As one who actively resisted the Vietnam War, I remember the tremendous political and cultural divisions that it created within the United States. It is tragic that this war, which offered an opportunity for a much-needed, honest discussion about America’s interventionist foreign policy and the ideological messianism underlying it, came to be interpreted instead in ways that have resulted in an even more myopic nationalism.
American Reckoning is a balanced, thoughtfully written investigation of how this came to pass. Professor Appy believes that the Vietnam War “still matters” because the crucial questions it raised are still unresolved.
“Should we [the United States] continue to seek global military superiority? Can we use our power justly? Can we successfully intervene in distant lands to crush insurgencies (or support them), establish order, and promote democracy? What degree of sacrifice will the public bear and who among us should bear it? Is it possible for American citizens and their elected representatives to change our nation’s foreign policy or is it permanently controlled by an imperial presidency and an unaccountable military-industrial complex?
“Our answers to those questions are shaped by the experience and memory of the Vietnam War, but in ways that are cloudy and confusing as well as contested. I believe we could make better contributions to our current debates if we had a clearer understanding of that war’s impact on our national identify, from its origins after World War II all the way to the present…
“My main argument is that the Vietnam War shattered the central tenet of American national identity – the broad faith that the United States is a unique force for good in the world, superior not only in its military and economic power, but in the quality of its government and institutions, the character and morality of its people, and its way of life. A common term for this belief is ‘American exceptionalism.’”
Why Did the United States Get Involved in Vietnam?
Our slide into war in Vietnam was neither accidental nor unintended. It was a clear choice, prompted by an unquestioned faith in American’s unique role in the mission of spreading democracy and from the mistaken interpretation of seeing the ongoing Vietnamese national struggle to jettison colonialism as but another manifestation of the sinister intent of communism’s agenda to take over the world.
1) The Driving Ideology of American Exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny
• The widespread, often subconscious, belief in American exceptionalism – the conviction that our divine mandate to spread economic and political “freedom” grants America a unique role to play in the world – is central to the unfolding of U.S. history. Its roots lie in its pre-independence, colonial era when many of its original settlers, having come to the New World to escape religious persecution in Europe, sought to create a new society where religious tolerance and widespread democracy would serve as “a beacon to the rest of the world.”
• As this central myth continued to evolve through passing decades it came to also embrace manifest destiny – the conviction that the United States was destined to expand throughout the continent of North America as well as in the Western Hemisphere. (Two early manifestations of this were the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 and the Mexican-American War of 1848.)
2) Ideological Blinders that Confused Nationalism with Communism
• It is important to remember how the Cold War framed every development in those days. Only scant years after the end of World War II, the world seemed to be divided between two armed camps, the United States and its allies on the one side and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other. American leaders believed that it was their responsibility to take the lead in halting the “spread of communism” wherever it threatened to occur.
• This era was characterized by a relentlessly dualistic process of interpreting the words and actions of “our side” vs. “their side”:
• Because these “two sides” represented completely incompatible values, not only was some kind of violent clash seemingly inevitable, but also any kind of compromise was out of the question. (For, if we were in the right and they were in the wrong, any attempt to “compromise” became equivalent to actual “betrayal.”)
• Nations were either “with us” or “against us,” and other countries were simply either “free” or “communist.” (This is the reason the U.S. often found itself aligned with nation-states controlled by dictators and tyrants.)
• A nation that “fell” into “Communist hands” was a loss to “our side,” while any nation that “chose the side of freedom” was a clear gain for “us.”
After Communist troops defeated Nationalist forces in China in 1949, a shocked American elite realized that it must broaden its focus from threats to Central and Western Europe to include those in Asia as well. This was a key factor behind the U.S. to join South Korea in opposing its invasion by North Korea.
How Did This Lead to United States Involvement in Vietnam?
In 1954, the Geneva Accords forced France to grant independence to Vietnam (originally acquired from China by force in 1885). One of the important provisions of the Geneva settlement stipulated that the country would be separated – for a brief time – into northern and southern zones, a concession to the reality of the situation on the ground. American leaders, who had viewed France as the last bastion against Communism in Southeast Asia, reacted with alarm. If we stood idly by, was South Vietnam, too, destined to “fall” to communism?
Even though the Geneva Accords also provided for a general election in 1956 through which all of Vietnam’s people could determine their own future, the United States joined South Vietnam in declaring that free elections were simply “not possible” as long as the north was under communist rule. Thus, the “temporary” division of Vietnam was morphing into a “permanent” one.
By the early ‘60s, President John Kennedy began to send a small number of “advisers” to assist South Vietnam’s military. Though by early 1963 he was having second thoughts about continuing American involvement there, his assassination in November of that year ended possible changes. Ironically, while both of his successors – Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon – apparently wanted to get out, they feared that if they did so before winning several clear military victories, then outsiders would perceive America as “weak” while the domestic Right would assert that we had now “lost Vietnam” just as we had “lost China.”
So the stream of troops sent to Vietnam became a flood, as did the casualties. It took ten more years before the United States finally withdrew.
What Should Americans Have Learned from the Vietnam War?
• That we need to ditch our secular theology. America is not an “exceptional nation,” nor have we been appointed “sheriff of the world.”
• That the large community of nations have multiple, legitimate understandings of what constitutes the “best” society or the “most desirable” political structure.
• That, with a more fully informed understanding of our own history, we would understand – maybe even apologize for – how often we have intervened in the internal affairs of other nations, often prioritizing the protection our own commercial and political interests instead of the interests or wishes of those other nations’ peoples.
• That our tendency to act on our own has served to weaken the organizations designed to collectively share the burden of maintaining the world’s peace and stability, the same structures that we helped create.
• That American politicians have ill-served citizens by masking or distorting history and by manipulating the public’s belief in American exceptionalism.
• That, because the United States has become the “military-industrial complex” that President Eisenhower warned us about, fundamental policy changes are absolutely necessary if American democracy is to have a chance at survival.
Sadly, however, the profoundly different “lessons” that entered cultural consciousness were a result of multiple, reinforcing layers of misunderstandings, ideological biases and outright deceit, forces that continue to bedevil America in the 21st century.
The Vietnam War did seriously undermine citizens’ confidence in their government. However, under the sway of the far Right, the object of citizen animus has changed from anger over the government’s deceit about the war to a general disbelief in the government’s competence and ability to do anything well. Furthermore, this same interpretation affirms that while the government may be venal and bumbling, the people – and the troops that serve them – remain pure and honorable. (This helps explain why so many citizens block out stories of alleged atrocities by U.S. forces, whether in Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan; clearly, decent people and noble troops cannot commit evil acts.)
America’s failure in Vietnam, therefore, has come to be understood by many Americans to be not a misguided venture – for in trying to “save the people of South Vietnam from the evils of communism” we were being faithful to our moral calling to defend “freedom” – but, rather, a mistake resulting from government incompetence: we should have known better than to get sucked into a land war in Asia.
Many Asian nations are demanding that Japan face up to – and admit the truth of – its imperial misadventures. The United States needs to do the same. Otherwise, the 58,000 American troops – and upwards of 3 million Vietnamese people – killed during the Vietnam War will truly have perished for naught.
[For those interested in delving further, I recommend two additional works: The Untold History of the United States, by Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick, that is a scathingly honest and focused account of the past 100 years, and The Irony of Manifest Destiny: The Tragedy of America’s Foreign Policy, by William Pfaff, which offers meaningful insights into American mythic beliefs.]