In his book The Four Cardinal Virtues, Josef Pieper lays a critical foundation for the understanding of the cardinal virtues as seen through the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Pieper lays out very directly where he is going in his Thomistic explanation of the cardinal virtues and the moral life. In his treatise of prudence, for example, Pieper explains the primacy of prudence in relation to the moral virtues and the ethics of man. Prudence has to be primary because that is what the moral life (and subsequently prudence) is all about – doing the good. Pieper not only shows that prudence disposes practical reason to discern the true good in every circumstance and to choose the right means of achieving it, but that all good is prudent; and therefore that all virtue is necessary prudent (p. 5). His logical display of all virtue as prudent is logically followed by the proposition that all vice and sin is thus imprudent.
Pieper’s demonstration of the virtues of prudence is helpful in further understanding Aquinas and the moral life. Pieper does so by clearly demonstrating the relationship of the virtues of prudence: memory, solaria, and a sort of providential foresightedness working intertwined together with the will. This, naturally, for Pieper is ontologically how the growth of the virtue of prudence in Aquinas is brought about (p. 14-17). This is further illumined with the vices of prudence. Pieper demonstrates that for Aquinas first and foremost there is a type of imprudence where something is lacking in the quality of a particular act. He shows how Aquinas discovers that these acts have their origin in unchastity – surrendering to the power of the goods of the sensual world, which splits decision making in two (p.19). This will make even more sense in Pieper’s treatment on temperance. Pieper then goes on to state that cunning (astutia) is the most characteristic form of false prudence in the human person. Thus the proposition that there cannot be any false or crooked ways leading to the proper end goal; that, for Aquinas, not only the end of acts have to be in accord with truth but the means as well. Thus reason, formed by the reality of the truth, must not be blocked by cunning in the means to getting to true and proper ends.
And so, for Aquinas the role of prudence in the moral life cannot be over emphasized. For it is prudence alone, according to Aquinas, which Pieper says is in accord with reason (p. 24). An example that Pieper gives from Aquinas to help demonstrate this is to imagine a man who is temperate in his sensual appetite and yet does not have prudence in his reason, then the temperance, de facto, would fail to be a virtue. This idea further shows the primacy and foundation of prudence in the thought of Aquinas. Thus whatever we do, prudence is the virtue of doing an act well or rightly, or as Aquinas says, the right reason of doing (p. 29).
There is more one could say on the role of prudence in the thought of Aquinas, especially the relationship concerning supernatural prudence, that is, prudence affected by grace and the theological virtue of charity. This would require a further treatise on charity and the supernatural life. Suffice it to say, even supreme supernatural prudence, according to Aquinas, can only have the following aim: to make the more deeply felt truth of the reality of God and world the measure for our will and action (p. 40). According to the scriptures, the man who acts in truth acts in light (Jn 3:21).
As Pieper moves along the hierarchy of moral virtues, he and Aquinas come to justice next. Simply speaking, justice is the habit to give to God and to man what is his due. But it follows that if one presupposes that man is to give to others their due, it means that man by his nature has things that are in fact due him. In the moral and social realm we call these rights. Thus the interplay of justice and rights. Pieper does a good job here of laying out the foundational principle that rights come before justice (p. 45). It is through creation and that the created being first comes to have rights. The right to life and all that surrounds it is our basic human right and it is receiving them that establishes justice. These rights are inalienable. Man has inalienable rights because, again, he is a created person by the act of God.
Pieper shows further how justice can only be discussed meaningfully if it is regarded in the context of a complete moral doctrine. Justice is one feature in what he calls in Aquinas the “sevenfold image of man.” The part of justice only becomes clear within the context of the whole. That as a part of man, justice is arranged toward the good, toward the other, it directs man in his relationship with others (p. 54). Justice, simply speaking, deals with living with others (p. 56). Thus just as only the prudent man can be virtuous in relation to himself and others, so too can only the just man acquire the prudence to live bravely and temperately in the world for the common good of all.
This leads Pieper to unpack the various relationships of justice as found in Aquinas. There is a broader meaning of justice: that it is just to do the good for the sake of the common good. This is known as legal or general justice. For Pieper this is a salient insight because justice thus cannot be on the same level as fortitude or temperance (p. 59). And since justice exists because of objective truth, the mean of justice consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the external person (p. 63). Thus the good of reason shines more brightly in justice than in and of the other moral virtues; justice is closer to reason. Indeed, the good of reason consists in justice as its proper effect – giving further insight to justice’s relations to prudence and the moral life (p. 66-7¬). For it is not enough for us to do the just thing but to be just. Here we see the elucidating of being over doing, and a more complete truth of the moral and virtuous life.
Justice is said to rule in a community (state) when these three fundamental relationships are disposed in their proper order: the relations of individuals to one another (communicative justice); the relations of the social whole to individuals (distributive justice); and the relations of individuals to the social whole (legal justice). The brilliance in the way Pieper shows the interrelationship and depth of all these kinds of justice is the ability to see the depth of meaning in things. We see how we human being are configured towards right order and that when we damage and destroy this order, such as by committing an injustice, we not only damage others but counterintuitively harm ourselves even more.
Fortitude and temperance are, in a sense for Pieper, the practical living out of the moral life in the world by the prudent and just man (p. 125). To be brave, for Pieper, is at its heart not only of battle, but of martyrdom. It is fortitude that gives one the strength to die for the faith. Consequently, as Pieper observes, it is often forgotten in this day and age as a virtue, fortitude carries with it a positive relationship to (just) anger (p. 130). This is the passion that motivates a person to the willingness to attack evil and is thus a virtue.
Temperance is the fourth virtue. Today, temperance is associated with bodily pleasures, but the classic view of temperance included spiritual temperance as well, such as the virtue that regulates the desire for knowledge being studiositas as compared to the pathological need for sense perception which is the vice of curiositas (p. 198 - 199). It is a worthwhile exercise to read the section on temperance to see how moderate Aquinas is when it recognizes that virtue is the means between two antipodal vices. Even a disordered turning toward the goods (e.g. sensuality) of the world is not necessarily a mortal sin if it does not involve a turning away from God (p. 173). Even fasting can be a sin if done to strenuously because it is against reason to overtax nature (p. 183). To the Moderns of Pieper’s day, who can only imagine an either/or world – either all sexual activity is good or we face a world of totalitarian repression by a Puritanical-Jansenist-quasi-Manichean world view – would benefit from seeing the nuance that comes from looking at the world as if it had three dimensions. This as opposed to two, with two being polar extremes and the third being a large area lying near the mean between the extremes, as Pieper does. Pieper helps us to see that virtue and the moral life is not primarily about the knowing but is about “being,” understanding and choosing according to a reality of God who exists outside ourselves.
Personal Reflection
I think Pieper gives a good and an overall accessible read into the world view of Aquinas. This is brought about, no doubt, from Pieper’s long study, contemplation, and life experience. It is the kind of book on virtue which I would wish to write myself. It is a marvelous compendium of ancient truth, which will reward greater study.
After reading it I of course have a better sense of the cardinal virtues, but especially of how Aquinas sees them contextually. How he sees them fitting together so nuanced that they all relate to the others in such a way that it really does make one see the whole picture of the human person. I found prudence especially true in this regard. I had always taught my students in the past that prudence is the form of all the moral virtues, that it’s the charioteer of all the other moral virtues. But after reading Pieper I see more clearly how it is the preeminent virtue, how it is truly fixed on reality, the reality of God and his relation to the whole human person. I really appreciate how he helped show me so clearly the true nature of the virtues and how he distinguishes them from the counterfeit virtues which society labels by the same name. I am struck by how particularly good Pieper is at showing how counterfeits of these virtues are in fact Manicheaistic in nature, often showing disdain of the body, etc. An example is when he cites Aquinas as saying that in paradise the pleasure which man derived from the sexual act would have been greater rather than impaired by an over-spiritualism.
Pieper’s work does bring up questions about the role of grace and the moral virtues. While he does touch on this to some extent, it seems his work on grace and the theological virtues from his book of the same name, which I’ve read sections of in my undergrad days, is a necessary companion to his work on the cardinal virtues for one to get a full view of Christian ethics and the moral life, etc. His work also raises further questions on what role mystery and mysticism plays in the moral life, answers which can be found, I know, in his works on contemplation. Also, I did think his chapter on distributive justice is a bit dense and over extended. One could tell that it is clearly written as a response to modern Communism and Marxism. His chapter on chastity is also clearly written, and rightfully so, over and against casuistry. It would be interesting to see how Pieper would rewrite them for today’s world views on society and the human person. Perhaps this will be my task in and for the future.