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Other Minds: Critical Essays, 1969-1994
Over the past twenty-five years, Thomas Nagel has played a major role in the philosophico-biological debate on subjectivity and consciousness. This extensive collection of published essays and reviews offers Nagel's opinionated views on the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and political philosophy, as well as on fellow philosophers like Freud, Wittgenstein, Rawls, Dennett, Chomsky, Searle, Nozick, Dworkin, and MacIntyre.
240 pages, Paperback
Published June 3, 1999
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About the author
Thomas Nagel
81 books529 followersThomas Nagel is an American philosopher, currently University Professor and Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University, where he has taught since 1980. His main areas of philosophical interest are philosophy of mind, political philosophy and ethics. He is well-known for his critique of reductionist accounts of the mind in his essay "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" (1974), and for his contributions to deontological and liberal moral and political theory in The Possibility of Altruism (1970) and subsequent writings.
Thomas Nagel was born to a Jewish family in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (now Serbia). He received a BA from Cornell University in 1958, a BPhil from Oxford University in 1960, and a PhD from Harvard University in 1963 under the supervision of John Rawls. Before settling in New York, Nagel taught briefly at the University of California, Berkeley (from 1963 to 1966) and at Princeton University (from 1966 to 1980), where he trained many well-known philosophers including Susan Wolf, Shelly Kagan, and Samuel Scheffler, who is now his colleague at NYU. In 2006, he was made a member of the American Philosophical Society.
Nagel is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy, and has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation, the National Science Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. In 2008, he was awarded a Rolf Schock Prize for his work in philosophy, the Balzan prize, and the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters from Oxford University.
Thomas Nagel was born to a Jewish family in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (now Serbia). He received a BA from Cornell University in 1958, a BPhil from Oxford University in 1960, and a PhD from Harvard University in 1963 under the supervision of John Rawls. Before settling in New York, Nagel taught briefly at the University of California, Berkeley (from 1963 to 1966) and at Princeton University (from 1966 to 1980), where he trained many well-known philosophers including Susan Wolf, Shelly Kagan, and Samuel Scheffler, who is now his colleague at NYU. In 2006, he was made a member of the American Philosophical Society.
Nagel is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy, and has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation, the National Science Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. In 2008, he was awarded a Rolf Schock Prize for his work in philosophy, the Balzan prize, and the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters from Oxford University.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
October 31, 2009
This collection of essays is split into two halves, the first is reactions to what other people have said about the mind, and the second are reactions to what people have said about ethics. Mostly these are book reviews, and they are all very surgical in their dissection of where other philosophers are wrong. This makes for some pretty interesting reading, but I might have enjoyed the book more if I was better versed in the analytical tradition; instead I had very little first hand knowledge of many of the writers discussed, but I see where they have weaknesses in their arguments.
The first half of the book was very enjoyable. I still have no idea exactly what Nagel thinks about the mind/body problem, but I know that he doesn't like reductionist accounts of materialism. I still believe he is mistaken, but I also see where he doesn't believe that naturalists have done their job at proving yet that their solution works. I think that it's possible that part of the mind body problem is one of complexity, but what do I really know, and I'll back off of any real arm-chair theorizing for the moment.
The second half of the book I found less enjoyable. It served to remind me that I don't like ethics; even though I spend way too much time debating ethical/morality with myself and can almost paralyze myself with being unable to decide what to do and feelings of immense guilt at the smallest infraction of my own inner morality--I don't care to read about ethical systems. I've stated my own thoughts on what I think ethics should amount to in a previous review, but I'll restate it because I just thought of a new catchy little phrase for it; it could be summed up as a) the golden rule, but with b) don't be an asshole, and c) leave me the fuck alone and I'll leave you alone. I know that these are not the type of basis for a universal ethical system, and there is no grounding in fancy philosophical terms, or even much precision in the terms, but it's a much more workable system than Rawl's contracturalism -- I hadn't realized until today what this actually was, and it made me almost want to go buy a black mask and throw a flaming garbage can of dogshit through a McDonald's window. Liberalism has to offer something more than what amounts to an ignorant totalitarian lottery system; maybe I should read A Theory of Justice before passing judgment, but by the criticism in this book I felt like someone was seriously putting forward a philosophical justification for the most worthless society one could imagine.
I should learn more about something before I start running my mouth about it though.
The ethics part of the book had some interesting moments, but generally it didn't do too much for me. This book did offer quite a few things to think about, and made me wish I could pull apart peoples arguments with the skill that Nagel does.
The first half of the book was very enjoyable. I still have no idea exactly what Nagel thinks about the mind/body problem, but I know that he doesn't like reductionist accounts of materialism. I still believe he is mistaken, but I also see where he doesn't believe that naturalists have done their job at proving yet that their solution works. I think that it's possible that part of the mind body problem is one of complexity, but what do I really know, and I'll back off of any real arm-chair theorizing for the moment.
The second half of the book I found less enjoyable. It served to remind me that I don't like ethics; even though I spend way too much time debating ethical/morality with myself and can almost paralyze myself with being unable to decide what to do and feelings of immense guilt at the smallest infraction of my own inner morality--I don't care to read about ethical systems. I've stated my own thoughts on what I think ethics should amount to in a previous review, but I'll restate it because I just thought of a new catchy little phrase for it; it could be summed up as a) the golden rule, but with b) don't be an asshole, and c) leave me the fuck alone and I'll leave you alone. I know that these are not the type of basis for a universal ethical system, and there is no grounding in fancy philosophical terms, or even much precision in the terms, but it's a much more workable system than Rawl's contracturalism -- I hadn't realized until today what this actually was, and it made me almost want to go buy a black mask and throw a flaming garbage can of dogshit through a McDonald's window. Liberalism has to offer something more than what amounts to an ignorant totalitarian lottery system; maybe I should read A Theory of Justice before passing judgment, but by the criticism in this book I felt like someone was seriously putting forward a philosophical justification for the most worthless society one could imagine.
I should learn more about something before I start running my mouth about it though.
The ethics part of the book had some interesting moments, but generally it didn't do too much for me. This book did offer quite a few things to think about, and made me wish I could pull apart peoples arguments with the skill that Nagel does.
July 30, 2014
Not as good as I hoped. I liked his discussions on Searle, Nozick and Williams. I also had to skip pages due to boredom. I suppose that this is the flaw of a book that doesn't advance a particular argument, and consists of essays about the ideas of other people. If you're not interested in the ideas of those other people, then there's not much to see here.
July 15, 2022
4.5 stars.
Thomas Nagel is a professor of philosophy. I love his ideas because for once he communicates philosophy in a way that makes sense. However, as this is his thesis, it is very repetitive. Indeed, he discusses how subjective experience inhibits individuals from understanding through his notorious simile “What It Is Like To Be A Bat?” However, it was repetitious and often language was unnecessary and felt forced to fulfil a word count.
Thomas Nagel is a professor of philosophy. I love his ideas because for once he communicates philosophy in a way that makes sense. However, as this is his thesis, it is very repetitive. Indeed, he discusses how subjective experience inhibits individuals from understanding through his notorious simile “What It Is Like To Be A Bat?” However, it was repetitious and often language was unnecessary and felt forced to fulfil a word count.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews