Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win

by Jeffrey Record

Beating Goliath examines the phenomenon of victories by the weak over the strong―more specifically, insurgencies that succeeded against great powers. Jeffrey Record reviews eleven insurgent wars from 1775 to the present and determines why the seemingly weaker side won. He concludes that external assistance correlates more consistently with insurgent success than any other explanation. He does not disparage the critical importance of will, strategy, and strong-side regime type or suggest that external assistance guarantees success. Indeed, in all cases, some combination of these factors is usually present. But Record finds few if any cases of unassisted insurgent victories except against the most decrepit regimes. Having identified the ingredients of insurgent success, Record examines the present insurgency in Iraq and whether the United States can win. In so doing, Record employs a comparative analysis of the Vietnam War and the Iraq War. He also identifies and assesses the influence of distinctive features of the American way of war on the U.S. forces’ performance against the Iraqi insurgency. Make no insurgent victories are the exception, not the rule. But when David does beat Goliath, the consequences can be earth shattering and change the course of history. Jeffrey Record’s persuasive logic and clear writing make this timely book a must read for scholars, policymakers, military strategists, and anyone interested in the Iraq War’s outcome.

Genres: Military Fiction, History, Military History, Nonfiction, War, Politics

192 pages, Hardcover

First published May 1, 2007

Reviews

[Brett C · Rating 3 out of 5]

I thought this was a good read. I actually learned some stuff. It started by explaining what irregular/asymmetrical/guerrilla warfare is with examples seem in modern history. It gave brief lessons from the American Revolution, the Boer War, the Algerian War, the Vietnam War, Afghan-Russian War, and then the US-Coalition war in Iraq.

Overall the book was a logical and intelligent analysis of insurgency and laid the foundation for "stronger forces vs. weaker forces", political vs. military objectives, and unfortunately how America has become the victim of conventional warfare successes.

Though published in 2007 I believe this book still has relevant and overlooked information. I would recommend this to anyone interested in modern conflict and warfare. Thanks!

[S · Rating 3 out of 5]

Fairly dry but packed with interesting information. The book is sort of all over the place as well: about half of the book discusses various historical insurgencies and the factors that led to weak-side victories (namely: external assistance, superior political will, and superior strategy) while the other half is spent criticizing American war doctrine as it was employed in Vietnam and Iraq.

[Hj Reichen · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book gives an interesting overview of several insurgencies, however the analysis in the development of the Iraq war is dated. The reflections on armed forces development per se are still valid.

[Caleb Olander · Rating 3 out of 5]

Definitely solid information, but bland. Well cited and researched though. Presented in a very digestible format.

[Terence · Rating 2 out of 5]

Can't recommend. This book was written in 2007 and the title seemed interesting so I started reading it. The early part of the book shared some interesting characteristics of why some insurgencies win, and others don't.

Unfortunately the last few chapters left the topic and spoke specifically to what is wrong with America's military strategies. Also the book is dated and there are simply better books on this topic.

[Bruinrefugee · Rating 4 out of 5]

A nice dollop of common sense analysis supported by interesting facts, including a look at the American Revolution, Chinese Civil War, Vietnam, and Iraq, among others. Does a good job identifying the tensions in the American approach to Iraq in the mid-2000s. You can sense his take on the decision to go to war, but he does a good job not letting it over-impact the analysis. My only quibble: he's critical of the Powell doctrine, yet seems to endorse its fundamental premises and restraints.

[Chris · Rating 2 out of 5]

Not a long book. A nice overview of U.S. military history in "small wars." It shows the uselessness of trying to "win" a war in Iraq. Our foreign policy is deeply flawed. While this book does not deal with the fact that our current foreign policy is unconstitutional, it does argue against our current foreign policy based on the simple fact that it is failing.

[Michael Ware · Rating 3 out of 5]

I am waiting for the academics to be a little more entertaining. The book isn't bad, straight forward and makes a point. A little condemning of US policy and the Army. But if you're going to read a book on the subject, it isn't bad or too long.

[ERNEST MORE]

On the 2009 Chief of Staff reading list; I want to order and read while in Afghanistan.

[Tamara · Rating 2 out of 5]

first 2 chapters were difficult, but there are some good nuggets in this book.