necessary for happiness in the same vein that ideal bodily perfection is necessary for happiness. No health means an imperfect physical body with which to perform virtue or enjoy goods (I-II q. 2 a. 5). Moreover, bodily pleasure is the instantiation of this or that good, not “the Good” in and of itself. An instantiation of pleasure is transient by definition not ultimately fulfilling (I-II q. 2 a. 6).

Virtue or the “good of the soul” is the habit of human excellence. For Aquinas virtue is almost ultimate fulfillment, but falls short for being an essentially instrumental perfection for the achievement of some other created good. However, virtue unlike the other imperfect instrumental goods can have every created good or the perfection of happiness in Heaven for an object. Hence, virtue is one of the highest goods for Aquinas (I-II q. 2 a. 7). Finally, Aquinas questions whether any created good whatsoever can provide the perfect happiness that he sees missing from the above. His answer is no (I-II q. 2 a. 8). Created goods cannot be the source of their own perfections but rather only an imperfect part or transient aspect of an uncreated (immutable) transcendent Good, meaning the essence God Himself. The Summum Bonum is God. God is the Summum Bonum. Perfect happiness is in seeing the divine essence or in being perfected by the divine essence by seeing the vision of the divine essence (according to Aquinas' understanding of the divine). Perfect happiness is nowhere but in Heaven. That that is so is the key question that is being addressed.

Aquinas can be challenged on the above when his notion of Heavenly perfection is considered more closely. For example, created goods (imperfect aspects of perfect satisfaction) can be perfectly maintained for the duration of terrestrial existence or even into the afterlife. Whether the person knows this or not during the course of his or her life is not the matter. For Aquinas, when death comes or Heaven is reached the attainment of earthly perfection is not lost, but finalized. Ultimate finalization in no way necessitates that perfect happiness is not possible while living in an imperfect world. Perfect satisfaction of every desire can be potentially fulfilled in this life with the possible exception of the desire for God Himself. Absence of the Final End causes Aquinas to disallow perfect happiness short of Heaven. Still, the desire for Heaven can be satisfied in this life by perfect faith. The certainty of Heaven can be attained by perfect grace.

Now, an objection to Aquinas on this vital issue is that there is nothing in the constitution of God's creation that eliminates the potential for perfect happiness amidst imperfect happiness. Aquinas' metaphysical notion of the vision of the divine essence in Heaven differs from the way in which the divine essence can be potentially en-visioned here. Aquinas believes that perfect happiness is not possible when there is an unsatisfied immanent or “transcendent” desire. An assumption is made by Aquinas that desire causes unhappiness so that there can be no desire or will in Heaven. Furthermore, Aquinas states that the observance of God's effects leads the person to desire to know the cause of the effects, who can be known only insofar that He exists, but not in essence. Still, God reveals his essence by way of revelation which is then known or seen with the eyes of faith. The essence of God's goodness, truth or beauty, is known by finite creatures with finite measure here as well as in Heaven.

There is no reason that Aquinas can absolutely reject either by faith or reason the notion that human persons who remain finite creatures in everlasting Heaven will continue to know God in essentially the same way that God is known here. Faith can know God here without doubt provided God's grace. Finite knowing ceases to be finite knowing in one way when the finite creature can know eternally. However, eternal finite knowing in no way necessitates some other means of knowing other than to continue to know the way finite human persons know now without end. Therefore, the same can be said of human happiness when the potential for human happiness is not limited by Aquinas' understanding of what necessitates an “imperfect” happiness in this life relative to the perfect happiness of Heaven. Namely, perfect happiness is possible in this life when the following conditions have been met: 1) there is no privation of imperfect goods 2) Heaven is known by faith 3) Heaven is attained by grace prior to death 4) God's uncreated grace (his essence) is already present in the same way that He will be present eternally in Heaven.

[John · Rating 3 out of 5]

Q: What do a philosopher and a jazz musician have in common? A: They both make it up as they go along.

The title of this book is unintentionally ironic, since reading it is unlikely to bring anyone joy. Of course, any text written in the 13th century needs to be read within its historical context. On the other hand, we are now living in the 21st century, and since this is a work of philosophy -- a work which presumably aims at elucidating ultimate truths -- it is fair game to every manner of criticism which a present-day reader might bring to bear upon it.

Let's start with the fact that Aquinas takes it as a given that his readers are not only familiar with, but are expertly steeped in, the bodies of work of a great number of his predecessors. Thus, the editors of this volume labor under the burden of footnoting copious references which Aquinas seems to have assumed would be immediately recognizable to his readers. Given the era in which this treatise (actually just one small fragment of his much larger work, "Summa Theologica") was written, this is not an unreasonable assumption on the part of the author, since only scholars and theologians would have been expected to make up his target demographic.

This, however, points to one of the primary flaws with Aquinas' work: It contains a nearly continuous stream of appeals to various authorities. When he says that, "The Philosopher [Aristotle] states that..." he is assuming not only that the reader recognizes the specific reference within Aristotle's body of work, but that Aristotle's authority is self-evident. The reader is meant to accept Aristotle's authority unquestioningly, as a matter of settled fact. So, too, for Augustine, Dionysius, Boethius, Cicero, Gregory of Nyssa, and numerous other ancient thinkers as well. And naturally, Aquinas takes the Bible as revealed and absolute truth. To suggest that Aquinas should have proven each of his theses from the ground up, on their own merits and using his own words, would risk inflating this already tedious volume ten-fold, however.

Notably absent from Aquinas' references are any to Socrates, or, more precisely, Plato. This is perhaps because one of the points which Plato's body of work strongly suggests is that (as also implied by my epigram, above) philosophy is often mere sophistry raised to the highest level. A skilled philosopher can, in many cases, convince the reader that truth consists of the simple fact that one plus one equals three. A skilled philosopher can, indeed, argue this point so compellingly that it often confounds the reader, just as Socrates often confounded his audiences, turning their own assertions into absurdities with their willing consent and affirmation. Where Aquinas differs from Plato, however, is not that there is no deeper point to be made beneath it all, but that Plato at least had the good sense to write in an entertaining and engaging style. Aquinas, while still employing the Socratic method, follows an inflexible and tedious pattern of first presenting a series of arguments in favor of his antithesis, then a contrary thesis followed by counter-arguments which "prove" his thesis. This quickly becomes mind-numbing, and the contemporary reader is likely to wish that he had settled on either a more concise, or at least a more engrossing, literary form.

Next up is the fact that Aquinas is arguing as a theologian first, a philosopher second. It is my belief that a separation should exist between theology and philosophy, just as it ought to exist between church and state. By positing divine revelation and devotion to God as his ultimate truths, Aquinas takes the same easy way out which theologians have enjoyed long before and ever since his time. In addition, it is worth noting that he often cites the Bible when demonstrating both his antithesis and his thesis regarding one and the same question. This, in and of itself, points out the self-contradictory nature of Scripture, such that Aquinas' arguments often short-circuit themselves. This tendency also underscores the absurdity of basing one's philosophy upon religious convictions, if, indeed, it is assumed that philosophy is capable of describing any truths of an absolute nature.

Finally there is the fact, alluded to above, that this volume is simply one small piece of a much, much larger body of work. Until well towards the end, the reader is likely to still be wondering what over-arching points Aquinas is trying to make within his seemingly-endless morass of minutiae and hair-splitting. And even when he does tie his arguments slowly together toward the end of this treatise, the reader is left with a nagging sense that a deeper understanding of Aquinas' position would require enormous additional effort. Which, in the case of this particular reader, is unlikely to take place. And that is an absolute truth.

[J.F. Hussey · Rating 5 out of 5]

I read this for an 800-level philosophy class during my Ph.D. studies. St. Thomas' division of the causes of human acts into intention, consequence, circumstance and the act in itself was most helpful.

[Felipe · Rating 3 out of 5]

Treatise on Happiness starts off the second part of Aquina's Summa Thrologica. That said, it is the shortest and maybe the simplest of his work as of now. I will briefly highlight its main point.

All actions aim at some good, which in turn conclusively aim at an ultimate end. This ultimate end is, in its formal aspect, happiness, although that happiness is only achieved through the union with God in the afterlife. Therefore, despite happiness being achievable in the here and now by non believers, true and complete happiness that cannot be lost and satisfies all human needs is ultimately dependent on the union with God and the beatific vision.

The argument he poses is as follows: for an intellect to be perfected, it needs to grasp the essence of some thing, such that it reaches the cause in an unqualified sense, rather than just grasping the effect without understanding the cause. By definition, then, the human intellect is only perfected by understanding the First Cause. Otherwise, it would only grasp the knowledge that God is (the effect), lacking the cause or origin. Accordingly, the perfection of intellect is synonymous with the vision of the divine essence (beatific vision).

[Luke Daghir · Rating 5 out of 5]

Aquinas is the smartest human to ever live. Read this treatise on happiness and that will be made clear to you very quickly. This Saint, this man, understood reality, human nature, and the purpose of life.

Here are my thoughts:

1. Aquinas approaches happiness head first and fearless. The goal of his treatise is to find the answer to what makes us happy.

2. Aquinas was exceptionally gifted at synthesizing ideas and learning from others before him. He presents a very organized report on what others have thought about happiness. Basically, when you read Aquinas you read every smart writer before him and Aquinas does the bulk work of finding what it is you actually ought to know.

3. Give this treatise a read.

[Maureen · Rating 1 out of 5]

repetitive and repetitive.. no new information for me