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146 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1991
“[Talking about the first essay] In retrospect, I think I overlooked the gaps in Foucault’s critical philosophy – his inattention to the macro-structures of power and his lack of normative clarity – because I found his critique of past efforts to establish total theories, and to provide absolute foundations for them, to be compelling.”
[Talking about the second essay] Foucault’s reluctance to make political recommendations had always bothered me despite the fact that I understood some of his reasons for it. Thus, I endorsed efforts to build political movements that are sensitive to the dangers of authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and political vanguardism.” – this critique does not fully make it into the essay.
As one commentator has aptly characterized it, “freedom” in Foucault’s politics consisted of “a constant attempt at self-disengagement and self-invention.” We are free in being able to question and reevaluate our inherited identities and values, and to challenge received interpretations of them. As feminists, I believe that we have good reason to appeal to Foucault’s negative freedom, that is, the freedom to disengage from our political identities, our presumptions about gender differences, and the categories and practices that define feminism. We must cultivate this freedom because feminism has developed in the context of oppression. Women are produced by patriarchal power at the same time that they resist it. There are good reasons to be ambivalent about the liberatory possibilities of appealing to “reason,” “motherhood,” or the “feminine” when they have also been the source of our oppression. Even the recent history of feminism in the late twentieth century suggests that feminism has often been blind to the dominating tendencies of its own theories and to the broader social forces that undermine and redirect its agendas. Consequently, as I have argued elsewhere, genealogy is indispensable to feminism.