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The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy
This classic study is considered essential reading for its analysis of fast aircraft carrier development in WWII. It provides a fascinating record not only of the U.S. Navy's metamorphosis from a battleship-oriented to a carrier-centered fleet, but also of the heated debates that took place over the changing naval strategy. With an insider's grasp of the famous individuals involved, award-winning naval historian Clark G. Reynolds takes readers from the war rooms of Washington to the flight decks of the Pacific. He vividly describes the battles over the concept of fast carriers between the air admirals and battleship admirals and offers little-known details gleaned from personal interviews and private diaries.
740 pages, Kindle Edition
First published March 1, 2008
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About the author
Clark G. Reynolds
18 booksClark Gilbert Reynolds was a historian of naval warfare, with a particular interest in the development of U.S. naval aviation.
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
February 8, 2016
What can I say. A masterpiece of naval history, detailing the build up and devastating use of the US Navy fast carriers during World War II. Its true strength lies in detailing not just the carrier force itself, but the institutional build up of the force, in the face of strong opposition from the old school "battleship admirals". A through and through history of american aeronaval history up through WWII, this book is, in my opinion, one of the definitive cornerstones of naval historic literature.
May sound bombastic, but anyway: this is a must read for anyone with an interest in naval history!
May sound bombastic, but anyway: this is a must read for anyone with an interest in naval history!
May 31, 2017
April is Book Month here in San Antonio so I took the opportunity to attend the Northeast ISD Used Book Sale. As I scoured the history section, I saw a hardback copy of The Fast Carriers by Clark Reynolds -- a book I had read long ago -- and picked it up for the exorbitant price of $1. I probably read this book in high school or maybe as a junior officer. My Dad's stepfather had served on Intrepid post-war (he was on LST-522 during the war) and a high school buddy's father had served on Essex when she was struck by a kamikaze. Back then I certainly read it as an accounting of the decisive role played by naval aviation in the Pacific Campaign.
I considered it somewhat differently with the benefit of at least 30 years, my own experiences in my military and having read several other accounts of the Pacific War. I think I know recognize it now for what it really is -- a recounting of the power struggle within the Navy on which of the tribes -- the surface warfare community, as we call them today -- or the aviators -- will command as well as rule the post-War Navy. Clark certainly follows the role of airpower in the Pacific War and, much like Clay Blair's work on the Army Senior Leaders (Colonels and Generals) in the Korean War, focused on the Senior Navy Officers that fought this war. Included, of course, are the impressive platforms our nation built to prosecute it and the crews which manned them. But was strikes me as amazing, in a sense, is the degree to which officers of these different tribes seemed to pursue parochial interests -- the underlying premise being that 'aviators' were the only officers capable of leading these instruments of power and directing their employment. That this occurred at all in a struggle that we often look back on as 'existential' in relative terms seems to support the supposition that, of course, 'they all hate each other....and they always will.'
After reading it I pulled down my copy of The Quiet Warrior (Spruance's biography) as well as Wouk's recounting of the Battle of Midway in War and Remembrance. What I couldn't help but conclude was that The Fast Carriers only grudgingly admits is that arguably the most important carrier battles were fought and won by 'non-aviators' -- Fletcher (much maligned) at Coral Sea and Spruance at Midway, under the overall direction of Nimitz (a submariner and former BUPERS -- the real power in the Navy). Halsey was really only a 'token' aviator and of mixed reputation and King, the director of it all, was only little more than a 'token' aviator (he had commanded a carrier). Spruance's victory at the Philippine Sea, much maligned and criticized at the time, proved decisive in at least two aspects -- the destruction of the naval air arm of the Imperial Japanese Navy and securing the geographic position that allowed the Atomic attack on Japan (I also just finished listening to Hornfischer's The Fleet at Flood Tide). That the real 'Godfather' of the aviation community remained 'on the beach' throughout the war (Towers) at the direction of King -- reinforcing the notion that cronyism was more powerful than even parochialism -- seems almost immaterial. In fact, as Clark notes, by the time the 'real' aviators were assuming command, their decisive contribution to the war was over.
Finally, as I was reading an account of the Army Air Corps in World War II last night, I stumbled on a passage of lessons learned from the debacle in the Philippines in 1942 -- that many of the Army Aviators deployed forward on that critical mission, '...were great pilots but poor officers." Perhaps this was King's real dilemma.
I considered it somewhat differently with the benefit of at least 30 years, my own experiences in my military and having read several other accounts of the Pacific War. I think I know recognize it now for what it really is -- a recounting of the power struggle within the Navy on which of the tribes -- the surface warfare community, as we call them today -- or the aviators -- will command as well as rule the post-War Navy. Clark certainly follows the role of airpower in the Pacific War and, much like Clay Blair's work on the Army Senior Leaders (Colonels and Generals) in the Korean War, focused on the Senior Navy Officers that fought this war. Included, of course, are the impressive platforms our nation built to prosecute it and the crews which manned them. But was strikes me as amazing, in a sense, is the degree to which officers of these different tribes seemed to pursue parochial interests -- the underlying premise being that 'aviators' were the only officers capable of leading these instruments of power and directing their employment. That this occurred at all in a struggle that we often look back on as 'existential' in relative terms seems to support the supposition that, of course, 'they all hate each other....and they always will.'
After reading it I pulled down my copy of The Quiet Warrior (Spruance's biography) as well as Wouk's recounting of the Battle of Midway in War and Remembrance. What I couldn't help but conclude was that The Fast Carriers only grudgingly admits is that arguably the most important carrier battles were fought and won by 'non-aviators' -- Fletcher (much maligned) at Coral Sea and Spruance at Midway, under the overall direction of Nimitz (a submariner and former BUPERS -- the real power in the Navy). Halsey was really only a 'token' aviator and of mixed reputation and King, the director of it all, was only little more than a 'token' aviator (he had commanded a carrier). Spruance's victory at the Philippine Sea, much maligned and criticized at the time, proved decisive in at least two aspects -- the destruction of the naval air arm of the Imperial Japanese Navy and securing the geographic position that allowed the Atomic attack on Japan (I also just finished listening to Hornfischer's The Fleet at Flood Tide). That the real 'Godfather' of the aviation community remained 'on the beach' throughout the war (Towers) at the direction of King -- reinforcing the notion that cronyism was more powerful than even parochialism -- seems almost immaterial. In fact, as Clark notes, by the time the 'real' aviators were assuming command, their decisive contribution to the war was over.
Finally, as I was reading an account of the Army Air Corps in World War II last night, I stumbled on a passage of lessons learned from the debacle in the Philippines in 1942 -- that many of the Army Aviators deployed forward on that critical mission, '...were great pilots but poor officers." Perhaps this was King's real dilemma.
April 9, 2010
The first time I thought about picking this book up was in 1992 when I saw it at the UCONN CO-OP. I didn't buy the book though I should have. I finally got around to reading the book in 2010 and was pleasantly surprised by the book. I have read Clark Reynolds material before and found it nothing but hero worship for Admiral Joseph J "Jocko" Clark. I was expecting more of the same with Fast Carriers instead it was a well thought out, researched and clearly articulated history and interpretation of the Fast Carrier Task Forces.
If you are picking this book up for a ship by ship summary then you will be disappointed. This is the history of the evolution of a doctrine and naval theory. While that sounds dull Reynolds is equal to the task of making the subject interesting and relevant to a study of the WWII Pacific campaigns. What he does well is interweaves the beginning of the doctrine into its first practices to intra-service fights about the role of aviation to the maturing of the doctrine to the implementation of the doctrine. He does this with a gift of a fine historian with a nice pace and a historian's wisdom of what to include and what to exclude.
While I disagree with the conclusion that the Fast Carriers were the reason for victory (they were a part of a team that won not the only part of that equation) the majority of his conclusions are solid with a wealth of support. Reynolds doesn't hold his punches on his feelings towards the admirals he is studying primarily Fleet Admiral Halsey and Vice Admiral McCain. What was refreshing was even though he has a distinct bias for the Fast Carriers he recognizes as a good historian that after May 1945 the mission for them was for the most part gone.
The only other slight complaint is a style complaint about him over identifying with his subjects. He knew many of these men and used their nicknames often. This detracts from the book because the reader needs the information about the topic and the nicknames while shows familiarity doesn't help with the knowledge of the topic.
This is a book that will be on my bookshelf and re-read. I can't believe it took me eighteen years to read such a fine book.
If you are picking this book up for a ship by ship summary then you will be disappointed. This is the history of the evolution of a doctrine and naval theory. While that sounds dull Reynolds is equal to the task of making the subject interesting and relevant to a study of the WWII Pacific campaigns. What he does well is interweaves the beginning of the doctrine into its first practices to intra-service fights about the role of aviation to the maturing of the doctrine to the implementation of the doctrine. He does this with a gift of a fine historian with a nice pace and a historian's wisdom of what to include and what to exclude.
While I disagree with the conclusion that the Fast Carriers were the reason for victory (they were a part of a team that won not the only part of that equation) the majority of his conclusions are solid with a wealth of support. Reynolds doesn't hold his punches on his feelings towards the admirals he is studying primarily Fleet Admiral Halsey and Vice Admiral McCain. What was refreshing was even though he has a distinct bias for the Fast Carriers he recognizes as a good historian that after May 1945 the mission for them was for the most part gone.
The only other slight complaint is a style complaint about him over identifying with his subjects. He knew many of these men and used their nicknames often. This detracts from the book because the reader needs the information about the topic and the nicknames while shows familiarity doesn't help with the knowledge of the topic.
This is a book that will be on my bookshelf and re-read. I can't believe it took me eighteen years to read such a fine book.
December 29, 2025
I'm a nut about aircraft carriers and the war in the South Pacific, and I think this is the best book I've ever read on the subject. The author starts with the development of fast carriers in the 20's and 30's, then talks about the early days of World War II when both the Japanese and American navies knew they had a powerful offensive weapon, didn't quite know how to use it. He finishes with America's success in developing carrier task forces and Air Admirals. If you are interested in this subject, you can't do better than this in one volume.
Second Read: My opinion hasn't changed with my second reading.
Second Read: My opinion hasn't changed with my second reading.
July 19, 2019
Great account of the Air Admiral’s that Commander the US Navy Carrier task forces in the Pacific in WWII. Not a nuts and bolts account but rather an account of the change in the Navy from a battleship oriented focus (the Gun Club) versus the upstart Cartier men that believed that naval offensive power had shifted to AirPower as embodied by the Fast Carriers. It’s amazing how the US Navy expanded so dramatically after Pearl Harbor, and how that weapon destroyed Japan’s Navy and greatly facilitated their defeat. What the book doesn’t have is accounts from the deck plate level, but wasn’t written with that in mind, so I have issues with that. Good account of the senior Navy leadership, and the “Battles of Washington” That determines the course of the war.
August 5, 2021
I found Reynolds to be a well below standard instructor who should have focused on teaching - as he was employed to do - rather than all his derivative writings and biased, inane deskside nautical musings. He was a waste of time and resources for a student, and he was reported for his substandard teaching practices to the College and, as unfortunately necessary, to appropriate post-secondary academic and administrative oversight entities. Also, should someone misconstrue his career from his various biographies, he had no credible military service, nor, evidently, did he serve in the Vietnam War... . His "PDB" writing is reflective of the nature of that prickish knave, and I would recommend the book Imposters in the Temple (Anderson,1996) to him and his ilk.
March 11, 2019
It is sad that Clark Reynolds is no longer with us. This is one of the last books he wrote and it is a must read for anyone interested in the development of carrier aviation. Reynolds goes deep into the issues leaders of Naval Aviation in the 30s and during WWII had to face to turn it into one of the most powerful forces in the world. Reynolds also gets into the personalities and the clashes that drove assignments. Sometimes they were good, sometimes bad, but he describes how the Navy learned and grew from it.
Well done Clark!!!
Well done Clark!!!
July 14, 2024
I liked The Fast Carriers even though it contains an extraordinary amount of minutiae. The book provides a detailed account of the naval war in the Pacific and evaluates the admirals and personalities. Some don’t fare as well as others in Reynolds’ final summation and whether or not you agree with him, there are very valid points made.
May 22, 2021
Probably the best book concerning the development and strategic use of fast carriers and their task forces. Mostly concentrates on command and relationships among the brass but well worth the read.
August 9, 2012
How the Americans created a huge naval aviation fleet. The ultimate weapon in the Pacific.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews