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Concealment and Exposure: And Other Essays
Thomas Nagel is widely recognized as one of the top American philosophers working today. Reflecting the diversity of his many philosophical preoccupations, this volume is a collection of his most recent critical essays and reviews.
The first section, Public and Private, focuses on the notion of privacy in the context of social and political issues, such as the impeachment of President Clinton. The second section, Right and Wrong, discusses moral, political and legal theory, and includes pieces on John Rawls, G.A. Cohen, and T.M. Scanlon, among others. The final section, Mind and Reality, features discussions of Richard Rorty, Donald Davidson, and the Sokal hoax, and closes with a substantial new essay on the mind-body problem. Written with characteristic rigor, these pieces reveal the intellectual passion underlying the incisive analysis for which Nagel is known.
The first section, Public and Private, focuses on the notion of privacy in the context of social and political issues, such as the impeachment of President Clinton. The second section, Right and Wrong, discusses moral, political and legal theory, and includes pieces on John Rawls, G.A. Cohen, and T.M. Scanlon, among others. The final section, Mind and Reality, features discussions of Richard Rorty, Donald Davidson, and the Sokal hoax, and closes with a substantial new essay on the mind-body problem. Written with characteristic rigor, these pieces reveal the intellectual passion underlying the incisive analysis for which Nagel is known.
- GenresPhilosophyEssays
253 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2002
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About the author
Thomas Nagel
79 books524 followersThomas Nagel is an American philosopher, currently University Professor and Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University, where he has taught since 1980. His main areas of philosophical interest are philosophy of mind, political philosophy and ethics. He is well-known for his critique of reductionist accounts of the mind in his essay "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" (1974), and for his contributions to deontological and liberal moral and political theory in The Possibility of Altruism (1970) and subsequent writings.
Thomas Nagel was born to a Jewish family in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (now Serbia). He received a BA from Cornell University in 1958, a BPhil from Oxford University in 1960, and a PhD from Harvard University in 1963 under the supervision of John Rawls. Before settling in New York, Nagel taught briefly at the University of California, Berkeley (from 1963 to 1966) and at Princeton University (from 1966 to 1980), where he trained many well-known philosophers including Susan Wolf, Shelly Kagan, and Samuel Scheffler, who is now his colleague at NYU. In 2006, he was made a member of the American Philosophical Society.
Nagel is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy, and has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation, the National Science Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. In 2008, he was awarded a Rolf Schock Prize for his work in philosophy, the Balzan prize, and the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters from Oxford University.
Thomas Nagel was born to a Jewish family in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (now Serbia). He received a BA from Cornell University in 1958, a BPhil from Oxford University in 1960, and a PhD from Harvard University in 1963 under the supervision of John Rawls. Before settling in New York, Nagel taught briefly at the University of California, Berkeley (from 1963 to 1966) and at Princeton University (from 1966 to 1980), where he trained many well-known philosophers including Susan Wolf, Shelly Kagan, and Samuel Scheffler, who is now his colleague at NYU. In 2006, he was made a member of the American Philosophical Society.
Nagel is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy, and has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation, the National Science Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. In 2008, he was awarded a Rolf Schock Prize for his work in philosophy, the Balzan prize, and the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters from Oxford University.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
June 2, 2010
In his essay "Concealment and Exposure," Thomas Nagel argues that we have come to include too much in the public sphere, and that it is necessary to return to a notion of more reticence in public (that is, more privacy). Nagel understands concealment or reticence not as deception, but as what is ignored or not brought to the foreground (7). Reticence serves certain social functions, including protection of the self, and the allowance of more intimacy with certain others to build personal relationships (9). According to Nagel, the public/private dichotomy works in two directions: keeping some stuff out of public, and keeping the self free of external gazes (15). Having too much of the private in public causes the problem of there being too much to discuss in public, and issues of real concern to the public cannot receive the attention they deserve, causing the destruction of civility (20).
In "Personal Rights and Public Space," Nagel argues that we need to understand rights as status, that is, what is morally attributed to a person as a member of a moral community (33). Having rights makes one inviolable, and we should understand rights as prohibiting what we can do to others (37). Nagel is unconcerned with whether rights are true, but argues that instead that moral arguments are not about what is true, but what is better — more likely because it makes a better world (39).
In "Personal Rights and Public Space," Nagel argues that we need to understand rights as status, that is, what is morally attributed to a person as a member of a moral community (33). Having rights makes one inviolable, and we should understand rights as prohibiting what we can do to others (37). Nagel is unconcerned with whether rights are true, but argues that instead that moral arguments are not about what is true, but what is better — more likely because it makes a better world (39).
December 18, 2022
Reviewing the title essay. I find a lot of Thomas Nagel's takes overblown, but I agree with his critique of the obsession with constant exposure. It's not actually revolutionary to make every detail of your life accessible to the world, that's just how social media squeezes clicks out of naive simpletons. He gives a vivid example: imagine that you and your beloved both know a secret. A partner has been systematically lying about infidelity, say. The other partner knows that this is the case. Too much exposure, or a premature disclosure, would kill any chance of saving the relationship. This would be a shame if the offending partner regrets their fuckup and wants to repair. Instead of rushing to a closure that would disappoint everyone Nagel suggests we let our treacherous loved ones get away with it, giving them a knowing wink. They still love us, and this way we will always have leverage for future arguments.
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March 25, 2009Just Chapter 1 and 18, which Nagel published and provided as an independent essay, accessible through his NYU Philosophy site.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews