War and Change in World Politics

by Robert Gilpin

War and Change in World Politics introduces the reader to an important new theory of international political change. Arguing that the fundamental nature of international relations has not changed over the millennia, Professor Gilpin uses history, sociology, and economic theory to identify the forces causing change in the world order. The discussion focuses on the differential growth of power in the international system and the result of this unevenness. A shift in the balance of power - economic or military - weakens the foundations of the existing system, because those gaining power see the increasing benefits and the decreasing cost of changing the system. The result, maintains Gilpin, is that actors seek to alter the system through territorial, political, or economic expansion until the marginal costs of continuing change are greater than the marginal benefits. When states develop the power to change the system according to their interests they will strive to do so- either by increasing economic efficiency and maximizing mutual gain, or by redistributing wealth and power in their own favour.

Genres: International Relations, Politics, War, Political Science, Nonfiction, History, Academic

288 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1999

Reviews

[Trav · Rating 3 out of 5]

An interesting take on the way in which change is managed in the international system. Of note, Gilpin wrote this in 1981 and it is therefore focused on the world order built primarily upon US/USSR competition. The end of the Cold War resulted in a peaceful yet revolutionary "Systemic Change" in the international system, now with the increasing integration of Europe and the rise of China we are presented with another potential systemic change in the coming years. What is most interesting about this change is that it appears to be following the line of argument put forward by Gilpin. The US retrenchment as part of its military rebalancing and the clearly excessive costs of maintaining US hegemony are clear indications, at least according to Gilpin, of an impending challenge to international system. As he points out, this does not mean that the US will lose its status as number 1, rather it means that it may. Either way, if Gilpin is right the US can expect some pain ahead.

[Allie Gallagher · Rating 2 out of 5]

I had to read this for a class. If you like very specific political science theory maybe you will like this. I think he makes some valid arguments, but also this book is very boring and sometimes Gilpin is problematic (it was the written in the 80’s). His whole thing is that the hegemonic cycle has always been a thing and will always be a thing, but in the epilogue he mentions that other systems could happen. For that specific reason I gave this 2 stars instead of 3.

[Jed · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the book I most agree with and that has probably influenced my thinking the most in regards to well "War and Change in World Politics". Gilpin is more a classical realist rather than a pseudo-scientific neorealist. His examples are interesting and diverse and his view of hegemonic change is dynamic and comprehensive.

[Demetrios Georgalas · Rating 5 out of 5]

when the elephants fight,the grass get trampled. (Giplin1981,pp186-210)

[Emily Cruz · Rating 3 out of 5]

I had to read this book for a college course and felt it was an extremely difficult read. It seemed to put me right to sleep every time I picked it up.

[Liquidlasagna · Rating 1 out of 5]

The Wild Amazone and the High Chaparral

The Weakness of Hegemonic Realism

Robert Gilpin's work is the best-known and most influential within the Hegemonic Realist paradigm. Hegemonic Realism is a school of thought which views International Relations as organized hierarchically, with each state vying for the top position in order to gain the benefits of being the number one state.

In Gilpins' words "Throughout history a principal objective of states has been the conquest of territory in order to advance economic, security, and other interests".

War occurs when a rising state challenges the current hegemon, and seeks to overtake the priviliged postion.

On the other hand, when one state is firmly in control, they institute a stable economic system which tends to keep the peace.

There are serious problems with Hegemonic Realist theory, however, as well as Gilpin's own version of it.

The first is the deductive logic behind the theory. Surely Gilpin is correct when he asserts that states have always sought conquest and territorial expansion.

However, he is wrong about the motive. States seek security above all.

Economic interests are not a main motive.

Wars generally cost more than they could possibly gain in monetary terms. Major wars are especially costly, and no state would seek a major war with huge losses in order to gain a top position.

Rather, states start wars to protect themselves from potential destruction.

There are also major empirical problems with this theory, in that there really hasn't been a case of a rising power starting a war with the current hegemon. Part of this is due to the fact that Hegemonic theory only looks at the two strongest states, factoring out all the other Great Powers.

But in a Multipolar system, the other states matter as well.

Hegemonic Realism, for all its flaws, has made one major contribution to scholarship: The concept of state power as changing rather than fixed, as well as the concept of future expectations of power trends. This concept has been incorporated by Dale Copeland in The Origins of Major War. Other than that however, Gilpin and his colleagues have little to offer.

Eric Gartman

[Max · Rating 4 out of 5]

Obviously a classic. Very perceptive application of economic model building to neorealist IR theory and the core insights strike me as quite relevant today. The main ideas are so so sharp, every few pages you are confronted with the profound. Some issues though. Many case studies are overly Eurocentric and do not hold up well. He also doesn't make it clear enough when he's going off on ponderous tangents or continuing the argument (e.g. anything involving the Toynbee). Gilpin is also a cold warrior and his biases sometimes get the better of him. Biggest criticism though is his confusing concept of prestige. It often feels like he's describing a particular kind of male pride, and though this is undoubtable true in describing many regimes motivations, it renders his argument less universal than he claims.

[grace · Rating 5 out of 5]

most enjoyable book i’ve read for poli sci. written wholly enjoyably and understandably. like even if he’s not always on-target, he just writes very well— inspiring as someone learning academic & legal writing. he gotta be the elena kagan of poli sci. most political science academia seems to use either ridiculous round-about prose, or unreadable technical boring jargon, so this was honestly a delightful change. and even if his ideas aren’t always correct or i agree with them, i love the way he presented information. the mixture of historical comparisons and economic theory was very engaging. i’m only a sophomore so maybe im off-base and others are doing better than he is— but i just thought this was incredibly refreshing!

[Louis König · Rating 3 out of 5]

Whilst the idea that HST alone can explain the cycle of international politics has lost most of its persuasiveness by today, Gilpin‘s careful analysis still unearths important dynamics and is a must read for anyone wanting to understand Hegemony, Empire, and War.

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a great book despite being written in 1981. The insights he brings to the world order and how international politics work is astounding. His survey over hegemons combined with rising and falling powers could not be more prescient today. Although, this could and will be said many centuries after as there will always be great powers, some rising and others falling. It's interesting that he wrote this well before there was any talk of China or Japan for that matter, rising and taking over the top spot in the world causing disruption. I was particularly interested in his views on what options exist for both the dominant power and the rising power. It is a stark view but probably correct in the end.

[Raj Agrawal · Rating 5 out of 5]

[Disclaimer: This is a snapshot of my thoughts on this book after just reading it. This is not meant to serve as a summary of main/supporting points or a critique – only as some words on how I engaged with this book for the purposes of building a theoretical framework on strategy.]

Gilpin builds on Waltz’s third image by focusing on the idea of self-interest as the primary motivation for states in the international system. His presentation of economics is a bit more flexible than Waltz’s, as Gilpin allows for technology, organization, foreign policy, position in the international structure, and other factors to affect the value of a state’s economic investment toward gain. He also believes in a more defensive/balanced existence of the international system, where equilibrium is the natural condition and disequilibrium is the more costly, affected condition. States will affect equilibrium only if it appears to be in their advantage (interest) to do so, where the perception is an overall net gain (or at least, no net loss). As a result of the self-interest of states, the international system has been and will be in constant flux, where great powers will seek even greater power, thereby overextending themselves in an effort to maintain their position, and ultimately being rebalanced into a new order. Despite technology and progressiveness, power will remain the primary control mechanism. Prestige (authority) also plays a significant role according to Gilpin, which often is the primary control mechanism during equilibrium. States will likely feel compelled to use violence to regain a perceived loss of prestige.

Gilpin provides an effective defense for why the state remains the foundational unit in the international system, but allows for flexibility where non-state actors may play such a role. What is most significant is that the distribution of power (among states) is “the principal form of control in every international system” (29). This is important, as it justifies the need for states to maintain the ability to project power in some form – most recognizable as violence; however, Gilpin allows for some flexibility in that interpretation as well. Nevertheless, power demonstrated as violence may very well remain the most effective means to wrestle with other states to gain an advantage in the international system. Once that gain has been established, however, the long-term cost of maintaining this new position may overextend the new leader, creating further tension, loss of prestige, and eventually, loss of power. From my point of view, this may be true, but only if a state reaches beyond its strategic culminating point in an effort to gain an advantage. If a state is able to prioritize its resources in such a way as to understand its strategic limitations, and know when to “cut its losses,” it may be possible to wrestle an advantage while retaining enough of a reserve to maintain its new position through to a new state of equilibrium.

The author makes it quite clear that his theory is not predictive, especially due to the nature of a state’s internal dynamics. This is a significant departure from other realist theorists, especially Waltz himself. While Waltz accounts for the state in his second image, he tends to focus primarily on solving for his third image. Gilpin allows for unpredictability within the state and its external behavior within the international system, while discussing the theory of politics through the lens of self-interest via efficiency.

[Kw Estes · Rating 3 out of 5]

Gilpin proposes a realist (read: somewhat pessimistic) account of the way in which power is employed by and transferred among hegemons in the world political system. The basic takeaway, at least to myself, would seem to be that no matter how invincible a hegemon might seem in its time of glory (ie the US in the decades immediately after WWII), nature will take its course, the hegemon's global responsibilities will exceed what it can afford to expend, its citizens will lose their martial spirit, and some new power will take its place, generally through a great (read: horrendously destructive) war.

Gilpin attempts to use a good deal of economic lingo in his work, and as far as this is necessary to make the point that hegemons tend to rack up duties more quickly than they can expand their economy to pay for them, one wishes he would just say this and refer the reader to appropriate economics texts.

In the end, Gilpin's account rests on the realist premise that, though the particulars of world politics might change--new states may come about through nationalist separatism; women may begin to be adequately represented at the head of governments, etc.--the overall pattern of hegemonic rule and transition will not change anytime soon. Great wars will continue, despite the belief of some that the nuclear age may have provided the deterrence mechanism. While there is no denying that Gilpin is right in that state power still has an important place in world politics, possibly still the foremost place, it is difficult not to take issue with the fact that implicit in his account is the theory that our current system is somehow inherent in the human condition. Can there really be anything natural in the billiard-ball conception of the world? Don't people and the actions that they take separate from the state matter?

[Emil Milanov · Rating 5 out of 5]

Refreshing in its sweep and depth, "War and Change" tackles some of the most complex questions in IR as a field of study. Gilpin's take on change is different from that of most contemporary authors. Some of the implications of his conclusions for this second decade of the 21st century are troubling, indeed... All the more reason for both students and practitioners in the field to read it.

[Chase Parsley · Rating 4 out of 5]

A gem covering a broad sweep of political science. The cold war stuff is a bit dated but does not detract from a enlightening and wonderful read. Also, I wish Gilpin would explain each hegemonic power over history more - calling the Dutch and Portuguese hegemonic powers along with Great Britain in the 1800s warrants some conversation, etc.

[Victor Wu · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a far more scholarly, theoretically developed version of Allison's "Thucydides' trap". Gilpin's main goal is to develop a dynamic, as opposed to static, approach to international politics that accounts for the rise and fall of powerful polities over time.

[Nanto · Rating 3 out of 5]

Buku awal yang menjadikan Gilpin identik dengan Hegemonic Stability theory, khususnya the declining perspectives.

[!Tæmbuŝu]

KOBOBOOKS

[Claire Leavitt · Rating 5 out of 5]

Another not-just-for-political-scientists read. If all academic tomes were this good, Nicholas Kristof wouldn't be writing articles about the so-called irrelevance of our discipline.