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George C. Marshall #2
George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope: 1939-1942
WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME THE STATURE of General Marshall at home and abroad becomes increasingly clear. His definitive biography, of which this is the second of four volumes, provides information crucial to the study of our age. Much of the voluminous source material collected by Dr. Pogue was originally classified, but released by the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations expressly in order to make available the information needed for the writing of these volumes.
Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942, covers General Marshall's career from the day when he was sworn in as Chief of Staff of the United States Army (the same day on which Hitler sent his Panzer divisions rumbling into Poland) until the establishment of an Allied beachhead in North Africa.
Faced at the very outset by the overwhelming problem of safeguarding, in a world that was catching fire, the far-flung interests of his own peace-loving and undefended country, Marshall assembled helpers, exerted all his gifts of diplomacy, and labored early and late to build up this nation's defenses. As the flames of war drew nearer, Congressional opposition seemed to increase. Three months before Pearl Harbor there was a move to reduce the size of the Army.
And then, with the crippling of the Pacific Fleet, all the plans and calculations of the Chief of Staff came to grief. The way was open for Japanese expansion to the south, Hawaii was open to attack, the West Coast of the United States was vulnerable, and the means of sending aid to MacArthur in the Philippines ceased to exist.
This was the prelude to our part in World War II and to the strategy and the uneasy teamwork that brought victory to the Allies. Marshall's increasing role in the global effort is presented in vivid and colorful detail, often in his own forthright words. Caught again and again between the mercurial improvisations of Roosevelt and the granite stubbornness of Churchill, between the material requirements of England, Russia, and the Pacific and the needs of our own Army, Marshall became a touchstone of judgment and levelheadedness. He is seen here in all his public and private dealings with the other soldiers, statesmen, and politicians who shaped the course of the war.
Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942, covers General Marshall's career from the day when he was sworn in as Chief of Staff of the United States Army (the same day on which Hitler sent his Panzer divisions rumbling into Poland) until the establishment of an Allied beachhead in North Africa.
Faced at the very outset by the overwhelming problem of safeguarding, in a world that was catching fire, the far-flung interests of his own peace-loving and undefended country, Marshall assembled helpers, exerted all his gifts of diplomacy, and labored early and late to build up this nation's defenses. As the flames of war drew nearer, Congressional opposition seemed to increase. Three months before Pearl Harbor there was a move to reduce the size of the Army.
And then, with the crippling of the Pacific Fleet, all the plans and calculations of the Chief of Staff came to grief. The way was open for Japanese expansion to the south, Hawaii was open to attack, the West Coast of the United States was vulnerable, and the means of sending aid to MacArthur in the Philippines ceased to exist.
This was the prelude to our part in World War II and to the strategy and the uneasy teamwork that brought victory to the Allies. Marshall's increasing role in the global effort is presented in vivid and colorful detail, often in his own forthright words. Caught again and again between the mercurial improvisations of Roosevelt and the granite stubbornness of Churchill, between the material requirements of England, Russia, and the Pacific and the needs of our own Army, Marshall became a touchstone of judgment and levelheadedness. He is seen here in all his public and private dealings with the other soldiers, statesmen, and politicians who shaped the course of the war.
1 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1966
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About the author
Forrest C. Pogue
12 books13 followersForrest Carlisle Pogue Jr. was an official United States Army historian during World War II. He was a proponent of oral history techniques, and collected many oral histories from the war under the direction of chief Army historian S. L. A. Marshall. He also served for many years as the Executive Director of the George C. Marshall Foundation as well as Director of the Marshall Library located on the campus of Virginia Military Institute in Lexington, Virginia.
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
May 5, 2022
As the fifteenth Chief of Staff of the United States Army, George Catlett Marshall oversaw the transformation of the United States Army from a modest constabulary into an organization capable of waging war on a truly global scale. Though such a metamorphosis was due to the efforts of thousands of people working over the course of many years, as Forrest Pogue demonstrates in the second volume of his biography of the general and statesman Marshall’s contribution was key to the development of the Army into a force that would play a vital role in defeating the Axis powers and establishing the United states as a global superpower.
This was no small achievement, nor was it an easy one. As Pogue notes, Marshall would regard his two years of service as Chief of Staff before the war as the most difficult of his tenure, far more so than the four years he spent in the post during the war itself. Much of this had to do with the dimensions of the task before him. When Marshall took up the post in September 1939, the Army was both under-funded and under-strength, limited by postwar disillusionment and financial constraints. Nor did the outbreak of war in Europe suddenly change everyone’s thinking. As late as April 1940, members of Congress questioned the need to expand the ground forces, believing that the low-intensity “phony war” that developed after the fall of Poland was easily avoidable. Only after their invasion of Denmark and Norway made German intentions clear did Congressional opposition to spending for a larger force finally evaporate.
Yet Marshall gained his money at the expense of time. In short order he was expected to develop a fighting force capable of deterring or defeating any German threat. Nor did the now-expanded budget solve the Army’s problems, as Marshall had to cope with the competing need to support the British in their ongoing war against Germany for weapons production. Even more problematic was the widespread reluctance of many Americans to serve in the rapidly-expanding Army for one moment longer than they were required to by the draft, a sentiment to which many powerful politicians were sensitive. So how did Marshall surmount these challenges?
Pogue makes it clear that foremost among Marshall’s attributes was a Herculean work ethic, as he dedicated nearly every day to the duties of his office. To the task he also brought considerable diplomatic skill and a sensitivity to the limits of what was possible, enabling him to navigate skillfully the formidable politics that were part of his job. Finally, there was his eye for talent, as he had an extraordinary ability to identify men of ability and a determination to place them in the posts where they could make the best use of their skills. Often this meant promoting them over older men of longer service, many of whom Marshall knew personally. That Marshall was willing to turn friends into enemies in order to prepare the Army for what lay ahead is perhaps the best evidence of his determination to succeed in his mission.
These efforts, though, were outpaced by events. Pogue spends a considerable amount of space detailing Marshall’s role in the events leading up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, with the goal of rebutting the claims that he was part of a conspiracy to bring the United States into the war. Nevertheless, Pogue acknowledges the limits of Marshall’s conceptualization of the Japanese threat, noting that he overestimated the Army’s Hawai’ian defenses and underestimated the ability of the Japanese to attack him. The months that followed were especially tragic, as Marshall watched with despair as the Army units stationed in the Philippines were defeated by the Japanese. Yet this did not deflect him from his commitment to the “Germany first” focus adopted before the war, as he worked strenuously to launch a second front in France as early as 1942. Though Marshall was frustrated in this by the British (whom, as Pogue notes, would have borne the brunt of such an early effort), by the end of America’s first year of the war he could look with hope to the victories he knew would soon come.
Benefiting from interviews with Marshall and his contemporaries as well as considerable archival research, Pogue’s book serves as an effective monument to his subject and his achievements as Chief of Staff. Though focused on detail, it provides more analysis of its subject than Pogue’s previous volume, Education of a General, which helps to explain Marshall’s motivations and the thinking underlying them. While further analysis would have made for an even better book, given Pogue’s proximity to many of the key figures he describes he may have felt a little too constrained to offer the sort of judgments the facts he describes seem to demand, Nonetheless, his book is a valuable resource on both Marshall and his achievements, one that will likely remain required reading on the general for many years to come.
This was no small achievement, nor was it an easy one. As Pogue notes, Marshall would regard his two years of service as Chief of Staff before the war as the most difficult of his tenure, far more so than the four years he spent in the post during the war itself. Much of this had to do with the dimensions of the task before him. When Marshall took up the post in September 1939, the Army was both under-funded and under-strength, limited by postwar disillusionment and financial constraints. Nor did the outbreak of war in Europe suddenly change everyone’s thinking. As late as April 1940, members of Congress questioned the need to expand the ground forces, believing that the low-intensity “phony war” that developed after the fall of Poland was easily avoidable. Only after their invasion of Denmark and Norway made German intentions clear did Congressional opposition to spending for a larger force finally evaporate.
Yet Marshall gained his money at the expense of time. In short order he was expected to develop a fighting force capable of deterring or defeating any German threat. Nor did the now-expanded budget solve the Army’s problems, as Marshall had to cope with the competing need to support the British in their ongoing war against Germany for weapons production. Even more problematic was the widespread reluctance of many Americans to serve in the rapidly-expanding Army for one moment longer than they were required to by the draft, a sentiment to which many powerful politicians were sensitive. So how did Marshall surmount these challenges?
Pogue makes it clear that foremost among Marshall’s attributes was a Herculean work ethic, as he dedicated nearly every day to the duties of his office. To the task he also brought considerable diplomatic skill and a sensitivity to the limits of what was possible, enabling him to navigate skillfully the formidable politics that were part of his job. Finally, there was his eye for talent, as he had an extraordinary ability to identify men of ability and a determination to place them in the posts where they could make the best use of their skills. Often this meant promoting them over older men of longer service, many of whom Marshall knew personally. That Marshall was willing to turn friends into enemies in order to prepare the Army for what lay ahead is perhaps the best evidence of his determination to succeed in his mission.
These efforts, though, were outpaced by events. Pogue spends a considerable amount of space detailing Marshall’s role in the events leading up to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, with the goal of rebutting the claims that he was part of a conspiracy to bring the United States into the war. Nevertheless, Pogue acknowledges the limits of Marshall’s conceptualization of the Japanese threat, noting that he overestimated the Army’s Hawai’ian defenses and underestimated the ability of the Japanese to attack him. The months that followed were especially tragic, as Marshall watched with despair as the Army units stationed in the Philippines were defeated by the Japanese. Yet this did not deflect him from his commitment to the “Germany first” focus adopted before the war, as he worked strenuously to launch a second front in France as early as 1942. Though Marshall was frustrated in this by the British (whom, as Pogue notes, would have borne the brunt of such an early effort), by the end of America’s first year of the war he could look with hope to the victories he knew would soon come.
Benefiting from interviews with Marshall and his contemporaries as well as considerable archival research, Pogue’s book serves as an effective monument to his subject and his achievements as Chief of Staff. Though focused on detail, it provides more analysis of its subject than Pogue’s previous volume, Education of a General, which helps to explain Marshall’s motivations and the thinking underlying them. While further analysis would have made for an even better book, given Pogue’s proximity to many of the key figures he describes he may have felt a little too constrained to offer the sort of judgments the facts he describes seem to demand, Nonetheless, his book is a valuable resource on both Marshall and his achievements, one that will likely remain required reading on the general for many years to come.
November 13, 2024
This second volume of four is a big improvement over volume One. Probably most of the difference comes from the much more interesting work in which Marshall was involved -- the vast and difficult job of getting a next-to-disarmed US Army ready for what was ahead. Pogue's writing isn't exciting but it's clear and the book moves along smoothly. The first-person interviews that inform much of the research is illuminating.
The first year of WW Two probably is the least-known period of the war but that doesn't mean it wasn't worthy of a being thoroughly studied. This book contributes a great deal.
The first year of WW Two probably is the least-known period of the war but that doesn't mean it wasn't worthy of a being thoroughly studied. This book contributes a great deal.
November 13, 2019
Forrest Pogue's second entry into his series of books on Marshall's life was an excellent read. It started up where the previous book left off, where Marshall had become chief of staff and examined how Marshall ran his crew and how he was forced to essentially reform the bureaucracy and inner mechanics of how it functioned, always trying to make it more efficient. The book really picked up however when the Japanese began to rear their heads and become a looming threat for the Americans in the Pacific. I really appreciated how Pogue examined just how unprepared the Americans were for the attack and any overall preparation for a fight against the Japanese in general. The book also examined how the chain of command and miscommunication had led to the actual disaster that would be Pearl Harbor, where Marshall would eventually be brought before the War Department when they looked into how was ultimately responsible for the disaster, where Marshall naturally took the blame.
The book then progresses into the entry of America into the Second World War and the relationship between Marshall and MacArthur who respected each other immensely and after having read Eisenhower already and two other MacArthur biographies it was nice to see the perspective. Overall the book was very interesting, largely dealing with bureaucracy while also getting to know Marshall a bit better during these years. I did find that pogue did tend to lionize Marshall at times, in one case comparing him to the Roman general cinncinnatus. He did this solely based on the fact that when they were not at war, both were in the garden. All the same, I look forward to the next entry into this book series which will take place when operation Torch is well underway.
The book then progresses into the entry of America into the Second World War and the relationship between Marshall and MacArthur who respected each other immensely and after having read Eisenhower already and two other MacArthur biographies it was nice to see the perspective. Overall the book was very interesting, largely dealing with bureaucracy while also getting to know Marshall a bit better during these years. I did find that pogue did tend to lionize Marshall at times, in one case comparing him to the Roman general cinncinnatus. He did this solely based on the fact that when they were not at war, both were in the garden. All the same, I look forward to the next entry into this book series which will take place when operation Torch is well underway.
March 2, 2018
A continuation of Forrest Pogue’s amazing series on George Marshall. In this volume, the reader follows the campaign that Marshall carried out to prepare the United States military for war. He did so in the face of determined opposition from his own countrymen and government. As the flames of world conflagration were growing in Europe and the Pacific, America clung desperately to the dream of neutrality and isolationism.
Almost every attempt Marshall made to grow, train, and equip our fighting forces met resistance. The obstacles confronting Marshall arose from a combination of traditional American fears of militarism, a preference for austerity in the wake of the Great Depression, and partisan politics.
After their first meeting, Field Marshal John Dill of the British Imperial General Staff initially thought that Marshall was insufficiently focused on “matters of strategy.” However, Dill failed to recognize the enormity of Marshall’s domestic task in building a military capable of waging modern war. He did not have the luxury of devoting the balance of his time and energy to policies around the world. But it would be Marshall’s success in his efforts at home that would contribute to Allied victory more than any other action. He would turn more and more to global strategy in the coming years to great effect.
Marshall made many mistakes, but he confronted them with integrity and an eye to correcting the problems rather than assigning blame. He struggled to balance his preference (and need) to empower subordinate leaders with the reality that the organization and experience of the US War Department and the General Staff was inadequate in many important areas. As he came to fully appreciate the shortcomings, Marshall adjusted his actions appropriately. An example was the deliberate approach Marshall took to growing the capability of General Hap Arnold’s Staff to serve as the foundation for a future independent US Air Force service staff.
Again, the common theme of identifying talent and promoting the right leaders is evident. That was Marshall’s greatest accomplishment: recognizing those commanders who would be essential in fighting the war against the Germans and Japanese. A great book from cover to cover.
Almost every attempt Marshall made to grow, train, and equip our fighting forces met resistance. The obstacles confronting Marshall arose from a combination of traditional American fears of militarism, a preference for austerity in the wake of the Great Depression, and partisan politics.
After their first meeting, Field Marshal John Dill of the British Imperial General Staff initially thought that Marshall was insufficiently focused on “matters of strategy.” However, Dill failed to recognize the enormity of Marshall’s domestic task in building a military capable of waging modern war. He did not have the luxury of devoting the balance of his time and energy to policies around the world. But it would be Marshall’s success in his efforts at home that would contribute to Allied victory more than any other action. He would turn more and more to global strategy in the coming years to great effect.
Marshall made many mistakes, but he confronted them with integrity and an eye to correcting the problems rather than assigning blame. He struggled to balance his preference (and need) to empower subordinate leaders with the reality that the organization and experience of the US War Department and the General Staff was inadequate in many important areas. As he came to fully appreciate the shortcomings, Marshall adjusted his actions appropriately. An example was the deliberate approach Marshall took to growing the capability of General Hap Arnold’s Staff to serve as the foundation for a future independent US Air Force service staff.
Again, the common theme of identifying talent and promoting the right leaders is evident. That was Marshall’s greatest accomplishment: recognizing those commanders who would be essential in fighting the war against the Germans and Japanese. A great book from cover to cover.
April 22, 2021
The Reality of the Politics of War - Military vs Politicians
This book will the give the reader the sense of frustration that General Marshall had to incur during his teams build up to World War 2. The build of war strategy of US vs England. The differing philosophies of war planning and short, mid-term and long term plans, tactics and strategies. General Marshall's constant effort on keeping President Roosevelt on point with his US war planners and military vs. Churchill's influence of UK wants and needs. The constant second guessing of England's Alan Brook. This WW2 history book is one of the finest I have read. A great read.
This book will the give the reader the sense of frustration that General Marshall had to incur during his teams build up to World War 2. The build of war strategy of US vs England. The differing philosophies of war planning and short, mid-term and long term plans, tactics and strategies. General Marshall's constant effort on keeping President Roosevelt on point with his US war planners and military vs. Churchill's influence of UK wants and needs. The constant second guessing of England's Alan Brook. This WW2 history book is one of the finest I have read. A great read.
April 8, 2023
Superb continuation to the first volume, showing the time of his initial appointment as Army Chief of Staff to the end of 1942, the "end of the beginning" of World War II. It shows his knack for picking good men (Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley) and his insistence they handle their actions, not expect him to make every decision. He expected his officers to not be yes men, but to push to get their mission accomplished. It also shows his ability to handle the egos and other peculiarities of the men he had to deal with, e.g. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral King, General MacArthur, etc. Can't wait to get to Volume 3
February 27, 2015
The second of a four book series on Marshall is much like the first, it provides a lot of back story and Detail to historical events leading up to Pearl Harbor attacks and our foray into WWII. It's my opinion that some of the detail included is unnecessary to relate the history of the times and Marshall's role as an actor in it. However, the book is well worth the read to those who enjoy reading about history and this influential figure of his time.
I would also recommend Thomas Rick's book "The Generals".
I would also recommend Thomas Rick's book "The Generals".
March 6, 2013
Lengthy, but provides deep insight into the heart of an amazing leader.
January 7, 2014
lengthy, but full of insight and back story. It's been my back burner book for a while and I'm glad to have finished it. Now two more books in the four volume set.
August 10, 2014
This book was recommended in one of the "Bookmarks" magazine's issues of either: (Nov/ Dec 2007) or (Jan/ Feb 2008).
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews