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Equality and Partiality
Derived from Thomas Nagel's Locke Lectures, Equality and Partiality proposes a nonutopian account of political legitimacy, based on the need to accommodate both personal and impersonal motives in any credible moral theory, and therefore in any political theory with a moral foundation. Within each individual, Nagel believes, there is a division between two standpoints, the personal and the impersonal. Without the impersonal standpoint, there would be no morality, only the clash, compromise, and occasional convergence of individual perspectives. It is because a human being does not occupy only his own point of view that each of us is susceptible to the claims of others through private and public morality. Political systems, to be legitimate, must achieve an integration of these two standpoints within the individual. These ideas are applied to specific problems such as social and economic inequality, toleration, international justice, and the public support of culture. Nagel
points to the problem of balancing equality and partiality as the most important issue with which political theorists are now faced.
points to the problem of balancing equality and partiality as the most important issue with which political theorists are now faced.
208 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1991
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About the author
Thomas Nagel
78 books518 followersThomas Nagel is an American philosopher, currently University Professor and Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University, where he has taught since 1980. His main areas of philosophical interest are philosophy of mind, political philosophy and ethics. He is well-known for his critique of reductionist accounts of the mind in his essay "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" (1974), and for his contributions to deontological and liberal moral and political theory in The Possibility of Altruism (1970) and subsequent writings.
Thomas Nagel was born to a Jewish family in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (now Serbia). He received a BA from Cornell University in 1958, a BPhil from Oxford University in 1960, and a PhD from Harvard University in 1963 under the supervision of John Rawls. Before settling in New York, Nagel taught briefly at the University of California, Berkeley (from 1963 to 1966) and at Princeton University (from 1966 to 1980), where he trained many well-known philosophers including Susan Wolf, Shelly Kagan, and Samuel Scheffler, who is now his colleague at NYU. In 2006, he was made a member of the American Philosophical Society.
Nagel is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy, and has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation, the National Science Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. In 2008, he was awarded a Rolf Schock Prize for his work in philosophy, the Balzan prize, and the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters from Oxford University.
Thomas Nagel was born to a Jewish family in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (now Serbia). He received a BA from Cornell University in 1958, a BPhil from Oxford University in 1960, and a PhD from Harvard University in 1963 under the supervision of John Rawls. Before settling in New York, Nagel taught briefly at the University of California, Berkeley (from 1963 to 1966) and at Princeton University (from 1966 to 1980), where he trained many well-known philosophers including Susan Wolf, Shelly Kagan, and Samuel Scheffler, who is now his colleague at NYU. In 2006, he was made a member of the American Philosophical Society.
Nagel is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy, and has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation, the National Science Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. In 2008, he was awarded a Rolf Schock Prize for his work in philosophy, the Balzan prize, and the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters from Oxford University.
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
July 5, 2023
Amazing and concise. Nagel begins by setting up the framework for a justifiable political theory and then goes through the trouble of trying to balance the two sides of the justificatory coin - the personal perspective and the impersonal moral perspective. Essentially beginning with strict egalitarianism and tempering it based on concerns raised with regards to the personal perspective, Nagel does an amazing job of both raising and considering issues that stand in the way of the institution of an egalitarian politics that is justifiable to all. Well-written and incredibly intellectually honest, a true work of art.
March 21, 2020
En el interior del individuo (según Nagel) conviven dos puntos de vista: el personal (a través del cual se manifiestan nuestros deseos y aspiraciones como agentes) y el impersonal (que es cuando hacemos abstracción de nuestra identidad y reconocemos que los otros también poseen su hato de preocupaciones, intereses y deseos). Esta dualidad hace su aparición en la teoría política cuando observamos, por un lado, que el capitalismo democrático produce (¡y de qué manera!) niveles moralmente escandalosos de desigualdad económica y social, y por el otro, que el comunismo igualitarista ha fracasado. Lo primero choca con nuestro afán “impersonal” de justicia social, mientras que lo segundo con muchos de nuestros deseos “personales”. ¿Es posible —se pregunta el autor— sin caer en el utopismo, diseñar instituciones que reconcilien ambas perspectivas y que cuenten con la legitimidad requerida por los regímenes democráticos?
La respuesta que da Thomas Nagel a esta difícil pregunta se abreva en la filosofía neokantiana: dichas instituciones deben aparecernos como un límite, hacia el que irán desplazándose nuestras sociedades a través de la redefinición (lenta y cambiante) de la relación que guarda cada individuo consigo mismo.
La respuesta que da Thomas Nagel a esta difícil pregunta se abreva en la filosofía neokantiana: dichas instituciones deben aparecernos como un límite, hacia el que irán desplazándose nuestras sociedades a través de la redefinición (lenta y cambiante) de la relación que guarda cada individuo consigo mismo.
March 28, 2017
Interesting read about the relation between the dual personal/impersonal nature of human perspectives, and how that is relevant to moral and political frameworks. Written quite nicely.
October 15, 2024
SHOULD OUR SOCIETY ENCOURAGE ECONOMIC EGALITARIANISM?
Thomas Nagel (born 1937) is an American philosopher, currently University Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University, where he has taught since 1980.
He wrote in the Acknowledgements section of this 1991 book, “This book was written between 1987 and 1990… the bulk of it was presented as the John Locke Lectures at Oxford in 1990…”
He begins the Introduction, “This essay deals with what I believe to be the central problem of political theory. Rather than proposing a solution to it, I shall try to explain what it is, and why a solution is so difficult to achieve… My belief is not just that all social and political arrangements so far devised are unsatisfactory… there is a deeper problem---not merely practical, but theoretical: we do not yet possess an acceptable political ideal, for reasons which belong to moral and political philosophy.” (Pg. 3)
He continues, “The hardest problems of political theory are conflicts within the individual, and no external solution will be adequate which does not deal with them at their source. The impersonal standpoint in each of us produces, I shall claim, a powerful demand for universal impartiality and equality, while the personal standpoint give rise to individualistic motives and requirements which present obstacles to the pursuit and realization of such ideals.” (Pg. 4)
He states, “The individual point of view is not only a perspective on the facts and a causal point of contact… but a perspective of value… The ideal, then, is a set of institutions within which persons can live a collective life that meets the impartial requirements of the impersonal standpoint while at the same time having to conduct themselves only in ways that it is reasonable to require of individuals with strong personal motives.” (Pg. 18)
He suggests, “Impersonally considered, the ideal of eliminating inherent economic inequality is morally attractive… if people could become different so that they would support a thriving system of economic equality freely, they would thereby become not worse as individuals, but in some ways better. They would not have to submerge all their personal motives and concerns beneath a desire for the common good, but need only… give up their acquisitiveness and greatly expand their public-spiritedness and devotion to productive labor for its own sake.” (Pg. 28-29)
He explains, “The impartial attitude is, I believe, strongly egalitarian both in itself and in its implications. As I have said, it comes from our capacity to take up a point of view which abstracts from who we are, but which appreciates fully and takes to heart the value of every person’s life and welfare. We put ourselves in each person’s shoes and take as our preliminary guide to the value we assign to what happens to him the value which it has from his point of view. This gives to each person’s well-being very great importance, and from the impersonal standpoint everyone’s primary importance, leaving aside his effect on the welfare of others, is the same.” (Pg. 64-65)
He admits, “I believe there may be cases in which no legitimate solution to the problem of conflicting interests is available, so that parties are reduced to trying to impose their personally preferred solution by whatever power they may be able to muster---against the reasonable opposition of their opponents.” (Pg. 81)
He argues, “an egalitarian system would have to completely forget the idea… that the root of social injustice is exploitation---in the sense of a failure to reward people in accordance with their productive contributions or the true value of their labor. The defense of equality requires that rewards not depend on productive contribution, and in particular that some people receive much more of the social product than they contribute. People’s productive contributions are no unequal that the mere avoidance of exploitation would allow great inequalities of economic condition.” (Pg. 99)
He also asserts, “For some reason it appears to be harder to internalize the sense that advantages derived from the exercise of talent are in themselves morally suspect, on the ground that talent itself is a matter of luck… It is true, of course that your talents are an intimate part of you, and that any attempt by the state to prevent you from exercising and developing them would be intolerable… But the economic rewards which some talents are able to command, if properly developed, are another story. They cannot be said to be merited just because the recognition of excellence on which they are based is merited. To sever the connection between talent and admiration would be wrong. But to sever the connection between talent and income… would be fine.” (Pg. 113)
He concludes one chapter, “My conclusion … is that a strongly egalitarian society … [is] psychologically and politically out of reach… [But] Intolerance of severe poverty at least receives lip service … and it ought to be possible to develop it into insistence on a higher and higher social minimum, until it becomes intolerable in a rich society if anyone does not have a decent standard of living and a fair opportunity to go as far as his natural talents will take him above that.” (Pg. 128)
But in another chapter he contends, “I suggest… that this may justify a society in trying to adopt economic policies that permit such extremes. As things are, these luxuries are the concomitants of earned or inherited wealth. But even if inequalities of that kind could be rationally reduced, it would be desirable to permit in some other way the enjoyment of life at its upper boundaries by a few. While there may be no ideal way to distribute such opportunities, I believe no egalitarianism can be right which would permit haute cuisine, haute couture, and exquisite houses to disappear just because not everyone can have them.” (Pg. 138)
Whether one always agrees with Nagel, this is a thought-provoking book of political philosophy, and will be of key interest to students of such.
Thomas Nagel (born 1937) is an American philosopher, currently University Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University, where he has taught since 1980.
He wrote in the Acknowledgements section of this 1991 book, “This book was written between 1987 and 1990… the bulk of it was presented as the John Locke Lectures at Oxford in 1990…”
He begins the Introduction, “This essay deals with what I believe to be the central problem of political theory. Rather than proposing a solution to it, I shall try to explain what it is, and why a solution is so difficult to achieve… My belief is not just that all social and political arrangements so far devised are unsatisfactory… there is a deeper problem---not merely practical, but theoretical: we do not yet possess an acceptable political ideal, for reasons which belong to moral and political philosophy.” (Pg. 3)
He continues, “The hardest problems of political theory are conflicts within the individual, and no external solution will be adequate which does not deal with them at their source. The impersonal standpoint in each of us produces, I shall claim, a powerful demand for universal impartiality and equality, while the personal standpoint give rise to individualistic motives and requirements which present obstacles to the pursuit and realization of such ideals.” (Pg. 4)
He states, “The individual point of view is not only a perspective on the facts and a causal point of contact… but a perspective of value… The ideal, then, is a set of institutions within which persons can live a collective life that meets the impartial requirements of the impersonal standpoint while at the same time having to conduct themselves only in ways that it is reasonable to require of individuals with strong personal motives.” (Pg. 18)
He suggests, “Impersonally considered, the ideal of eliminating inherent economic inequality is morally attractive… if people could become different so that they would support a thriving system of economic equality freely, they would thereby become not worse as individuals, but in some ways better. They would not have to submerge all their personal motives and concerns beneath a desire for the common good, but need only… give up their acquisitiveness and greatly expand their public-spiritedness and devotion to productive labor for its own sake.” (Pg. 28-29)
He explains, “The impartial attitude is, I believe, strongly egalitarian both in itself and in its implications. As I have said, it comes from our capacity to take up a point of view which abstracts from who we are, but which appreciates fully and takes to heart the value of every person’s life and welfare. We put ourselves in each person’s shoes and take as our preliminary guide to the value we assign to what happens to him the value which it has from his point of view. This gives to each person’s well-being very great importance, and from the impersonal standpoint everyone’s primary importance, leaving aside his effect on the welfare of others, is the same.” (Pg. 64-65)
He admits, “I believe there may be cases in which no legitimate solution to the problem of conflicting interests is available, so that parties are reduced to trying to impose their personally preferred solution by whatever power they may be able to muster---against the reasonable opposition of their opponents.” (Pg. 81)
He argues, “an egalitarian system would have to completely forget the idea… that the root of social injustice is exploitation---in the sense of a failure to reward people in accordance with their productive contributions or the true value of their labor. The defense of equality requires that rewards not depend on productive contribution, and in particular that some people receive much more of the social product than they contribute. People’s productive contributions are no unequal that the mere avoidance of exploitation would allow great inequalities of economic condition.” (Pg. 99)
He also asserts, “For some reason it appears to be harder to internalize the sense that advantages derived from the exercise of talent are in themselves morally suspect, on the ground that talent itself is a matter of luck… It is true, of course that your talents are an intimate part of you, and that any attempt by the state to prevent you from exercising and developing them would be intolerable… But the economic rewards which some talents are able to command, if properly developed, are another story. They cannot be said to be merited just because the recognition of excellence on which they are based is merited. To sever the connection between talent and admiration would be wrong. But to sever the connection between talent and income… would be fine.” (Pg. 113)
He concludes one chapter, “My conclusion … is that a strongly egalitarian society … [is] psychologically and politically out of reach… [But] Intolerance of severe poverty at least receives lip service … and it ought to be possible to develop it into insistence on a higher and higher social minimum, until it becomes intolerable in a rich society if anyone does not have a decent standard of living and a fair opportunity to go as far as his natural talents will take him above that.” (Pg. 128)
But in another chapter he contends, “I suggest… that this may justify a society in trying to adopt economic policies that permit such extremes. As things are, these luxuries are the concomitants of earned or inherited wealth. But even if inequalities of that kind could be rationally reduced, it would be desirable to permit in some other way the enjoyment of life at its upper boundaries by a few. While there may be no ideal way to distribute such opportunities, I believe no egalitarianism can be right which would permit haute cuisine, haute couture, and exquisite houses to disappear just because not everyone can have them.” (Pg. 138)
Whether one always agrees with Nagel, this is a thought-provoking book of political philosophy, and will be of key interest to students of such.
November 14, 2011
Now, this is a book with a rich political argument. Nagel tries to find a way to support the idea that equality and impartiality can build the society of the future.
What is always charming about Nagel is his clever writing, his intellectual humor and the methodic presentation of all the theoretical aspects of his argument.
What I really distinguish from this book is the chapter about utopia, the arguments about charity and benevolence, the strength of the imagination on the possible future society.
What tired me is the repetition of the central arguments in the peripheral chapters. But this is something quite common in the political science essays, especially on moral action and the like…
What is always charming about Nagel is his clever writing, his intellectual humor and the methodic presentation of all the theoretical aspects of his argument.
What I really distinguish from this book is the chapter about utopia, the arguments about charity and benevolence, the strength of the imagination on the possible future society.
What tired me is the repetition of the central arguments in the peripheral chapters. But this is something quite common in the political science essays, especially on moral action and the like…
May 8, 2018
This is my favorite work in philosophy (and Nagel is my favorite philosopher). I first read this book about ten years ago. I found it very dense and difficult but extremely rich and interesting, and have tried to reread it every one or two years.
April 2, 2023
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews