In 1966, President Lyndon Johnson and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara were desperate to find additional troops for the Vietnam War, but they feared that they would alienate middle-class voters if they drafted college boys or sent Reservists and National Guardsmen to Vietnam. So, on October 1, 1966, McNamara lowered mental standards and inducted thousands of low-IQ men. Altogether, 354,000 of these men were taken into the Armed Forces and a large number of them were sent into combat. Many military men, including William Westmoreland, the commanding general in Vietnam, viewed McNamara’s program as a disaster. Because many of the substandard men were incompetent in combat, they endangered not only themselves but their comrades as well. Their death toll was appallingly high. In addition to low-IQ men, tens of thousands of other substandard troops were inducted, including criminals, misfits, and men with disabilities. This book tells the story of the men caught up in McNamara’s folly.
I received my copy of “McNamara’s Folly” from the author himself. He had read the first poem (and later others) in my book, “Love Poems for Cannibals,” and also learned that I am a Vietnam Veteran (July 1967 – July 1968). The poem that he read was “Dream Frag of Robert Strange McNamara.” This poem clearly (and correctly) communicated to Hamilton Gregory that I never liked McNamara very much.
Whereas my poem was personally hostile and wild and darkly funny regarding McNamara, “McNamara’s Folly” is informative, dispassionate (in the best sense) and utterly compelling as a statement of painful truth. This is an important book because it contributes to our understanding of the overall tragedy of the Vietnam War. This book is not a personal portrait of the small-minded bureaucrat and prevaricator, Robert McNamara. It is, rather, a thorough description and analysis of just how mindlessly destructive a man and his cohorts can be in the name of “properly” continuing the Vietnam War.
“McNamara’s Folly” reveals a U.S. Government version of “the banality of evil.” Imagine devising and implementing a plan to recruit and draft substandard young men (low IQ, physical and moral defects) to fight our War in Vietnam. Even though I am a Vietnam Veteran and generally aware that McNamara was the primary architect of the Vietnam War, I was completely unaware of his “Project 100,000” until I read “McNamara’s Folly.”
Now that I look back on my year in Vietnam (1967 – 1968) at the 1st Medical Battalion on the outskirts of Da Nang, I realize that I met at least two of these “unfit for combat” young men. As a Navy clinical psychologist attached, with other Navy doctors and corpsmen, to the 1st Marine Division, I was sometimes asked by my two psychiatrist colleagues to assess IQ and personality of a perplexing Marine with formal psychological testing. In September 1967 one of my psychiatrist colleagues requested that I administer the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) to a PFC who was referred to us because he seemed barely able to function or successfully complete simple tasks required in his MOS. To our amazement, he earned a Full Scale IQ of 71 on the WAIS. This low IQ placed the Marine in the “Borderline” range of intelligence, just two points above the “Mentally Deficient” range. I recommended that this Marine be given an Administrative discharge under honorable conditions.
I saw the second Marine on October 24, 1967. I remember the date because I wrote about him in my diary. This Marine was sent to 1st Med Battalion after receiving a concussion when a satchel charge exploded near him in the field. I talked with this Marine after he had been hospitalized for several days at our facility and seemed to be fully recovered. It was then I learned that this 20-year- old L/Cpl (articulate, with average or high average intelligence) had been initiated into the “Hell’s Angels” in California when he was 16. He was very proud of this, and also very proud of his criminal record of robberies and assaults. We sent him back to his rear area, where it was likely he would be returned to the field.
To make a long story short, five months later (March 1968) this Marine was referred back to us by his command. He was no longer in the field, but was engaging in bizarre and violent/dangerous behavior in the rear area. This behavior included beating Viet Cong prisoners who were secured and posed no threat, and biting off the heads of live chickens as he walked around the compound. When I saw this Marine in March, he did not deny any of the activities described; again, he seemed proud of them. There was no evidence that he was psychotic. He was “morally handicapped.” On the basis of his disturbed and dangerous behavior he was recommended by us for an Administrative discharge. Today this Marine would be called a “psychopath” or, as in the 5th edition of the “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual” (DSM – 5), an “Antisocial Personality Disorder.” Clearly his being allowed into the Marine Corp was a result of the relaxation of “moral standards” by the Pentagon, as discussed in chapter 34 (“Criminals”) of “McNamara’s Folly.”
A profound thanks to the author for his superb book. God bless Hamilton Gregory for his military service to our country, and for his service to the truth.
Raymond Keen – Clinical Psychologist, Medical Service Corp – USNR (1966 – 1969)
Many of us--especially Vietnam veterans like myself--know well the basic facts: that an escalation of troop levels began in the mid-1960's and peaked at about 550,000 by 1968; that all total 2.7 million Americans served in Vietnam during the war years; and that 58,000 American's died there, mostly in combat situations. But how many know that approximately 10% of those casualties were suffered by low IQ men brought into the service under a plan sponsered by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamera that drastically lowered the recruitment standards in order to fill the ranks, while ostensibly serving to give these low functioning men a chance to better themselves? The program was known as "McNamara's 100,000" for the number of substandard men to be recruited each year--who became commonly called "McNamara's Morons." While the program did not necessary intend to send those men--many of whom were illiterate--into combat, they often ended up on the front lines, dying at a rate three time higher than their cohorts of normal intelligence.
Haminton Gregory, a Vietnam veteran, journalist and college professor, tells the story with a compelling blend of objectivity and restrained moral force. Gregory went through Army boot camp at Fort Benning in 1967 where, as a college graduate, he was assigned to "look out for" another recruit who happened to be one of "McNamara's 100,000." Gregory describes his astonishment at discovering that this young man could not read, write, tie his shoes and did not understand that the U.S. was at war. Such men got through training, Gergory describes, thanks to leaders under pressure to keep the pipeline full who were willing to look the other way. Frustrated officers who tried to resist and send low-IQ recruits home were often rebuffed by the chain of command.
Though the haunting story of this program is full of fascinating anecdotes and statistics, Gregorgy grounds it in the larger social context of conscription during the Vietnam era. The pipeline needed to be pumped full of less-than-combat-capable individuals because so many of the most intelligent young men were managing to avoid this increasingly unpopular war. Sons of the upper-middle class and upper class had no trouble getting student deferrements, and other means of avoidance. All it took to get a medical "pass" was a trip to the right doctor. If you had the wherewithal you could flee to Canada or Sweden, far from the killing fields of Indochina. The argument can even be made that the need to reach lower and lower into the barrel of potential recruits contributed to such tragedies as the My Lai Massacre, where the troops were led by a college dropout.
Aside from a single instance of mild redundancy, this book has the qualities of a page turner--a well-told tale of a compelling situation. Though the subject may have special resonance for those of us who came of age during the Vietnam War era, its message still speaks just as strongly today. Our modern wars in Iraq and Afganistan are being fought by an all-volunteer military. These men and women, however, in return for making their decision to sacrifice for the nation, are being exposed to multiple, brutal combat tours, and they are paying the price. The Vietnam draftee was limited to a single tour. Both then and now, the upper socio-economic strata of our society was and is under-represented in combat. I believe that "McNamara's Folly" will become a classic in the literature of how a society approaches making war. For its drama and human interest this book deserves to be widely read.
A very personal book and well met. I’ve read several weighty tomes on vietnam and had no knowledge of Mcnamara’s plan to let the Low IQ into the military.
Some of America’s failures there makes more sense now.
A great example of what happens when expediency meets feelgood social policy…the army needed more soldiers but not from the voting middle class and the social engineers decided that low IQ folks could learn skills and grow their potential…
The army got their cannon fodder who died at 3.5x higher rates and the social scientists ignored the results…
IQ is real…mental competency has huge value in today’s society…more evidence that Charles Murray’s Bell Curve should be read by everyone of average and high IQ.
There's a quote from The Fog of War which I like a whole lot. "How much evil must we do to do good? Know that you will do evil, but try and minimize it." Well, Secretary McNamara, you just MAXIMIZED evil.
The genesis of Project 100,000, McNamara's program to lower standards for admittance to the military, was simple. As the Vietnam War heated up in 1965, more bodies were needed to man the line. Mobilizing the National Guard and reducing deferments for students would have political costs, as the children of the middle class and elites had connections to make their displeasure felt in Washington. The "brilliant" plan, as organized by McNamara and President Johnson over the objections of the entire military bureaucracy, was to dramatically reduce standards for the draft. Something like 350,000 men drafted were drafted, despite failing pre 1966 criteria, and they died at a rate three times higher than the average soldier deployed to Vietnam.
The army has long been in the intelligence business. Carson's article Army Alpha, Army Brass, and the Search for Army Intelligence (a great read if you have JSTORE access) shows that at the entry to WW1, when America faced the task of a thirteen fold expansion of the Army beyond it's prewar size, it turned to the nascent science of intelligence testing to separate out NCOs and officers from the mass of general recruits. In the 1960s, the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) was a standard part of the intake process. Only recruits who scored above a Category III, equivalent to IQ 92, could serve.
Project 100,000 erased that limit. McNamara argued that many low scoring troops were merely poorly educated, and it's true that in the upper range of Category 4 there were a number of people who had nothing intrinsically wrong with them, but simply hadn't been educated, who had the potential to be fine soldiers. But Category 4 and Category 5 included masses of people with profound developmental disabilities who would never make good soldiers.
Gregory went through Basic with several of "McNamara's Morons", as men drafted under the new lower standards were called. He had responsibility for one who was completely illiterate, and wound up in the Special Training company with many more, after developing near-fatal heat stroke on a training march. His personal story is heart-wrenching, and in the decades on, he collected every anecdote put to print about these men. As expect, they fared poorly in combat. You may not have to be a poet or a mathematician to carry a rifle, but quick thinking is necessary. Small-units depend on everybody pulling their weight, and McNamara's Morons were weak links, who either found a protector who kept from combat, or who became scapegoats for the rest of the platoon. In a final cruelty, McNamara argued that service would educate and improve these men, but many were discharged other than honorably, marking them as misfits and failures for the rest of their lives.
McNamara's Folly blends memoir and somewhat amateurish scholarship into a persuasive whole. This is not to say that Gregory is wrong, but as someone with letters after his name, I care about the difference between a collection of anecdotes, no matter how complete and compelling, and an actual research question. I would have loved to see some more systematic analysis of the origins of Project 100,000, and the careers of the men drafted under it.
Read this on the recommendation of my brother, who is a Viet Nam vet. Wow. This was so enlightening about the people that were drafted or talked into enlisting. Intelligence, physical and mental standards were greatly reduced beginning in 1967 to get the enlisted 'numbers up', putting them and other service members at risk.
Hamilton Gregory, a Vietnam veteran who worked with intelligence, has written a much needed book on McNamara's so-called "Project 100,000" utilized beginning in 1966 and continued throughout the rest of the war to boost total inductions by relaxing the intellectual, medical, and physical standards for the armed forces.
"The road to Hell is paved with good intentions," the old aphorism reads. It seems an apt description of what happened with "Project 100,000." During Lyndon Johnson's laudable "War on Poverty," Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed that Johnson consider using the armed forces as a way to rehabilitate the poor and jobless from deep rural country in the South and Midwest and from the inner-cities of America. In McNamara's estimation, the program could admit previously disqualified candidates (usually disqualified for various medical conditions, low scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, AFQT, or criminal misconduct) most at risk for continuing a generational cycle of poverty and not only instruct them in some practical trade (e.g. auto mechanic) but provide some form of classroom instruction that could help candidates secure GEDs, learn basic arithmetic, and learn to read and write. In theory, these men would not serve in Vietnam nor in the combat arms but fulfill their commitments in supply and service where they would learn valuable skills or, at worst, perform physical labor and thus free up other personnel for the combat arms. In theory, therefore, "Project 100,000" was not such a bad idea of social engineering because, as Gregory admits, some of "McNamara's men" hailed from the poorest and most remote areas of America—thus three square meals, $95/month, health care, housing allowances, and clean clothes were welcomed by these men as unthinkable largess.
As Gregory argues convincingly, though, "Project 100,000" hardly lived up to McNamara's lofty ideals. The military brass and members of the Senate Armed Services Committee successfully rebuffed LBJ's attempts to relax armed forces standards between 1964 and 1966 by rightly stating that as warfare became increasingly complex and technologically dependent so too did the intelligence and physical standards need to rise in such a way that the military could induct the best and the brightest America had to offer (to borrow a popular phrase from Halberstam).
The military reluctantly accepted "Project 100,000" in 1966 because of severe manpower shortages in Vietnam. These shortages were caused by, in on particular order of importance, LBJ's refusal to call up the reserves or deploy the national guard, the one-year rotation system for personnel in Vietnam, and the mass deferments provided to *mostly* middle-class Americans in college, raising families, or fortunate enough to secure shoddy medical or psychological exemptions. Add to all this the constant stream of casualties in Vietnam and the armed forces, particularly the army, found itself in the midst of struggling to maintain its NCO and junior enlisted rank-and-file.
"Project 100,000" recruits and inductees were brought into the services precisely at a time when those branches had little incentive or budgetary discretion to create wholesale "education programs" and "rehabilitation" cadres to provide these young, uneducated, and impoverished men with the skills and knowledge McNamara and LBJ promised. Instead, Hamilton explains how systemic corruption from military recruiters, to induction center physicians, to boot camp instructors allowed men totally unfit for service to steadily progress through the procedural requirements to eventually deploy to Vietnam as primarily, you guessed it, infantrymen.
Gregory has both a personal and an academic interest in "Project 100,000." Personally, he now works as a journalist and an activist for the causes of former "Project 100,000" men. He also remembered being assigned to watch over a "McNamara man" during his time at basic training and seeing the profits of "Project 100,000" when he was assigned to a Special Training detachment where men who "washed out" of their basic company were given extensive physical training or medical rehabilitation. In Gregory's recollections, these men were borderline mentally handicap, or worse, and often suffered from obesity, malnutrition, and, in one rare case, dwarfism. "They should have never been allowed in" is a constant refrain throughout the work. Gregory cites a litany of anecdotes of men being unable to fire a rifle, having physical handicaps that impaired the most basic physical fitness routines, suffering psychological distress, and being unable to comprehend instructions.
But if these men could not comprehend and execute orders from drill sergeants, navigate obstacle courses, or properly assemble/disassemble and fire a M-14, they surely did not ever see the shores of Vietnam, right? Wrong. Gregory claims* that drill sergeants and company commanders in basic often fudged reports for "McNamara's men" to pass them through to advanced individual training (AIT) and that similar circumstances them pushed these men from AIT to regular service. Once in Vietnam, these men became not only a danger to themselves but to their comrades—some refused orders, others could not understand the complex and varied practices for survival—in combat. Many were wounded and others were killed in Vietnam. Those who were fortunate enough to secure an MOS in the rear often puzzled NCOs and officers with their ineptness.
Gregory fingers induction centers and military recruiters as primarily responsible for exacerbating the problems inherent in McNamara's plan by deliberately falsifying paperwork to classify men in Category V (IQ < 71) as Category IV (IQ 72-91), ignoring various medical conditions, and paying individuals to take the AFQT for potential Cat 5 individuals. Of course, these arbitrary mental categories were invidious and relied mainly on suspect IQ testing (e.g. What's precisely the qualitative difference between a Cat 5 with an IQ of 71 and a Cat 4 with an IQ of 72?). In any sense, Gregory argues that the military accepted "the bottom of the barrel" and sent men to Vietnam who had little chance of survival.
Gregory does acknowledge that many of "McNamara's Men" were successful in the military and afterward. In no way does Gregory stereotype those inducted under the auspices of this program as mentally handicap, physically inept, misfits and criminals. However, he would argue that successful P100K inductees and volunteers were the exception rather than the rule. In my own research, I studied the correspondence of an African American from rural North Carolina who, rejected twice in the early-1960s for medical conditions was subsequently drafted during the P100K years. He was not given a "moral waiver" (e.g. making exceptions for past criminal misdeeds) or "administrative acceptance" (e.g. re-categorizing a Cat 5 as a Cat 4). His letters home were poetic and insightful and after his two years in uniform he went on to a successful career at Branch Banking & Trust (BB&T).
What's most interesting is how anecdotes about "McNamara's men" seem pervasive in both Gregory's interviews and among Vietnam veterans, generally. The reviews of this book on Goodreads speak to the seeming ubiquity of men with mental and physical handicaps existing in the rank-and-file of the army during Vietnam.
My one reservation about this book is that Gregory primarily relies on anecdotal and personal experience to formulate some of his most provocative arguments. As one retired general once remarked about my own work: "A thousand anecdotes is not a statistic." I think the same applies here—Gregory collects an assorted and at times convincing array of anecdotes from veterans that attest to the problems of P100K, but did not do any systematic statistical research to investigate precisely how widespread the problem of "Low-IQ Troops . . . Unfit Men, Criminals, and Misfits" became in Vietnam or in the army general. For example, I am not persuaded by a quote from William Westmoreland that inducting the "dregs" of society had contributed materially to the disintegration of morale in the U.S. Army and an American defeat in Vietnam. Westmoreland was apt to blame any and all things for his failed strategy in Nam.
This is a provocative book and purposefully so. Gregory wants to start a conservation among veterans and academics about this thorny issue and he does not shy away from the colorful language used to describe "McNamara's Men" during the 1960s—'idiots,' 'morons,' 'retards,' etc.—in his attempt to convey that the Pentagon and the White House perpetrated a grave injustice upon perhaps the weakest and most defenseless members of our society during the Sixties. As Gregory puts it, for every intellectually or physically handicapped young man sent to Vietnam to be killed there was a corresponding middle-class, college-bound (usually white) male looking forward to deferments and prosperity. I hope that there will be more investigation of this often misunderstood and ignored issue during the American war in Vietnam.
4/5
*I say "claim" here because some of these arguments rested on Gregory's personal experiences and remembrances and are not the most reliable nor empirical source.
A good book. Well written text. What I didn't know is the use of all these "morons" to fight a war. And then there is all kinds of stuff about the Vietnam war to learn. This book adds to your knowledge about life.
"The least intelligent among us should never be viewed as expendable units of manpower, but as our fellow sojourners on this fragile Earth"
"Imagine sending a five year old into combat. That's what Project 100,000 was all about"
The author promised to one day tell the story of how the US drafted low IQ individuals to fight and die in the Vietnam war. In writing this book, which is mostly a collection of their stories, he fulfilled that promise a few years before his death.
The author is uniquely suited to write about this topic, both as a Vietnam vet himself, but also as someone who had met some of these people and had written about them contemporaneously in letters to his wife during the war.
A few stories about the creative ways people dodged the draft were very entertaining - like the kid who ate 3 extra large pizzas every night for 6 months, so he'd be categorized as overweight and avoid the draft early in the war. But most of the stories in this book are sad.
Somewhat common facts:
• Standards were lowered so that criminals could choose jail or military service
• Physical examinations were faked so that men with normally disqualifying ailments and conditions could not escape being drafted
• The draft disproportionately targeted the lower class, and middle and upper class men typically escaped the draft by getting education or other deferments, or by having connections that let them serve in the National Guard and avoid Vietnam. E.g. Only 1 out of the 10000 men of the Mississippi National Guard was black, in a state that was 42% black
Lesser known facts:
• These men died at a rate greater than 3 times other Vietnam soldiers
• Men could be drafted even if blind in one eye, or generally having such poor vision they cannot see targets they are shooting at
• Men with IQs lower than 70 were required to serve, and in some cases even lower. In some cases these men didn't even know their home addresses, or how to read
• "Fragging" of officers dramatically increased as more criminals were sent to Vietnam in a "jail or army" deal. Combat units were refusing to fight, and officers often refused to discipline soldiers for fear of being killed by a grenade in the nighttime
• The draft is like the old British method of "pressing" men into service at ports, any young man they can find. This was one of the drivers of the war of 1812 and yet now the US was using the same method 150 years later to conduct their own war
Extremely crazy facts:
• Postwar, the recruitment process was still pretty screwed up - in one case somebody with Down syndrome successfully enlisted when the recruiter faked his test scores and he was even shipped off to basic training
• A dwarf (little person) was drafted, and got sent to the frontlines in Vietnam. The army didn't have boots small enough for him to wear...
• Joe Namath, quarterback for NY Jets, escaped draft because of "bad knees" while continuing to play football as a superstar - while men who were blind in one eye or had limps were forced to serve
Like other reviewers have stated on here and in reviews on other websites, my mind immediately thought of men like Private Pyle and Forrest Gump when I first started this book. To find out that those film depictions were not exaggerated, that actual men of that caliber, and of even worse conditions, were actually drafted into the armed forces and sent off to Vietnam, is truly beyond belief.
Hamilton Gregory has written the definitive book on the subject of the "Project 100,000 men." The book accounts his own experiences in basic training with fellow trainees of the program, how their plight became the focus of his attention, leading him to investigate and write on the various struggles that these men, their comrades, and the military's institutions faced during the Vietnam years and beyond.
Let's hope that such a program is never attempted again by our government.
The first three parts are quite good, describing the personal account of the author and his experience with the low-IQ section of the US milliary. After that, the rest of the book is just short, disorganized anecdotes from people he interviewed years later. There's a lot of "not his real name" and "he declined to give specifics," which combined with the fact that these anecdotes simply rehash the author's experiences, don't lend much. It's an interesting read, but there weren't many takeaways other than "don't let idiots handle grenades."
A very sad recounting of how the US military from 1966-71, namely SECDEF McNamara and POTUS LBJ concocted a plan to lower the AFQT standards and allow men who previous were ruled unfit to now be accepted in the military. The result was a tragic story for many of the 350,000 men accepted.
Hamilton Gregory, attempts to straddle three worlds.
That of a historian documenting a sordid incident, if the death, wounding of thousands can be considered an "incident". On this he does an adequate job. It would have been better done for him to name names, not of the handicapped persons who did their duty as best they could, but of those who perpetrated these outrages, MacNamara and Johnson did not act alone and Reagan's Secretary of the Navy is a public figure.
He does single out appropriately call out Dick Cheney and George W. Bush for successfully evading service in Viet Nam as young men, but interestingly, except for a single positive mention, not John Kerry, who's "Ghengis Khan" comment in the early 70's (youngish) and his ""get stuck in Iraq" comment of 2005 (decidedly not young). Unless I missed it, while delving into Iraq and Afghanistan, he fails to mention that Bush had the courage to call up the National Guard and Reserves, unlike Johnson. Perhaps a simple oversight, but it detracts form the case he is building. That all said, when appropriate, he does seem to name the good guys, but they always seemed to be framed as isolated cases.
That was the less powerful stuff.
His story is also partly as auto-biographer, re-examining an interesting portion of his life. Again he does a good job as a somewhat unique observer. Good anecdotes that helped to set the framework, although I find it hard to believe any person is a saintly as he.
He acts as an advocate for the "MacNamara's Morons." On this score he does a superlative job. He is sympathetic to their plight and works his way through most of the "typical cases." He documents of the their plight in theater and post-war. He is perhaps less sympathetic to the average soldier who's lives depends on theses unfortunate people who have been placed by others in the wrong place and time. Easier to do when you are a rear echelon soldier I suppose.
He does a cogent job of intersecting the three tasks, although I think it can be reasonably said, his first role, that of being a historian is in conflict with the other two roles and it showed by what it omitted.
I too served in the military. I met Sergeants, corrupt and stupid, and more than a few who were in fact brilliant, both intellectually and those with emotionally intelligence. I also met native born Sergeants who could barely speak or read english, and yet managed to get in during other low points in recruitment, in the Carter years, also not mentioned. They knew their profession and equipment thoroughly and were generally good NCOs.
I met many officers who either kind and/or intelligent. I met officers who were openly racist. I met officers that were jerks, who would have indeed been in danger of being fragged, for failing to respect, even in the most militarily basic ways, their subordinates. I'm am speaking of a person mentioned in the book, Colin Powell with who I had a run in with as a PFC. I did not walk away favorably impressed. No wonder he repositioned himself in his tent every night.
Good effort, important topic. Let's not do the draft again. Either a nation muster up enough volunteers or it picked the wrong fight or more likely the wrong politicians.
This was a very moving book -- although Hamilton's prose is clipped and concise, it reveals volumes about the emotional, physical, and mental trauma that mentally unfit (differently abled) men who were drafted into the US armed forces in the Vietnam War faced. Because the administration(s) did not want to anger their powerful middle-class voter base, they significantly expanded the scope of the draft to include persons who would otherwise be considered unfit for service, the vast majority of whom came from deep rural or urban poverty, or extremely troubled socioeconomic backgrounds that impaired their cognitive abilities.
My heart broke to hear about men in their twenties with the mental capacities of ten year olds having to contend with the raucous, abusive, physically demanding atmosphere of barracks life: they had to play a game that they had no conception of. These were men who did not know how to read or write or tie their shoelaces or put buttons on, did not comprehend the abstract concepts of locations, and could not remember their own parents' names, much less understand what the country of Vietnam was and why they were going there. Sergeants and company commanders would conspire to fake their test results so that they would appear to have passed the battery of tests in basic training, and they would be sent to Vietnam.
They died at a rate 3 times higher than the average American soldier in Vietnam, and frequently endangered their comrades during combat, to the point where they severely affected troop composition and morale. I think that this was a cruel, immoral and dishonorable chapter in American military history.
Some quotes from the book:
"“The least intelligent among us should never be viewed as expendable units of manpower, but as our fellow sojourners on this fragile earth, deserving respect and compassion—and gratitude for the contributions they make to our families and to our society.”
“In contemplating the names on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall in Washington, DC, William F. Abbott, a Vietnam veteran, says, “John Kennedy said that life is unfair. True enough, but many of the surviving Vietnam casualty families would reply that the ultimate unfairness is death at an early age, in a land far from home, for reasons not clearly defined.” In response to this observation, another veteran noted that most of the men who avoided Vietnam were destined to die of old age, “while some large number of McNamara’s 100,000 with room-temp IQs let into the Army in their stead” were slaughtered at a young age “in rice paddies half a world away.”
In 1966, facing a serious manpower shortage for the Vietnam War, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara introduced Project 100,000, a plan to address the manpower shortage by drafting men that would typically never be allowed in the U.S. Army. In particular, this included men with mental disabilities (many of whom were illiterate), men with serious psychiatric issues (including schizophrenia), men that were underweight, overweight or too short and even men with a history of violent criminal behaviour.
The book begins as a first-hand account of the author's being drafted and sent to basic training with a company of these "New Standards Men," being slightly overweight, but of normal intelligence, himself. He highlights the bullying and exploitation the mentally disabled men he was training with faced and the efforts by him and few other Good Samaritans to protect them.
As the author went on to work in the Army as intelligence officer rather than a combat soldier, the later chapters of the book beyond his beyond his basic training are essentially a serious of anecdotes about the predictably disastrous results of forcing these men to serve in the Army. Originally, I figured this book was going to be a first hand account, but it quickly transitioned to more a long-form journalism piece. However, the author did a good job of making it a compelling read and handled the subject at hand with sensitivity.
Overall, this was a good account of a tragic and mostly forgotten piece of history and it serves as a reminder of just how completely insane the whole concept of conscription is.
Sometimes it is easy to get caught in a bubble of where you work and the people you hang out with. Books like these are nice, since they provide context and make you understand the world on a more holistic level. Most surprising were that the new minimum IQ qualifications for military service didn't seem that low to me - whereas before, the military required a score in the 31st percentile, it was lowered as part of Project 100,000 down to the 10th percentile. Although the author goes into the fact that a large number of recruits were let in through 'administrative acceptance' (and actually had scores even lower) - it was still surprising to me how stark a contrast there was in 31 vs 10.
I would only give 3.5 stars, however, because the second part of the book becomes repetitive very quickly and probably isn't worth a read. The author chooses to go into stories of individuals, without ever focusing on anyone for more than a few paragraphs. This makes it hard to connect with those described and results in what feels like a mass of stories haphazardly smashed together.
Overall would recommend reading, but only the first half (parts 1-3). The author does a good job of defining any military concepts or slang, which is nice for readers that don't have previous familiarity.
The core thesis of McNamara’s Folly is simple: secretary of defense Robert McNamara’s “Project 100,000”, which lowered mental standards for the military in order to draft more men into the Vietnam War, was an abject failure. And it’s not one that needs a lot of supporting evidence; well-intentioned governmental programs fail all the time, and you can see how this one sounds like a bad idea on the very face of it. What makes the book so compelling is the level of detail that Hamilton Gregory gets into, and the sheer number of anecdotes that really illustrate both the harsh consequences of forcing people to perform far beyond their abilities as well as the absurd unintended consequences that result from trying to enforce certain outcomes through the use of bureaucratic red tape. It’s a relatively short read and written in a plain, utilitarian prose, so in terms of effort-to-reward ratio, it’s very much worth reading if the topic seems at all interesting to you.
Disturbing ! This book is a collection of first hand accounts of author’s as well as various members of US Armed forces who fought the Vietnam War. It tells the story of implications of Project 100,000. LBJ and McNamara devised a plan to fulfill the demand of men in Vietnam by lowering the selection criteria along all lines, mental, physical, and moral. This resulted in thousands of men sent into war who should have never been selected in first place. These men were physically or mentally or emotionally or morally unfit to serve in armed forces. Their mere presence in war zones meant that not only they were in danger of death more than others, but also a constant threat for other’s safety.
Author, a Vietnam Veteran, gives first person account of what it was like to be one of McNamara’s Boy during basic and advanced training. In later chapters he weaves various first hand accounts to tell all that was wrong with McNamara’s plan.
The experience of thousands of men inducted into the US military during the Vietnam war, despite glaring flaws in intellect, health and character, will strike many in different ways. The loss and/or trauma will reverberate with their families. Some will note the cruelty of their treatment and experience, and others will see the larger contempt held by leadership for the profession of arms. While I can see all those things, what stands out for me is the distance arrogant technocrats created between “good intentions” and downstream consequences. Robert McNamara’s plan was never going to work, and any competent soldier could have told him that. And yet they proceeded. As to the book itself, Hamilton Gregory deserves great credit for telling an important story with compassion and clarity. Highly recommended.
Sad reading and it will make you angry. It makes a compelling reason for the reintroduction of the draft. However it must be implemented without exemptions enabling the wealthy and talented from imposing their burdens on the less fortunate. It would also make the American elites more judicious in the use of military action if it is their children who will be in harms way.
The book is extremely informative and interesting. Engaging narrative and anecdotes are used throughout to paint a clear picture. I was interested to see Moynihan mentioned here, and that would be a good trail to follow in regard to policy. I also like that the author very briefly brought in current injustices. Great read about a little known injustice - probably because the 70’s are filled with them coming to light.
This book was very informative and educational on a subject that I had no idea took place. As an Air Force veteran I could definitely relate to the basic trading aspect of the book and although I had no combat experience I do understand the relationships that take place in close quarters and the problems that arise.
Intriguing, but infuriating! I had no idea this had and continues to happen. What a disservice to those that place their trust in the recruiter! A well written and well researched informative text.
Appalling stuff to read for a guy who served long after the draft ended. I can't imagine how messed up the power dynamic would have been had we gone into a war of that nature in the early 2000s. I'm a retiree of a volunteer Army, and that's good 'nuff by me.
Very interesting book that good real life accounts of the Project 100,000 program. Interesting to read if you want to get a slight understanding of the Department of Defenses desperation for troops and the political desperation to not upset the wealthy.
Not the most polished or well written book I have ever read, but one of the most impactful. The author had no background in writing but wrote this book anyways to tell the story of the men he served with so that history doesn’t repeat itself
More a series of anecdotes than rigorously researched history or social science, the tale told of low-IQ men drafted and sent to Vietnam is a dark stain on the history of the nation.
Más anecdótico de lo que esperaba. Aunque las historias individuales formaban una serie de ejemplos interesantes, faltaron más datos estadísticos comparativos como para ponerlas en contexto.