Antony Beevor's work is an engaging overview of the Ardennes offensive, Adolf Hitler's "last gamble."
On September 16 1944, the day before Operation Market Garden (a series if battles fought in southern Holland) was launched, Hitler bewildered his entourage at the Wolf's Lair with his decision to counter-attack from the Ardennes. The Führer was determined never to negotiate, explains Beevor. He continued to convince himself that the "unnatural" alliance between the capitalist countries of the west and the Soviet Union was bound to collapse, and he calculated that, instead of being ground down in defensive battles on both eastern and western fronts, a final great offensive stood a far better chance of success. "By remaining on the defensive, we could not hope to escape the evil fate hanging over us,’ explained Generaloberst Alfred Jodl (chief of the Wehrmacht planning staff). "It was an act of desperation, but we had to risk everything."
On the eastern front, an attack with thirty-two divisions would be overwhelmed by the immense forces of the Red Army, reasoned Hitler further; a sudden victory on the Italian front would also change nothing. However, he believed that in the west, by driving north to Antwerp, two panzer armies could split the western Allies, forcing the Canadians out of the war and perhaps even the British in "another Dunkirk"; it would also threaten the war industries of the Ruhr.
As Beevor explains, the Führer had selected Ardennes as the sector for the breakthrough because it was thinly held by American troops. Another great advantage was the thickly forested region on the German side of the frontier, which offered concealment for troops and tanks from Allied airpower. Everything would depend on surprise and on the Allied leadership failing to react quickly enough. Eisenhower, he assumed, would have to consult with the other Allied commanders, and that could take several days.
Ever lacking realism, he wanted to launch the offensive in November, "the period of fogs," although he knew that it would take most of the month to prepare. Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, known as "the Old Prussian," and Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model, commander-in-chief of Army Group B, could hardly have been more different in appearance, tastes and political outlook; yet, even they agreed that Hitler’s "grand slam", or "large solution", was one of his map fantasies, narrates Beevor. They, as well as the rest of the field commanders, realized that fuel was going to be a problem big enough, and of course, soon any hope of keeping to Hitler’s original plan of attacking in November disappeared. Even the beginning of December looked increasingly uncertain – the transport of fuel, ammunition and the divisions themselves was delayed, partly due to Allied bombing of the transport network and partly due to the earlier difficulties of withdrawing formations to prepare. "Hardly a single panzer division found the time and fuel to train many of the novice tank drivers. German forces on the western front had been receiving priority for the replacement of panzers, assault guns and artillery. Waffen-SS divisions received the bulk of the new equipment and had the pick of reinforcements, but even then they tended to be mainly youngsters transferred from the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine," describes the situation Beevor. And tensions between the Waffen-SS and the German army were growing because of Hitler’s insistence on saving SS formations in a retreat while ordinary divisions were left to fight on as a rearguard.
On top of that, Hitler's never-slackening obsession with secrecy further complicated matters. According to his orders, no troops were to be briefed until the evening before the attack, regimental commanders would know nothing until the day before, and no registering of artillery could take place in advance; maps were to be distributed only at the very last moment, for security reasons, and total radio silence was to be observed. Commanders of corps artillery had to reconnoitre all the gun positions themselves. Not surprisingly, remarks Beevor, many officers were soon able to work out that a major offensive was in preparation, since the artillery dispositions alone indicated that the deployments were not for defensive purposes.
Meanwhile, Goebbels "kept repeating the mantra of the Nazi leadership that ‘the political crisis in the enemy camp grows daily’." Yet, many of their most loyal followers were not convinced by this message of hope anymore; they simply felt that there was no choice but to fight on to the bitter end. Beevor cites the shocking words of a captured Waffen-SS Standartenführer: " . . . if the whole German nation has become a nation of soldiers, then it is compelled to perish; because by thinking as a human being and saying – 'It is all up with our people now, there’s no point in it, it’s nonsense' – do you really believe that you will avoid the sacrifice of an appreciable number of lives? Do you think you will alter the peace terms? Surely not. On the other hand it is well known that a nation which has not fought out such a fateful struggle right to the last has never risen again as a nation."
As "X-Day" for the Ardennes approached, continues Beevor, the delays in the delivery of fuel and ammunition became worse – each panzer division needed seventy trains alone – and the attack had to be pushed back to dawn on 16 December.
So far, nobody below the level of corps command had been informed, but SS-Obersturmbannführer Joachim Peiper of the 1st SS Panzer-Division guessed what was afoot on 11 December when Krämer, the Sixth Panzer Army’s chief of staff, wanted to discuss a hypothetical offensive in the region. He asked Peiper "how long it would take a panzer regiment to move eighty kilometres at night." To be sure of his answer, Peiper himself took out a Panther (a German armored tank) for a test run over that distance in darkness, and realized that moving a whole division was a much more complicated matter. What he and his superiors had underestimated, though, was the state of the roads and the saturated ground in the Ardennes.
To say that the German commanders were optimistic about Hitler's gamble would be a huge exaggeration, argues Beevor. When, on September 13, Oberstgruppenführer-SS Sepp Dietrich of the Sixth Panzer Army visited the headquarters of Army Group B, Model said to him that this was "the worst prepared German offensive of this war." Rundstedt noted that out of the thirty-two divisions promised, four divisions were withdrawn just before the attack. While most generals were deeply sceptical of the operation’s chances of success, younger officers and NCOs, especially those in the Waffen-SS, were desperate for it to succeed.
On the evening of 15 December officers were finally allowed to brief their troops. Hauptmann Bär, a company commander in the 26th Volksgrenadier- Division, told his men: "In twelve or fourteen days we will be in Antwerp – or we have lost the war." In the 10th SS Panzer-Division Frundsberg, the briefing on the offensive produced "an extraordinary optimism" because the Führer had "ordered the great blow in the West." They believed that the shock of an unexpected attack would represent a massive blow to Allied morale, explains Beevor, and according to an officer in the highly experienced 2nd Panzer-Division, "the fighting spirit was better than in the early days of the war." Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army alone had more than 120,000 men, with nearly 500 tanks and assault guns and a thousand artillery pieces. As Beevor remarks, "the Allied command had no idea of what was about to hit them on their weakest sector."
One of the great debates about the Ardennes offensive, asserts Beevor, has focused on the Allied inability to foresee the attack. There were indeed many pieces of information which taken together should have indicated German intentions (Right from the start, Hitler’s orders for total secrecy cannot have been followed. Word of the forthcoming offensive even circulated among senior German officers in British prisoner-of-war camps.), but "as in almost all intelligence failures, senior officers discarded anything which did not match their own assumptions," explains he. Plus, the Allies could not believe that the Germans, in their weakened state, would dare to undertake an ambitious strategic offensive, when they needed to save their strength before the Red Army launched its winter onslaught. Such a gamble was definitely not the style of Gerd von Rundstedt, reasoned they. In London, the Joint Intelligence Committee had also concluded that "Germany’s crippling shortage of oil continues to be the greatest single weakness in her capacity to resist." Yet, reveals Beevor, the Allied command had gravely underestimated Hitler’s "manic grasp on the levers of military power."
Another reason why the Germans succeeded in surprising their enemy was that the Ardennes sector was deemed a low priority for air reconnaissance, and as a result of bad weather, very few missions were flown in the region. This is why, when the Germans began bringing new divisions to the sector and then relieving them out for commitment elsewhere, the Allied headquarters wrongly perceived this practice as an indication of Hitler's desire to have this sector of the front remain quiet and inactive.
Thus, when at 05.20 hours on 16 December, ten minutes before "zero hour", the artillery of Sepp Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army opened fire, most American soldiers, "avoiding the chill of damp snow in the sixteen hours of darkness", were asleep "in farmhouses, foresters’ huts, barns and cow-byres." As Beevor explains, German artillery commanders, knowing that American soldiers preferred shelter, always targeted houses, so sentries were instructed to never be in the house by the door, but in foxholes at a short distance away to watch for German surprise attacks. "But it was only when the shells began to explode all around that there was a panic-stricken scramble by the men to extricate themselves from their sleeping bags, and grab equipment, helmets and weapons," writes Beevor.
It was Hitler who had laid down that infantry divisions would make the breakthrough so that the precious panzer divisions would start fully intact farther on. The first reports to reach him were most encouraging – Jodl reported "that surprise had been achieved completely." Indeed, surprise had been achieved, analyzes the situation Beevor, but what the Germans really needed was momentum to turn surprise into "a paralysing shock." However, while some American troops, together with frightened civilians, "lost their heads" and began to save themselves, "in other places there was supreme valor," as an officer in the 99th Division relayed. According to Beevor, these feats of extraordinary courage would slow down the German onslaught with critical results.
Although Hitler refused to face reality until it was far too late, German generals realized that the great offensive was doomed by the end of the first week, reveals the author further. They may have achieved surprise, but they had failed to cause the collapse in American morale that they needed. It was German morale instead which began to suffer. "Officers and men began to show more and more their loss of confidence in the German High Command," wrote Generalmajor von Gersdorff. "It was only the realization of the immediate danger of the homeland and its frontiers, which spurred the troops to increase their effort against an unmerciful enemy." The commander of Panzer Lehr, Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein, described the Ardennes offensive as "the last gasp of the collapsing Wehrmacht and the supreme command before its end."
Fighting in the Ardennes had reached a degree of savagery unprecedented on the western front. The Nazi cold-blooded slaughter of prisoners and civilians was chilling. For instance, Belgian civilians who hadn't flown the onslaught and had resigned themselves to another German occupation, were subjected to indiscriminate arrests and executions because SS Sicherheitsdienst security service was bent on taking revenge for the harassment the retreating German forces had suffered from young Belgians in Resistance groups in September.
The surprise and ruthlessness of Hitler’s Ardennes offensive had brought the terrifying brutality of the eastern front to the west. But, as with the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, the shock of total warfare did not achieve the universal panic and collapse expected. It provoked instead a critical mass of desperate resistance. "When German formations attacked, screaming and whistling, isolated companies defended key villages against overwhelming odds. Their sacrifice bought the time needed to bring in reinforcements, and this was their vital contribution to the destruction of Hitler’s dream," concludes Antony Beevor. "Perhaps the German leadership’s greatest mistake in the Ardennes offensive was to have misjudged the soldiers of an army they had affected to despise."
Another, less known but rather entertaining, part of the narrative deals with the two "special" operations the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) had planned.
The first one concerned the Führer's order of "a parachute attack in the framework of a powerful offensive": Oberstleutnant Friedrich Freiherr von der Heydte was to drop on the first night south of Eupen; the mission was to block American reinforcements coming south from the Aachen sector.
Heydte’s 300 paratroopers dropped, indeed, but the mission was a disaster. Sitting in his forest hideout, Heydte was getting increasingly bitter about the "amateurish, almost frivolous manner displayed at the higher levels of command, where the order for such operations originated". While Dietrich had assured him that he and his men would be relieved within a day, there was no indication of a breakthrough round Monschau, and without radios, there was no hope of discovering the progress of the battle. Not to mention that the paratroopers had so little food left they had to creep up to an American artillery battery to steal some boxes of rations.
Isolated paratroopers and air crew from the scattered drop soon fell into American hands. On 22 December Heydte, by then feeling very ill and utterly exhausted, went into Monschau on his own and broke into a house. When discovered by a civilian, he was relieved when the man told him that he would have to report him to the American military authorities. After a spell in hospital, Heydte was transferred to a prison camp in England. "It was comfortable, but he and other officers held there never realized that their conversations were being recorded," remarks Beevor with a tinge of humor.
The other special operation which the OKW planned was a commando venture, using picked troops in captured American vehicles and uniforms to penetrate Allied lines and cause mayhem in the rear. The infamous SS-Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny, known for his role in Operation Oak (Hitler's raid to save Mussolini), was assigned with supervision of the mission.
Eight of Skorzeny’s nine Jeep teams slipped through American lines on the night of 16 December. They consisted of the best English-speakers, but, as Beevor reveals, even they were not good enough, so some carried vials of sulphuric acid to throw in the faces of guards if stopped. Some groups cut wires and changed road signs. One even managed to misdirect an entire infantry regiment. According to Beevor, however, the greatest success of the operation, combined with Heydte’s disastrous parachute drop, was to provoke an American over-reaction bordering on paranoia – the "idea of German commando troops charging around in their rear areas turned the Americans into victims of their own nightmare fantasies." Roadblocks were set up on every route, greatly slowing traffic because the guards had to interrogate the occupants to check that they were not German. American roadblock guards came up with their own questions to make sure that a vehicle’s occupants were genuine: they included a baseball quiz, the name of the President’s dog, the name of the current husband of Betty Grable, and ‘What is Sinatra’s first name?’ American General Bruce Cooper Clark gave a wrong answer about the Chicago Cubs. "Only a kraut would make a mistake like that," declared the guard. Having been told that he should look out "for a kraut posing as a one-star general", he was convinced he had discovered his man, and Clarke found himself under arrest for half an hour. (Another way of checking was to make the soldier or officer in question lower their trousers to check that they were wearing regulation underwear.)
In summary, "Ardennes 1944" is an outstanding historical work in all aspects. From the experience of soldiers to the day-by-day account of the battle to the logistics of the whole offensive, it is impressively researched, brilliantly detailed, and compellingly told.